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Abstract
The Ph.D. thesis chronicles the establishment and history of the Defense Intelligence Agency under
its first director, Lt. General Joseph Carroll, from 1961-1969. Based on published works, archival
materials, declassified documents, and interv iews w ith cognoscenti, the thesis explores the creation of
the agency in the context of the historical propensity to consolidate common military functions under
the auspices of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Although the intelligence function of the
military departments resisted this trend for ov er two decades al ter the Second World War, by 1960 the
perceived failures of military espionage made the consolidation of this function ineluctable. Impelled
by the recommendations of the Joint Study Group, in 1961 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
concluded that the creation of a potent military intelligence agency was necessary to meliorate the
strategic estimate process — which he believed to be flawed and ineffectual — through the centralization
of military espionage activities. The military leadership was av erse to this design, alternately favoring
the establishment of a weak coordinating body as a means to preserve the autonomy of existing
military structures. After fervent debate, the DIA was eventually created as a compromise between
both factions. The thesis argues that the history of the agency, its successes and failures. largely has
been the result of the dialectic between both v isions of the agency. Caught between the dissimilar,
often competing, requirements and expectations of its two masters -- the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and the Joint Staff -- the agency strove to forge its identity, establish and preserve its
autonomy, and secure the resources necessary to fulfill its responsibilities. It was an arduous,
frequently contentious struggle In its first year of existence, the agency's efforts to consolidate and
manage military contributions to strategic intelligence estimates were opposed in Washington by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and in the field by the theater commanders. As a consequence, the authority of
the inchoate agency was diminished: its jurisdiction restricted. The thesis details the exploits of the
DIA in the Cuban missile crisis of 1662. Although the missile crisis was in many ways a rite of
passage for the DIA, the work notes that the agency displayed a troubling propensity to conform its
intelligence analyses in accordance with the operational preferences of the military leadership.
Surveying the performance of the agency in the Vietnam conflict, the thesis concludes that this
predilection was reinforced. The causes of this analytical subservience arc explored. The influence of
the agency on policy deliberations ov er intervention, and the subsequent course of the air and land w ar
in Southeast Asia arc examined. The agency's shifting assessments of the sustained bombing
campaign of North Vietnam — codenamcd Rolling Thunder -- are chronicled; as is the consequent
disillusionment of Robert McNamara. In exploring the role of the agency in the infamous 1967 order
of battle dispute, the thesis demonstrates that the agency was unable to challenge the intelligence
estimates of the military command, despite considerable evidence that the estimates were erroneous.
The work concludes that the performance of the DIA in its first eight years was marked by timidity and
pliancy. Reflecting the principle that intelligence is a function of command -- subordinate to plans and
operations — the Defense Intelligence Agency w as not able to surmount its heritage and truly direct the
military intelligence community as its founder had intended.
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What Came Before
The origins of this dissertation lay in a 1990 thesis submitted for a M.Sc. in American Espionage
(Department of History, Faculty of Arts, the University of Edinburgh). Entitled "The Triumph of
Parochialism and Bureaucracy: Robert S. MeNamara and the Birth of the Defense Intelligence
Agency," the short work (some 18,000 words) surveyed published secondary sources (and some primary
sources, notably those materials collected by the Declassified Document Reference Service) to chronicle
the establishment of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). In so doing, the work presented several
themes that are developed m detail in this dissertation. First, the thesis dismissed the prevalent notion
that the DIA was established in response to the perceived failure of military intelligence in the Bay of
Pigs fiasco; instead asserting that the organization was primarily a result of the organizational
propensity to consolidate traditional military functions within the Defense Department. Second, the
thesis argued that Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Secretary of Defense pursued disparate objectives
in creating the agency. Whereas the military leadership was principally concerned with preserving the
prerogatives of the military departments, Robert McNamara was committed to meliorating the strategic
intelligence estimative process. This disparity of purpose resulted in conflict over the structure and
mission of the proposed agency. Finally, the thesis concluded that the JCS ultimately prevailed in this
dispute, establishing the agency in accordance with its desires as a weak organization largely
subordinate to existing military institutions.
The M.Sc. thesis w as later published in truncated form in the anthology North American Spies:
New Revisionist Essays. [Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones and Andrew Lownie (eds.). Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1991.]
The first two chapters of this Ph.D. thesis explore the preconditions and precipitants of the creation
of the agency in far greater detail, employing new documentary evidence to explicate on the
aforementioned three themes. The use of new primary sources — much of it derived from the National
Security Files of the John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Libraries, the Military
Reference Branch of the National Archives, and Freedom of Information Act requests — allows the
author to reconstruct the historical proclivities and events which influenced the evolution of the
military intelligence community and the creation of the DIA with unprecedented accuracy.
Consequently, w hile the discussion of the evolution of the military intelligence community between
1947 and 1960 and the historical trend toward centralization in the Defense Department presented in the
first chapter roughly parallels that of the thesis, the interpretation is more refined; based on historical
evidence of greater accuracy and reliability. The role of the U-2 Affair and the missile "gaps" in the
creation of the agency are given added prominence; the examination of the influence of nascent nuclear
doctrine and the declining hegemony of the Air Force on the debate is newel. The second chapter
contrasts civilian objectives in intelligence reform -- the reorganization of the United States
Intelligence Board to provide improved management capabilities and putative national estimates for
strategic planning and budgetary purposes — with those of the military. The .ICS proposal for the
creation of a Military Intelligence Agency is examined in unprecedented detail, as arc the suspicions of
the Secretary of Defense and his staff. The narrativ e demonstrates that in the end, the DIA was created -
- despite the wishes of Robert McNamara -- as a creature of the JCS: subject to the compelling
influences of established military institutions. The remainder of the Ph.D. thesis chronicles the
consequences of this conception.
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Introduction
The Defense Intelligence Agency
Established in 1961 by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, the Defense Intelligence Agencj
(DIA) was an ambitious attempt to centralize the prodigious espionage activities of the Department of
Defense without destroying the autonomy of the intelligence elements of the military departments.
Heralded as the most significant organizational development in military intelligence since World War II.
the agency was publicly directed to challenge the waste and redundancy which had long imperiled the
nation's defense efforts.
These aims prosed to be unattainable. Since its inception the DIA has been widely condemned for
a multitude of failutes. Successive government-sponsored reviews ot the American intelligence effort -
- notably the Whittcn Report (1968), the Fitzhugh Report (1970), the Schlesingcr Report (19?!), and
the Final Reports of the Church and Pike Committees (1976) -- censured the DIA for its inability to
fulfill its mission: its failure to allocate resources efficiently and reduce the duplication of effort w ithin
the defense intelligence community. The Pike Committee went so far as to recommend that the agency
be abolished.
In spile of this repeated disapprobation, to date the DIA remains the preeminent organization within
the American military intelligence community. Its duties are extensive. The agency is responsible for
coordinating the contributions of the military sen ices to national intelligence products, in support of
the strategic requirements of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the Unified
and Specified (U&S) Commands (that is, the theater commands). Accordingly, the DIA is charged with
coordinating military input to National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and Special National Intelligence
Estimates (SNIEs), the vital threat assessments which arc the foundations of American strategic force
planning decisions and crisis management. The organization is responsible for setting military
policies and procedures in the intelligence collection process, performing imagery analysis on foreign
military capabilities, and managing and operating the international Defense Attache System.
Additionally, the agency is tasked with "planning, reviewing, coordinating, and evaluating" all the
intelligence programs and activities of the American military intelligence community, including the
preparation of a consolidated defense intelligence budget (the General Defense Intelligence Programs
budget, or GDIP). The latter function is particularly important when one considers that the intelligence
activities of the Department of Defense (DOD) consume over ninety percent of the total funds allocated
for the American intelligence effort, currently estimated to be in excess of thirty billion dollars per
annum.'
1 New York limes, "The CIA Club Needs a Cleanup," 30 September 1994 (A30:1).
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Curiously, scholars and journalists have all but ignored the DIA. What little information there is
available in the public domain is scattered and fragmentary. The agency typically receives cursory
review in works which survey the American espionage community, or is mentioned merely incidentally
in studies of the more palpable Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)." Outside of the armed forces,
defense intelligence has been conspicuously neglected, despite the fact that the military intelligence
effort is far more extensive (and expensive) than that of the civilian agencies. A venerable metaphor is
apt: the tree (that is, the CIA) has been scrutinized at the expense of the forest. My thesis is a modest
attempt to redress this situation.
The work attempts to recount the most promising years of the DIA, from 1961 to 1969, when the
agency was still in its youth. The period of inquiry was selected for several reasons. First, it coincides
with the tenures of its creator Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and its first director General
Joseph Carroll. Both men significantly influenced the agency in its formative years. Second, the
relative continuity of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations provides a stable context to explore the
ev olution of the agency: for the most part, the key protagonists and institutions that influenced the
DIA remained in power throughout this period. Third, the declassification of many important
government documents from the these years allows the author to reconstruct a cogent, if incomplete,
documentary record of cv ents. The recent declassification of myriad documents relating to the Vietnam
conflict and the Cuban missile crisis -- two events examined in detail in this work -- facilitate
historical research. In contrast, the documentary record accessible to scholars for the subsequent years
of the Nixon administration (1969-1974) is meager and fragmentary, presenting formidable obstacles to
historical inquiry . Fourth, since the thesis contends that many of the failures and deficiencies of the
agency are a product of its peculiar birth, it is appropriate to explore the establishment and first years
of the agency with thoroughness.
The thesis is seminal in that it is the only comprehensive scholarly history of the DIA in
existence. The work collects, refines, and explicates upon the scattered work of prev ious authors,
mining new primary source material and incorporating broader historical perspectives. It attempts to
supply a balanced account of why and how the agency was formed, how it has performed over the
years, and why it has attracted so much criticism.
Its originality lays further in its methodology and interpretation. The work is unprecedented in its
use of primary source material -- some neglected in the past, some newly-discovered -- to chronicle the
early years of the DIA. The prcponderanee of this material is in the form of declassified government
documents from the United States Congress, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the
Executive Office of the President (and the National Security Agency), the CIA, and the military
departments and related agencies. They were garnered from departmental histories, CIA historical
studies, executiv e branch inquiries, the Declassified Document Reference Service, commercial
2 Illustrative of this treatment arc William Corson, The Annies of Ignorance: The Rise of the
American Intelligence Empire. New York: Dial Press, 1977, p. 386; and Thomas Ross and Dav id
Wise, The Invisible Government. New York: Vintage, 11)64, pp. 212-17. N.B. At first reference in
the thesis, w orks and materials receive full citations. Subsequent references arc limited to author, short
title, and page numbers, in the interest of economy. Complete citations arc, of course, provided in the
bibliography.
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microfilm collections, and trial evidence and testimony. The material was collected through the
National Library of Scotland, the United States National Archives, the Library of Congress,
Presidential libraries (notably the John F. Kennedy Library and Lyndon B. Johnson Library), the CIA,
the Department of State, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military
departments, and the DIA. Many of the documents were public; some were until recently classified.
The latter were declassified at the request of the author through the provisions of the Freedom of
Information Act and the Mandatory Review process. Although declassification is frequently a long and
arduous procedure -- commonly requiring two years time and repeated correspondence -- on rare
occasions it yields surprising results.' In excess of 60,000 pages of printed material were re\ icwcd.
Memoirs and oral history collections were also consulted and compared with official documents.
Aware ofMorton Halperin's warning that "Bureaucrats rarely w rite w hat they sign, and rarely sign
what they w rite," the author interviewed present and former intelligence officials, policymakers, and
cognoscenti.4 Their insights and recollections prov ed to be inv aluable. Some confirmed ev ents and
interpretations; others suggested additional areas of inquiry . Many of those interviewed requested
anonymity. In respecting their wishes, they are cited only by profession. As the author's itinerary w as
often well-known, additional details — interview dates and places, organizational positions -- are
omitted as they would be rev ealing. The author interpreted these recollections with prudence, recalling
the words of the historian R. G. Collingwood:
Recollection is a treacherous guide . . . politicians [and historical actors] . . .
remember very well the impacts and emotions of crisis, but are apt, in describing the
policy they then advocated, to contaminate it with ideas that belonged in fact to a
later stage in their career. And this is natural; because thought is not wholly
entangled in the flow of experience, so that we constantly reinterpret our past
thoughts and assimilate them to those we are thinking now.5
3 In works on intelligence it is standard to lament the lack of access to archiv al material, much of
which remains classified after several decades of disuse. While I shall striv e to resist the temptation, I
will note that the John F. Kennedy Library and the Historical Office of the DIA are the most
intransigent archive and agency respectively. The former is still processing several requests by the
author submitted in 1989, with little hope on the horizon. The latter enjoys a similar predilection
toward procrastination: when asked about the seemingly interminable delays in responding to Freedom
of Information Act requests, a senior DIA official confided to the author: "As a general rule, the DIA
does not declassify. I know its the law, but that's our policy."
4 Quoted in Daniel Ellsberg, Papers on the Wxr. New York: Pocket Books, 1972, p. 77.
Halpcrin is a former Harvard professor and protege of Henry Kissinger. In a similar vein, the secret
Defense Department history of the Vietnam conflict concludes: "The lesson in this [the historical
study] is that the rationales given in such pieces of paper (intended for fairly wide circulation among
the bureaucracy, as opposed to tightly held memoranda limited to those closest to the decision maker),
do not reliably indicate why recommendations were made the way they were." The Pentagon Papers.
As published by the New York Tunes. Written by Neil Shcehan, Hcdrick Smith, E. W. Kenvvorthy,
and Fox Butterfield. New York: Bantam, 1971, p. xxiv.
5 Collingwood quoted in James Blight and David A. Welch, On The Brink: Americans and
Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Hill and Wang, 1989, p. 135.
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Finally, the author read and weighed myriad secondary sources, particularly those relating to the
evolution of American intelligence and the Defense Department. Many were read for historical context;
some for theme; others provided gems of information. In all, well o\ er 200 books and articles were
sun eyed for this thesis.
George Carver, a veteran of the CIA, once remarked "Intelligence is not written for history: it is
w ritten for an audience.'"5 The D1A performs for an audience of two: the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff. The needs and preferences of these organizations arc dissimilar.
The thesis attempts to explore the relationship of the agency to both of its superiors by examining its
efforts to prov ide strategic (as opposed to tactical) intelligence to each: intelligence w hich is
employed in the formulation of policy and military plans at the national and international lev els." The
emphasis on strategic intelligence is born of design and necessity: design because it illuminates the
political and bureaucratic influences on the agency; necessity because the bulk of the tactical
intelligence produced by the D1A remains classified and unavailable to researchers. By examining the
DIA's concurrent efforts to supply the Secretary of Defense and the the JCS with strategic intelligence,
we max discern much about the complex relationship between the producer and consumers of national
intelligence. This is important because in the end the agency must be judged in part by its success in
fulfilling the requirements of both superiors.
At times the work strays from a narrow recounting of the history of the DIA to explore broader
developments in the American intelligence effort. This is intentional. To understand and evaluate the
performance of the agency fully, it is often necessary to illuminate the context in w hich it functioned,
to explore the forces and ev ents that influenced the agency. Thus in the third and fifth chapters the
thesis details the ev olution of American nuclear doctrine to assess the impact on strategic intelligence
requirements; considerations that significantly influenced Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's
expectations on the inchoate DIA. Without the proper exploration of historical context, the actions of
the agency would be frequently inexplicable. Furthermore, the achievements and failures of the DIA
may be properly measured only by this expansive examination.
Although the thesis is primarily a work of historical scholarship, committed to verifiable
documentation and historical ev idence, it raises many issues relev ant to contemporary political policy.
Foremost among these is the relationship of intelligence to policy . Conventional wisdom holds that
the two processes should be independent, but recent writings have challenged this belief, arguing that
closer collaboration between both processes is necessary in order to ensure that intelligence is relevant
to the policies under consideration.8 Throughout its history, the DIA has been repeatedly accused of
committing the cardinal sin in intelligence analysis: tailoring its assessments to accommodate
political concerns, civilian and military. The experience of the DIA questions the proposition that
intelligence and policy can be separated, in spite of the best efforts of reformers to the contrary. Yet the
5 Quoted in Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA.
London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 217.
7
United States Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary ofMilitary Terms.
London: Grccnhill, 1990, p. 373.
9 A discussion of the evolution of intelligence theory may be found in Walter Laqueur, .4 World
ofSecrets: Hie Uses and Limits of Intelligence. New York: Basic, 1985, pp. 89-91.
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revisionists can not claim victory, lor the DIA also challenges their assertions by casting doubt on the
notion that close collaboration between the producers and consumers of intelligence is preferable. The
history of the DIA suggests that proximity promotes bias. It also demonstrates the perils of being
overly amenable to the demands of two superiors: that in striving to accommodate both, the agency
often satisfies neither.
Moreover, the w ork explores the value of pluralism versus consolidation in the intelligence effort.
This dichotomy is central to the problem of military centralization, and is especially germane to the
current political debate regarding the best means to reduce the American defense budget without
compromising national security. Consolidating reforms offer the promise of augmenting efficacy,
reducingredundaney, and clarifying lines of accountability, but increase the danger of the suppression
of dissent and the abuse of power. Pluralistic structures tend to be more flexible, providing greater
access to information and assuring a multiplicity of interpretation, but arc marked by duplication of
effort and by waste. The DIA was an early and ambitious attempt to bridge both seemingly-
contradictory organizational structures. As James Roherty remarked, the establishment of the DIA as
a consolidated military intelligence agency poses in microcosm many of the problems which have
plagued the consolidated Department of Defense." It forces the analyst to compare the \aluc of
pluralism and competition in the interrelated realms of statecraft and intelligence with the merits of
centralization and economy. In this regard, the history of the DIA is instructive, and may be useful to
future reformers struggling to find a practical compromise within this dichotomy, to plot a course
between Seylla and Chary bdis.
Finally, the history of the DIA sheds light on the role of organizational reform within the
American federal system. The agency is undoubtedly the most reformed mechanism in the intelligence
community (perhaps in all the Department of Defense), subjected to nine major reorganizations and
countless minor ones throughout its thirty-three year history. The ostensible pretext for
reorganizations has alw ays been the same: to reduce duplication of effort and achieve a more efficient
allocation of intelligence resources. While these claims arc accurate in part, they veil a deeper truth:
that reform is essentially an exercise of political power. As the sociologist Karl Mannheim noted, it
is a fundamental predilection of bureaucracy to turn all problems of politics into problems of
administration.10 In this regard, the intelligence community is no different from other bureaucratic
structures, concealing political decisions behind managerial rationale. The historian must be aware of
this propensity, for seen in this light the frequent reorganizations of the DIA are interesting not only
in the narrow sense of functional efficiency, but revealing as political conflicts betw een civilian and
military factions ox er the control of information xx ithin the gox ernment. The stakes in these conflicts
are substantial: as Senator Daniel P. Moynihan, a long-time member of the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, obscrxed, "Knowledge is poxxcr. and the ability to define what others take to be
knowledge is the greatest power." The history of the DIA is a compelling tale of the struggle for this
poxxcr. The xalue of the story lays not only in the talc itself, but in what the chronicle rexeals about
the motives and actions of other actors in the American political system.
9 James R. Roherty, The Decisions ofRobert S. McNatnara. Coral Gables, FL: University of
Miami Press, 1970. p. 89.
10 Mannheim quoted in Laqueur, A World ofSecrets, p. 93.
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Structure and Literature Review
Chapter One of the thesis demonstrates that the DIA was not, as some histories suggest, a
consequence of the "missile gap" or the Bay of Pigs fiasco.While both events contributed to the
establishment of the agency, they were not decisive. Rather, the powerful forces of organizational
centralization within the Defense Department produced the DIA. When \ iewcd in this light, the agency
may be properly seen not as an anomaly , but as the culmination of the historical trend to consolidate
common activities and functions of the military departments under the auspices of the Secretary of
Defense. Thus the first chapter offers a synopsis the evolution of the modern Defense Department
from 1947 to 196(1, detailing the consequences of increasing centralization on military intelligence.
Although the military departments were able to protect their intelligence components from the forces
of consolidation for some time, events in the late nineteen-fifties and nineteen-sixty -- notably the
bomber and missile "gaps" and the U-2 Affair -- compelled the Eisenhow er administration to examine
the possibility of integrating military intelligence activ ities. In 1960 the President conv ened the Joint
Study Group on the Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States to study this prospect. The
formation, deliberations, and recommendations of the Joint Study Group arc detailed in Lyman
Kirkpatrick, Jr.'s book The Real CIA. Kirkpatrick has been referred to as the "father of the DIA"
because he sen cd as chairman of the an inter-departmental Joint Study Group, w hose recommendations
for reform of the American intelligence effort served as the catalyst for the creation of the DIA. Of
particular interest is Kirkpalrick's contention that the DIA was an innovation consistent with the
centralizing reforms of the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act. 2 The contention is supported and
elaborated upon in the chapter. In the parlance of historians, amid the background of organizational
centralization, the "missile gap" and the U-2 Affair were preconditions for the creation of the DIA; the
report ofKirkpatrick's Joint Study Group w as the precipitant.
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara inherited the Joint Study Group recommendations in
1961. He interpreted the proposals in the context of his requirements for authoritative National
Intelligence Estimates for strategic and budgetary planning. McNamara viewed the creation of a potent
military intelligence agency as a means to fulfill these requirements and exercise central control over
the miscellaneous and sundry intelligence activities of the military departments. Where many studies
of the DIA have concentrated on the agency's endeavors to reduce redundancy and promote efficiency,
this work judges these efforts to be ancillary, and focuses on the real objective of McNamara in
establishing the agency: to centralize the production of strategic intelligence and manage military
11 Emblematic of this approach arc Glenn P. Hustedt (ed.), Controlling Intelligence. London:
Frank Cass and Co., 1991, pp. 35-37; Corson, Armies of Ignorance, pp. 386-91.
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Lyman Kirkpatrick, Jr., The Real CIA. New York: Macmillan, 1968, pp. 205-267.
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espionage operations.1' In this regard, the thesis refines and elaborates upon the insights of John
Marks and Victor Marchetti, Lawrence Frecdman, and John Prados. These authors highlight the
proposed estimative mission of the agency; namely, that McNamara intended the organization to
consolidate military representation on the United Stales Intelligence Board (USIB) in order to mitigate
the perceived biases of the armed sen ices in strategic intelligence assessments.11 This design was
vehemently contested by the military leadership, who were adverse to the diminution of the influence
of the military departments in the formulation of strategic intelligence. They favored the creation of a
weak military intelligence agency, which would coordinate rather than manage espionage acti\ itics. In
this, their aim was to preserve the autonomy and discretion of the intelligence components of the
military departments. Thus McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff embraced disparate concepts
regarding the authority and mission of the proposed agency; each strove to implement its preferences
according!y
Whereas past analyses of dispute between McNamara and the JCS over the DIA have viewed the
conflict as a pedantic, sterile argument over bureaucratic ends, the Chapter Tw o demonstrates that the
conflict was primarily political, concerned with organizational power and privileges. Simple put.
McNamara was anxious to seize control ox er the military intelligence process; the JCS w ere loathe to
relinquish it. In the end, in classic democratic fashion, a compromise was fashioned, wherein the
prerogatives of the intelligence elements of the armed sen ices w ere largely preserved, in exchange for
the promise of future USIB reform.!5 As a consequence, the DIA was created as a fragile craft, subject
to the powerful currents and tides generated by its potent masters, the Secretary of Defense and the
JCS.'-
Turning to the early years of the agency, there is, as prc\ iously noted, a dearth of historical writing
on the DIA. An unpublished manuscript by the present in-house DIA historian Deane Allen, "The
Defense Intelligence Agency : A 21-Year Organizational Overview," sheds some light on the early.
13 The role of the DIA in promoting efficacy and eliminating duplication is emphasized in Defense
Intelligence Agency, Historyof the Defense Intelligence Agency. 1985; Charles H Andrcgg, The
Management ofDefense Intelligence. Washington: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1968; and
USC (94/2) Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities (hereafter cited as the Church Committee). Final Report: Book I. Washington: GPO,
1976.
14 Victor Marchetti and John Marks, The CIA and the Call of Intelligence. Hodderand
Stoughton: Coronet, 1974, pp. 117,334; Lawrence Freedman, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet
Strategic Threat. London: Macmillan, 1977, pp. 23-25; John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: U.S.
Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1982, pp. 122-28.
15 Arnold Kantor w as the first to observe that the compromise was one-sided: "McNamara, who
w as more concerned about having to deal with conflicting intelligence reports — none of which he
trusted — than with improving the quality of military intelligence — which he despaired of — gave
control of the DIA to the Chiefs [JCS], and then proceeded to virtually ignore it." Arnold Kantor,
Defense Politics: A Budgetary Perspective. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975, p. 53-54.
16 The Final Report of the 1976 Church Committee stated: "In retrospect, a strong case can be
made that the DIA has never really had a chance. Strongly resisted by the military services, the
Agency has been a creature of compromise from the outset." Church Committee. (I) p. 350.
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affairs of the agency.'" However, as the work is principally an organizational history, concerned with
evolving structural and functional arrangements, its value to historians is limited. Similarly, Charles
Andregg's account of the first six years of the organization is primarily a managerial study,
highlighting functional consolidations and prospective efficiencies.18 An insider's perspective on the
agency can be found in the Patrick McGarvey's book, CIA: The Myth and the Madness. McGarvey, a
former DIA intelligence analyst, is highly critical of the agency, which he views as impotent and
ineffective. The work is rich in anecdotes and reminiscences; powerful in its condemnation of
bureaucratic self-interest masquerading as intelligence assessments.1" The work is a memoir, rather
than an institutional history, and as such is often fragmented and subjective. Yet it offers some
illumination for Chapter Three, which na\ igales largely uncharted waters in examining the first year
of the DIA's existence. This is a critical period for new organizations, for it is w hen identity is forged
and responsibilities are assigned. The chapter explores the formidable constraints placed on the agency,
both by fiat and circumstances, and the difficulties faced by General Carroll in surmounting them. It
also recounts McNamara's efforts to implement USIB reform, wherein the DIA was an indispensable
component, in spite of tenacious obstruction from the military departments. The consequences of the
internal and external restraints on the agency arc explored in the context of American intervention in
Southeast Asia in 1 PA 1-62. Here the chapter follow s in the footsteps of John Newman, w hose book
JFK and Vie!nam: Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle for Power chronicles the provenance of the
celebrated 1967 order of battle controversy; a contentious dispute which culminated in the landmark
case Westmoreland v. CBS. The chapter explores the DIA's recurrent acquiescence to the
manipulations of the field command. Finally, the chapter surveys the influence of Congressional
oversight on the inchoate intelligence agency.
Chapter Four chronicles the role of the DIA in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Although the
nuclear confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States has been the subject of
numerous symposia, books, articles and theses, concurrent American intelligence operations — with the
notable exception of the September and October 1962 U-2 reconnaissance missions -- have received
scant attention.21 This neglect was principally the result of sparse and fragmented documentary
evidence. However, recent events -- the opening of the Soviet Archives, the declassification of
American records, and several conferences of participants -- have provided researchers with a wealth of
1' Deane Allen, "The Defense Intelligence Agency: A 21 -Year Organizational Overview."
Comment Edition. 28 September 1983. Unpublished manuscript obtained by author.
'e SeeAndregg, The Management ofDefense Intelligence, pp. 11-12, 26-46.
19 Patrick McGarv ey, CIA: The Myth and the Madness. New York: Saturday Review Press,
1972.
29 John New man, JFK and Vietnam: Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle for Power. New York:
Warner, 1992.
21 The activities of the CIA and the National Photographic Interpretation Center before and during
the crisis arc recounted in Dino Brugioni, Eyeball To Eyeball: The Inside Storx of the Cuban Missile
Crisis. New York: Random House, 1990.
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evidence to reconstruct the crisis.22 Thus the chapter employs these new primary sources to recreate
and re-examine the actions of the American intelligence community throughout the crisis, for it is only
in this broad context that the performance of the DIA may be accurately recounted and evaluated.
Despite its omission from existing histories, the chapter argues that the influence of the DIA was
decisive in the discovery of the missiles. Thereafter the influence of the agency swiftly waned. This is
attributable to several factors, the most significant of which w as the rcasscrtion of prerogative by the
military departments. The work argues that the swift erosion DIA influence was a revealing and
prophetic incident. The flaws of the agency had come home to roost. Thus the poor performance of
the agency for the remainder of the crisis was a direct result of the organizational impotence; the
consequence of the bureaucratic compromise which created the agency.
Chapter Five examines the inability of the DIA to influence American intervention in Southeast
Asia and the strategic intelligence process. The amalgam of political and bureaucratic interests vv hich
led the United States to interv ene in Vietnam hav e been the subject of my riad histories of the conflict.22
In the preponderance of these works the DIA is absent. This is for good reason; the agency had only
marginal influence on policy deliberation. The chapter striv es to discover why. Draw ing heav ily on
previously overlooked primary sources, it argues that the inability of the agency significantly to affect
policy was a consequence of both internal and external censorship. In this regard, both the military
predilection toward optimism and the traditional subordination of intelligence to operational
requirements and preferences influenced the agency and its superiors. The narrative demonstrates that
the interests of the military leadership were more immediate -- by virtue of the placement and
composition of the agency — and typically prevailed over those of the Secretary of Defense. The
chapter displays the often extraordinary lengths the armed services went to in order to preserve their
preeminence over the DIA; resisting all attempts, however innocuous, to expand its authority and
jurisdiction. The fate of USIB reform is a particularly revealing example. Although the agency was
22 The recollections of a senior Russian general and official Soviet documents may be found in
Anatoli I. Gribkov and William Y. Smith, Operation Anadyr: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the
Cuban Missile Crisis. Chicago: edition q, 1994. The most recent documents declassified by the
United Stales government are collected in Mary McAuliffe (ed.), CIA Documents on the Cuban
Missile Crisis. Washington: CIA, 1992. Excerpts and evaluations of the conferences of participants
and scholars arc offered in Blight and Welch, On The Brink; Bruce Ally n, James Blight, and David
Welsh, Back to the Brink: Proceedings of the Moscow Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1992; James Blight. Bruce J. Ally n, and David A.
Welsh, Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse. New York:
Pantheon, 1993; and Gribkov and Smith, OperationAnadyr.
23 The most comprehensive bibliographic works are Lester Brune and Richard Burns, America
and the Indochina Wars, 1945-1990: A Bibliographical Guide. Claremont, CA: Rcgina Books, 1991;
Louis Pcake, The United Stales in the Vietnam Wcr, 1954-1975: A Selected, Annotated Bibliography.
New York: Garland, 1986; and Gary Hess, "Historians and the Vietnam War." Diplomatic History 18
(Spring 1994): 264-95. Relevant works on intelligence during the Vietnam conflict are Joseph A.
McChristian, The Role ofMilitary Intelligence, 1965-1967. Washington: GPO, 1974. Philip B.
Dav idson, Vietnam at War: The History: 1946-1975. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988; Bruce
Palmer, Jr., The Twenty-Five Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam. Lexington, KY:
University Press of Kentucky, 1984; James Gibson, The Perfect War: The War We Couldn't Lose
And How We Did. New York: Vintage, 1986. and Robert W. Komer, Bureaucracy at War: U.S.
Performance in the Vietnam Conflict. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986.
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explicitly created to consolidate military representation of the Board, the resolute opposition of the
military departments to this reorganization effectively prevented the agency from fulfilling its
assignment. Previous studies of the DIA noted that the agency met considerable resistance from the
military departments; chapter five rev eals the hitherto undisclosed depth and span of this recalcitrance.
The 1970 Fitzhugh Report observed that the DIA is in the difficult position of trying to serve two
masters whose intelligence needs are dissimilar."4 Chapter Six recounts the efforts of the DIA to
satisfy both the Secretary of Defense and the JCS during the controversial sustained bombing campaign
of North Vietnam from 1965 to 1967.25 As McNamara and his military advisors were divided over the
effectiveness of the campaign, the DIA found itself caught between the irreconcilable desire of the
military leadership for sanguine assessments and the increasing disillusionment of civilian
policymakers. The agency was powerless to mitigate the conflict, as it lacked the authority and
capabilities to effectively mediate. As the rift between its superiors grew, both came to distrust the
DIA, each suspecting that the agency was overly sympathetic to the other. Thus, for a time, the
agency was spurned by both those it was intended to serve. In recounting this tale, the chapter
employs numerous declassified documents and several organizational histories from the Defense
Department and the State Department, supplemented by interviews and oral histories. The
interpretation is, to the best of my knowledge, nov el.
Chapter Seven details the role of the DIA in perhaps the most infamous intelligence dispute of
the Vietnam era, the order-of-battle controversy of 1967. First made public in 1975 by the former CIA
analyst Sam Adams, the dispute centered on allegations that the American military command in
Vietnam under the leadership of General William Westmoreland had deliberately misrepresented the
strength of the enemy -- underestimating the number and capabilities of the communist insurgents to
support official claims of progress in the conflict -- to his superiors in Washington.The television
network CBS produced a documentary in January 1982 entitled "The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam
Deception" that embraced Adams' claims and asserted that General Westmoreland had conspired to keep
the true dimensions of the communist insurgency from the President and the American public. In
response, Westmoreland sued the network for defamation, resulting in the landmark case Westmoreland
v. CBS.2 Though Westmoreland ev entually withdrew the law suit on 18 February 1984, a week before
the case w as scheduled to go to the jury, in subsequent years many journalists and scholars hav e taken
24 Department of Defense, Report the the President and the Secretary of Defense on the
Department of Defense by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel [Fitzhugh Report], 1 July 1970, pp. 32-33.
25 A comprehensive account of the bombing campaign is prov ided in James Clay Thompson,
Rolling Thunder: Understanding Policy and Program Failure. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North
Carolina Press, 1980.
26 Samuel Adams, "Vietnam Cover-Up: Playing War With Numbers." Harper's (May 1975):
41-44, 62-73. Adams memoirs were published posthumously as Sam Adams, War ofNumbers: An
Intelligence Memoir. South Royal ton, VT: Steerforth Press, 1994.
27 The law suit produced a wealth of primary source material that, curiously, remains largely
untapped by historians. The sworn affidavits, depositions, trial testimony, declassified documents,
cables, correspondence, and notes total over eighty thousand pages. The are reproduced in the
microform collection Vietnam. A Documentary Collection: Westmoreland v. CBS, Walter Schneir
(cd.). New York: Clearwater Publishing Co., 1985 (Hereafter cited as Westmoreland). The most
balanced account of the trial is presented in Bob Brew in and Sydney Shaw, Vietnam On Trial:
Westmoreland vs. CBS. New York: Athencum, 1989.
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up the general's cause, asserting that the conspiracy allegations are exaggerated: that the controversy
was merely an honest difference of opinion between the CIA and the military intelligence community
over the ordcr-of-battle estimate.:s Most recently, the respected military historian James Wirtz
portrayed the incident as a largely pedantic disagreement between a recalcitrant Sam Adams and the rest
of the espionage community. Wirtz maintains that Adams employed a faulty methodology to generate
a spurious order-of-battlc estimate; an estimate repudiated, Wirt/, asserts, by the Tct offensive which
validated Westmoreland's assessment.'9 In exploring the role of the D1A in the dispute, this thesis
contests Wirtz's analysis by demonstrating that the conflict can be accurately viewed not as between
Sam Adams and the CIA against the rest of the intelligence community, but rather as Westmoreland
against the entire intelligence community. An examination of the assessments of the agency --
assessments that supported Sam Adams' claims — prov ides much-needed context for interpreting the
dispute. Moreover, the thesis demonstrates that the dispute was not over methodology, but
jurisdiction. Instead of an honest disagreement, it may be more accurately characterized as a struggle
over command prerogative. Finally, the thesis attempts to prove that far from repudiating Adams'
estimate, the Tel Offensive of 1968 substantiated it, so much so that the DIA was forced to abandon
the order of battle assessments championed by Westmoreland and his staff, despite considerable political
pressure to the contrary. The expansion of the scope of inquiry beyond the CIA and military command
in Saigon represents a new approach made possible by the exploitation of primary materials on a scale
not previously attempted.
Further Thoughts
In researching this work I attempted to adhere faithfully to Francis Bacon's celebrated exhortation
to: "Read not to contradict and confute, nor to believe and take for granted, nor to find talk and
discourse, but to weigh and consider." I must confess that upon embarking on this study, 1 held no
strong convictions regarding the US intelligence effort. Like many Americans, I believed (and
continue to believe) that the volatile international scene necessitated an efficacious intelligence
apparatus for the modern democracies. I v iewed the dispute as one of means rather than ends. I had
neither animosity nor sympathy toward my subject. I therefore attempted to approach my topic with a
combination of curiosity and detachment.
28 The most prominent works by journalists sympathetic to Westmoreland are Rcnata Adler,
Reckless Disregard: Westmoreland v. CBS el al; Sharon v. Time. New York: Knopf, 1986; and Don
Kovvett, A Matter ofHonor. New York: Macmillan, 1984. For a scholarly assessment see T. L.
Cubbage, "Westmoreland v. CBS: Was Intelligence Corrupted by Policy Demands?" Intelligence and
National Security 3:3 (July 1988): 119-180.
29 Sec James J. Wirtz, The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in Wcr. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1991. Wirtz's judgment of the order-of-battle dispute is summarized in James Wirtz,
"Intelligence to please? The order of battle controversy during the Vietnam War." Political Science
Quarterly 106 (Summer 1991): 239-263.
ZH
Yet I walk away with some firmly-held convictions regarding the American intelligence effort. 1
hesitate to call thent lessons, as the word connotes a sense of certitude I am loathe to embrace.
However, it is the nature of man to generalize, to strive to draw rigid conclusions from equivocal
experiences in an ephemeral world. I share these with the reader to make known my sentiments, which
undoubtedly influenced this finished work. For, in the end. honesty is the last refuge of the historian.
They run thus:
Ideas are important. They give life and shape to our needs and aspirations, influencing the course
of men and nations. Ideas motivate and inspire; we neglect them at our peril. Therefore this thesis
underscores the competing concepts regarding a consolidated military intelligence agency held by
civ ilian policymakers and military professionals in 1961. It argues that the DIA was created as a
compromise of between the disparate ideas of Robert McNamara and the military leadership over the
future of military intelligence. The history of the agency , its successes and failures, has been the result
of the dialectic between the opposing demands of both visions.
Structure matters, in intelligence organizations, as in other human institutions. Although in recent
years it has become fashionable to argue that organization is subservient to personnel — that a talented
staff can ov ercome the constraints of bureaucracy ("it's not the organization that's important, but the
people in it") — I contend that the proposition is specious.15 There is little doubt that indiv iduals,
through informal means, may occasionally surmount the obstacles of formal structure; nonetheless,
we must concern ourselv es not with the exception but w ith the rule. The rule is that people arc in part
products of their organizational position. Individual achievement is often dependent upon the authority
and resources w ith w hich to act. " Organizational structure can assist or impede individual efforts and
therefore the formal structure of the military intelligence community deserves attention and scrutiny.
Finally, leadership matters. Leaders must not only direct the daily operations of the agency, but
project a compelling vision of the mission, culture,and importance of their organization while securing
the required authority and resources. As the organizational theorist Norton Long remarked:
There is no more forlorn spectacle in the administrative world than an agency and a
program possessed of statutory life, armed with executive orders, sustained in the
courts, yet stricken with paralysis and deprived of power, an object of contempt to its
30 Illustrating this sentiment, Walter Laqueur remarks: "In last resort, more depends on the
integrity , the self-confidence, and the strength of character of the analysts than their bureaucratic
affiliation." Laqueur, .4 World ofSecrets, p. 90. Curiously, military officers are frequently
proponents of this perspectiv e, despite the fact that their chosen profession is dominated by structure
and hierarchy. Skeptics believ e that their argument is specious: that they are more concerned with
preserving the status quo than improving organizational performance. If they were removed from
Washington and its political env irons and giv en a field command under precarious circumstances, I
suspect that they w ould quickly abandon this argument and acknowledge the importance of formal
organizational structure.
31 Sec James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It.
New York: Basic, 1989, pp. 23-25. Also see James M Kcagle and David C. Kozak (eds.),
Bureaucratic Politics and National Security: Theory and Practice. London: Lynne Rienner, 1988, pp.
6-8.
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enemies and of despair to its friends. The lifeblood of administration is power. Its
attainment, maintenance, increase, dissipation, and loss arc subjects the practitioner
and student can ill afford to neglect."33
This is the proper realm of leadership.
It is the contention of this thesis that the DIA was deficient in all three: ideas, structure, and
leadership. The contradictions between the disparate civilian and military concepts of the agency w ere
never fully resolved, creating enduring confusion over the mission and responsibilities of the agency.
The awkward placement of the agency — reporting to the Secretary of Defense "through" the JCS — led
it to be overly attentive to the concerns of the military leadership at the expense of civilian
policymakers. Timid leadership repeatedly failed to secure the authority and resources needed by the
agency to establish credibility within the intelligence community and the federal hierarchy. As a result
by 1969 the DIA would be spurned by the very men and institutions that had created the agency only
eight years before.
32 Norton Long, "Power and Administration." Public Administration Review 2 (1949): 357.
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Chapter One
Antecedents
Centralization and its Opponents
Unlike the Greek goddess Athena, the Defense Intelligence Agency did not emerge from its creator
fully-formed. Rather, it was the imperfect product of historical forces, both idiographic and
nomothetic. The most significant of these was the intrinsic w eakness of the National Security Act of
]Q47, which laid the foundation for the modern Department of Defense. The Act created a military
establishment marked by inefficiency, duplication of effort, and an absence of central authority. In
response to these shortcomings, evident from the start, Congress enacted a series of amendments to the
1947 Act, designed to strengthen the power of the Secretary of Defense vis-a-vis the military
departments. The armed sen ices opposed such legislation, as they w ere averse to the consolidation of
pow er in the civilian Office of the Secretary of Defense. Nowhere was their opposition more intense
than in the realm of intelligence. The military departments had long coveted the autonomy of their
intelligence organizations, and fought off till attempts to submit them to outside direction. The
success of these efforts resulted in a American military intelligence effort that was fragmented and
duplicative. The disarray of military intelligence was highlighted by the bomber and missile "gaps" of
the nineteen-fifties and by the U-2 Affair of nineteen-sixty. These events led the Eisenhower
administration to establish the Joint Study Group in I960 to examine the operations and performance
of the American espionage system. The Group judged that the military intelligence organizations
lacked effective leadership and recommended the establishment of the D1A as a means to consolidate the
diverse military intelligence operations of the armed services under the direction and authority of the
Secretary of Defense. In effect, the bomber and missile "gaps" and the U-2 Affair finally prompted the
military intelligence agencies to confront the powerful forces of centralization, historical currents that
they had skillfully eluded in the past. The first section of this chapter examines the organizational
predilection tow ard centralization in the Defense Department, while the second offers a synopsis of the
evolution of the military intelligence community and explores how the military departments were able
to secure their intelligence elements from the threat of consolidation. The third section sketches the
organizational concerns of the Air Force, a powerful player in the government milieu that would
greatly influence the course of intelligence reform. The final section inv estigates the 1960 Report of
the Joint Study Group, the catalyst for the creation of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
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The Evolution of the Department of Defense, 1947-60
The origins of the Department of Defense are to be found in the National Security Act of 1947.
Signed on 26 July, this legislation was the culmination of an arduous two-year struggle over the future
of the American military establishment. The political contest pitted President Truman and the War
Department (represented by the renowned generals Omar Bradley, George Marshall, and Dwight
Eisenhower) against the Navy and its powerful allies in the United States Congress (notably, senators
Carl Vinson and Richard Russell, both of Georgia). Basing their arguments upon their experiences in
the Second World War, Truman and his allies were convinced that the armed forces of the United States
should be consolidated and fully integrated. A single military structure, they argued, would reduce
inter-service rivalry; thus augmenting coordination and facilitating efficiency.1 The Department of the
Navy and its benefactors viewed this proposal as unacceptable. Loathe to cede any of its considerable
autonomy, the Navy (supported by its scion, the Marines) favored the retention of the current system of
separate armed sen ices. Its cavalier attitude is best conveyed in the w ords of Admiral Ernest J. King in
1946, who had the unique distinction of having served the nation in the dual capacity of Commander-
in-Chief of the Atlantic fleet and Chief of Naval Operations (the two posts were normally discrete)
during the Second World War; "If the Navy's welfare is one of the prerequisites to the Nation's welfare
-- and I believe that to be the case -- any step that is not good for the Navy is not good for the
Nation."2
Spirited negotiations between the two factions ultimately produced an acceptable compromise. The
final legislation drew together the War, Navy, and newlv-formed Air Force departments under the
auspices of the "National Military Establishment" (NME) and the authority of the Secretary of
Defense. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, a titular coordinating committee established by an executive order
of the President in 1942, was given Congressional sanction and assigned as "principal military
advisors" to the President and the Secretary of Defense. ' Although the departmental status of the
military was downgraded, the separate identities of the armed services were preserved and their
autonomy was to a large degree maintained. Although theoretically the Secretary of Defense was
directed to exercise "general direction, authority, and control" oxer the military departments and take
appropriate steps the eliminate duplication and overlapping, in reality he lacked the means to do so.
He had little statutory power to compel the services to follow his lead. Lacking these means, he was
dependent upon the goodwill of the armed sen ices.4 Consequently, a loose form of federalism prevailed
1 Rohcrty, Decisions ofRobert S. McNamara, pp. 24-27.
2 Arthur T. Hadley, The Straw Giant. Triumph and Failure: America's Armed Forces. New York:
Random House, 1971, p. 81.
3 The provenance of the modern JCS can be traced to the pro forma Joint Army-Navy Committee
of the ninctecn-twenties. The committee was modified during the Second World War to mimic the
British Chiefs of Staff Committee. The National Security Act of 1947 denied the JCS operational
authority and a chairman. The 1949 Amendment appointed a non-voting chair.
4
Henry L. Trewhitt, McNamara. New York: Harper and Row, 1971, pp. 60-65.
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in the inchoate department, with a weak Secretary of Defense exercising a vague "general authority"
over the stronger military services. As Truman's shrew d political advisor Clark Clifford noted;
The flaws in this proposal were self-evident. It left real power in the hands of the
services and gat e the Secretary of the National Defense almost no real authority, but
this was the best the President could get at the time, and he decided to accept it."
The subsequent history of the Defense Department largely has been a talc of successive attempts to
remedy the deficiencies of the original 1947 Act by strengthening the authority of the Secretary of
Defense vis-a-vis the armed services. In the absence of strong central authority, the services became
mired in customary petty bureaucratic infighting; often subordinating the national interest to
organizational self-interest.6 In an attempt to stem the feuding, President Truman appointed the former
Wall Street investment banker James Forrestal as the first Secretary of Defense. A vociferous
opponent of military unification as the Secretary of the Navy in 1946, Forrestal fought relentlesslv and
successful!}' to dilute the authority of the Secretary of Defense over the armed services under ihc
pro\ isions of the 1947 Act. In a shrewd political move, Truman offered the combative Forrestal the
office he disdained. Forrestal, instrumental in creating the weak Secretary of Defense, had little choice
but to accept. Upon assuming office in 1947, Forrestal swiftly discovered that the post w as untenable;
it lacked the authority and resources to effectively manage the sprawling military establishment. After
a dramatic personal epiphany, in October 1948 Forrcstal informed President Truman that the NME w as
unworkable and recommended substantive reform. In response, Congress and the Truman
administration sought to strengthen the authority of the Secretary of Defense by enacting the 1949
amendment to National Security Act. Under this legislation the three military departments w ere
eliminated as executive departments and the Department of Defense was created (replacing the NME) to
embrace the services. Although the armed services continued to be administered by their respective
Secretaries, the} were now made directly responsible to the direction, authority, and control of the
Secretary of Defense. Despite this legislation, managing the Defense Department remained a Herculean
task. The strenuous demands of this post and a tempestuous personal life ultimately proved too much
for James Forrestal. On the night of 22 May 1948 he committed suicide." It was a tragic loss, and a
portentous commencement for the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
In subsequent years additional reforms effected greater centralization in military activities and
expedited the consolidation of power within the department into the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
In 1953 the DOD was reorganized by President Eisenhower (with Congressional approval) with the
intention of directing the focus of the Joint Chiefs of Staff away from their respective parent services,
5 Clark Clifford, with Richard Holbrtxrkc, Counsel to the President: A Memoir. New York:
Anchor, 1991, pp. 147-170.
6 Trewhitt, McNcunara, p. 65.
7 Townsend Hoopcs and Douglas Brinklcy, Driven Patriot: The Life and Times of James
Forrestal. New York: Vintage, 1992, pp. 446-68.
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towards their national responsibilities. Nonetheless, the 1953 reorganization failed to appease many
critics of the department. They believed that OSD required still greater power: it should possess
comprehensive and indisputable authority ewer the armed services. In a organization saturated with
waste and replication, critics claimed that the Secretary of Defense must be allowed to take active
measures to promote efficiency and eliminate duplication.8 For a lime such criticism w as disregarded;
a 1957 Air Force proposal for greater consolidation w as allow ed to languish due to fierce resistance
from the Navy.11 Yet the launching of Sputnik on 4 October 1957 revived the argument for further
centralization and served as a catalyst for the reforms of 1958.
Although the CIA had been warning the Eisenhower administration for over three years that the
Soviets were planning a satellite launch, the American public, unaware of Russian technological
advances, was shocked by the October Sputnik launch. It represented a clear challenge to the American
Cold War belief in technological superiority . This creed w as further shaken by the alarmist Gailher
Report (named after the chairman of the study group, H. Rovvcn Gailher) of 7 November 1957, which
predicted that the Russians would have 100 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in place by
early 1960. Amid growing public apprehension, and at the behest of President Eisenhow er, Congress-
passed a new amendment to the National Security Act, the 1958 Reorganization Act. Based on
Eisenhower's conv iction that "separate ground, air, and sea warfare is gone forev er," the planning and
execution of strategy and operations were shifted from the military services to the "mechanisms of the
Secretary of Defense and the JCS."1' Operational command was centralized w ithin the Office of the
Secretary of Defense: "unified" and "specified" (U&S) military commands were established and the
military departments w ere removed from the chain of command over operational forces.': The Act also
granted the Secretary of Defense greater authority to delv e into traditional service activities in order to
direct military research and dev elopment. Ov erall, the 1958 Reorganization further shifted the balance
of pow er in the Pentagon away from the sen ices, toward the OSD and the collectiv c JCS."
8 Keith C. Clark and Lawrence J. Legere, The President and the Management ofNational
Security. New York: Praeger, 1969, pp. 168-175.
9
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Although the 1958 Reorganization put the Secretary of Defense squarely in the military chain
of command dejttre, under the President and over the unified and specified commands, the defacto
command line runs from the President to the Secretary through the JCS by DOD directive (DOD
Directiv e 51(X). 1 Sec 11(c) [31 December 1958|). Accordingly, the JCS are transmitters, not
originators, of command orders. The concept appears muddled: How docs one issue clear and effective
orders to subordinates through a committee?
12 Provisions of the National Security Act and amendments arc giv en in Alice C. Cole, et a!.,
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The most significant and controversial provision of the 1958 Reorganization Act was the
McCormack-Curtis Amendment, which is section 202(c)(6) of the National Security Act (as amended).
It states:
(6) Whenever the Secretary of Defense determines it w ill be advantageous to the
Government in terms of effectiveness, economy, or efficiency, he shall provide for the
carrying out of any supply or serv ice activity common to more than one military
department by a single agency or each other organizational entities as he deems
appropriate.1'
The McCormack-Curtis Amendment was adopted by the House of Representatives during floor
action on the 1958 Reorganization Act on June 12, 1958. Prior to its adoption, its sponsor,
Congressman John McCormack. slated to the House of Representatives that it was intended expressly
to include the intelligence activ ities of the military departments.14 The McCormack-Curtis
Amendment was intended to give the Secretary of Defense the necessary authority to fulfill his legal
responsibilities, as staled in Section 202(c)( 1) of the National Security Act (as amended), "to take
appropriate steps (including the transfer, reassignment, abolition, and consolidation of service
functions) to provide in the Department of Defense for more effective, efficient, and economical
administration and operation, and to eliminate duplication."It allows the Secretary of Defense to
effect further centralization by consolidating common serv ice functions and placing them under the
direct control of the OSD rather than the indiv idual services. However, it is important to note that
such consolidation could only be implemented in the name of greater efficiency and the elimination of
duplication. Historically, Congress had resisted all attempts to integrate the American defense
establishment, insisting that the military departments not be merged. " Thus they were wary of any
proposal w hich might endow, inadvertently or otherwise, the Secretary of Defense with the unilateral
power to coalesce the serv ices. Consequently, the McConnack-Curtis Amendment was passed only
after extensive debate during which many congressmen were persuaded to endorse the proposal due to
their impression that it would bring about substantial sav ings in the procurement of common-use
military items.'" Future Secretaries of Defense, however, would interpret the amendment broadly (as
13 L;SC. Eighty-Seventh Congress, Second Session. House: Aimed Services Committee
Report: Special Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations. Washington: GPO. 1962, p. 6609.
(Hereafter congressional sessions will be specified number of Congress / number of session.)
14 USC (87/2) House Armed Serv ices. Report, p. 6597.
15 USC (87/2) House Armed Sen ices. Report, p. 6597.
15 USC (87/2) House Armed Services. Hearings: To inquire into agencies that had been created
or were being contemplated by the Office of the Secretary ofDefense. Washington: GPO, 1962, p.
6683.
17 USC (87/2) House Armed Services. Report, p. 6611.
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its sponsors had), employing the amendment to justify further centralization within the Defense
Department in the name of "greater efficiency" and the "elimination of duplication."1 ?
Two years after the McCormack-Curtis Amendment was passed by Congress, Secretary of Defense
Thomas Gates used the provision to create the Defense Communications Agency (DCA). Established
on 12 Ma\' 1960, the DCA was authorized to act as the single manager for all military long-haul,
point-to-point communications. Accordingly, the DCA was instructed to plan and execute the orderly
conversion of the disparate communications networks of the military departments into an integrated
Defense Department system, reducing costs in manpower and money in the future.19 The creation of
the common communications agency w as a historic ev ent: for the first time, the Secretary of Defense
had consolidated a military activity without the explicit approval of Congress. It marked the
emergence of a potent Secretary of Defense, wielding expansive powers and exercising broad discretion
in the execution of his duties. It was the very antithesis of the frail executive James Forrestal had
envisaged in 1947.
Therefore from 1947 to 1960 the trend within the Defense Department was toward the consolidation
and centralization of military activities under the auspices of OSD. The power and authority of the
Secretary of Defense w as repeatedly strengthened vis-a-vis the military departments and the focus of the
JCS was directed toward its joint responsibilities. Successive reorganizations, culminating in the 1958
Reorganization Act, gave OSD statutory control over virtually all Defense Department endeavors.
Since the "support" and "command" lines ran directly to the Secretary of Defense, he was able to exert
direct authontv over nearly all the activities of the military departments. Yet in 1960 military
intelligence eluded his grasp.
Military Intelligence. 1947-60
In spite of the centralization which was occurring within the Defense Department, throughout the
nincteen-fortics and -fifties military intelligence remained autarkic. While the National Security Act
of 1947 consolidated American civilian intelligence efforts under the aegis of the CIA, the military
departments were allowed to maintain control of their individual intelligence components in
recognition of their need for specialized tactical (that is, combat) intelligence. The presence of Soviet
military forces in the heartland of Eurasia and nascent Cold War tensions reinforced the argument of the
armed services that the retention of their independent intelligence agencies was necessary to ensure
accurate combat intelligence and enemy "order of battle" information. The merits of this argument are
considerable. Autonomous military intelligence components facilitate flexibility and insure
responsiveness to the disparate intelligence requirements of dissimilar serv ice missions. Despite the
negativ e consequences of this pluralism -- notably fragmentation, duplication, and parochialism -- a
18 By 1992, successiv e Secretaries of Defense would use this amendment to sanction the transfer
of most of the service activities to nine unified and specified commands and ten "superagencies." The
military serv ices eventually retained only training and logistic capabilities.
19 USC (87/2) House Armed Serv ices. Report, pp. 6598-99.
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strong case can be made for tolerating these costs for the sake of analytical competition, multiple
advocacy, and the prevention of the suppression of dissent.25 Pluralism, aibeit duplicative and
fractious, is an essential feature of liberal democracy. As the esteemed jurist Justice Louis D. Brandcis
observed in 1926, the American federal system was created "not to promote efficiency but to preclude
the exercise of arbitrary power.""1
However, one must also be aware (as the advocates of the bureaucratic politics model persuasively
argue) that the military departments, like all bureaucracies, arc driven by agency interests. The
acquisition and maintenance of organizational power are preeminent among these interests."
Independent military intelligence components allowed each armed sen ice to formulate enemy threat
assessments which frequently served to justify the desired departmental budget and allocation of
resources. "As they say in sen ice argot, mission motivates estimates.The loss of control over
their intelligence components was viewed as a direct threat to the autonomy of the military
departments and therefore was to be resisted. Thus appeals to the sublime democratic principle of
pluralism veiled simple organizational self-interest. The latter played a more prominent role in the
resolute opposition of the sendees to the consolidation of their intelligence components.
The National Security Act of 1947 created the Joint Intelligence Group (JIG), a small
interdepartmental body housed within the Joint Staff, ostensibly to provide greater military intelligence
coordination. However its limited size, lack of clear authority, and the institutional antipathy it faced
from the more powerful and established service intelligence agencies caused the JIG to be largely
ineffective. William Corson concluded:
The JIG represented the military's acceptance of an armistice-type organization in
which the various intelligence sen ices would agree to discuss problems of common
interest w ithout surrendering any of their perquisites, and cooperate with each other
beyond the strict criteria of self-interest.24
The CIA was not able to evolve into the potent arbitrator of the intelligence community, as
originally conceived. Opposition from the established military intelligence bureaucracies was too
strong; the incipient agency was too weak. Ultimately, the CIA became simply another intelligence
agency competing for the attention of policymakers (as the 1948 Dullcs-Jackson-Correa report
concluded).25 In the absence of central authority, the military intelligence community remained an
agglomeration of fiercely independent bureaucratic entities which looked to their parent service for
20 Laqueur.A World ufSecrets, p. 33.
21
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guidance rather than to the Secretary of Defense or the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). The
military fiercely fought off all attempts to centralize the intelligence effort. An Admiral who
personally witnessed this resistance recalled:
The resistance, in a good many cases, came from personal views or from people w ho
w ere in positions where they could see their importance undermined and the control
of certain areas given up. From a logical point of view, certainly nobody could
gainsay its advantage, but it's like a bunch of children playing ball. Everybody
w ants to be the captain and, in a good many cases, this was regarded as the first step
in doing away with individual intelligence agencies, that this was the over-all answer,
and that they would then lose what position they had in the intelligence
community.-6
Consequently, an American intelligence system developed that, in the words of former CIA deputy
director Admiral Rufus Taylor, resembled a "tribal federation."-" Each sen ice separately collected,
produced, and distributed intelligence for their own use. Each service was also responsible for
supplying its intelligence products to the OSD and other involved government entities. This
arrangement was characterized by inefficiency and duplication of effort, fostering, in the eyes of its
critics, an "extremely parochial approach in each sen ice's analyses of enemy capabilities."28 The CIA
simply lacked the bureaucratic power to overcome these centrifugal forces. Dispute among the
disparate agencies was common. This organizational conflict regularly inhibited the formulation of
unified intelligence estimates (or threat assessments) — a commodity increasingly demanded by
Washinglon pol icymakers.29
Tensions between the intelligence organizations were particularly conspicuous in deliberations over
the most ambitious American intelligence product: NIEs. Intended to be the most authoritative
statement on any given subject by United States intelligence, NIEs are "a strategic estimate of the
capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable intentions of foreign nations which is produced at the
national level as a composite of the views of the intelligence community."30 Produced under the
auspices of the DCI, these estimates were considered to be the most influential documents in the
formulation of national security policy; hence, they w ere frequently the subjects of controversy among
the espionage agencies.
In the early nineteen-fifties, DCI Gen. Walter Bedell "Bcedle" Smith overhauled the NIE process.
Although the estimates remained under the aegis of the DCI, responsibility for administration was
delegated to the newly-established Board of National Estimates (BNE). Composed of retired military
officers, former diplomats, and academics, BNE defined the terms of inquiry and drafted the estimates.
26 Transcript, Rear Admiral Samuel B. Frankel oral history interview, no date, by John T. Mason,
p. 268, United States Naval Institute.
27 Taylor quoted in Marchetti and Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, p. 109.
28 Marchelti and Marks, CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, p. 116.
29 Defense Intelligence Agency, History of the Defense Intelligence Agency, no page numbers.
30 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary ofMilitary Terms, p. 268.
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Staff work -- research, corroboration, and coordination -- w as performed by the Office of National
Estimates (ONE), w hich replaced the CIA's Office of Research and Evaluation. It was hoped that this
reorganization would mitigate organizational rivalry and expedite compromise." Commenting upon
the new system, the former intelligence analyst William Bundy (an official with ONE from 1951 to
1959) remarked:
The real contributors to the process were State, the military sen ices, and the CIA as
coordinator. Beetle [DCI Gen. Walter "Beedlc" Smith) established the principle that
thc\ would not waffle on an agreement. If someone didn't agree, OK, but Smith was
not going to fudge his language to produce mush. The Estimate w as the Estimate of
the director of central intelligence. Disagreement could be footnoted. It did not
happen most of the time, but on the Soviet Strategic Estimate the army and air force
would always disagree with each other. Their appropriations hinged on it. Human
nature hasn't been repealed, and G-2s (the intelligence chiefs of the armed services]
were seldom powerful enough not to reflect their service point of view. If the
Estimate said the Soviets were building six hundred heavy bombers, the army w ould
disagree; if it said tw o hundred, the air force would disagree.
The JIG was not in a position to adjudicate these disputes among the military intelligence
organizations. In addition to suffering from insufficient authority and resources, it had more
compelling responsibilities. For the JIG found itself in the derisory situation of having to serve two
onerous masters -- the OSD and the JCS. The needs of the two bodies were dissimilar: the JCS tend
to be more concerned with battlefield (that is, tactical) intelligence, while the OSD requires national
(that is, strategic) intelligence. These forms of intelligence differ primarily in lex c! of application,
although they may also vary in terms of scope and detail. Despite some overlap, strategic intelligence
tends to be more capacious: it transcends the exclusive competence of a single sen ice or agency."
Hence the needs of the Secretary of Defense for political and economic strategic intelligence arc quite
different from the tactical intelligence needs of the operating armed forces and the collective JCS.
Furthermore, the intelligence processes necessary to provide both forms of finished intelligence are
disparate. The requirements of tactical intelligence are communications-intensive: demanding capable,
reliable, and secure communications sy stems; while strategic intelligence tends to be labor-intensive:
requiring objective judgments from assiduous analysts.34 The JIG simply lacked the authority and
resources to satisfy the requirements of both groups.
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The deficiencies of ihe JIG were symptomatic of the larger weaknesses of the JCS system, whose
flaws became readily apparent after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. The conflict revealed the
JCS machinery to be ponderous and slow , prone to dissension and discord, ill-suited for the bold
command decisions essential during wartime. General Douglas MacArthur regarded the system with
contempt, while President Truman frequently despaired of it. Truman was particularly dissatisfied with
the vital communications intelligence (COMINT) he was receiving through the Air Force Security
Agency (AFSA).<5 In 1952 his mounting frustration led him to commission a survey of the American
COMINT effort, directed by Herbert Brow ncll, a special assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force and
Harvard-educated lawyer. After an exhaustive six-month review, the Browncll Committee concluded
that inter-sen ice rivalry was hindering efforts to consolidate COMINT, implicating both the JCS and
the armed sen ices. Consequently, on 4 Nor ember 1952, Truman remov ed signals intelligence
(SIGINT) activ ities (that is, COMINT and ELINT efforts) from the jurisdiction of the JCS and the
military departments, centralizing them under the direct authority of the Secretary of Defense in the
ncwly-creatcd National Security Agency (NSA). The director of the NSA was granted extensive
operational control over all aspects of SIGINT -- collection, processing, evaluation, and distribution --
and made directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense, who was appointed as the executive agent
responsible for SIGINT.The JCS were furious with the arrangement: Lhev believed thai their
operational jurisdiction had been circumvented and their authority diluted (both assertions w ere, of
course, true). Yet their protests could not obscure their culpability. The JCS were to a great extent
responsible for the w artime shortcomings of SIGINT, for they had devoted far too much of their energy
to equivocation and safeguarding serv ice autonomies while neglecting the intelligence needs of civ ilian
policymakers. Despite the fact the JIG proved to be ineffectual, the JCS continued to support the
organization.
As a result of the failures of the JIG, in 1953 the Office of Special Operations (OSO) was created
w ithin the OSD as part of a departmental reorganization. This office was headed by an Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations w ho sat on the National Security Council and was
responsible for providing intelligence staff support directly to the Secretary of Defense and his staff.
The OSO was enjoined to serve as a point of coordination for Defense intelligence activities and a
liaison with civilian intelligence agencies.It was intended that the OSO would replace the JIG in
serving the intelligence needs of the Secretary of Defense, thus allowing the JIG to concentrate on the
tactical intelligence requirements of the JCS. Yet the OSO found itself in much the same position as
the JIG: it was dependent upon the services for raw intelligence but lacked a clear mandate and
therefore the power to impel the services to provide this intelligence and to cooperate in joint projects.
Like the JIG, the OSO had little success in mediating disputes between the armed services, particular!}
those concerning threat assessments. Thus, the difficulties surrounding military contributions to the
NIEs process endured.
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This dilemma was exacerbated in the mid-nineteen-fifties. The decade was dominated by the dispute
w ithin the American intelligence community over the "bomber gap," later to become the "missile
gap." At heart, the "gaps" w ere disagreements between the intelligence agencies over Soviet strategic
capabilities. A complete examination of this contentious affair is beyond (he scope of this chapter; it
has been treated at length elsewhere. For our purposes it is sufficient to note that w hile many
arguments have been put forth in support of the Air Force's overestimates of Soviet nuclear strength
(the "gaps") — including mirror-imaging, "worst-case" assessments, and the ambiguous nature of the
evidence — most judicious analyses have concluded that the Air Force w as engaged in a deliberate
exaggeration of Russian strategic capabilities in order to justify increased funding to the department and
its strategic programs.18 The respected military historian Lawrence Frccdman concludes:
There seems little doubt that the Air Force from the start was determined to prove the
existence of a Soviet [strategic] program of massive proportions, whatever violence
the arguments employed did to evidence or logic.19
Meanwhile, the intelligence components of the Army and Navy were issuing estimates which
predicted a meager Soviet missile program. In a move which appeared to be based on political rather
than empirical considerations, the CIA adopted a position of compromise and predicted a modest Soviet
buildup, midway between the Air Force and Army/Navy estimates."10 In effect, the agency "split the
difference." By embracing this diplomatic posture, the CIA once again showed itself to be incapable of
taking decisive action to settle inter-agency disputes over critical NIEs. Thus the dispute was
prolonged. It was also exacerbated by the fact that it was made public in 1956, during Congressional
hearings on the fiscal 1957 budget. Thus, the quarrel within the intelligence community was to
acquire political dimensions. In the 1960 Presidential election, the Democrats employed the "missile
gap" as a rhetorical rapier to attack Republican defense policies.
A 1958 reorganization of the Defense Department had done little to improve this situation: the
reform of military intelligence was largely superfluous. Since a DOD directive had placed the JCS in
the military chain of command, the JCS assumed responsibility for the intelligence support of the
U&S Commands. Thus the JIG became the J-2 of the Joint Staff. Its manpower and mandate were
not substantially altered, however, and it was therefore forced to delegate much of its U&S Commands
support responsibilities to the armed services.41 The JIG frequently failed to resolve disparities
between service intelligence estimates (as evidenced in the bomber and missile "gaps"); conflicts
38 The "missile gap" is analyzed in myriad w orks. Among the best are Frecdman, The Soviet
Strategic Threat, pp. 70-89; Prados, The Soviet Estimate, pp. 65-116; Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of
Armageddon. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983, pp. 155-57; and Laqucur, .4 World ofSecrets.
pp. 144-58.
39 Freedman, Soviet Strategic Threat, p. 79.
40 Freedman, Soviet Strategic Threat, p. 80; Confidential interview s, Air Force general and
senior CIA official.
41 Andregg, Management ofDefense Intelligence, p. 10.
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which proved intractable at higher level forums. The highest of these, the USIB, had no more success
than the JIG. In the late nineteen-fifties, the deliberations of the US1B. an interdepartmental working
group established in 1958 to review NIEs and establish intelligence collection requirements and
priorities, were marked by long and bitter controversies over the conflicting bomber and missile
estimates.j: The resolution of these conflicting estimates into a putative NIE was arduous at best.
Often, in order to gain the assent of all agencies involved in the estimate, it was necessary to allow
individual agencies to file opposing footnotes within the body of the estimate. Consequently, the
finished estimates were frequently filled with myriad dissenting footnotes, which effectively
undermined the cogency of the document and therefore reduced its influence on senior policymakers.45
Not surprisingly, the last years of the Eisenhower administration were marked by widespread discontent
with NIEs and military intelligence.
This disenchantment, coupled with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's public claims that
American intelligence agencies were exacerbating East-West tensions over Berlin, prompted President
Eisenhower to propose a review of the entire American intelligence effort in 1959. At his behest, the
Bureau of the Budget (BOB) increased its review of the size and the scope of U.S. intelligence
activities. Moreover, the BOB proposed two studies designed to thoroughly evaluate the effectiveness
of the present intelligence system, yet the intransigence of the military to these studies resulted in their
postponement and eventual cancellation.44
The U-2 Affair of May, 1960, serv ed as a catalyst to reviv e calls for a rev iew of the American
intelligence effort and set in motion a chain of events which culminated in the establishment of the
DIA in 1961. The downing of a secret American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft ov er the Soviet Union
and the subsequent capture of its pilot Francis Powers resulted in widespread criticism of the covert
surveillance activities of the United States.41 The failure of the intelligence community to make the
"cover story" credible and thereby validate "plausible dcniability" convinced the Eisenhower
administration that the time had come to examine the possibility of consolidating the general
intelligence activities of the military departments (defined rather clumsily as all "non-SIGINT,
nonoverhead, non organic activities").46 It was thought that this consolidation might improve
coordination within the espionage community in order to prev ent the occurrence of a similar incident
and facilitate the formulation of NIEs. Many senior civilian officials believed that the consolidation of
42 USIB replaced the Intelligence Adv isory Board (established in 1947) and the United States
Communications Intelligence Board (established in 1946). In NIE disputes Air Force officers were
renowned to be the most vicious bureaucratic combatants. One participant observed: "In estimate
battles with SAC y ou put your hands over y our balls because that is where would hit y ou."
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military intelligence was long overdue: thai intelligence, like the command and support functions,
should be removed from the service domains and made more responsive to the authority of the OSD.4~
Follow ing the U-2 Affair President Eisenhower established an interagency study group, named the
Joint Study Group on the Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States, to examine the
American intelligence effort and make recommendations to improve its performance. The Joint Study
Group (JSG) operated under the auspices of the Director of Central Intelligence and was chaired by the
CIA Inspector General Lyman Kirkpatrick, Jr.. Kirkpatrick was an intense, dnxen man, crippled by
polio and confined to a wheelchair. Appointed as Inspector General in 1953 and charged with
inv estigating policy and performance, his tenure at the post was marked by controversy, culminating in
1961 when Kirkpatrick authored the CIA's controversial in-house post-mortem of the Bay of Pigs
operation. The demands of the independent office were such that Thomas Powers remarked, "It was
probably inevitable that no man would leave the CIA with more personal enemies than Lyman
Kirkpatrick."48 The Joint Studx Group he oversaw was composed of representatives from the State
Department, the White House, the DOD, the BOB, and the CIA.4" The group examined U.S.
intelligence activities throughout the summer and fall of 196(1, paying particular attention to military
intelligence as its terms of reference directed it to explore:
The present military intelligence coordination machinery and its relationship to
the intelligence community -- with particular attention to possibilities for closer
integration under the authority of the DOD Reorganization Act of 1958."°
In mid-October, 1960, the Joint Study Group indicated to the administration that they believed that
the American espionage community required greater centralization, particular!;, the military intelligence
agencies, "including greater integration of intelligence activities and the elimination of unnecessary
duplication.""' This finding surprised few of the President's senior advisors; most were conv inccd that
a reorganization of the intelligence apparatus was long overdue. Yet there was considerable
disagreement within the administration over the best means by which to effect the impending JSG
recommendations. President Eisenhower personally believed the answer was to create a large military
central intelligence agency within the Joint Staff. This belief was based on his conviction that the
JCS should be given more power with w hich to focus on their joint "national" responsibilities.
Eisenhower hoped that this solution would mitigate the tendency of the JCS to identify their service
interests with the national interest. Nonetheless, he acknowledged to his close advisors that military
47
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48 Pow ers, Man Who Kept the Secrets, p. 119.
49 Kirkpatrick, Real CIA. p. 216.
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intelligence reform would be problematic, asserting "the hardest thing to destroy in this world is
entrenched bureaucracy and [the military] intelligence agencies are among the worst.
At the request of the President, his staff examined two alternative proposals for intelligence reform:
vesting coordinating responsibility of all intelligence activities (including those of the armed services
and the Defense Department) in the DCI or installing coordinating responsibility for the Defense
Department in a new government agency or official. There was considerable debate within the
administration over w hether new legislation would be required to implement these alternatives, or
whether the existing legislation (the National Security Act, as amended) would suffice."
The debate ended in October 1960, w hen the National Security Council (NSC) concluded that the
ability of the DCI to "exercise strong, centralized direction" within the Defense Department was
limited to national (that is, strategic) intelligence. Since the DCI did not possess statutory authority
over departmental intelligence, he had no control over the sen ice intelligence efforts. As the DC! w as
unable to reorganize and direct the military intelligence community, the NSC suggested an alternate c:
Under the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, the Secretary of Defense is
empow ered to take the necessary steps (other than a merger of the services) to provide
for efficient administration and "to eliminate duplication" within Defense.
[Quotations in original document]'4
It is important to note the emphasis on redundancy. In effect, the memorandum suggests that the
Secretary of Defense is legally empow ered to enact virtually any reorganization (in this instance, that
of intelligence) provided that the ostensible justification is "to eliminate duplication." Recall that
Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates had used used this provision of the National Security Act (the so-
called McCormack-Curtis Amendment), to establish the Defense Communications Agency on May 12,
1960. Curiously, there was little Congressional or military resistance to its creation. It is reasonable
to assume that the implications of this consolidation were not lost on civilians in the OSD - that the
Defense Department could be further reorganized and centralized under existing legislation. The above
memorandum is indicative of the shift in consensus that occurred in late 1960 among senior officials
in the Eisenhower administration: that the authority for further reorganization need not come from
outside the Department of Defense (that is, Congress), but that it could come from within (that is, the
OSD). Whereas in 1958 civilians in OSD had turned to Congress for the legislative authority to enact
Defense Department reorganization, in late 1960, many believed that OSD possessed the necessary
authority to enact reform on its own. This was an important shift in perspective, for the new
administration would inherit this thinking.
Goodpaster, "Memorandum of Conference With the President," 11 October I960 (Declassified
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Ironically, an advisory committee set up by President-elect Kennedy immediately after the
presidential election of 1960 to examine the prospects for the further reorganization of the Defense
Department, the Kennedy Committee on the Defense Establishment, reached the contrary conclusion.
In its 5 December I960, report to the President-elect, the committee, led by Senator Stuart
Symington, put forth its assessment that previous legislation had failed to give the OSD the executive
power needed to exercise the full control over the Defense Department. Noting that there was
considerable disagreement within the government and academia as to whether present legislation
provided a statutory basis for the Secretary of Defense to exert complete authority over the entire
Defense Department, including the traditional activities of the armed services, the committee's final
report asserted: "It is the conclusion of this Committee that the doctrine of civilian control will be
compromised as long as any doubts exist on this vital point."55 The report censured the military
departments, remarking, "the present multiple layers of control and overlapping among military
programs and operations [is] caused by steadily increasing inter-sen ice rivalry." "In short," the report
concluded, "there is a clear need for a defense interest rather than particular sen ice interest.'"" The
Symington Committee recommended the passage of radical legislation to eliminate the separate armed
serv ices and buttress the powers of OSD in order "to make the Secretary of Defense the civilian official
in the DOD with unquestioned authority and control over aU elements of the DOD at aH levels."
[Emphasis in original document.]' In submitting these recommendations for extreme reform, the
Kennedy Committee on the Defense Establishment rejected the traditional pluralistic structure of the
Defense Department in favor of the single manager concept, the dominant organizational paradigm in
business and industry in the early ninctecn-sixties. In so doing, the motive of the committee was not
wholly philanthropic; political considerations played a vital role. Committee member Clark Clifford
(subsequently the transition advisor to Kennedy) later remarked:
We went much further in the direction of unification of the services than was
politically feasible, but this was deliberate: both Symington and I, remembering the
brutal battles of 1946-49, felt that a group as tangential to the process as ours could
make an impact only if it consciously overstated its recommendations. To get half a
loaf, as I suggested in our first meeting, we needed to ask for a whole loaf.58
As hoped, the President-elect was strongly influenced by the report of the committee. In his search
for a Secretary of Defense he would seek a strong executive to "restart the engines of reform" within
the Defense Department.
55 United States Senate. Committee on the Defense Establishment (Symington Committee),
Report to Senator Kennedy on the Defense Establishment. 5 December 1960. Washington: GPO,
1960, p.4. Stuart Symington chaired the committee; other members were Clark Clifford, Thomas
Finletter, Roswell Gilpairic, Fowler Hamilton, and Marx Leva. Apparently, a law degree w as the
prerequisite for admission.
56 Symington Committee, pp. 6-7.
57 Symington Committee, pp. 8.
58 Clifford, Counsel to the President, p. 330.
Apprehension at the Air Force, 1960
While talk of military reform swept through Washington, one military department prepared for
retrenchment. In 1960, the Air Force believed itself to be under siege. Though the previous decade had
been a prosperous one for the sendee, both in terms of appropriations and prestige, nascent trends were
ominous. The "missile gap" had damaged the Air Forces credibility, and once-benevolent supporters
were casting a skeptical eye on its intelligence estimates and budget requests. Moreover, changes in
intelligence collection systems, American nuclear forces, and strategic deterrence doctrine threatened the
position of the Air Force as the dominant service in the American defense establishment.
In the late nineteen-fifties the Air Force lost a consequential battle over control of the innovative
U-2 project to the CIA. The loss was significant, for the Air Force had long regarded strategic
reconnaissance as its sole prerogative, an essential activity in support of ordnance targeting. General
Curtis LeMay, the commander of Strategic Air Command (SAC) -- ward of the nation's nuclear arsenal
— fought the CIA (in the persons of DCI Allen Dulles and his special assistant Richard Bisscll) for
jurisdiction over this experimental plane, contending that the relation between reconnaissance and
targeting w as so intimate that the tasks could not be effectively separated, and therefore should remain
under military (that is, Air Force) control.The irascible LeMay had commanded the Twenty-first
Bomber Command at the end of the Second World War, and was responsible for planning the
conventional and fire-bombing of Japan. Appointed Commander of SAC in 1948, he was an ardent
advocate of air pow er. Prominently displayed on. the walls of his office at SAC headquarters was a
quote from a 1949 speech of the former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Mid-Century Convocation: "For good or ill, air mastery is
today the supreme expression of military power, and fleets and armies, however necessary and
important, must accept subordinate rank.""" The quote embodies the general's firm convictions. Like
fleets and armies, LeMay viewed national intelligence as ancillary to the strategic intelligence
requirements of the Air Force.61 Whereas the CIA saw in the U-2 vast opportunities for gathering not
only military, but economic and political intelligence on other nations, the Air Force envisaged the
aircraft primarily as reconnaissance platform to service its targeting needs."- The CIA ultimately
prevailed in this contest for control of the plane, largely because Allen Dulles provided the funding for
the project (estimated by the Air Force to be at least $22 million) from the DCI's "black" (that is,
53 As General LeMay frequently told his SAC crews: "There are only two things in this world,
SAC bases and SAC targets." Quoted in Brugioni, Eyeball lo Eyeball, p. 265.
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covert) treasury'.63 Consequently, Air Force Chief of Staff General Nathan Tw ining and Allen Dulles
signed an agreement that the project would be directed by the CIA; SAC's role was limited to support
and technical assistance. The project bore fruit quickly, due in no small part to Bisseil's strategic
vision and administrative prowess. An operational w ing of four U-2 planes w as deployed in Turkey in
May 1956; the first flight over the Sov iet Union was authorized by Eisenhower the following month.
By the time of the U-2 Affair of May, 1960, ov er two hundred flights had been flown over the Soviet
heartland.64
Despite the success of the U-2 project, many in the Air Force w ere convinced that a dangerous
precedent had been established. They feared that civ ilian control of strategic reconnaissance might
result in the neglect of military requirements. The CIA's proclivity to satisfy the intelligence
requirements of civ ilian policymakers before those of military planners and theater commanders w as
well known. Thus the military was loathe to place vital intelligence assets in the hands of the civ ilian
agency, whose objectives and, more importantly, "consumers" (that is, the specific policymakers who
are the audience for a given intelligence product) were dissimilar.65 The officers feared that SAC
readiness might suffer, and so leave the United States vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. This fear w as
not an apparition: a series of RAND studies, commissioned by the Air Force, had made SAC
vulnerability the critical defense issue of the mid-fifties.66 The topic became one of public debate after
the Gailhcr Report was leaked to the press in 1957, fueling speculation that the Sov iets were on the
verge of first-strike capability and thereby abetting advocates of the "missile gap." Given the military's
preoccupation with the alleged Soviet strategic buildup, it is not surprising that the Air Force regarded
civilian control of reconnaissance with apprehension and foreboding. When the successor system to
the U-2, the Discoverer/Corona satellite, (also originally an Air Force project taken over by the CIA)
came of age in the early nineteen-sixties, the Air Force felt that it could no longer stand idle and
initiated what would become a brutal bureaucratic war of attrition with the CIA for control of the
American technical intelligence collection effort. Yet that struggle lay in the future. In 1960, the Air
Force could only watch the CIA's efforts with a mixture of jealousy and dread.
63 For an account of the evolution and abuse of secret funding see Tim Werner, Blank Check:
The Pentagon's Black Budget. New York: Warner, 1990.
54 Jeffreys-Jones, CM and American Democracy, pp. 107-108; Laqucur, A World of Secrets, pp.
144-45.
65 Historically, priority has been placed on getting timely and accurate intelligence to those at the
highest levels of US government (that is, senior civilian policymakers). The result is that the needs of
the military theater commanders, often more immediate and compelling, arc often given secondary
consideration. This is particularly true in the ease of SIGINT, PHOTOINT, and imagery analysis.
This tendency for intelligence to "congeal at the top" has received scant attention in contemporary
literature. Yet this preoccupation with strategic intelligence at the expense of tactical has very real
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As technological advances threatened the role of the Air Force in strategic reconnaissance, so too
were they rendering vulnerable the service's traditional hegemony over American nuclear forces. The
Navy's successful test fire of a nuclear-capable missile from a submerged submarine in July of I960
heralded the triumph of the Navy's Polaris program and the end of the Air Force's monopoly on
strategic nuclear weapons. With the successful test fire, the Navy immediately became a formidable
competitor for strategic appropriations. Well aware of the magnitude of this threat, the Air Staff did not
stand by idly. In a bold bureaucratic maneuver in the spring of 1959, the Air Force sought to preempt
its rival by proposing that a single strategic command composed of a joint staff be established under
SAC to integrate all American strategic force planning and operations, including, of course, the Polaris
program. The ostensible rationale for the proposal was to eliminate the possibility of target
duplication among military planners, but the Army and Navy were quick to see the true intent of the
Air Staff: to maintain Air Force dominance over US nuclear power. The Army and Nary mounted a
determined resistance, arguing that the realm of target planning and service coordination properly
belonged to the JCS, and thus strategic command functions should be performed under its aegis." A
fierce inter-service melee ensued, wherein the JCS found itself deeply divided and unable to formulate a
workable compromise. Ultimately the matter was decided by the personal intervention of President
Eisenhower, who endorsed the Air Staff's proposal over the vehement protests of Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) Admiral Arlcigh Burke. Subsequently, on 16 August 1960, Secretary of Defense
Thomas Gates publicly announced the creation of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS).
The JSTPS w as assigned the task of developing a National Strategic Target List and devising a Single
Integrated Operating Plan (SIOP): essentially the nation's blueprint for general nuclear war."8 There-
was little doubt that the JSTPS was a creature of the Air Force: its director, General Thomas Powers,
was the commander of SAC (although Rear Admiral Edward M. Parker was chosen as his deputy), it
was located at SAC Headquarters in Offutt Air Force Base in Omaha, and 228 of the assigned 269
personnel came from the sen ice. Thus the Air Force narrowly preserved its preeminence in strategic
nuclear matters.
Yet cause for celebration proved short-lived. The November 1960 presidential election brought a
new democratic administration into power, one determined to separate itself from the alleged failed
military policies of the past. These declarations were not merely rhetorical; rather they signified a
profound distinction in strategic thinking. The incoming administration viewed the Eisenhower
strategy of "massive retaliation" with contempt, perceiving this "all or nothing" approach to nuclear
deterrence to be strategically indexible and politically naive. Instead, the Kennedy disciples believed
that a more diversified force structure was desirable to cope with the w ide range of possible nuclear and
37 The Army sided w ith the Navy in the conflict because it was concerned about the possibility of
losing control of its tactical nuclear weapons, at the time deployed in forward areas, notably West
Germany.
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non-nuclear conflicts, in order to provide Washington policymakers with a broader choice of options.
They therefore espoused the "flexible response" doctrine that then was being advocated by Army
generals Matthew Ridgway, James Gavin, and Maxwell Taylor.69 This policy required a substantial
buildup of conventional forces in order to cope with the brush-fire conflicts which w ere commonl;
believed to be the wars of the future. To the Air Force, the implications of this change in strategy
were lucid: funding for the Army's conventional forces would increase, probably at the expense of the
Air Force's nuclear programs. The adoption of the new doctrine meant that the atomic arsenal of the
Air Force would no longer be the nation's primary deterrence force; the arsenal w as relegated to being
co-equal with Army and Navy forces. To the Air Force the implications were clear: it was destined to
fight petty program battles for scarce appropriations. The balance of power at the Pentagon was
shifting away from the Air Force. Many of its officers viewed the prospect with alarm, and began to
search for means to restore the preeminence of the service. They would ultimately discover respite in
the Report of the Joint Study Group.
The Report of the Joint Study Group, 1960
On December 15, 1960, the Report of the Joint Study Group (also called the Kirkpatrick Report,
after its chairman) was submitted to the Eisenhower administration. As expected, the report was
critical of the military intelligence system, branding it "duplicator}' and cumbersome." It highlighted
the failure of the JIG to serve as a "focal point" for the Secretary of Defense and to effectively
coordinate national intelligence estimates.-0 The report noted that the failures of military intelligence
were indicative of the disarray of the American espionage effort in general. The Joint Stud}' Group
concluded thai this disorder was the result of the absence of central authority within the intelligence
system. The report dw elled on the failure of the USIB to direct intelligence operations and integrate
the estimative process, characterizing its role as "deliberative" rather than "coordinating." The report
suggested that the Board was incapable of exerting greater influence over the intelligence community
because the representatives of the military departments, who composed six of the Board's ten members.
69 See Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet. New York: Harper, 1960.
70 Central Intelligence Agency, "Joint Stud} Group on the Foreign Intelligence Activities of the
United States Gov ernment," 15 December 1950 (Declassified 1 February 1977) p. 24. DDRS: 1989-
3120 through 3130. The JSG met 90 times, received 51 briefings, and interviewed 320 indiv iduals.
The final report ran over 140 pages, covering a broad range of topics from Collection Resources to the
Costs of Foreign Intelligence; the declassified version is heavily sanitized.
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opposed a poteni USIB and blocked all efforts to augment its authority and jurisdiction."1 Since the
military faction w as formidable, often forming a majority, it was typically successful in its endeavors
to limit the power of the USIB over the intelligence organizations, and thus the military departments
effectively preserved the autonomy of their intelligence components against encroachment from
exterior direction. In order to rectify the deficient system, the report recommended that the DC! exert
greater authority over foreign intelligence activities, advised and assisted by a reorganized USIB. The
Joint Study Group proposed that the membership of the USIB would be reduced from ten to four; the
lean USIB would be composed of the DCI, and representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary
of Defense, and the JCS (with ad hoc representation from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the
Atomic Energy Commission). : Under this proposal, military representation on the Board would be
reduced from six to two, as the roles of the intelligence chiefs of the armed services, the director of the
NSA, and the J-2 were downgraded from participant to observer; thereafter they would be represented
by the JCS member. Thus the influence of military would be diluted on the USIB, enabling the Board
to assume a more dynamic management role. The USIB was to be the principal coordinating
mechanism to assist the DCI in coordinating American intelligence operations.
Although a potent USIB w as the centerpiece of the Joint Study Group, the report offered additional
recommendations aimed at centralizing the military intelligence effort, by strengthening the authority
of the JCS in operational matters and establishing within OSD a "local point for exerting broad
management review authority" over all Defense Department intelligence assets."4 This focal point
would coordinate defense intelligence operations, consolidate requirements and evaluation, and represent
the department on a revitalized USIB. The chairman of the Joint Study Group, Ly man Kirkpatriek, Jr..
remarked:
The report had not specifically, in so many words, recommended the creation of the
Defense Intelligence Agency, but had made recommendations directed toward
streamlining the military intelligence sy stem in order to reorganize it, as the Defense
Reorganization Act of 1958 had streamlined and modernized the command and
operations system.
71 in 1960 the USIB was composed of the following regular members; the Director of Central
Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence and Research, State Department; a representative of the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; a representative of the Director of the Atomic Energy
Commission; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations; Director of Intelligence,
Joint Staff; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Air Force; the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, Army; the Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Navy; and the
Director of the NSA. The latter six were judged to be military members. Other government
departments and agencies were included according to subject at the discretion of the chair.
72 Joint Study Group, p. 114.
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Kirkpalrick accurately places the report of the Joint Stud} Group in historical perspective: it was
not an anomaly, but rather it represented the latest in a long series of attempts to effect greater
centralization within the Defense Department. The military intelligence components had managed to
escape past consolidations, due not to negligence, but to the resolute bureaucratic resistance of the
sen ices to any attempt to encroach upon their sacrosanct intelligence elements. They were motivated
neither by pride nor contempt, but by simple organizational self-interest and the sincere belief that
autonomous military sendee intelligence elements were intrinsic to maintaining American militan
strength. However in early 1961, it appeared that the}' could resist the tides of change no longer. The
National Security Council endorsed the recommendations of the Joint Stud}' Group on 18 Januarv
1961, and called for the implementation of its forty-eight recommendations as swiftl} as possible.
Outgoing Secretary of Defense Thomas Gales provided the JCS with a cop}' of the Joint Stud} Group
report in January 1961 and asked the military leaders to consider specific ways and means of
consolidating their intelligence functions, particularly in the strategic field, in accordance with its
recommendations. * Yet the JCS were not able to complete their evaluation of the report before the
Kenned}' administration entered office on 20 January 1961, thus leaving the future of the Joint Stud}
Group's recommendations in doubt. Would the new administration endorse the report's findings'? The
military was uncertain, yet prepared for the worst. As the new administration replaced the old, the
Pentagon readied itself to battle for the most jealously-guarded military fiefdom, that of intelligence.
'5 USC (87/2) House Armed Sen ices. Hearings, p. 6814.
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Chapter Two
Creation
A Creature of Compromise
Following the recommendations of the Joint Study Group a reorganization of military intelligence
was ineiuetable. The issue of contention was one degree: to what extent w ould the military espionage
community be centralized? Based on his review of American intelligence operations, management
philosophy, and the strategic and budgetary requirements of his office, the new Secretary of Defense
Robert S. McNamara far cied a radical reorganization, culminating in the creation of a powerful
consolidated defense intelligence agency. The military leadership, encumbered by tradition and riven by
inter-service rivalries, desired the establishment of a weak coordinating body, beholden to the venerable
military departments. The dialectic between two concepts ultimately produced the Defense Intelligence
Agency. The synthesis was not equable, however, for the interests of the JCS prevailed over the
aspirations of the Secretary of Defense, as this chapter shall demonstrate. The first two sections of the
chapter explore the motives and objectives of Robert McNamara and his civilian staff; the third their
evaluations and ambitions for the military intelligence effort. Therein the prominence of strategic
intelligence in their designs will be highlighted.* The fourth section investigates the perspectives and
initiatives of the military leadership. The fifth examines the conflict belwcen the two factions over the
proposed agency; the last, its resolution.
Robert S. McNamara and Active Management
In his search for a Secretary of Defense, President-elect John Kennedy was strongly influenced by
the report of the Symington which called for a dynamic chief executive to head the cantankerous
department. Upon the recommendation of Robert Lovett, the Wall Street banker who serv ed as the
Assistant Secretary of War for Air under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy appointed
Robert S. McNamara, the supremely rational technocrat, to be the eighth Secretary of Defense. In
1960, McNamara was the foremost practitioner of the new management technique w hich has come to
be know n as "active management," applying its methodology with spectacular success first at the Air
Force during the Second World War under Charles Thornton, and later at the Ford Motor Company
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His achievement at Ford was unparalleled: he and his fellow disciples of modern analytical methods
(who would eventually become known as the "Whiz Kids") transformed Ford from an aging, inefficient
dinosaur into a streamlined, competitive giant in the automotive industry . In the process, McNamara
emerged as the preeminent Whiz Kid and rose quickly within Ford, eventually becoming the president.
He relinquished this position after a mere month to accept the office offered to him by the President¬
elect: the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Kennedy was able to lure McNamara away from his lucrative position at Ford by offering him a
challenge of Herculean proportions: that of converting the Defense Department from a paragon of
waste and inefficiency into an efficient and cost-effective department. McNamara accepted the office on
the conditions that he be allowed to choose his ow n men to staff the Defense Department and that he
be allowed to study the controversial Symington Committee Report and personally decide if the radical
reorganization of the DOD it recommended was necessary. Kennedy agreed and gave his new Secretary
of Defense a single directive: "to determine and provide what we needed to safeguard our security
without arbitrary budget limits, but to do so as economically as possible."1 This directive was a
consequence of Kennedy's campaign strategy. During the presidential election Kennedy had harshly-
criticized the Eisenhower administration's defense policies, utilizing the "missile gap" claims to
support his assertions that America had lost its strategic superiority and implying that Eisenhower had
"gone soft" on communism. Thus, upon w inning the White House, Kennedy w as pledged to overhaul
the Defense Department and restore America's strategic superiority. McNamara was charged with
fulfilling this commitment.
McNamara relished the challenge. The Second WorldWar and the Cold War had transformed the
Defense Department from a modest military institution into a voracious leviathan; a spraw ling
autonomous organism, seemingly beyond the control of one man. If there was ever a man to meet
this challenge it was Robert McNamara, for, above all, Robert McNamara was a man of control. He
was, in many ways, the precursor of the modern business manager, men not associated w ith line
production (as the managers of old tended to be), but with cost accountancy.2 As an outsider,
McNamara challenged the prevailing powers — first in Detroit, then in Washington — with ruthless
determination, rigid discipline, and intellectual certitude. An apostle of modern financial techniques, he
brought a formidable new weapon into the bureaucratic melee: statistical analysis. Numbers were his
life-blood. They defined him. With statistics he believed he could bring coherence to confusion,
summon order out chaos. They w ere his means of control. For McNamara, insofar as was possible,
everything was to be quantified; made amenable to analysis, manipulation, and systematic
interpretation. Emotion and intuition were reviled. Reason and empiricism were honored. In
Me.Namara's universe, order and logic always prevailed.
McNamara set out to conquer the Pentagon in much the same way that he had triumphed at Ford:
hire the best staff, commission detailed studies, generate relevant databases, correlate and assess, decide
Robert S. McNamara, The Essence ofSecurity: Reflections in Office. New York: Harper and
Row, 1968, p. 87.
2 See David Halberslam, The Reckoning. New York: Avon, 1986.
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and implement. His assumption was that the art of war was little different from the production of
goods. It was simply a matter of the proper quantification, the proper analysis. As McNamara himself
stated:
I am sure that no significant military problem will ever be wholly susceptible to
purely quantitative analysis. But every piece of the total problem that can be
quantitatively analyzed remov es one more piece of uncertainty from our process of
making a choice. There arc many factors which cannot be adequately quantified and
which therefore must be supplemented with judgment seasoned by experience.
Furthermore, experience is necessary to determine the relev ant questions with which
to proceed with any analysis.3
The remark is revealing. To McNamara's way of thinking, only quantitativ e analysis is certain,
other means are equivocal and ephemeral. Military experience is not valued on its own; rather it
serves as a poor substitute in the absence of statistics. One suspects that if McNamara could hav e
fully quantified military matters, he would have preferred to discount military professionalism all
together. (Indeed, by the mid-1960s the military brass was openly accusing him of this longing.)
In combination with statistical analysis, McNamara believ ed that the introduction of a new form of
management w ould allow him to achiev e an unprecedented lev el of control in the Defense Department.
The management strategy he sought to implement has been described as "activ e management." Two of
McNamara's disciples, Alain Enthovcn and K. Wayne Smith, summarized it as "decision making based
on explicit criteria related to the national interest, as opposed to decision making by compromise
among various institutions and parochial interests."4 Essentially, the concepts of rationality and
civilian control were taken to their ultimate application. With regard to the latter, James M. Roherty
characterized "active management" thus:
It puts the Secretary of Defense firmly in control of the ov erall process of decision¬
making which can be summarized as follows: a policy framework is set by the
Secretary of Defense; much of the data base is provided by the secretary; judgments
are made by the secretary. In a word, power is concentrated in the Secretary of
Defense under a philosophy of activ e management.3
McNamara's predilection to introduce this form of management, the one which serv ed him so well
at Ford, into the Pentagon was reinforced during the transition period. Immediately after accepting the
offer of the office from the President-elect in late 1960, McNamara consulted defense experts and
former DOD officials on the current state of the Pentagon. Outgoing Secretary of Defense Thomas
3 Quote from Trewhitt, McNamara, p. 17.
4 Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense
Program, 1961 -1969. New York: Harper and Row , 1969, p. 160.
5 Roherty, Decisions ofRobert McNamara, pp. 70-71.
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Gates warned him that the "missile gaps" were illusory and that a consolidation of the military
intelligence function might be desirable. When contemplating reorganization, Gates advised his
successor to seriously consider the recommendations of the Joint Studs Group and to examine a
Pentagon study titled "The Air University Black Book of Reorganization Papers." The latter, echoing
the views of many senior officials late in the Eisenhow er administration, contended that the Secretary
of Defense had extensive authority under the National Security Act, of which much had not yet been
exploited.6 Both were critical in influencing the new Secretary of Defense not to seek new legislation
for further reorganizations of the Defense Department (thus tabling the Symington Committee Report)
and to implement his "active management" concept. McNamara would later slate:
From the beginning in January, 1961, it seemed to me that the principal problem
in efficient management of the Department's resources was not the lack of
management authority. The National Security Act provides the Secretary of Defense
a full measure of power. The problem was rather the absence of the essential
management tools needed to make sound decisions on the really crucial issues of
national security."
The McNamara management philosophy was a radical departure from the traditional bureaucratic
bargaining method of policy formulation which had reigned in the Pentagon since the department's
inception. As such, it was certain to foster resentment and spark controversy.
Although Kennedy had agreed to the provision that McNamara be allowed to choose his own staff,
he did "suggest" certain candidates. One of the suggestions was the New York law yer Roswell L.
Gilpatric for the position of Deputy Secretary of Defense. Gilpatric had served on President-elect's
transition studies on the defense establishment, the Symington Committee and the Jackson Committee
(the latter was primarily policy-oriented), and had favorably impressed the Kennedy men. Like
McNamara, Gilpatric had served in the Air Force, first as an Assistant Secretary (Material) and then as
Undersecretary of the Air Force during the Korean War. Although he returned to private practice after
the war, he remained active in national security politics, and was a member of the Rockefeller Panel
Report of 1958 which censured the JCS system.
Originally a supporter of the system of separate armed serv ices, Gilpalric's views had changed
during his tenure at the Pentagon. His positions in the Air Force during the Korean War had allowed
him to witness first-hand the deleterious effects of inter-service rivalry on the war effort. He recalls
6 Kinnard, Secretary ofDefense, p. 86.
7 McNamara, Essence ofSecurity, p. 88.
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that during the conflict JCS deliberations over appropriations for rival major weapons systems were
marked by such bitter feuding that, in one instance, funding was decided by the flip of a dime."
Experiences such as this ultimately caused him to become a proponent of the unification of the armed
services. Subsequently, Gilpatnc was persuaded by former Secretary of Defense Robert Lovclt that this
objectiv e was unrealistic in the political climate of the nincteen-fifties and therefore the only practical
means for civilians to exert greater authority over the serv ices was through the control of
appropriations. He held this v iew in 1960, when he was approached by McNamara. Gilpatric quickly
decided that active management w as a step in the right direction.
Within two weeks of accepting the offer from Kennedy. McNamara selected Gilpatric to be his
Deputy Secretary of Defense, beginning a close collaboration which would last for over four years.
McNamara viewed the Deputy Secretary as a junior partner that he should share the trust and authority
of the Secretary as he must often stand in his stead. Gilpatric performed well in this role and, not
surprisingly, became a close confidant of McNamara. In fact, many viewed Gilpatric as McNamara's
altcr-ego: where McNamara was detached and distant, Gilpatric was amiable and affable. There was an
clement of "good cop" v ersus "bad cop" in the symbiosis, yet the practical result was that Gilpatric
became the informal mediator of disputes within the department. It was a role for which Gilpatric was
well-suited: his congenial manner concealed an astute sense of judgment combined with keen political
instincts. McNamara, at limes lacking in sociable temperament and political sav v y, deriv ed great
benefit from the counsels of Gilpatric.
In the McNamara management concept, the Comptroller of the DOD was a critical office, as it
became a repository of vital military information. After much deliberation, McNamara rejected the
traditional appointment of an accountant to the post. Instead he offered the position to Charles J.
Hitch, the director of the Economics Div ision at the RAND (Research and Development) Corporation,
the Air Force brain trust. Hitch reluctantly accepted. It was an appointment of great significance for
two reasons. First, Hitch introduced the new science of systems analysis to the Pentagon which had
been pioneered at RAND. Based on the work of Edward Paxon, it was essentially a refinement of the
operational research studies of the Second World War, commissioned to assess the efficacy of selected
weapons and to recommend their most effective use. McNamara himself had employed this technique
in the Statistical Control Division of the Air Force (then a component of the Department of the Army)
during World War II. After the war, McNamara and his disciples modified and applied the methodology
in work for Ford, but the theorists at RAND continued to apply the concepts of statistical control to
modern warfare. Systems analysis was the next logical step in the evolution of the methodology.
Whereas operational research focused on a specific weapon, systems analysis had a more expansive
framework: it explored the foundations of the American military establishment, examining the
missions of the armed services to ascertain the types of w eapon systems required and to determine those
most effective. Cost/benefit analysis reached new heights. In effect, the statisticians evolved from
efficiency experts to become military planners in their own right.9 To implement this methodologv in
the Pentagon, Hitch persuaded Alain C. Enthovcn, a former operations research analyst at RAND, to
8 Anecdote from Hadley, Straw Giant, p. 112. Confirmed in interv iew with Roswell Gilpatric,
23 July 1992.
9 Kaplan, Wizards ofArmageddon, pp. 86-87.
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accept the newly-created post of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis. Under
Enthoven's administration, the Office of Systems Analysis (OSA) became a bastion of civilian power
in the McNamara Pentagon. Due to the close collaboration between Hitch and Enthoven, OSA
achieved a virtual monopoly on information concerning the American military effort. This allowed its
analysts to generate statistical studies that were difficult for the armed services to challenge, as the
departments at the time were data-starved and statistically unsophisticated. Enihovcn later w rote that
McNamara's Pentagon "operated under the theory that information w as power." By controlling access
to military information, OSA eventually became the preeminent bureaucratic player in the McNamara
Defense Department.
The second consequence of the Hitch appointment was that a group of young civilian intellectuals,
many of them RAND graduates, followed the new comptroller into the Pentagon. Filling many of the
lower level appointments, they were confident and brash, eager to gather data and test novel theories. It
was no surprise that the new "w hiz kids" quickly ran afoul of the military brass."1 Anecdotes of
confrontations between these young civilians and military officers are legion.11 Nevertheless, they
prov ed to be an important source of information for the new secretary and his staff. Their persistent,
probing inquiries frequently led them to uncover data which was not communicated through formal
channels. In fact, they formed an clandestine intelligence system for the civilians in OSD.
McNamara appointed Cyrus Vance, another New York lawyer and the former counsel to the Senate
Preparedness Subcommittee, to be the Genera! Counsel of the DOD. After a brief review of the
National Security Act and related amendments, Vance agreed with McNamara's appraisal that further
reorganization could be effected within the department under existing legislation. Aware of the thorny
legal issues involved in any proposed reforms (under the provisions of the McCormack-Curtis
Amendment), McNamara assigned the General Counsel responsibility for reorganization. Thereafter,
Vance established an office under his auspices devoted solely to restructuring the Pentagon. It was
named the Office for Management Planning and Organizational Studies (OMPOS) and Solis Horwitz, a
Kennedy election consultant on foreign relations and defense policy, agreed to serve as its director. Its
small staff was composed of military officers on loan from the services. In the early days of the
administration, MeNamaraand Vance charged OMPOS with ensuring that all elements of the Defense
Department functioned in accordance with the 1958 Reorganization (that is, served the operational
needs of the Secretary of Defense and the JCS). Priority was initially to be given to the two functions
which then were not operationally controlled by the JCS: communications and intelligence.''
10 Names commonly associated with this group include Harold Brown, Daniel Ellsberg, Malcolm
Hoag, and Harry Rovven.
11
Military men claim many of the incidents were sparked by the arrogance of the young defense
intellectuals. There is much truth to these claims. Two examples are illustrative: In an argument
with one general over US nuclear war plans, one Whiz Kid retorted, "General, I have fought just as
many nuclear wars as you." Enlhov en, who appeared to consciously seek to inllame the military and
thus earned special enmity, once interrupted a senior USAF general in Europe who began to brief him,
stating "General, I don't think you understand. I didn't come here for a briefing. 1 came to tell you
what we have decided." Quoted in Kaplan, Wizards ofArmageddon, p. 254.
12 Transcript, Solis Horvvitzoral history interview, 18 March 1966, by Joseph O'Connor, pp. 13-
17, JFK Library.
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McNamara and the Defense Intelligence Agency
Given the prominence of the "missile gap" allegations in the 1960 election, it is not surprising
that after officially assuming office in January 1961, McNamara and his deputy Gilpatric immediately
set out to review the military intelligence effort and examine the veracity of the claims. They swiftly
discovered that the judgment of Thomas Gates had been accurate: the "gap" was spurious: the
invention of Air Force intelligence. Though the Air Force claimed that the Soviets possessed hundreds
of ICBMs as part of an aggressive strategic buildup, after a personal review of the photo-intelligence
derived from the Discover/Coronal satellites, McNamara and Gilpalric concluded that only four ICBMs
deployed at Plesetsk in Northern Russia were actually operational." McNamara first revealed this
discovery to reporters at an off-thc-record session at the Pentagon on 6 February 1961. His rejection of
the "missile gap" caused quite a stir in Washington at the time, due to its prominence as an election
issue.14
McNamara's examination of the "missile gap" and the state of military intelligence left him
disturbed and reinforced his nascent conviction that military intelligence was tainted by budgetary
influences." He believed that past intelligence estimates often had been prejudiced by political
considerations; that facts had been orchestrated to reinforce bureaucratic positions.16 InMcNamara's
view, intelligence was essentially a quantifiable matter, ideally limited to a careful compilation of the
numbers of weapons and equipment on each side. He was skeptical of any efforts by the intelligence
agencies to go beyond this quantitative base and into interpretive dimensions, such as predicting enemy
actions and intentions. To McNamara, intelligence of the latter sort was simply conjecture, frequently
inaccurate as the "missile gap" episode demonstrated. He therefore became convinced of the need to
eliminate service bias from intelligence products, particularly threat assessments, to prevent a
reoccurrence of the bomber and missile "gaps." McNamara thought it essential that senior
policymakers be provided with objective intelligence, in order to make rational decisions on issues of
national security.
13 Kaplan. WizardsofArmageddon, pp. 286-90; Prados, The Soviet Estimate, pp. 109-110;
Laqueur, A World of Secrets, pp. 150-52. It took some time for this finding to be reflected in formal
intelligence products. A June 1961 N1E concluded that the Soviets might possess 50-100 ICBMs
(100-200 by 1962), despite a vigorous Army and Navy dissent that an accurate count was "no more
than a few." It was only in a September revision of this NIE that Russian ICBMs were assessed to be
four, finally shattering the chimera of an aggressive Soviet buildup which had prevailed for almost a
decade and putting to rest the missile gap myth.
14
Gilpatric attributes this indiscretion to the political naivete of the Secretary of Defense. For
McNamara's part, he immediately knew that he had made "a terrible mistake." He later recalled: "The\
[the reporters I broke the damn door down. They went out and the headline on the late afternoon edition
of the [Washington] Evening Star says, 'McNamara declares no missile gap.' And the next day,
perhaps tongue in cheek, the Republicans asked that the election be rerun." Quoted in Michael R.
Beschloss, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963. New York: Edw ard Burtingame
Books, 1991, p. 65.
15 Trewhitt, McNamara, p. 21; Personal interview with Roswell Gilpatric, 23 July 1992.
16 Ernest Volkman, Warriors of the Night: Spies, Soldiers, and American Intelligence. New
York: Morrow, 1985, p. 113.
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MeNamara's review of CIA intelligence operations buttressed this conviction and left him even
more disenchanted with the American intelligence effort (which he characterized as "smoke and
mirrors"). However, he was impressed with the work of ONE under the stewardship of the former Yale
professor Sherman Kent. McNamara admired the academic orientation of its staff and judged that it
consistently produced objective analyses based on empirical ev idence. More importantly, McNamara
felt that ONE supported its conclusions irrespective of bureaucratic and political pressures. McNamara
attributed this steadfast impartiality to the leadership of Sherman Kent. As Gilpatric observed, "Kent
had intellectual integrity and McNamara immediately recognized it.'" Although McNamara believ ed
that most organizational intelligence was self-serving, he judged ONE products to be essentially
unbiased. To the new Secretary of Defense, ONE was a bulw ark of objectivity in the maelstrom of
prejudice.
Accordingly, McNamara was impressed with the Report of the Joint Study Group. Its assessment
that intelligence estimates were distorted by organizational biases ran parallel to his own findings.
After reflecting on the recommendations for some time, the Secretary was intrigued by the Joint Study
Group's collective, if idealized, vision of a reorganized intelligence community: A, strong DC1
providing central direction, a potent USIB vigorously managing the daily operations of the sundry
espionage agencies. Under this scenario, the authority and influence of ONE, the staff component of
the USIB and BNE, would be enhanced significantly; the power of the military departments would
abate commensuratcly. McNamara welcomed this prospect, as he respected the endeav ors of ONE and
now believed that the influence of the military departments in the N1E process should be diluted,
because he thought "the findings of the different G-2s were not reliable; they tended to be based on
service needs rather than evidence."18 The Secretary of Defense believed this was neither deliberate nor
perfidious; rather it was the result of the natural tendency to allow personal and institutional bias to
influence judgments. It was his task, as the director of the department, to assay to eliminate this
tendentiousness from strategic intelligence assessments. McNamara later recalled:
... I did believe that parlies of interest frequently look at their operations through
rose, what 1 call "rose colored glasses." That started in World War II, it has been true
in every human enterprise that I've ever been part of -- business, academic, military;
and I've always sought to have the evaluation of one's actions made by a person other
than the actor.19
Thus McNamara viewed the Joint Study Group's recommendations to strengthen the USIB as an
opportunity to reduce the evaluative capabilities of the armed services and thereby diminish service bias
from national intelligence products. He believed that the implementation of the recommendations and
17 Personal interview with Roswell Gilpatric, 23 July 1992.
18 Personal interview with Roswell Gilpatric, 23 July 1992.
19 Walter Schneir (ed.), Victnam: A Documentary Collection Westmoreland v. CBS. New
York: Clearwater Publishing, 1985. (Hereafter referred to as Westmoreland ). Deposition of Robert S.
McNamara, fiche no. 331, pp. 87-88.
the resulting reduction of the role of the military departments in strategic intelligence would ultimately
produce "more objective analysis in the intelligence function.""0 Thus, McNamara endorsed the
recommendations of the Joint Study Group.
His motive in this was clear: to improve the quality of national intelligence products. This was
important to McNamara for two reasons: the first strategic, the second budgetary. With regard to the
former, upon assuming office McNamara commissioned an ambitious "general reassessment of our
military forces in relation to our national security policies and objectives."Sparked partially by John
Kennedy's campaign attacks on the "massive retaliation" doctrine of the Eisenhow er administration and
partially by McNamara's natural inquisitiveness, this w as nothing less than a w holesale re-examination
of American strategic thinking. NIEs plavcd a crucial role in this strategic reappraisal. As
assessments of current international situations and predictors of future developments, NIEs arc the
foundation of any critical examination of American military strength. This is because military
strength is inherently a relative perception: comprised of subjective judgments concerning enemy
capabilities and intentions and American vulnerabilities." The conflict within the intelligence
community over crucial NIEs concerning Sov iet strategic capabilities (NIE-11 -4s) which marked the
"missile gap" era precluded such a strategic reassessment. With Russian capabilities in doubt.
American military strength was indeterminable. Thus McNamara was acutely aware of the need to
develop a consensus within the intelligence community concerning the Soviet strategic threat
concomitant with his general reassessment of U.S. military posture. Conflict w ithin the USIB needed
to be mitigated and the accuracy and reliability of its estimates refined. The recommendations of the
Joint Study Group appeared to be an effective means to this end.
Second, with McNamara's encouragement, Hitch and Enthoven were developing a revolutionary
methodology to link long-range military planning to short-term budgeting. Eventually know n as the
Planmng-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS), the procedure was intended to replace the past
practice of setting arbitrary budget ceilings for the armed services (within which the services had broad
spending discretion) with a more rational process. In the succinct phrase of its progenitors. PPBS was
intended to determine "How much is enough?"2' To this end, the system employed military-economic
studies to compare alternative means of achieving national security objectives based on cost-
effectiveness. Military decisions on force structure, strategic programs, and w eapons systems would be
ev aluated on economic criteria and subjected to systems analysis within rolling fivc-vear planning
cycles, instead of per annum. An essential requirement for the introduction of PPBS was authoritative,
long-range NIEs: estimates that were not readily av ailable in early 1961. McNamara and his staff
attempted to rectify this situation. Rosvvell Gilpatric recalled:
20 Personal interv iew w ith Rosw cll Gilpatric, 23 July 1992.
21 McNamara, Essence ofSecurity, p. 71.
22 Frccdman, Soviet Strategic Threat, pp. 5-7.
23 See Enthov en and Smith, How Mitch Is Enough? pp. 124-56.
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Well, first of all, McNamara set out to broaden and redirect the flow of intelligence
between the Pentagon and the CIA. He was not satisfied simply with the standard
A pe of NIE, and he made it a point to go ewer, as we did on several occasions, and
sit down with Allen Dulles and try to find out how things really happened: Who did
what to what in the CIA . . . We didn't have DIA then, and we had the arms', navy,
and air force all writing their pet hobbies as far as particular estimates. And then the
agency insisted at that stage on never going very much beyond the sort of short time
limits of prediction. It took McNamara quite a while to get them to conform and
time phase their estimates with his five-year planning cycle [required by PPBS).
Fir e years, they didn't want to give that kind of estimate. So he spent a lot of time
on that. He began, in his characteristic fashion, to ask small questions.24
Thus the success of PPBS was directly linked to the ability of the intelligence community to
concur on durable threat assessments. Again, the recommendations of the Joint Study Group appeared
to enhance the ability to the USIB to produce the desired assessments.
After considering the recommendations and debating their merits w ith Solis Honvitz at OMPOS,
in early February 1961 McNamara arrived at the conviction that the aims of the Joint Study Group
could best be achieved through the establishment of a consolidated Defense Intelligence Agency, in
the creation of the DIA McNamara saw the opportunity both to remove the evaluative and
interpretative capabilities from the armed services and to replace the three oft-feuding sen ice members
on the USIB with a single representative from the new agency (supplanting the JCS representative
proposed by the Joint Study Group). The former would consolidate the estimative function,
eliminating redundancy and increasing efficiency; the latter would reduce military representation on the
USIB, mitigating bureaucratic conflict and thereby allowing it to take a stronger management role
within the intelligence community. McNamara believed that the cumulative effect of these measures
would foster the creation of authoritative NIEs, the assessments so crucial to his strategic reappraisal.
This was Robert McNamara's primary objective in establishing the DIA: the reduction of service bias
in national intelligence products. He would later write:
I believed that removing the preparation of intelligence estimates from the control of
the military sen ices would reduce the risk that sen ice biases — unconscious though
they might be -- w ould color the estimates. [Emphasis his own]25
24 Transcript, Roswell Gilpatric oral history interview, 5 May 1970. by Dennis O'Brien. JFK
Library.
25 Personal correspondence w ith author, 16 February 1990. Also see USC (87/2) House Armed
Sendees. Hearings, p. 6710.
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At risk of simplification, McNamara hoped to force the Pentagon to speak with one voice, as
opposed to many. The proposed agency would be potent and autonomous; in the w ords of Roswcll
Gilpatric, "a self-contained operating group with an independent identity."7" Initially, the Secretary of
Defense was inclined to establish the DIA under the auspices of the OSD. rather than the JCS, as such
an organizational arrangement was consistent not only with the historical propensity to centralize
common military functions under the authority of the Secretary of Defense but also with McNamara's
personal desire to assert firm control over the new agency. Well aware that OSD had been poorly
served by both the JIG and the J-2. McNamara was determined to make the DIA responsive to the
intelligence needs of the Secretary of Defense. By establishing the agency under his office, McNamara
could ensure that the DIA would first be responsive to the strategic intelligence requirements his office;
the tactical needs of the JCS and the military departments would be ancillary. "McNamara was just not
satisfied with the intelligence product he was getting," Roswell Gilpatric recalled. "He wanted
someone with primary allegiance to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, not the armed services."'"
It must be recognized that McNamara's motives in this were not entirely altruistic. The removal of
the military departments from the L'SIB would enhance the influence of the representative of the
Secretary of Defense, and thereby increase McNamara's pow er over the Board. Moreover, as previously
noted, McNamara's "activ e management" philosophy sought to restrict decision-making to a handful of
top executives: namely, the Secretary of Defense and his civilian deputies. Hence, authority was to be
centralized in the OSD. To achieve this, McNamara employed a time-honored method which had
serv ed him w ell at the Ford Motor Company: control access to information. By concentrating data
and ev idence — intelligence — in the OSD and its subordinate components, the Secretary could justify
controversial decisions as as based upon superior information. Since this information would be
unav ailable to opponents, dissent would be effectively mitigated. To many in the military this method
of management was at best, undemocratic; at worst. Machiavellian. The advice of career military
officers could be shunted by inexperienced bureaucratic managers. Consequently, military leaders
tended to the view the establishment of a central military intelligence agency directly under the OSD as
yet another insidious method of concentrating knowledge and power in the hands of imperious
civilians.
McNamara hoped that the DIA would eliminate, or at least drastically reduce, duplication within
the military intelligence effort. As previously noted, under the National Security Act, as amended, the
Secretary of Defense has the legal authority to initiate military reorganization so long as the ostensible
justification is "to eliminate duplication." This was the thrust of the McCormack-Curtis amendment:
reform in the name of efficacy. Not surprisingly, Pentagon memoranda and the statements of defense
officials stress the "elimination of unnecessary duplication" to "provide more effective, efficient, and
economical administration in the Department of Defense" as the central objectiv e in establishing the
DIA.78 The statements were a legal necessity . However, this work argues that these objectives,
economy and efficiency, were in fact peripheral: for McNamara, efficacy was subordinate to NIE
26 Personal interview with Roswell Gilpatric, 23 July 1992.
27 Personal interview with Roswell Gilpatric, 23 July 1992.
28 USC (87/2) House Armed Services. Report, p. 6605.
reform. Authoritative threat assessments were essential for his strategic reappraisal and the success of
PPBS. This thesis is supported by the McNamara's subsequent decisions: as the dissertation will
detail, the Secretary later acquiesced to questionable JCS proposals for nominal improvements in the
areas of"efficiency" and "elimination of duplication," yet he was intransigent in his advocacy of
measures designed to reduce military influence on national intelligence products. Nevertheless, the
"elimination of duplication" dominated Pentagon rhetoric and documents on the proposed agency,
leading many to mistakenly concluded that greater efficacy was McNamara's paramount purpose in
establishing the DIA. As will be shown, this rhetoric was disingenuous.
On 8 February 1961 McNamara formally endorsed the recommendations of the Joint Study Group
and directed the JCS to submit within thirty days a concept proposal, draft Defense Department
directive, and lime-phased implementation schedule for the creation of "a Defense Intelligence Agency
which may include the existing National Security Agency, the intelligence and counterintelligence now-
handled by the military departments, and the responsibilities of the Office of the Assistant to the
Secretary, Special Operations."29 He instructed the JCS to ensure that the the organizational charter
was drafted with the proviso that the director of the DIA should be one of the two military
representatives on the USIB; an indication of the importance he attached to this reform. Despite
McNamara's predilection to establish the agency under the auspices of OSD, he allowed the JCS to
consider alternative locations w ithin Defense Department, provided that new legislation was not
required for placement. This stipulation effectively ruled out placing the DIA within the Joint Staff,
for its size w as strictly limited by Congress. McNamara's directive preempted the belated efforts of the
JCS to formulate their own response to the JSG recommendations, requested by former Secretary of
Defense Thomas Gates. Now military leaders were forced to react to the Secretary's initiative.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Military Intelligence Agency
After receiving the recommendations of the Joint Study Group from outgoing Secretary of Defense
Thomas Gates in early January, the JCS distributed copies to the military departments for comment.
Thereafter, each service prepared its own response to the proposals. The Army and the Air Force
submitted concept papers to the JCS on 6 January and 17 January 1961, respectively. The Navy failed
to submit a concept proposal, apparently as a sign of its resolute opposition to the consolidation of
military intelligence operations. On 18 January the director of the Joint Staff (J-2) first met w ith
representatives of the military departments to discuss the recommendations and concept papers. After
several meetings, the Joint Staff and the armed services agreed to endorse a series of minor reforms,
including proposals to integrate the separate current intelligence efforts of the sendees and the
formation of a joint military intelligence requirements facility. The military departments, however,
opposed the consolidation of military membership on the USIB recommended by the Joint Study
29 Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Establishment of a Defense intelligence Agency," 8
February 1961 (Declassified at request of author) p. I.
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Group and expressed their desire to maintain the present system of individual representation. All
concurred that the reforms should be implemented in a deliberate manner in order to avoid unnecessary
disruption of existing intelligence operations. In order to safeguard service prerogatives, the
participants proposed that this agency be supervised by a Military Intelligence Board (MIB) composed
of the intelligence chiefs of the armed sen ices. The Secretary of Defense would delegate authority to
the MIB to make decisions in the name of the JCS on intelligence matters with a majority votes.
Significantly, the military organizations disagreed or er the proposed location of the new intelligence
agency. The Air Force and the Joint Staff proposed that the agency be housed within the Joint Staff;
the Army, Navy, and Marines preferred that it be established under the auspices of the JCS.The
dispute over the location of the agency appeared minor prima facie, but veiled a deeper matter of
import.
The Army and Navy were apprehensive of the motives of the Air Force in intelligence reform.
They suspected that the Air Staff viewed the recommendations of the Joint Study as an opportunity to
expand their influence over strategic intelligence. Since the majority of military intelligence analysts
were affiliated with the Air Force — due to the the hegemony of the department in strategic targeting --
the many in the other armed sen ices feared that the Air Force would dominate a consolidated military
intelligence agency. This trepidation was reinforced by the fact that Air Force officers were among the
most vocal proponent of the integration of military intelligence. Admiral Samuel D. Frankel, the
DIA's first chief of staff, recalled:
Long before the Defense Intelligence Agency was established, there were a few
spokesmen in the Air Force who had sponsored this type of thing, and by the way
they went about it the Arm)' and Navy appeared to suspect that the Air Force w anted
to capture the intelligence field and that it would be used for the aggrandizement and
more power by the Air Force. This went on all the time. . . So that w hen the DIA
was first established, there was a lingering suspicion that this was something which
the Air Force had brought about."
Accordingly, these skeptics perceived the Air Force to proposal to house the new intelligence
agency within the Joint Staff as a bureaucratic gambit to gain control over not only the intelligence
agency, but the Joint Staff as well. In particular, the Navy, with the bitter taste of the creation of the
JSTPS (and the consequent usurpation of Polaris targeting by the Air Force) still lingering in its
collective mouth, viewed the Air Force proposal with cynicism. The admirals, led by Chief of Naval
Operations Arlcigh A. Burke, regarded the motives of the Air Force as purely hegemonic. It was a
conviction they would not soon forsake.
30 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1JCS 2031/1541. "Report by the J-2 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on
Control and Coordination of Military Intelligence by the JCS," 31 January 1961 (Declassified at
request of author) pp. 1103-09.
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Transcript, Rear Admiral Samuel B. Frankel, p. 452.
This is how matters stood when the JCS received McNamara's directive on 8 February 1994. The
military leaders were shocked at the lev el of integration the Secretary desired. McNamara w anted to
establish a strong central intelligence organization with potent authority; the JCS preferred a weak
agency with restricted jurisdiction. The McNamara proposal was anathema to many military men
because it threatened the domains and autonomy of the service intelligence components. Military
leaders thought that some form of consolidation was an ineluctable consequence of the Joint Study
Group report, yet they were determined to dilute the outcome in order to preserve their influence over
the intelligence process. They promptly decided to submit the present reform plan, essentially
unaltered, to the Secretary of Defense in spite of the fact that it w as far more modest than the proposals
he had suggested. (McNamara's stipulation that the creation of the new intelligence agency must not
require additional legislation resolved the remaining issue of contention among the military, as it
effectively excluded the Air Force proposal to house the intelligence organization wa thin the Joint Staff
from consideration, much to the relief of Army and Navy officers.) The JCS appeared to adopt a
policy of restrained opposition to the ambitious reform program of the Secretary of Defense. The risk
in this strategy was manifest, and explicitly stated to the JCS in a memorandum from the Director of
J-2 (Intelligence), Joint Staff:
In some specific areas of intelligence activity, such as counterintelligence and
technical intelligence, it is possible that the Joint Chiefs of Staff may wish to
submit a reclama on certain aspects of the concept enunciated by the Secretary of
Defense in his memorandum. However, the risks inherent in making any reclama
should be carefully considered, since efforts to minimize the degree of integration
contemplated might well result in a decision to place the D1A outside the jurisdiction
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.33
On 2 March 1961, the JCS submitted the concept paper and draft Defense Department directive
requested by McNamara to the OSD.33 The military leadership formally proposed that a Military
Intelligence Agency [MIA) with limited authority and discretion be established under their direct
control.34 They recommended that the director, deputy director, and chief of staff be military officers
from separate services on active duty; appointed by and accountable to the JCS. The proposed agency
would serve as "coordinating and planning" body for military intelligence, responsible for suggesting
areas wherein the integration or cooperation of service activities might be profitable. The JCS
recommended that the agency be established on a flexible time-phased implementation schedule, in
order to avoid a disruption of the intelligence efforts of the services. Apart from the creation of a
32 Deane Allen, DIA, p. 36.
33 The first cut was Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS 2031/159], "Establishment of a Military
Intelligence Agency," 27 February 1961 (Declassified at request of author). The final submission was
Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCSM-117-61 ]. "Establishment of a Military Intelligence Agency," 2 March
1961 (Declassified at request of author).
34 The difference in names is significant. Within the Pentagon, the term "defense" had
connotations associated w ith civilian authority; "military" was unambiguous. The distinction is
illustrative of the disparate perceptions of both parties regarding the mission of the agency.
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central intelligence collection requirements facility and a current intelligence center, decisions on the
precise activities of the MIA were to be held in abeyance until further studies could be undertaken. To
ensure that the MIA was responsive to the needs of the armed services, the JCS proposed:
To assist and advise the Director, MIA, in establishing and operating the Agency, and
to facilitate the achievement of the objectives stated above there shall be established,
immediately upon the approval of the concept, a Military Intelligence Board. This
board, which will be chaired by the Director, MIA, will consist of the Service
Intelligence Chiefs, the J-2 Joint Staff, and upon transfer of the NSA to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Director, NSA.
As the abov e excerpt suggests, the JCS recommended that the NSA be immediately placed under their
direct control and that the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) be
abolished, its functions transferred to the Joint Staff. On the important issue of USIB representation,
the JCS concluded:
It is essential that the Director, MIA, be designated a member of the United Slates
Intelligence Board (USIB), and that the other Department of Defense representativ es
continue as members until such a time as the integration of military intelligence and
counterintelligence functions has progressed to such a degree that Service
participation on the USIB is no longer useful.'6
It is difficult to regard the JCS proposal as anything other than cynical and self-serving. Even a
cursory review of the JCS memorandum reveals the true nature of the MIA: it was intended to be a
powerless coordinating forum in an effort to preserve the intelligence prerogatives of the JCS and
armed services. The v ery name of the organization — the Military Intelligence Agency — signified the
resolve of the armed services to maintain primacy. The proposal was not directed at true integration,
but superficial consolidation. The agency was to be assigned what one senior military intelligence
officer called "mundane and trivial" responsibilities (that is, the coordination of current intelligence
publications and collection requirements).'" Its director was to control only the sparse resources
assigned to MIA; his authority over other military intelligence components was confined to "review
and coordination." As a practical matter, he would have no power over the Joint Staff, the service
intelligence components, and the NSA, for they were beyond his executive jurisdiction. In fact, the
36 JCSM-117-61, Appendix, p. 1.
36 JCSM-117-61, Appendix, p. 2.
37 Confidential interview, retired Navy admiral and former DIA official. McNamara was
particularly alarmed that the mission of the agency stipulated: "The military departments shall
continue to acquire, produce, and disseminate military intelligence and counterintelligence as required in
the fulfillment of their assigned departmental missions, and shall participate in joint intelligence
activities as required." He feared that the services would continue to conduct business as usual. See
JCSM-117-61, Appendix, p. 10.
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director would not be able to exert full control over his own agency; his administration of the meager
MIA was to be supervised by the MIB, an agent of the armed services. The inescapable conclusion is
that the authority of the Director of the MIA was titular.
Furthermore, the JCS proposal for USIB reform would actualh increase military representation on
the USIB -- in contradistinction to the recommendations of the Joint Study Group -- by preserving full
service membership while adding a representative from the MIA. Although the JCS proposed to
eliminate the service participation on the USIB in the indefinite future, when it was no longer
"useful," the stipulation was sufficiently ambiguous as to cause many in OSD to doubt that the reform
would ever be willingly implemented. The JCS proposal for direct control over the N'SA appeared to
be a blatant bureaucratic power play. McNamara had instructed the JCS to consider the functions of
the NSA only within the context of a expansive consolidation of Defense Department intelligence
activities; a consolidation which the JCS ultimately spurned. Nonetheless, they seized the
opportunity to attempt to gain operational control over the NSA, an organization they had long
coveted, presenting a dubious rationale on suspect legal grounds. '8 (It should be recalled that control of
the AFSA, the NSA's predecessor, was removed from the JCS as a result of its disregard for civilian
intelligence requirements during the Korean War. The JCS offered no assurances that such neglect
could be prevented.)
Thus the ambitious vision of a reorganized military intelligence system of Robert McNamara met
the cold reality of the entrenched interests of the military departments. Where McNamara desired
consolidation, the services preferred confederation. Where McNamara wanted control, the services
proposed coordination. Each embraced a competing paradigm: McNamara, that of a potent central
manager of military intelligence operations, dedicated to the production of accurate and durable National
Intelligence Estimates, responsive to the strategic and budgetary planning requirements of the Secretary
of Defense; the JCS, that of a meager coordinating agency, devoted largely to the integration of minor
intelligence functions, subordinate to the military departments. Each side possessed legitimate
concerns about the compatibility of intelligence products to the discrete needs of their organizations.
However, it must be recognized that each side tenaciously pursued a political agenda, designed to
fortify its own bureaucratic position and influence the intelligence process in accordance w ith its needs
and preferences. The organizational theorist David Kozak astutely remarked:
38 The JCS argued that the NSA should be placed under their control to "preclude precipitous
reorganization of military intelligence activities at the initiation of hostilities." The argument
presumes that reorganization would be both imperative and expeditious, and neglects the more
immediate intelligence requirements of peacetime. National Security Council Intelligence Directive
No. 6 prescribes that the Secretary of Defense w ill be the executive agent of the government for the
conduct of COMINT/ELINT activities and for the maintenance and operation of NSA. The directive
allows the Secretary of Defense to delegate, in whole or in part, his authority over the Director, NSA.
However, the legality of permanent assignment of this authority to JCS is questionable, for it
circumvents the spirit of the directive: that of civilian control over American COMINT/ELINT
activities.
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Organizational change is neither a technical nor neutral exercise -- it is the object of
intense political pressure, conflict, and turmoil. Reorganizations hare political
purposes: They are not undertaken simply to conform to abstract principles; they
arc proposed and adopted not or therapeutic reasons, but for political reasons with
political purposes.39
Thus the sound and fury which marked the conflict over the reorganization of American defense
intelligence concealed pragmatic political considerations.
Conflict
The struggle oxer the future of defense intelligence w as made public in late March in a two-part
series by the respected military correspondent Hanson Baldw in in the New York Times. In pieces
sympathetic to the military, Baldwin outlined the McNamara proposals and argued that the potential
gains of centralization "arc far outweighed" by the possible risk. Echoing the criticism of many
military officers, Baldwin asserted that historically intelligence was a function of command (despite the
fact that the 1958 Reorganization had remoxed the military departments from the chain of command),
and therefore a scrx ice prcrogatix c. He also expressed the fear that the proposed consolidation, by
strengthening the role of OSD. would allow political considerations to unduly influence the
intelligence process. Baldwin concluded:
It is the trend of human nature — hard to resist — to interpret facts xx ith preconceix ed
prejudices. It must be guarded against to the utmost in our intelligence xxork. The
proposed merger of our sendee intelligence sections xvould facilitate the error rather
than reduce it. The old American principle of checks and balances is as applicable to
intelligence collection and ex aluation as it is to administration.40
Of course, Baldxx in failed to observe the high costs of this pluralism: profligate inefficiency and
redundancy. The articles xxerc notable not for force of argument, but as an indication that the military
would employ all means ax ailable to press their case.
39 Dax id C. Kozak, "The Bureaucratic Politics Approach: The Exolution of the Paradigm," in
Keagle and Kozak, Bureaucratic Politics and National Security, p. 10.
40 New York Times, "Intelligence I: Merger of Separate Sen ice Agencies Is Being Proposed To
Curb Rix alrics," 27 March 1961 (6:3); and "Intelligence II: Major Dangers Scented In Merger of
Serxices," 28 March 1961 (9:1).
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A shrewd bureaucrat, McNamara immediately recognized the MIA proposal for what it was: a
paper tiger. On 3 April 1961, McNamara sent a memorandum to the Chairman of ihc .ICS Genera!
Lyman Lemnitzer w hich requested detailed answ ers to a series of questions concerning the proposed
MIA. His motive in this was two-fold: the first managerial: to gather as much information as
possible before making a decision; the second political: to subtly alert the military leaders that he
knew the game, that he was aware of the issues and prerogatives involved in the reorganization of
military intelligence and could not be easily misled. Thus he confronted the JCS on the proposed
MIA: Why the change in name? What is the distinction between military and defense intelligence?
Why place the agency under the command of the JCS'.' What arc the actual functions of the agency and
the precise authority of its director? How long exactly will it take the agency to assume full control of
its assets? What are the real functions of the MIB'.' How soon can Defense Department representation
on the US1B be reduced from six to two?
McNamara was not impressed with the responses he received from the JCS in a 13 April
memorandum.41 The answers confirmed the suspicions of the the Secretary of Defense and his staff:
the director of the MIA would have little power oxer the intelligence elements of the Joint Stall' and
the armed services, as his authority was confined to "monitoring closely those intelligence activities
that would remain under the Services. This coordinating role of the director would be directive in
nature."4: McNamara correctly feared that the JCS concept was intended to lay the foundation for a
"confederation" of defense intelligence activities, w herein the autonomy and discretion of the separate
military organizations for the most part would be preserved, rather than the true "consolidation" he
desired. This fear was exacerbated by the fact that many vital decisions regarding the MIA -- the
precise resources to be transferred to MIA, the timetable for such transfers, the tenure of the MIB, and
an effective dale for the reduction of military representation on the L'SIB -- were to be held in abeyance
until after the MIA was established. McNamara believed that the JCS were stonewalling. His
competent deputy Roswcll Gilpatric, who repeated warned the Secretary that the most effective tactic of
the military leaders to resist disagreeable civilian policies was bureaucratic footdragging, agreed. Given
the brief tenure of civilian policymakers in the Defense Department (whose average time in office was
just over two years) and the possibility of a new administration (presumably, with new defense
policies) every four years, the military could often obstruct the implementation of policies that they
opposed through procrastination and torpid execution. They simply outlasted their civilian foes.
"Civilians come and go," Frank Collbohm, the founder of the prestigious Air Force think-tank the
RAND Corporation, once remarked. "The Air Force slays forever."4® Similarly, Gilpatric advised the
new Secretary of Defense: "The JCS consistently prevail by simply digging in their heels.'"4 The
lesson was not lost on Robert McNamara, a veteran of the internecine bureaucratic wars at the Ford
Motor Company.
41 The queries and responses are given in Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS 2031/166), "Establishment of
a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)," 13 April 1961 (Declassified at request of author), pp. 1199-1214.
42 JCS 2031/166, p. 1205.
43 Quoted in Kaplan, Wizards ofArmageddon, p. 56.
44 Personal interview with Roswell Gilpatric, 23 July 1992.
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The merits of the competing McNamara and JCS proposals were hotly debated in the Pentagon,
where the bureaucratic infighting was exceptionally fierce.45 The dispute simmered throughout the
spring of 1961, abiding amid the political fallout from the Bay of Pigs incident of April. Despite
claims to the contrary, the failed invasion of Cuba was neither the catalyst for the creation of the DIA
nor did it play a decisive role in its organization.46 Its import should not be exaggerated. "A brick
through the window," McGcorgc Bundy, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, would later refer to the incident among friends, implying that the damage was easily repaired.4^
By May, two issues had emerged as pivotal to the controversy over the military intelligence
organization: the placement of the proposed agency and the substance of USIB reform. The first was
significant because the location of the intelligence agency would greatly affect the character of its
operations. If established under the auspices of the JCS, the agency was likely to be primarily
concerned with operational requirements of the Joint Staff; if established under the Secretary of
Defense, the agency was likely to serve the policy planning needs of the OSD. The second was
important because the reduction of military representation on the USIB was vital to McNamara's
endeavors to mitigate service bias in threat assessments and enable the Board to take a more active
management role in military intelligence operations. The military leaders, particularly Chief of Naval
Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke and the Chairman of the JCS General Lyman Lemnitzcr, were
inimical to both USIB objectives.
In early June McNamara and Gilpatric moved to resolve the contentious matter of the location of
the proposed agency. After considerable debate, McNamara acceded to the JCS stipulation that the DIA
45 Corson, Armies of Ignorance, pp. 387-88.
48 For contrary claims see Glenn P. Hastcdt (ed.), Controlling Intelligence. London: Frank Cass
and Co., 1991, pp. 35-37; Corson, Armies ofIgnorance, pp. 386-91; Jeffreys-Jones, CIA and
American Democracy, p. 123.
In the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy asked Genera! Maxwell Taylor to perform
a post-mortem on the failed operation. Taylor concluded: "Although intelligence was not perfect...
we do not feci that any failure of intelligence contributed to the defeat [of the rcbelsj." Quoted in Luis
Aguilar, Operation Zapata: The "Ultrasensitive " Report and Testimony of the Board of Inquiry on the
Bay of Pigs. Frederick, MD: Alethcia, 1981, p. 42. Nonetheless, the President was disappointed
w1th the actions of the CIA before and during the operation. He subsequently asked Arthur Schlesingcr
to evaluate the performance of the intelligence community in the fiasco. However, the Schlesingcr
inquiry excluded military intelligence. See White House, "Memo to the President: CIA
Reorganization," 30 June 1961 (Declassified 12 May 1983) DDRS: 1988-2808. In conversations in
the spring on 1961 with JFK on intelligence matters, Schlesingcr does not recall any remarks on the
DIA. Personal interview with Arthur Schlcsingcr, 20 July 1992. McNamara claims that the Bay of
Pigs had no impact on deliberations over the DIA. Personal correspondence with Robert McNamara,
16 February 1990. Gilpatric agrees with his former boss, calling the failed invasion "an aberration; a
separate issue." Personal interview with Roswell Gilpatric, 23 July 1992. The incident may hav e had
a marginal impact; confirming the decision to establish the agency.
47 Quoted in Dav id Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest. New York: Random House, 1969, p.
86.
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report to the Secretary of Defense through the JCS, rather than report directly to the OSD.48 In this
context, "through" means that the JCS can not wield operational command in its own right; rather, it
issues orders in the the name of the Secretary of Defense or the President. Yet this is mere bureaucratic
obfuscation: for practical purposes, the chain of command would run from the Secretary of Defense to
the JCS to DIA.4" In fact, the DIA would operate under the direct supervision of the JCS. It w as an
momentous concession, with important consequences. McNamara must have realized that the
concession would impair his ability to control the agency and consequently its responsiveness to his
policy requirements. In a 6 July 1961 memorandum to President Kennedy, McNamara justified the
decision thus: "the DoD [Department of Defense] intelligence function is inextricably linked to the
strategic planning functions of the JCS and to the combatant responsibilities of the unified
commanders. On the balance, I have concluded that the best solution is to place DIA under the Joint
Chiefs of Staff."5'3 A senior military officer involved in the debate concurred, remarking that the
decision was based on "practical, rather than political considerations."5'
High-ranking civilian officials, however, have subsequently stated that this justification was
specious; that the concession was motivated largely by political concerns. They observe that given
the intensity of the military opposition to intelligence reorganization, this operational arrangement
was the only tenable means for McNamara to gain the support of the JCS in this endeavor. Thc\
suggest that McNamara conceded functional control of the DIA to the JCS in exchange for their
support in his effort to reform the USIB.'" The argument is plausible. There is little doubt that this
concession represented a significant departure from McNamara's previous position that the agency be
established directly under his aegis. It is unlikely that the Secretary would surrender this stipulation in
15 The proposal was contained in the JCS draft DOD directive of 2 March 1961; "The chain of
command shall run from the Secretary of Defense, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Director,
MIA. Guidance to the Director, MIA, shall be issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." JCSM-117-61,
Annex A, p. 11. Lest there be any confusion on operational matters, the directive stated: "the
Military Intelligence Agency is hereby established as an agency of the Department of Defense under the
direction, authority, and control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." JCSM-117-61, Annex A, p. 11. This
text was retained in the final directive of 1 August 1961.
Some commentators, notably those of the Church Committee, have erroneously identified this
arrangement as a "compromise," on the mistaken belief that the original JCS proposal called for the
agency to be set up directly under the Joint Staff. Seen in this faulty light, the "through" arrangement
appears to be a compromise. However, this interpretation is contrary to the evidence presented abo\ e.
I have called McNamara's decision a "concession," rather than a "compromise," in the interest of
accuracy.
49 USC (87/2) House Armed Sen ices. Hearings, p. 6763.
50 Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Memorandum to the President: The Establishment of a
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)," 6 July 1961, p. 3. DDRS: 1986-85.
51 Personal interview with Lt. General William Quinn, 8 May 1992.
52 Confidential interviews with former Defense Department officials. This quidpro quo was
acknow ledged by McNamara in a congressional appearance six days after the formal establishment of
the agency. Noting the historic opposition of armed sen ices to all previous efforts at centralization,
one congressman asked the Secretary of Defense if an earlier claim that the JCS "wholeheartedly"
supported the new agency was true. McNamara replied, "Yes. One of the reasons, of course, is that wc
propose that this new agency operate under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff so they will have
full opportunity to shape its operation." [Italics added) Sec USC (87/1) Senate Government
Operations. Hearings: National Policy Machinery. Washington: GPO, 1961. p. 1123.
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the absence of a commensurate concession from the military leaders. USIB reform was the only matter
that possessed equable importance to McNamara. A quidpro quo appears probable.
Irrespective of the verity of this claim, there is no doubt that McNamara personally insisted that
the new organization be called the Defense Intelligence Agency , to ensure that there would be no
confusion that it was intended to serve both civilian and military requirements. He assented to the JCS
proposal to establish a MIB, but he confined it to an advisory role on an interim basis. He rejected the
military proposal to place the NSA under the control of the JCS, preferring to keep American SIGINT
activities under his authority and direction.53 Although the location of the agency was now decided, the
thorny matter of the resources and functions of the agency remained unresolved.54
By mid-June 1961, the deliberations over the DIA had attracted the attention of Dr. James Killian
of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). The PFIAB (formerly the President's
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities [PBCFIA] during the Eisenhower
administration) was a deliberative body composed of distinguished private citizens which met
periodically to report to the President on the performance of the U.S. intelligence community.
Kennedy's distaste for formal policymaking structures had initially caused him to disregard the Board;
consequently, it was "lying moribund and ignored, waiting for formal termination" in the early months
of the new administration.53 Yet the Bay of Pigs incident endowed the Kennedy administration with
new-found respect for the national security apparatus, and the PFIAB was revived and given far-
reaching oversight responsibilities.5" Dr. Killian. the President of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, had been the chairman of the PBCFIA under President Eisenhower and followed the
inquiries of the Joint Study Group with interest. Since the establishment of a central military
intelligence mechanism had been a prominent recommendation of the Joint Study Group, in early June
Killian asked the Secretary of Defense for an appraisal of progress to date. In response, McNamara
presented a briefing on the putative outlines of the DIA to the PFIAB on 30 June 1961. The Board
was favorably impressed with the rudimentary plan and recommended its early adoption.
The PFIAB recommendation provided impetus to settle the remaining disagreement over the DIA.
In a memorandum dated 5 July 1961, Gilpatne formally informed the military departments and the JCS
of the decision of the Secretary of Defense regarding the final form of the DIA, enclosing a DOD draft
53
Though McNamara decided to keep the NSA under his purview, he did establish a study group
(which included representatives from the JCS) to examine the ELINT requirements of the Unified and
Specified Commands to suggest guidelines for the delineation of responsibilities between the NSA and
the service cry ptologic agencies. Office of the Secretary of Defense, 'Theater ELINT Centers (U)," 7
July 1961 (Declassified at request of author) pp. 1-2. In August, McNamara ordered a far reaching
reorganization of the NSA to strengthen the control of its director over defense ELINT and cryptologic
resources. Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Memorandum to the President," 21 August 1961
(Declassified at request of author) p. 2.
54 Personal interview with Roswell Gilpatric, 23 July 1992.
56 Quote from Clifford, Counsel to the President, p. 315.
56 The official post-mortem of the Bay of Pigs incident, the Taylor Report (named after its
chairman General Maxwell Taylor), asserted that the failure of the invasion w as due in part to the
absence of formal decision-making bodies which might have reviewed and criticized the operation. Sec
Aguilar, Operation Zapata, pp. 170-220.
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directive for the establishment of the agency for comment. In the memorandum Gilpatric reiterated the
decision to have the DIA report to the Secretary of Defense through the JCS. He wrote:
The principal objectives in establishing a DIA are to obtain unity of effort among
all components of the Department of Defense in developing military intelligence and
a strengthening of the over-all capacity of the Department of Defense for the
collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence information.
Although perhaps of lesser priority, but certainly not of lesser importance, arc the
objectives of obtaining a more efficient allocation of scarce intelligence resources,
more effective management of all DoD intelligence activities, and the elimination of
all duplicating facilities, organizations and tasks.5"
This revealing excerpt buttresses a point made earlier in the chapter, namely that McNamara''s
primary objective in establishing the DIA was the consolidation of military intelligence products;
efficiency was a secondary concern. It is therefore not surprising that the DOD draft directive listed the
first function of the agency as follows: "Develop and produce all DoD intelligence estimates and DoD
information for the United Stales Intelligence Board. Such estimates may indicate differences in
analysis and evaluation."58 Furthermore, the draft directive stipulated thai the director of the DIA be
one of the two military members on the reorganized US1B. It also provided that the DIA would
represent the Defense Department on all USIB subcommittees. In spite of substantial concessions to
the JCS on other matters, notably the operational arrangement of the agency, McNamara clearly sought
to preserve his primary objective to reduce military representation on the USIB.
The draft DOD directive failed to designate the precise functions and responsibilities of the DIA. In
spite of several months of heated debate between the OSD and the JCS, the matter appeared
irresolvable. It was a peculiar dilemma: McNamara and his staff were driving to establish an
organization despite the fact that there was no accord regarding the mission and activities of the agency.
The heart of the dispute between the military and civilians -- what would DIA do? When would it do
it? and most importantly, Who would decide? -- endured. The Gilpatric memorandum shed no light on
this matter, cryptically remarking:
The Defense Intelligence Agency will assume control over certain DOD intelligence
functions and will coordinate and supervise the execution of those DOD intelligence
functions not transferred to DIA. It is envisaged that some DOD intelligence
activities, such as personnel, and industrial security and intelligence training, will
probably be retained in the military departments. While other intelligence functions,
such as technical intelligence and counterintelligence may be transferred in whole or
in part to DIA, for the time being they will continue to be conducted by the military
departments. The draft Directive, of necessity, cannot treat how these and other
57 The Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Establishment of a Defense Intelligence Agency," 5
July 1961 (Declassified at request of author) p. 1.
58 OSD, "Establishment of a Defense Intelligence Agency," p. 7.
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details of DIA are to be implemented. At the time the Directive is signed, a
mechanism will be provided for resolving such problems to the end that DIA may
become fully operational as soon as possible. Mr. McNamara and 1 regard this
objective as a matter of highest priority.59
The response of the JCS to the Gilpatric memorandum was cool. In a reply of 13 July 1961, they
agreed to the above provisions, yet evaded an explicit elucidation of the resources and responsibilities
DLA would assume and refrained from providing a precise definition of its relationship to other military
intelligence organizations. Once again the JCS equivocated, arguing that specific proposals "would be
premature and could prejudice the outcome of the studies to be made after the establishment of the
DIA."50 The bureaucratic shell game continued. Nevertheless, the military leaders presented no
explicit objections to the draft directive.
Compromise
On 1 August 1961 Secretary of Defense McNamara signed DOD Directive 5105.21, 'The Defense
Intelligence Agency" (effective 1 October 1961), a slightly altered version of the Gilpatric draft of 5
July 1961. The directive called for the establishment of the DIA as an agency of the Department of
Defense under the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 and the McCormack-Curtis
amendment. It should be recalled that the amendment stipulated that functions and activities of the
armed services could be consolidated only in the name of promoting efficiency and the reducing
redundancy. Accordingly, the accompanying press release emphasized that the purpose of the agency-
was to achieve a "more efficient allocation of critical intelligence resources and the elimination of
duplicating facilities.""1 However, the specific means that would be employed for this end were
imprecise. The directive prescribed the following operational arrangement:
The chain of command shall run from the Secretary of Defense, through the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to the Director, DIA. Guidance to the Director, DIA, shall be
furnished by the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff acting under the
authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense, and the United States Intelligence
Board.
59 OSD, "Establishment of a Defense Intelligence Agency," p. 2.
60 Quote from Deane Allen, DIA. p. 40.
61 Church Committee. (I) p. 349.
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The DIA was assigned the following responsibililies:
A. The organization, direction, management, and control of all Department of
Defense intelligence resources assigned to or included within the DIA.
B. Review and coordination of those Department of Defense intelligence
functions retained by or assigned to the military departments. Over-all guidance for
the conduct and management of such functions will be developed by the Director,
DIA, for review, approval, and promulgation by the Secretary of Defense.
C. Supervision of the execution of all approved plans, programs, policies, and
procedures for intelligence functions not assigned to DIA.
D. Obtaining the maximum economy and efficiency in the allocation and
management of Department of Defense intelligence resources. This includes analysis
of those DoD intelligence activities and facilities which can be fully integrated or co-
located with non-DoD intelligence organizations.
E. Responding directly to priority requests levied upon the Defense Intelligence
Agency by the USIB.
F. Satisfying the "intelligence" requirements of the major components of
Department of Defense.":
The directive stipulated that the first function of the agency was to "develop and produce all DoD
intelligence estimates and DoD information and contributions to National Intelligence Estimates for
the United States Intelligence Board."6' The directive provided that the Director of the DIA would be
one of the two Defense Department representatives on the USIB. Of the remaining seventeen
functions, most were vague and enigmatic (e.g. "H. Conduct coordinating and planning activities to
achieve the maximum economy and efficiency in the management of all Department of Defense
activities"). The only tasks explicitly defined were those suggested in the JCS proposal of 2 March
1961: the establishment of a single Defense Department Collection Requirements Registry and
Facility, the integration of current intelligence production, and the creation of an Indications Center.
Of course, the ambiguity over specific functions and responsibilities was intentional; after all, this
was the focus of remaining disagreement. Gilpatric had stated in 5 July 1961 memoranda that a
"mechanism will be provided for resolving such problems." He outlined this mechanism in a
memorandum accompanying the 1 August directive.
Despite his initial desire to delineate the functions and responsibilities of the DIA and the armed
services prior to creation, in the end McNamara acceded to the military demand that these matters be
decided on the basis of studies conducted after the creation of the agency. In the 1 August
62 Department of Defense Directive 5105.21, "Defense Intelligence Agency," 1 August 1961
(Declassified at request of author) pp. 2-3.
63 Department of Defense Directiv e 5105.21, pp. 3-5.
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memorandum McNamara announced that a study group would be promptly established to conduct these
examinations. The group was instructed to review military intelligence operations, determine optimal
organizational responsibilities, and recommend the transfer of select intelligence functions to DIA.
Several functions were specifically targeted for possible consolidation into DIA: technical intelligence,
counterintelligence, intelligence mapping and charting, military attaches, and espionage training. The
stud)' group was to operate under the jurisdiction of OMPOS (who would safeguard the interests of the
Secretary of Defense), advised and assisted by the MIB (who would protect service prerogatives). After
completing these studies, the group was instructed to devise a detailed activation plan for the DIA,
stipulating the precise functions that the agency would assume from the armed services and
establishing a reasonable timetable for implementation. This activation plan was to be formulated by
1 October 1961, and submitted through the JCS to the Secretary of Defense for approval.04
Since this study group was tasked to fill in the details of the DIA directive (in effect, constructing
the agency upon the foundations McNamara provided), the composition of the group -- military,
civilian, or a hybrid — became of crucial importance. Many in OSD thought that McNamara should
appoint civilian policymakers and academics to the group. They believed that the military simply
could not be trusted to reform itself. McNamara surprised his staff by deciding that the study group
w ould be composed solely of military officers; officers that would ultimately form the leadership of
new agency. It is curious that McNamara allow ed the future director of an agency to decide the tasks,
assignments, and structure of his own organization. This contradicted the fundamental bureaucratic
canon to divide labor and responsibility and defied the tenets of McNamara's own active management
philosophy. It appears the decision was a combination of the practical and the political: practical in
that the Secretary of Defense could only gain the support of the military for this endeavor if he let
them participate in the planning; political in that McNamara believed that he could appoint military
officers to the planning staff who were sympathetic to his views on consolidation and who could
overcome the pressure from the armed sen ices. This gamble (and a gamble it was) hinged on the man
McNamara chose as the first Director-Designate of the DIA, General Joseph Carroll/5
A highly respected Air Force officer, Carroll began his intelligence career with the FBI and became
a leading assistant to J. Edgar Hoover. After the Second World War he w as transferred to the Air Force
and, in 1947 set up its first security and counter-intelligence section, the Office of Special
Investigations. Commissioned as a colonel, he quickly rose to the rank of lieutenant general, serving
as chief of staff of the United States Air Forces in Europe and deputy inspector general for security of
the Air Force. From 1958 to his appointment as DIA director in 1961, he was the Inspector General
of the Air Force, responsible for investigating suspected security violations. He personally oversaw
the 1960 inquiry into the defection of two NSA analysts, Bcrnon F. Mitchell and William H. Martin,
to the Soviet Union. One high-level Defense Department official at the time called the defections
54 Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Administrative Requirements for the Establishment of a
Defense Intelligence Agency," 1 August 1961 (Declassified at the request of author) pp. 1-3.
65 On 9 August 1961, CJCS Lemnitzer submitted the names of 7 flag officers to McNamara for
consideration as Director, DIA (two Army, two Navy, three Air Force). The nominations were a mere
formality, however, as McNamara had already decided on Carroll. For nominees see Joint Chiefs of
Staff [JCSM 538-61], Lemnitzcr to McNamara, "Nominations for the Position of Director, DIA," 9
August 1961, folder "CCS 5229 (2 August 1961)," box 114, JCS files, National Archives.
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"possibly the worst security breach since Klaus Fuchs gave the Russians the secret of the atom
bomb."66 A lawyer by training and a devout catholic, Carroll was widely admired for his personal
integrity and professional commitment.
Though formally appointed as DIA Director on 12 August 1961, McNamara had approached
Carroll in July 1961, to sound out his qualifications and views.6" The Secretary was impressed by
general's background and commitment to the national interest. McNamara believed Carroll's ei\ ilian
background and professional integrity allowed him to transcend the parochial service perspectives.
Moreover, McNamara felt Carroll's reputation for impartiality and bureaucratic savvy would enable
him to overcome the remaining opposition within the military departments to the new agency. The
Secretary swiftly decided that Carroll was the man he wanted to run the DIA. So great was
McNamara'.s confidence in Carroll and his abilities that he gave him virtually free reign over the
drafting of the activation plan. Gilpatric recalls that the director was given this unprecedented carte
blanche authority because, "McNamara felt Joe Carroll could resist service foot-dragging to guard their
prerogatives.'"58 Although under the provisions of the 1 August 1961 memorandum, McNamara was
to select the deputy and chief of staff from the JCS short list, as a sign of confidence in the new
director he deferred the selection to Carroll. To strike an initial balance between the departments
Carroll chose an Army general for the former and Navy admiral for the latter.'59
Lieutenant General William Quinn was Carroll's choice for deputy director. A former West Point
football star, Quinn specialized in tactical intelligence. He served in G-2 (the intelligence element) of
the Seventh Army during the Second World War, where he helped plan the allied invasion of
Normandy. After the war he served as director of the Strategic Services Unit, an ephemeral precursor of
the CIA. With the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in 1950, Quinn was transferred to the theater,
where he achieved considerable fame as the commander of 17th Infantry Regiment (nicknamed the
"Buffaloes"). During the late nineteen-fifties, he was shuffled between a v ariety of Washington
positions, eventually ending up in 1959 as Chief of Information for the Army. Roswell Gilpatric
knew Quinn from his tenure with the Air Force during the Korean War and recommended him to
McNamara as DIA Director. Yet McNamara was more comfortable with Carroll, for the Secretary
knew him personally, and therefore chose him as director. In the end, Quinn took place in the
bureaucratic race, becoming Carroll's deputy. To round out the command staff, Rear Admiral Samuel
66 Quoted in Bamford, Puzzle Palace, pp. 134-149.
S7 For details of appointment see Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, "Appointment of
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency," 12 August 1961 (No declassification date). Reported in New
York Times, "Intelligence Job Given To General," 13 August 1961 (37:1).
68 Personal interview with Roswell L. Gilpatric, 23 July 1992. McNamara instructed Carroll: "I
am holding you personally responsible for the expeditious establishment of DIA and for the
development of all plans necessary to its activation. Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Specific
Responsibilities of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency," 12 August 1961 (Declassified at request
of author) p. 1.
69 The tenure of the director was four y ears; the deputy director three years; the chief of staff two
years. For details of the Quinn and Frankel appointments see Office of the Secretary of Defense,
McNamara to Lemnitzer, 29 August 1961, folder "CCS 5229 (2 August 1961)," box 114, JCS files.
National Archives. Also see New York Tunes, 'Two Named To Intelligence Posts," 30 August 1961
(10:2).
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Frankel was chosen as the chief of staff. A Russian expert, Quinn served with the Office of Naval
Intelligence (ONI) during World War II. After the war, he w as loaned to the CIA's Office of Research
Estimates (ORE), where he set up the Eastern Europe and USSR desks. Frankel subsequently served
in sundry intelligence-related positions, including deputy director of ONI. He occupied this position in
1960, when he was approached by Carroll and offered the post of DIA chief of staff. Given the
opposition of the Navy to the centralization of intelligence. Quinn's recollection of his response to the
offer is revealing:
1 must say that probably like all the other intelligence officers in the Army and
Navy, I didn't think it would work. I thought that the establishment of another super
intelligence agency would just put more people in at the lop, and that instead of
costing less it would probably cost more, and that each military intelligence agency
was bound by law to serve its own service, and this might degenerate into a watering-
down of intelligence and not calling the shots as they were seen. This was my
feeling.
After I talked with General Carroll, it was quite evident to me that Ins was no
parochial viewpoint. He was a general in the Air Force, but he was an American
patriot who had undertaken this job with the enthusiastic purpose to accomplish the
reason w hy it was established . . . Another word about General Carroll: 1 har e never
worked with a more highly principled and more ethical man in my life. Veiy
thorough, a lawyer be training, I believe he was, a very outstanding lay person in the
Catholic Church, and, in all respects, a considerate, quietly intense patriot as we like
to feel we have them.
It initially appeared that McNamara's gamble paid off. Carroll was able to convince many military
officers w ho were opposed to the consolidation of intelligence in principle to support (or at the v ery
least, acquiesce to) the establishment of the DIA. Even military officers who were otherwise critical of
McNamara and his policies praised his appointment of and deference to General Carroll, conceding that
the Secretary of Defense "had a great v ision to ensure that the Department he was responsible for had
adequate intelligence for tactical and strategic purposes.""1
In early August, Carroll, Quinn, and Frankel, assisted by three colonels (representing the Army,
Air Force, and Marines) and a Navy captain, gathered in a small OMPOS office in the Pentagon to
formulate the activation plan of the DIA. Quinn recalls that they began w ith little more than "a pad
and pencil." Despite this humble beginning, in succeeding days Carroll and his staff assembled a
detailed inventory of all Defense Department intelligence and counterintelligence assets and conducted a
scries of studies designed to give them a comprehensive overview of the militarv intelligence
apparatus: performance, methods, and requirements."2 An additional study contrasted the military
effort with that of the CIA. ' In the middle of August Carroll added nine officers to the staff to
70
Transcript, Rear Admiral Samuel B. Frankcl, pp. 444-46.
71 Confidential interview, senior Army intelligence official.
72 Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, "DoD Intelligence and Counterintelligence
Inventory," 23 August 1961 (Declassified at request of author) pp. 1-3.
73 Personal interv iew with Lt. Gen. William Quinn, 8 May 1992.
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examine current intelligence, production and estimates, and collection requirements, "J The project was
supervised by OMPOS (future Lyndon Johnson aide Joseph Califano acted as liaison) and the MIB
(formally activated 15 August 1961 on ad hoc basis).
In conducting these studies of military intelligence, Carroll and his staff frequently consulted w ith
the armed services. Relations between Carroll and the military departments were cordial; little delay
or stonewalling to requests for information was reported. Nevertheless, opposition to the
establishment of the DIA persisted within the Army and Navy."5 The Director ol" OMPOS Solis
Horwitz, w ho was designated as McNamara's principal staff advisor on the establishment of DIA,
remembered:
... there was considerable opposition. Everybody was afraid ... the opposition came,
generally, from all over. The intelligence function had traditionally been in the
military departments. Everybody yelled, "Oh, it's a function of command!" Well,
you know it took us a long time to get it through to these people and really to get it
clear in our own mind. "Well, gentlemen, we agree with you. What you're
overlooking is that command is not over in this side of the house [that is, the
military departments); it's over here (that is, the Secretary and JCS]. And that's why
vve want to move it over here." Well, this is the type of opposition you got. 1
think, basically, that they didn't wan! to change. By virtue of being in the
intelligence business, the military departments were still in the operational business,
and they wanted to continue to be in the operational business.""
Only the Air Force — perennially seeking to expand its power and influence -- truly endorsed the
creation of the DIA, as it was quick to realize the opportunity the agency presented the young
department to enhance its prestige vis-a-vis the older military scrv ices. Not only did the DIA offer the
Air Force the chance to increase its influence over national intelligence processes and products, but it
allowed the service to transfer many of its intelligence officers from SAC to DIA. Such transfers
effectively reduced the number of intelligence analysts assigned to the Air Force, and enabled the
serv ice to claim, somewhat disingenuously , that it had reduced its personnel requirements accordingly.
Although the alteration was nominal, it was timely, for the Air Force was under pressure from
Congress to limit the explosive growth of its intelligence staff in recent y ears. Both inducements led
74 Defense Intelligence Agency, "Plan for Activ ation of the Defense Intelligence Agency," 29
September 1961 (Declassified at request of author) p. 2.
75 Of the two services, the Navy was most antagonistic to DIA. It is difficult to gauge the depth
of opposition, as military officers tend to mitigate the dispute; referring to the service's position as
"less joint-inclined." Many acknowledged that Naval resistance took the form of footdragging, y et
were quick to sidestep the implications, qualifying the assertion with phrases like: "however, not in
the sense of being detrimental to the agency."
76 Transcript, Solis Horwitz oral history interv iew, pp. 17-18.
77 Confidential interview, senior DIA official. He wryly observed that although the intelligence
analysts assigned to the Air Force Intelligence Center were transferred to DIA, they remained in the
same building in Arlington Hall Station, many at the same desk. They simply changed the sign on
the desk from "Air Force" to "DIA."
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the Air Force to champion the DIA and account for the preponderance of Air Force officers in
management positions throughout the early years of the agency.
Carroll and his staff completed their studies of military intelligence in early September and, based
on these studies, thereafter formulated a number of recommendations which served as the activation
plan for the DIA. 8 Central to these recommendations was the premise that the most effective
procedure for the transfer of intelligence functions to DIA was to remov e a single intelligence activit)
from the military departments or the J-2 and relocate it within DIA. Subsequently, this "core"
component would be supplemented with similar components from other departments until the DIA
possessed and performed the intelligence function in its entirety. An unfortunate consequence of this
process was that the DIA developed unevenly, for functions and their corresponding components were
assimilated at disparate rates. Another important premise of the recommendations was that the DIA
would command unlimited recruiting and transfer powers. As Admiral Frankcl observed:
The idea was the in effecting the Defense Intelligence Agency, the services would
each contribute the best qualified people in all the military intelligence fields. The
director of the Defense Intelligence Agency consulted the other intelligence agencies'
directors, made known his requirements, and 1 must say that they responded with their
best people. General Carroll, at least at the beginning, interviewed every one of the
people who were proposed to him, together with General Quinn and myself, to be
sure that he was getting top-notch people, and he did. Genera! Carroll had the full
backing of the Secretary of Defense and of the White House in everything that he
did."9
Both premises were the foundation of the "Plan for the Activation of the Defense Intelligence
Agency," completed by Carroll and his staff in six weeks, and forwarded to the JCS on 18 September
1961. The JCS concurred with the plan, with minor modifications, and forwarded it to the Secretary of
Defense for approval. McNamara endorsed the plan on 29 September 1961. In its final form, the DIA
activation plan embraced the worthy goal of the full integration of military intelligence functions and
resources, albeit in a deliberate, evolutionary manner. Given that this would take some time to
achieve, for the present the DIA was ordered to assume military planning, coordination, and
management functions. The plan established the DIA as two directorates composed of five offices.
The agency was initially structured as follows:
The Directorate of Acquisitions (DIAAQ), composed of:
The Office of Requirements (DIAAQ-1);
The Office of Collection Management (DIAAQ-2);
78 Personal interview with Lt. General William Quinn, 8 May 1992.
79 Transcript, Rear Admiral Samuel B. Frankel, pp. 447-48.
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The Directorate of Processing, composed of:
The Production Planning Group (DIAAP-I);
The Estimates Office (DIAAP-2); and
The Current Intelligence and Indications Center (DIAAP-3).
The Directorate of Acquisitions was established as the central military repository of collection
requirements. Defense Department agencies w ere to submit intelligence requirements to the Office of
Requirements, where they would be evaluated, prioritized, and assigned to the agency or service with
the appropriate capabilities to fulfill the request. These latter activities were to be superv ised by the
Office of Collection Management. The Directorate of Processing was designated as the locus of
national intelligence production w ithin the Defense Department. Therein, the Production Planning
Group was responsible for conducting a comprehensive examination of the evaluative intelligence
components of the armed sen ices in order that this function could be transferred to DIA, in the form, of
the long-promised Production Center, by the middle of 1962. The remaining offices, Estimates and
Current Intelligence and Indications, were J-2 elements that were simply transferred in their entirety
from the Joint Staff to DIA. The Estimates Office was tasked with representing the DIA in USIB
meetings and advising the Director of the DIA on military contributions to NIEs and SNIEs, The
Current Intelligence and Indications Center maintained a 24-hour Alert Center to monitor international
developments and provided current all-source intelligence bulletins to all concerned national agencies.80
It is noteworthy that the two substantive intelligence activities that the DIA initially assumed —
collection requirements and current intelligence and indications — were those proposed in the original
JCS concept paper of 2 March 1961. This was indicativ e of the triumph of the military leadership. In
fact, the final activation plan for the DIA was a testament to the perseverance of the JCS. The
"compromise" which created the agency clearly favored the JCS. In the end, nearly all the operational
preferences of the military departments and the JCS were adopted: the DIA was established, albeit in
an indirect fashion, under the auspices of the JCS; the service intelligence chiefs were formally
empowered through the MIB to advise and assist the Director of the DIA; the staff of the agency was
largely composed of military men, based not on a career program (which would risk severing the link
between the intelligence officer and his parent service, thus mitigating departmental loyalties81), but
rotational tours of duty; and the devolution of intelligence functions to the DIA would be gradual and
measured. Lest there exist any uncertainty over the deliberate pace of reform, in a memorandum of 3
October 1961 to McGeorgc Bundy, Gilpatric commented:
80 "Plan for Activation of the Defense Intelligence Agency," pp. 3-5; and Memorandum from the
Director Designated, DIA, to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Plan for the
Activation of the Defense Intelligence Agency," 18 September 1961, 39 pages, folder "CCS 5229 DIA
(5 July 1961) Sec 2," box 113, JCS files, National Archives. Also see Deane Allen, DIA, pp. 91-
104.
81 A significant omission from the activation plan was provisions for the cross-servicing of
civilian personnel. See Deane Allen, DIA, p. 59.
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General Carroll has been instructed that in the event any conflicts arise between
meeting the planned activation dates of DIA organizational components and the
effective conduct of Defense intelligence activities, in no case will a planned
activation date take priority.82
There is considerable merit to this provision, as the continuity and the quality of the intelligence
process must be safeguarded. Yet there is also a more subtle aspect of gradual implementation: it
allowed the services to continue to manage reform to ensure that their protected interests were not
threatened. Thus McNamara's v ision of radical reorganization was abandoned for incremental reform.
Consequently, the DIA never achieved nor profited from the organizational impetus that accompanies
drastic change. As one former official remarked: "DIA was born old. McNamara just gathered the
drones and put them all in one building."8'
By design the DIA was a weak creature. The agency was, and here one must risk the unpardonable
truth, largely impotent; its authority fictional; its resources meager. The agency had little statutory
jurisdiction over the military departments, who would continue to exercise considerable discretion in
their espionage activities. The .ICS had succeeded in creating the DIA in their image: as a weak
deliberative body. Aside from executing several minor budgetary functions, the DIA conformed to
McNamara's original v ision only in that the agenev would consolidate military representation on the
USIB. McNamara was to discover, much to his chagrin, that although the military departments had
agreed to this reorganization in principle, they would contest it in practice. This revelation, however,
was still some time away, and in its absence McNamara formally approved the activation of the
Defense Intelligence Agency on 1 October 1961.
82 Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell Gilpatric to McGeorge Bundy, 3 October
1961 (No declassification date) p. 1.
83 Quoted in Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p. 179. The Church Committee elucidated upon this
point: "As a consequence [of starting the DIA slowly], the Agency never had the impetus which many
other newborn government entities have enjoyed and profited from. Dominated and staffed in large part
by the professional military, it is not surprising that DIA has come to concentrate on the tactical
intelligence demands of the services and their field commands." Church Committee. (1) p. 350.
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Chapter Three
Adversity
The Arduous Early Months
As should be apparent from the previous chapter, on paper the DIA was a feeble entity, dependent
upon the military departments and the JCS for intelligence assets and personnel. It was up to Carroll
and McNamara to breathe life into the agency, to make it a viable espionage organization. Carroll,
motivated by his profound conviction that defense intelligence operations could be substantially
improved, essayed to secure sufficient resources for the agency. McNamara. driven by budgetary and
strategic requirement, strove to implement US1B reform. The campaign of the two men w as thwarted
on three fronts, primarily by the temerity and intransigence of the military departments. The firs!
section of the chapter details the endeavors, for the most part in rain, of the director of the DIA to
acquire the necessary men and material to make the agency tenable. It also explores the deleterious
effects of the absence of a putative mission on the inchoate organization. The objectives of the
Secretary of Defense in the reform of the NIE process is explored in the second section. The motives
of hts allies and opponents are recounted, as are their tactics, and the bureaucratic stalemate which
ensued. The third section investigates the role of the DIA in the formulation of the Vict Cong order of
battle estimate, which pitted the agency against a powerful field command. The failure to the DIA to
press its assessments and to assert its authority would have significant repercussions on the American
military effort in Southeast Asia. After chronicling the defeat of the agency on these fronts, the fourth
section surveys congressional concerns over the agency, as expressed in a House Armed Services
inquiry in the spring of 1962. The chapter concludes with an appraisal of the first months of the DIA.
71
Constraints, 1961-62
Although formally activated on 1 October 1961, on that date the DIA was little more than a
skeleton of an organization. Though McNamara had authorized the transfer of 500 personnel (250
military and 250 civilians) from the military departments to the agency, in the early months of October
the actual staff was sparse, consisting of under 25 officers.' Likewise, the physical presence of the
agency was confined: the DIA was located in approximately 2000 square feet of borrowed space at the
Pentagon. At the start of the month only two elements were operational: the Office of Collection
Management and the Production Planning Staff. In line with the "core" component strategy w hich
Carroll and the DIA planning staff had embraced, in mid-October the Estimates Office was partially
activated; its staff for the most part drawn from the J-2 Estimates Division. On 1 November the
Office of Requirements became operational. The office was composed entirely of the Air Force
Requirements Division, located at Arlington Hail Station in Virginia.2 On 5 November 1961, the
largest element of the DIA became operational, the Current Intelligence and Indications Center (CIIC).
The "core" component of the CIIC was the Air Force Warning Division, supplemented by the Current
Intelligence Division of the J-2 and the corresponding elements of the armed services. As a DIA
analyst observed, in effect, the Air Force's current intelligence facility absorbed its Army and Navy
counterparts.1 Thus, by late November the first stage of the activation strategy -- the transferal of
"core" components to DIA - was complete. Yet the second stage of the strategy -- building around
these cores — proved to be problematic, for the armed services delayed in transferring additional
functional elements and their staff to the agency. As a result, the early months of the agency were
marked by a dearth of qualified personnel.
There were several causes for this shortage of staff. First, the activation plan made no provisions
for the cross-servicing of civilian personnel to DIA from the military departments. After some early
confusion, an informal agreement was reached w hereby the armed services loaned or detailed civilians to
the agency. These civ ilian staffers were temporarily processed by OSD's Civ ilian Personnel Office.
Yet the processing procedures were cumbersome, and lengthy transfer delays were frequent. Second, the
service intelligence elements were often understaffed (especially those from J-2) prior to their transfer to
DIA. Third, General Carroll's preoccupation with security, based in part upon his counterintelligence
background and his recent investigation into the two NSA defectors (Bernon F. Mitchell and William
H. Martin), caused him to personally review the transfer of all personnel to DIA. The obvious
consequence of such fastidious v etting was long delays in clearing indiv iduals for assignment to DIAL
1 Office of the Secretary of Defense, ASD (Manpower), "Initial Staffing for Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA)," 16 October 1961, folder "CCS 5229 Defense Communications Agency (5 July 1961)
Sec 2," box 1 14, JCS files. National Archives. The DIA was assigned 54 officers from the Army and
Navy respectively, and 64 from the Air Force.
? OSD, ASD (Manpower), "Initial Staffing for Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)," 16 October
1961.
3 George Allen, The Indochina Wars, 1950-75. Unpublished manuscript. Exhibit No. 1829,
fichc nos. 879-881, Westmoreland, p. 171.
4
Interviews, former DIA officials. Also see Deane Allen, DIA, p. 75.
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Fourth, the armed serviees were slow to identify qualified officers available to DIA for the planning
staffs.5 This was particularly true of the Navy, which still tended to view the DIA as a creature of the
Air Force.
The last point can not be overstated. With the bitter taste of the JSTPS and the loss of control
over strategic nuclear targeting still in its mouth, the Navy viewed the DIA as a bureaucratic ploy by
the Air Force to gain control oxer the strategic intelligence process. One former Director of Naval
Intelligence believes naval opposition to the DIA emanated from three sources in equal measure:
traditional resistance to change, opposition to inter-service efforts, and enmity tow ard the Air Force and
its affiliates. The suspicion of Naval officers was confirmed by the proliferation of aviators in top DIA
management positions: the director, the head of CIIC, and the chief of Intelligence Production w ere
Air Force officers. Consequently, the Navy was convinced that the DIA was a creature of the Air Force
and fought the expansion of its authority. The admiral remarked, "The Navy fought against the
establishment of the DIA tooth and nail, lost the battle, but fought on."6 For example, the Navy
refused to allow DIA CIIC analysts to brief their senior staff." The recalcitrance of the Navy's brass,
led by CNO Admiral Arlcigh Burke and Chief of Staff Admiral Rufus Taylor, to accept the DIA was
illustrated in their refusal to transfer top Natal intelligence analysts to DIA posts.8 In fact, the Burke
and Taylor frequently transferred their poorest analysts to the agency.9 The Navy also refused to fill
DIA billets assigned to flag officers with Navy Hag officers; instead nominating officers of lesser rank
for the posts. For a short time Carroll tolerated this stonewalling. Finally, in exasperation, he offered
5 A perennial problem for DIA is assessing the seniority (that is, the date of rank) of officers from
different sen ices; exemplified in the comparatively rapid advance of Air Force officers ox er their nax al
counterparts. Nax al officers often feel x ictimizcd, as it is not uncommon for a Nax y captain to haxe a
date of rank exceeding ten years ox er an Air Force colonel; although nominally both arc of equal rank.
This dilemma was ex ident from the founding of the agency. Chief of Staff Admiral Samuel B. Frankel
recalled: "I remember talking to General Carroll after xx e'd had many discussions on dates of rank,
where the Navy was really low on the totem pole, and I said, 'General, I'xe finally figured out how the
Air Force establishes dates of rank.' He said, T wish you would tell me." I said, 'It's quite simple.
When a senior Air Force general dies, he bequeaths his date of rank to somebody whom he likes.'"
Transcript, Rear Admiral Samuel B. Frankel oral history interview, p. 455.
6 Confidential interview, former Director of Naval Intelligence.
7 The Army finally relented in the spring of 1961 and allowed an Air Force officer with the DIA
to brief the its senior staff. The Navy remained intransigent; it is unclear xx hen they finally assented
to DIA briefings. Confidential interview, former DIA Editorial and Briefing unit officer.
8 Burke and Taylor were heirs to the long nax al tradition of \ irtual autonomy. Like their
contemporaries, Admirals Arthur Radford (CJCS 1953-57) and Thomas Moorcr (CNO 1967-70), they
were contemptuous of the joint system. Regarding the latter officers, retired Admiral Eugene Carroll
remarked: "I guess you could call Moorer and Radford the old guard. Both of those guys arc just pure
Navy. Hell, they'd rather bomb Omaha [Headquarters of SAC] than Moscow. They just absolutely
hate the Air Force; they spend every minute they can can trying to fight the Air Force. They did
everything they could to circumvent the joint system. It's become a tradition in the Navy." In the
interest of fairness, here is Moorer's response: "That's just bullshit." Quoted in Perry, Four Stars, p.
209.
9 Regarding these inept analysts, a former CNI remarked that, "We (the Navy] gave them to DIA
ready to be courtmartialled; we were always surprised when they weren't." This practice persisted for
over a decade.
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the billets to the Air Force, w ho eagerly filled them. Thus the Air Force captured many of the senior
positions in the fledgling DIA, and the Navy's claim that the D1A was a creature of the aviators came
to be a self-fulfilling prophesy.
Thus undcrstaffing was the most pressing problem w hich confronted Carrol! and his staff in the
early months of the agency, impairing the ability of the agency to respond to the intelligence
requirements of the OSD and the JCS. Rather than confront the serv ices over this footdragging,
Carroll decided to bide his lime and w ait for the promised transfers. Years later the first Director of the
DIA ruminated that he should have taken a more direct approach to overcome sen ice impediments, that
he should have assumed his full authority under the agency charter to force the military departments to
comply with his personnel needs.10 Yet such speculation was idle: Joe Carroll was first and foremost
a team player, a man who did things by the book. Despite his considerable integrity, he was not the
type of man who would directly challenge his superior officers. That would have been entirely out of
character. A colleague remarked, "Joe Carroll possessed an innately cautious state of mind."" Instead,
he chose to consult all parties involved, go through formal channels, and submit all the paperwork. It
was, in the words of his chiefs of staff, a "long-drawn-out decision process."" In the end Carroll
thought simple persistence would wear down the services, that he would eventually be prov ided the
manpower and resources needed to make the DIA work. In this he miscalculated: Carroll failed to
perceive the depth of the opposition, the determination of his adversaries, and the formidable mass of
the bureaucracies lined up against him. To prevail against the combined weight of the military
departments an officer would have to possess exceptional fortitude and a strong streak of independence,
bordering on rebelliousness. While Joe Carroll undoubtedly possessed the former attribute, he lacked
the latter. After all, one does not become a general during peacetime by going against the grain.
Thus the DIA never giuned true organizational momentum following its establishment. Instead of
hitting the ground in stride, it limped forward. A rare opportunity was lost in these early months. The
first days of any organization are a critical time, for it is then when an agency is largely defined and
given shape. The metal is still hot: pliant and malleable. It is the ideal time for leaders to conv ey
institutional objectives and seize the personnel and resources necessary to achieve these objectives. It
is a time when precedents arc established, both within the agency (as standard operating procedures are
designed) and outside (where its relationship to other bureaucratic entities is decided). In organizations,
as in human beings, identity for the most part is forged in the early years.
Organizational theorists point out that a clear sense of mission is an essential component of
successful agencies." In the DIA, the concept of mission was muddled and nebulous. This was
largely a consequence of the origins of the agency: in order to forge a consensus among the powerful
interests within the DOD for the establishment of the agency, each institution was granted a stake in
DIA. For OSD, it was authoritative NIEs; for the JCS, it was jurisdictional control; for the services,
10 Dcane Allen, DIA. p. 52.
11 Confidential interview, senior DIA official.
12 Transcript, Rear Admiral Samuel B. Frankel oral history interview, p. 453.
13 For a synthesis of contemporary organizational thinking see Wilson, Bureaucracy, pp. 18-123.
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it was the preservation of departmental control over tactical intelligence.11 In trying to be all things to
all parties, the DIA sacrificed much of its own identity. Even its primary objective was a matter of
uncertainty. The DIA directive stated "the organization, direction, management and control" of assets
assigned to it and the "review and coordination" of the remaining military intelligence functions, but
this w as vague and capacious. In concrete and practical terms, what was the agency established to do?
Even the command staff was uncertain: Carroll thought the primary task of the agency was the
production of strategic intelligence for Washington policymakers, Quinn believed it was to unify the
collection requirements of the military intelligence community, Frankcl argued that it was to integrate
and supervise the defense intelligence budget.15 The mission of the DIA was never explicitly addressed
by civilian policymakers and military leaders; disparate opinions endured. Given this lack of
unanimity over the central tasks of the agency, it is not surprising that there was little sense of
mission among the staff of the DIA.
The search for defining operational objectives was also frustrated by a lack of autonomy. In
fairness to Carroll and his staff, it should be noted that here they had little room for maneuver. The
MIB supervised agency decisionmaking, effectively protecting realms which the sen ices considered
vital. The deliberate manner in which the agency was established allowed the military departments to
impede the development of DIA simply by citing concerns (accurate or not) oxer the degradation of the
military intelligence effort during the process of transferal. The sen ice intelligence efforts were given
clear priority. Moreover, the agency's dependence upon the sen ices for resources and personnel further
weakened Carroll's bureaucratic hand. The DIA directive provided that the director had full control
only of those military intelligence resources directly assigned to the agency; he exercised vague
"managerial responsibility" oxer the remainder."' In practical terms, this stipulation denied Carroll
jurisdiction ox er the bulk of military espionage operations. He had fexx' cards to play. His dilemma
was illustrated by the fact that it took the DIA oxer three years to become fully operational in all
assigned functional areas. Such delay is remarkable, perhaps unprecedented. When the early months of
the DIA arc compared w ith those of other successful intelligence agencies, such as the Federal Bureau
of Inxestigation (FBI) or the NSA, the differences are striking. Both agencies were established with
clearly defined objectives that xvere well-understood. Both agencies xxere provided with the necessary
labor and capital to fulfill their central tasks. Most importantly, both organizations hax c relative!}'
14 Graham Allison observes: "Considerable misinterpretation is a standard part of the functioning
of each gox crnmcnt. Any proposal that is xx'idcly accepted is pcrceix cd by different men to do quite
different things and to meet different needs. Misperception is in a sense the grease that allows
cooperation among people whose differences otherwise would hardly allow them to coexist." Graham
Allison, Essence ofDecision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Little, Brown and
Company, 1971, p. 178.
15 Carroll from interviews with former DIA officials; Quinn from personal interx iexx with author,
8 May 1992. Frankcl from Transcript, Rear Admiral Samuel B. Frankcl oral history interview, pp.
438-43. In every interview 1 conducted I asked the interviewee what he perceived the primary purpose
of the agency to be. The diversity of response xvas astonishing. Ex en among former top officials there
was a disturbing lack of unanimity. The DIA, like the succubi of lore, was all things to all men.
16 Deane Allen, DM, p. 91.
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undisputed jurisdiction within their respective functional areas. Consequently, both developed
sufficient institutional independence to create and maintain a unique identity, a distinctiveness which
greatly contributed to their later success.1"
In contrast, the DIA was denied this autonomy and discretion. Its authority was vague; its
jurisdiction disputed. Its command staff operated under heavy constraints with sparse discretion. In
fact, a JCS memorandum of 16 November 1961 informed Carroll that, "Within purview of JCS Policy
Memo No. 132, the Defense Intelligence Agency will be considered as an element of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.'"8 In addition to explicit restraints such as this on its jurisdiction, the military departments
engaged in a subtle maneuver to undercut the authority of the new agency. Soon after the DIA was
established, the armed services requested that the DIA charter be revised, ostensibly to correct emerging
deficiencies. However, an officer directly involv ed in this effort stated that the expressed intent of the
sen ices in this endeavor w as to limit the authority of the DIA over the intelligence activities of the
armed serv ices. He ironically observed that several officers involved in this attempt to dilute the
nascent power of the DIA had served on General Carroll's planning staff which had drafted the DIA
charter. After serving on the joint team, they returned to the military departments to circumvent the
very directive they had helped create.19 As a result of these efforts, w ithin two years the original
directive underwent six revisions, each weakening authority of the DIA vis-a-vis the military services.
Moreover, supplements, interpretative memoranda, memoranda of agreement, and other orders and
prescriptions followed, which further defined and limited the reach of the intelligence agency.:o Giv en
this want of independence, it is not surprising that the DIA never developed the distinctive character and
mission that are intrinsic to successful gov ernment agencies.
Strife over the Reform of Strategic Intelligence, 1961-62
As General Carroll and his staff struggled to make the DIA a viable intelligence organization.
Secretary McNamara and his aides fought to reform the NIE process. Under their guidance, on 16
October the DIA Estimates Office was partially activated. Composed primarily of the J-2 Estimates
Division, the office was charged with providing estimative support to the OSD, JCS, U&S
Commands, and the military services. The DIA historian, Deanc Allen, observed:
17 Wilson, Bureaucraty; pp. 97-98, 115-180. Also see Stanford J. Ungar, FBI. Boston: Little
Brown, 1976; and Bam lord, Puzzle Palace.
18 Defense Intelligence Agency [DJSM-1387-61], DIA Director to Vice Director of the Joint Staff,
16 November 1961, folder "CCS 5229 Defense Communications Agency (5 July 1961) Sec 2," box
114, JCS files, National Archives.
19 Confidential interview, former DIA official.
?0 Cited in Deanc Allen, DIA, pp. 43-44.
The scope of DIA's responsibilities was more controlled and inclusive than the
service's former relationship with J-2's Estimates Division had been. The DIA
mission emphasized the Secretary of Defense relationship and dropped that part of the
J-2 estimates mission that provided for "the policy direction of joint target studies
and projects." The DIA Estimates Office provided a central control point for the
production of finished intelligence by "reviewing and coordinating as directed, the
intelligence estimative functions retained by, or assigned to, the military
departments," and providing intelligence for OSD contractors.21
Thus the Estimates Office was intended primarily to be a tool of the Secretary of Defense.
McNamara wasted little time in utilizing this instrument. On 5 October the Secretary of Defense, with
the approval of President Kennedy, charged the Director of the DIA (through the Office of Estimates) to
assume responsibility for representing the Del'ense Department on USIB committees. The fact that the
Secretary' took the proposal to Kennedy for concurrence is revealing. Due to the President's confidence
in McNamara, military matters were rarely referred to Kenned}' for approval. The fact that McNamara
sought Presidential approval in this instance suggests that the move was motivated by bureaucratic
considerations: McNamara wanted the military to know that in implementing this reform he had the
lull backing of the President. There was no effective appeal. It is also notable that despite the slow
activation pace of most DIA functions, the implementation of this directive was relatively swift.22
There is little doubt that McNamara was eager to get the Office of Estimates quickly involved in the
NIE process.
This eagerness may be attributed to two factors. First, and most importantly, McNamara and his
assistants were ardent for the office to generate the strategic intelligence necessary for the new
Planning-Programming-Budgeting System which was to be implemented in early 1963.22 A primary
purpose of the system was to clarify the long-range defense requirements of the United States, and
reduce what OSD perceived to be arbitrary decisions by the military departments on weapon system
development. On 10 November 1961, the Comptroller Charles Hitch sent a memo to Director Carrol!
detailing the role of the Office of Estimates in PPBS. Deane Allen summarized the instructions thus:
21 Deane Allen, DIA, pp. 99-100.
22 The following dates were set for effective membership on the USIB: On 4 November 1961 the
DIA was to replace the J-2 representative on the Watch Committee and the Current Intelligence
Bulletin Panel; on 5 November 1961 the DIA was to assume responsibility for current military
intelligence on the Critical Communications Committee, Berlin, Cuba, and Arab-Israeli Situation
Committee, Cold War Situation Group; and on the latter date the DIA was given observer status on
the Joint Atomic Energy Committee and the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee.
In the majority of instances the J-2 was allowed to "retain membership or these committees and
participate with respect to substance — estimative inputs within its competence and availability of
personnel." JCS [JSM-1202-61], "Staff Relationships and Procedures Between Organization of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Intelligence Agency in Current Intelligence," 6 November 1961,
folder "CCS 5229 Defense Communications Agency (5 July 1961) Sec 2," box 114, JCS files,
National Archives, p. 8. Also sec Deanc Allen, DIA, p. 58.
23 McNamara's former Special Assistant, Adam Yarmolinsky, identified PPBS as being the most
significant consideration to which all others were ancillary. Interview with author, 13 October 1992.
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the intelligence estimates prepared in DOD were not adequate for planning purposes.
They needed to extend five to ten years into the future to compensate for long
leadlimes for weapon systems development; assess the future enemy military
posture in terms of w eapon systems and types of forces rather than in terms of
weapons and their performance characteristics; assess economic feasibility and
limitations of an enemy's future weapon systems and the consequent alternatives
open to him; and develop a yardstick by which to measure economic costs. In
short, DOD required the Agency to program intelligence support according to long-
range projections of Soviet alternative force structures and costing."4
Second, McNamara was impatient for the Office of Estimates to produce strategic intelligence in
support of the new counterforce / no-cities nuclear doctrine which the administration recently embraced.
After assuming office, the Secretary was dismayed to learn that the American nuclear plan (SIOP-62)
drawn up by the JSTPS in December 1960 provided the President w ith a single option: an all-out
preemptiv e nuclear first-strike against the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China. Population per se
was not targeted, vet military and industrial complexes in cities received multiple warheads. JSTPS
calculated that if the entire US nuclear force was launched, over 285 million Russians and Chinese
would be killed and more than 40 million would be seriously injured. Appalled by the immorality and
rigidity of such a doctrine, McNamara turned to the alternative counterforcc doctrine advocated by the
RAND analysts William Kaufman and Marvin Stern; a doctrine both Enthoven and Hitch supported.
This strategy stressed a limited initial strike aimed at the destruction of enemy military forces (rather
than the more capacious "war-making capabilities" of SIOP-62), avoiding cities and preserving a ready
reserve force of nuclear weapons to be employed as a bargaining lever to seek a favorable resolution and
an end to hostilities. McNamara tasked the JCS with exploring the possibility of this doctrine as
Project Number One of the "Ninety-Six Trombones" inquiries.2'
The military balked at this strategy. The concepts of "controlled response" and "negotiating
pauses" integral to counterforce were anathema to military thinking. Many senior military officers
believed that nuclear weapons should only be employed on a massive scale. Nev ertheless, in May
1961, McNamara directed the JCS to incorporate the concept of counterforce targeting into a revised
SIOP-63. The new SIOP was to offer five options, progressing from a limited nuclear launch to a
comprehensive strike. In effect, the idea of Flexible Response was incorporated into the nuclear realm.
The Air Force, however, was intransigent: the Air Staff refused to modify the targeting of its
Minutemcn ICBMs, arguing that the new doctrine was unfeasible. In the face of such a brazen
challenge, Marvin Stern, the Assistant Director for Strategic Systems in the DOD, canceled
Minuteman funding for one month, pending a commitment from the Air Force to re-target the
21 Cited in Deanc Allen, DIA, p. 100.
25 The directive began: "Prepare a draft memorandum revising the basic national security policies
and assumptions, including the assumptions relating to 'counterforcc' strikes ..." See Kaplan.
Wizards ofArmageddon, p. 273.
missiles, despite the fact that this drastic measure was clearly illegal.Under this threat, the Air Force
finally relented. On 23 September 1961 McNamara sent Kennedy a Draft Presidential Memorandum
(DPM) noting:
The forces I am recommending have been chosen to provide the United States with
the capability, in the event of a Soviet nuclear attack, first, to strike back against
Soviet bomber bases, missile sites and other installations associated with long-range
nuclear forces, in order to reduce Soviet pow er and limit the damage that can be done
to us by vulnerable Soviet follow-on forces, while, second, holding in protected
reserv e forces capable of destroying the Soviet urban society, if necessary, in a
controlled and deliberate way."
Though the administration committed itself to the counlerforce strategy in the fall of 1961, it was
not officially acknowledged until 5 May 1962, when McNamara publicly described the no-cities
doctrine in a commencement address at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. Counterforce placed
a heavy burden on the military intelligence community: it called for precise strikes against Soviet
offensive forces which in turn required timely and accurate estimates of the location and capabilities of
Russian military units. The experiences of the bomber and missile "gaps" could not be repeated.
Consensus and accuracy were imperative. McNamara expected the DIA's Office of Estimates to
spearhead this drive for unanimity.
Both considerations — PPBS and counterforce — drove McNamara to accelerate the activation of the
Office of Estimates. The office was originally divided into five divisions: Soviet Bloc, Eastern
Europe, Western Europe, Latin America, and Scientific and Technical (the latter primarily coordinated
input from the armed sen ices, as the production and management of this type of intelligence remained
with the military departments). Yet the office was ill-equipped for the Promethean task McNamara set
for it, for this element, like the majority of DIA offices, was chronically understaffed. Although the
Office of Estimates was formally assigned one hundred and four staffers, in fact in the fall of 1961 the
office contained only seven estimators and one clerk.
Irrespective of this shortage of personnel, McNamara continued to press forward with his plans for
USIB reform, wherein the DIA was to play a major role. On 31 October 1961 the Office of the
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations (OSO) was disestablished. Its special
clearance responsibilities were reassigned to DIA, and the NSA was directed to report to the Secretary
of Defense through an Assistant Secretary of Defense (the Honorable John H. Rubcl).29 McNamara
was thereafter reliant on the DIA for strategic intelligence. McNamara pressed the military departments
26 When Stern approached the Defense Department's general counsel Cy rus Vance to discover what
measures could be employed to subdue the Air Force, Vance stated, "Anything you can get away with."
Quoted in Kaplan, WizardsofArmageddon, p. 280. For details of counterforce, pp. 270-85.
27 DPM quoted in Kaplan, Wizards ofArmageddon, pp. 281-82.
28 Dcane Allen, DIA, pp. 96-98.
29 Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, "Disestablishment of the Office of the Assistant to
the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations," 2 October 1961 (No declassification date) p 1.
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to transfer the required personnel to the Office of Estimates, so that it might be fully operational as
soon as possible. Again, the armed services delayed. They viewed the actu ation of the office as a
prelude to USIB reform; a prospect they feared and contested. In this resistance, the military
departments discovered an unlikely ally in DCI Alien Dulles. Dulles was averse to many of the JSG
recommendations, particularly that which proposed the substitution of the service intelligence
representatives on the USIB with a solitary D1A representative.The latter opinion is notable, given
the fact that the DCI was reputed to have little interest in the mundane estimates process, preferring the
glamour of covert operations. The proposal made Dulles and senior CIA officials apprehensive for
they feared that such a reform would result in the CIA no longer having direct access to raw military
intelligence, leaving civilians dependent solely on the judgment of the DIA.3' Although the USIB
meetings were often tumultuous, the frequent open disagreement between the services allowed CIA and
civilian officials to discern the divisions w ithin the military intelligence community ov er raw data and
its interpretation. The establishment of the DIA would radically alter this situation. The consolidated
military posture created by a single DIA representative would, in effect, suppress (or veil) dissent
within the military intelligence community. Civ ilians would have considerable difficulty in contesting
DIA estimates on military matters, for they would lack access to dissenting mililarv evaluations. As
one former Stale Department official stated; "It was desirable to maintain enough service tension to
flush out service interests."" Furthermore, a unified military intelligence community might also
threaten traditional realms of civilian dominance, particularly national reconnaissance. In private,
civ ilian officials complained that the establishment of the DIA would prevent the State Department and
CIA from playing the services against one another as they had done so successfully in the past; the
strategy of "divide and conquer" would become ineffective against their military rivals. Thus Dulles,
motivated by bureaucratic considerations, had supported the JCS in their opposition to a radical
reformation of the military intelligence community in the spring of 1961." Despite the compromise
which created the DIA, Dulles continued to resist the consolidation of military representation on the
USIB, much to the delight of the military departments.
Fortunately for McNamara, Dulles was dismissed as DCI in late November 1961. The move
caught few by surprise; by August it was widely known that Kennedy expected the resignation of
Dulles for his role in the Bay of Pigs fiasco. However, many in the Democratic party w ere shocked
when the President announced that his successor would be John McCone. NlcCone was a wealthy
conservative Republican from California, who had built his persona! fortune during the Second World
30 Dulles' views on the JSG recommendations are most fully expressed in Central Intelligence
Agency, "Memo to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council: The Seventh Report to
the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, dated 4 October 1960," 24
December 1960 (Declassified 10 September 1984) DDRS; 1985-13.
31 Ross and Wise, The Invisible Government, p. 214.
32 Quoted in Frcedman, Soviet Strategic Threat, p. 22.
33 New York limes, 10 April 1961 (16:3).
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War in shipbuilding, which caused man}' liberals to accuse him of being a war profiteer.14 Thereafter,
he served in an assortment of government positions: Assistant Secretary of Defense in 1948;
Undersecretary of the Air Force from 1950-51, and finally chairman of the Atomic Energ\
Commission (AEC). McCone assumed the position of DCI on 29 November 1961. Though officials
at the CIA were initially skeptical of his proclaimed commitment to restore morale and make
intelligence products more responsive to the needs of senior policymakers, they w ere soon impressed
with McCone's professionalism and integrity. Ray Cline, an analyst appointed Deputy Director for
Intelligence by McCone a year later, reflected:
[McCone] is the only DCI who ever took his role of providing substantive
intelligence analysis and estimates to the President as his first priori!} job, and the
only one who considered his duties as coordinating supervisor of the whole
intelligence community to be a more important responsibility than the CIA's own
clandestine and covert programs.35
In his drive to implement USIB reform, McNamara found a welcome all} in John McCone.
Though the two frequently clashed over other matters, the}' agreed on the need to improve the quality of
national intelligence products through a reduction in the estimative capabilities of the military sen ices.
All the military departments where opposed to this measure; however, the Air Force prov ed to be the
most recalcitrant.
The conflict over the fate of the USIB reforms began in earnest on 2 January 1962, when the DIA's
Office of Estimates was full}' activ ated. In past years the J-2 had coordinated sen ice inputs for USIB
deliberations: the armed services submitted estimates direct!} to BNE. With the full activation of the
Office of Estimates, McNamara instructed the sendees to discontinue this practice. Now the sendees
were to submit their raw intelligence and assessments to D1A, w ho would process and evaluate this
material, ultimately producing and submitting putative Defense Department estimates to BNE. In
effect, the serv ice evaluative capabilities were being transferred to DIA. It is important to recall that
this was McNamara's primary objective in establishing the DIA. This is why he pushed so hard for
the full activation of the Office of Estimates while the other components remained in rudimentary
stages of development. Sendee resistance to this measure was strong, despite the fact that the DIA
charter contained a provision for including sendee dissents in Defense Department estimates forwarded
to the USIB.36 As previously discussed, the military leadership feared the loss of independent analysis
34 In 1946 the General Accounting Office had investigated this allegation. One of its
investigators, Ralph Casey, testified that McCone and his colleagues in the California Shipbuilding
Corporation, had profiled $44 million on an initial investment of $100,000. Casey remarked: "I
daresay that at no time in the history of American business whether in wartime or peacetime have so
few men made so much money with so little risk and all at the expense of the taxpayers, not only of
his generation but of future generations." Quoted in Halberstam, Best and Brightest, pp. 189-90.
35
Ray S. Cline, The CIA under Reagan, Bush and Casey: The Evolution of the Agency:
Roosevelt to Reagan. Washington: Acropolis, 1981, p. 216.
36 Deane Allen, DIA, p. 48.
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capabilities, which would result in dependence upon DIA for processing and production. In their
minds, this centralization increased the possibility of the suppression of dissent within the military
intelligence community and raised the specter that intelligence could be manipulated to serve political
ends. Of course, McNamara was concerned with a similar apparition: that the military departments
were manipulating intelligence to serve bureaucratic ends (that is, in support of budget requests). Thus
the Secretary of Defense and the military departments possessed contradictory views on the Office of
Estimates: for the former it held the promise of purging bias from intelligence, for the latter it
increased the threat of manipulating intelligence. In the end, it was a question of mistrust: McNamara
did not trust the intelligence estimates of the armed services; in turn, they did not trust him. The
struggle was over who had the final say in the estimating process.
A bureaucratic war of attrition ensued. Although all the military departments were to some extent
involved in the dispute, the Air Force was the most intransigent. Under the leadership of Generals
Curtis LcMay and Thomas Powers, the Air Force had long considered assessments of Soviet strategic
capabilities to be its sole province. Though the bomber and missile "gaps" tarnished its reputation in
this area, the service still believed these threat assessments to be its prerogative. As described in the
previous chapter, the loss control of the U-2 program to the CIA in 1960 had galvanized the Air Force,
alerting it to the threat of increased civilian interference in traditional departmental activities.
McNamara's recent shift from the strategy of massive retaliation (a doctrine which bestowed military
primacy upon the bomber and missile programs of the Air Force) to flexible response and counterforcc
nuclear targeting (which threatened to reduce the department to primus inter pares ) heightened the
apprehension of the Air Staff. Among some of the senior officers a siege mentality set in. They w ere
determined to resist what they perceived to be civilian encroachment. It is not surprising that they
generally viewed McNamara's proposals to replace Air Force representation on US1B committees,
coupled with the cessation of direct submission of estimates to BNE, with alarm. Yet another
departmental prerogative was under threat. Thus they strove to defy McNamara by continuing to
submit prominent estimates (including those concerning Soviet strategic capabilities) directly to BNE,
spurning the DIA's Office of Estimates. The other services followed the precedent of the Air Force. '
McNamara, with McCone's support, strov e to force compliance. The services mounted fierce
resistance, arguing that the DIA did not have the necessary expertise to perform important intelligence
assessments. Of course, the argument was disingenuous: the reason that the DIA did not possess the
required expertise was because the services continued to delayed the transfer of qualified personnel to the
Office of Estimates. When pressed to accelerate the transfer of personnel, the services would stonewall,
citing the customary excuse that premature transfers would jeopardize the effectiveness of the military
intelligence effort and so put national security at risk. Historically, the argument that any proposal
under consideration threatens to "compromise national security" has been the trump card of the
intelligence agencies (indeed, it has been the trump card of the executive branch and its agents,
employed by statesmen and rogues alike). It was played frequently and effectively. Yet McNamara
37
Commenting on the affair, the DIA's historian states, with characteristic sympathy: "Before
DIA the J-2 had merely coordinated the service's contribution. Reluctant to break with long established
procedures, the services continued to independently submit some of their estimates directly to the Board
of National Estimates until 1963, when the practice was ended." Dcane Allen, DIA, pp. 98-99.
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would have none of this: it was his job to decide w hat was good for national security, it w as the job of
the military to follow orders. He ordered compliance. Yet the military can be very cunning about
things like this when they want to be, so while they did not openly disregard directives from the
Secretary, they continued to delay implementation, completing paperw ork, commissioning studies, and
complaining about manpower shortages. Classic footdragging. In the Pentagon, bureaucratic
struggles are rarely marked by sound and fury; silence and inaction arc more common. The latter
marked this dispute between McNamara and the Air Force. Its resolution would take almost two years.
It should be noted that this was one of two fronts the Air Force fought civilian policymakers in
early 1962. The other front was aerial reconnaissance. Although the Air Force lost control of the U-2
program to the CIA in 1960, the battle over overhead reconnaissance platforms continued. The stakes
were increasing: the new generation of satellite systems promised to be a lucrative and prestigious
prize.'8 In an attempt to forestall bureaucratic conflict, the Eisenhower administration had established
the inter-agency National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) on 25 August I960.39 Yet the creation of the
office did not quell the strife: the Air Force continued to design satellites although this function was
clearly assigned to the CIA. McNamara joined w ith McCone to assert the primacy of the civilian
agency in overhead intelligence. In this, the motive of the Secretary of Defense was simple: he was
determined to check the growth in the bureaucratic power of the Air Force. McNamara and McCone
won the first of many battles in early 1961, w hen they persuaded President Kennedy to support them.
On 16 January 1962, Kennedy signed a Presidential directiv e that instructed McCone to evert greater
statutory authority over the entire intelligence community.40 The message to the bureaucracy was
clear: the President upheld the authority of the DCI over national intelligence programs and weighed in
on the side of the CIA in the dispute over aerial reconnaissance. Yet this was but one victory in a long
campaign. Unlike the struggle ov er estimate reform, this was a long and bitter conflict, which raged
until 1965. Even today , otherwise gregarious Air Force officers involved in the dispute will go silent
when the subject is brought up. The bureaucratic wounds run deep.
38 From 1959 to I960 the Corona and SAMOS projects (CIA and Air Force programs
respectively) competed for funding as the premier reconnaissance satellite system.
39 The NRO operated under the auspices of the Undersecretary of the Air Force, Office of Space
Systems, and reported directly to the Secretary of Defense. The director was the Undersecretary of the
Air Force, his deputy was a CIA officer (thus both men were civ ilians). Under the provisions
Eisenhower approved, the Air Force was tasked with launching and recovering satellites, the CIA
would design and procure them. Burrows, Deep Black, pp. 115-16. For years the NRO was the most
secret of all the US intelligence agencies: even its name was classified. Its existence was only
publicly acknowledged in 1992.
40 Directive published in Ly man Kirkpatnck, The U.S. Intelligence Community: Foreign Policy
and Domestic Activities. New York: Hill and Wang, 1973, pp. 193-4. Also see Anne Karalekas,
History of the Centra! Intelligence Agency. Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Park Press, 1977, p. 73.
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A Practical Matter: Vietnam, 1961-62
The failure of McNamara and Carroll to secure adequate authority and resources for the D1A had
immediate and profound implications. The most significant related to American policy in Southeast
Asia. For, as the D1A became operational in October 1961, the Kennedy administration struggled to
come to terms w ith what would become the dominant foreign policy challenge of the decade:
A.mcrican involvement in Southeast Asia. Throughout the autumn. Admiral Harry S. Felt, the
Commander-in-Chief of United States forces in the Pacific (in military lexicon. CINCPAC), sent
cables to Washington expressing fears about the growing strength of the communist insurgency in the
Republic of Vietnam (RVN). There the conservative government of President Ngo Dinh Diem, long
the recipient of considerable economic and military assistance from the United Stales, was under
mounting military pressure from the Viet Cong (VC) rebels, communist insurgents supported by
North Vietnam (nominally, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam). China, and the Soviet Union.
Felt's pessimism resonated among the JCS, who w ere alarmed by the wider strategic implications of
the expanding communist insurgencies in the region. They attributed much of the proliferation of
guerrilla activity to the 6 January 196! speech of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, wherein the
Soviet leader announced that the Soviet Union would thereafter openly support regional "wars of
national liberation." Man)' American military officers interpreted this bold proclamation to be an
explicit challenge to the United States and an unequivocal indication of the new Soviet commitment to
support guerrilla wars against American allies, the latest incarnation of the historic struggle between
the forces of communism and capitalism. Indochina appeared to be the ideal laboratory to lest this new
doctrine of liberation. The tenacity of the indigenous insurgents, coupled with the communist
perception that the United States lacked the resolve to take decisive military action in the Southeast
Asia (which they viewed as the logical result of the conciliatory posture adopted by the Kennedy
administration in Laos), led American military leaders to believe that a Soviet initiative in the region
was ineluctable. South Vietnam looked to be the weakest prey. The Diem regime was politically and
militarily inept. For the past several years, its ineffective policies and misconceived programs caused
domestic opposition to wax as the military counterinsurgency campaign waned. By the fall of 196!
the JCS were certain that the Kremlin would no longer ignore the erosion of the Diem gov ernment and
would increase its support to the Vict Cong. The Chiefs were convinced that an explicit and potent
display of American support for the government of North Vietnam was imperative, in order to
demonstrate American resolve, forestall additional Soviet incursions, and reassure timorous allies in the
region. The JCS counseled bold action.
92
In early October the Chiefs recommended that the United States introduce combat troops into South
Vietnam to assist the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) in suppressing guerrilla activity.41
This recommendation was one of several proposals considered by the President.4" It is notable that all
shared the sanguine assumption that the commitment of US forces to Vietnam would be a decisive act,
which would indisputably vanquish the Viet Cong. Among American policymakers at the time this
belief was so elementary that it was almost visceral. In that age, few doubted that the American
military -- rife with modern armaments and proficient soldiers -- would swiftly prev ail over the bandits
and marauders assembled under the communist standard. After all, history demonstrated that God
favored the big battalions.
The American intelligence community was not so certain. In contrast to the confidence of
policymakers and military leaders, intelligence analysts were generally pessimistic about the ability of
American forces to turn the tide of combat in favor of the Diem regime. Experienced Indochina
specialists in the CIA, and the few assigned to the DIA, viewed the deployment of US soldiers with
foreboding. They were inclined to perceive the conflict in its historical perspective and therefore judged
the Vict Cong to be not a sundry and impotent collection of peasants and malcontents, but a
formidable, if unconventional, modern fighting force: the latest manifestation of the mighty Viet
Minh militia that drove the French from Southeast Asia in the nincteen-fifties.43 Seen from this
perspective, the Viet Cong were not communist agitators w ho infiltrated South Vietnam from the
North (as successive American administrations repeatedly claimed), but native dissidents and
nationalists. This judgment, widely shared by civilian and military intelligence analysts at the time,
was diametrically opposed to the conventional wisdom in Washington. All the policy
recommendations for South Vietnam considered by the President in 1961 shared the assumption that
the Vict Cong were heavily dependent upon their principal benefactor, North Vietnam, for manpower
and supplies. Under the JCS recommendation, American military forces were to be employed to assist
the ARVN in interdicting the stream of men and materials (presumed to be substantial) from North to
South in order to foil communist re-supply efforts. Denied this support, deemed to be essential, the
common wisdom held that the Viet Cong would w ithcr. The espionage community thought that the
scenario was appealing but fundamentally Hawed, for it disputed the central premise that the Viet Cong
were dependent on North Vietnam for assistance. Current intelligence indicated that the Viet Cong were
largely an indigenous military force. In fact, the CIA concluded "that 80-90 per cent of the estimated
17,000 VC had been locally recruited, and that there was little evidence that the VC relied on external
41 This was not the first such recommendation. The JCS advocated a commitment of US ground
forces to Vietnam and Laos as early as May, 1961. See United States — Vietnam Relations, 1945-67.
(hereafter cited as DODPP) 12 Volumes. (Volume II) GPO, 1971, p. 49. By the fall of 1961, the
United States had four hundred Special Forces troops and one hundred military advisors committed to
South Vietnam to assist the government in its efforts to combat the insurgency. This deployment was
the result of NSAM-52 of 11 May 1961. Sec The Pentagon Papers. As published by the New York
limes. Written by Neil Sheehan, Hedrick Smith, E. W. Kenworthy, and Fox Butterfield (hereafter cited
as NYTPP ). New York: Bantam, 1971, pp. 90-92.
42 Specifically, the proposals were submitted by the JCS, Walt Rostow, and Acting Assistant
Secretary of Defense William R Bundv.
43 Confidential interview, former DIA intelligence analyst.
9 3
supplies.""1"1 The DIA shared this judgment.4" The distinction between communist agitators and
indigenous rebels can not be overstated because it had important policy implications. If the
unorthodox opinion of the intelligence community was correct (and history appears to support this
judgment) ~ that the fundamental source of support for the insurgency was not North Vietnam but the
indigenous population — then the JCS recommendation to utilize American troops to interdict the
supply of men and materials from the North to the South was futile. The supply lines from the North
were not essential, but supplemental." The Viet Cong were likely to continue to fight irrespective of
the success of American interdiction efforts. To truly defeat the rebels, an ambitious and
comprehensive program of political and social reforms would be necessary, a program that would ally
the population with the Diem government, and thus deprive the insurgents of their base of support.
Separated from the host, the parasite would perish. In the end, the distinction was of civil war versus
foreign interv cntionism. The intelligence analysts, reticent and reflective, cautiously embraced the
former judgment; the JCS, assertive and intuitive, precipitously grasped the latter.
It is difficult to determine the influence of the pessimistic intelligence reports on President
Kennedy. It is probable that they fed his personal misgivings on the wisdom of deploying American
troops in Southeast Asia. After pondering the divergent policy recommendations toward South
Vietnam, including the JCS proposal to introduce combat forces, President Kennedy demurred. To
further delay the profound policy decision, the President sent General Maxwell Taylor and Walt Rostow
to Saigon in mid-October to investigate conditions w ithin South Vietnam and formulate a new set of
policy recommendations. Though it was not public!}" stated at the time, the two were privately
instructed by Kennedy to determine whether it was necessary to deploy American combat troops to
Vietnam to preserve the Diem regime. After a week-long visit to the country, the pair returned to
Washington and made a confidential recommendation to the President that the United States commit up
to eight thousand combat troops to South Vietnam, asserting that the deployment was "an essentia!
action if we are to reverse the current downward trend of ev ents."46 The JCS and McNamara were
consulted on the proposal; both endorsed it. When presented with the Taylor-Rostow recommendation
for American intervention, Kennedy again balked. It was a revealing moment. The President was
twice advised to commit American combat forces, and twice he rejected the counsel. Instead, Kennedy
instructed McNamara and the Secretary of State Dean Rusk to revise the recommendation to suggest
that support rather than combat forces be deployed. The Secretaries dutifully complied. Kennedy then
approved the revision, and thus the United States crossed the Rubicon and committed American armed
forces to what would be a devastating national ordeal in Southeast Asia.
What is remarkable about this fateful decision is the fact that the intelligence community provided
little direct advice and support to senior policymakers and the President. Neither the CIA nor the DIA
were asked to evaluate the probable consequences of the Taylor-Rostow recommendations. With regard
to the DIA, this neglect was understandable; after all, the agency was in its infancy, unable to perform
the panoramic analysis required. However, the CIA was more than competent in this capacity.
44 NYTPP, p. 98.
45 Confidential interview, former DIA intelligence analyst.
46 Sec DODPP (II), pp. 90-92.
Nevertheless, neither organization was asked to examine the two crucial aspects of the
recommendations: (1) was the deployment of American soldiers necessary to defeat the Vict Cong?
(Taylor and Rostov clearly believed it was.) and (2), if necessary, were the number of troops requested
sufficient to complete the mission? (Taylor and Rostov suggested it was not.4") No comprehensive
intelligence review of Vietnam was requested by the President or his senior advisors; nor, for that
matter, was one provided. Despite Kennedy's oft-cited reluctance to commit American troops to the
conflict in South Vietnam, the President never solicited the judgment of the intelligence community, a
judgment which he had reason to suspect, based on past estimates, would be pessimistic. It was a
curious omission. One would expect a skeptical President to turn toward those who might confirm his
doubts. Instead, Kennedy turned away. In limiting the advice he sought to that of professional soldiers
(Taylor and the JCS) and men who shared their basic convictions and predilections (Rostow and Rusk),
the President effectively constrained the scope of the policy debate, and ensured that the social problems
of South Vietnam would be viewed from a military perspective. Accordingly, the nature of the
recommendations was never in doubt: additional military measures to combat the insurgency.48
Although the Office of Estimates was incomplete and the CIIC was in a state of disarray, a DIA
staff analyst accompanied the Taylor-Rostow mission to South Vietnam. The experience confirmed his
suspicion that the problems of South Vietnam were primarily political in nature, the result of the
incompetence and rigidity of the Diem government. He believed the proper solution was not the
deployment of US forces, but a comprehensive program of social and political reform.44 After
returning to Washington, he persuaded many intelligence analysts at the DIA that reform of the
government of South Vietnam was essential if the insurgency was to be successfully defeated.50 Yet
the DIA's immediate superiors — the JCS and McNamara — ignored this assessment.
In the autumn of 1961 President Kennedy deployed American troops to Vietnam to support the
counterinsurgency effort. Thereafter, McNamara and the JCS became potent players in policy
deliberations within the administration over Vietnam. The bureaucratic position of the Defense
Department was immeasurably strengthened by the commitment of US troops to Indochina. South
Vietnam, long a diplomatic matter, now became an American military effort. As in most martial
47 The initial program including the deployment of eight thousand American combat troops was
presented to the President as adequate for the short run, but probably insufficient for the king run.
48 David Halbcrstam is fond of contrasting Kennedy's decision to commit American troops to
Southeast Asia w ith Eisenhower's decision not to intervene. In the spring of 1954, when both the
Chairman of the JCS Admiral Arthur W. Radford and the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles w ere
urging the Republican President to intervene in Indochina to support the French, Eisenhower allowed
General Matthew B. Ridgway to send an Army survey team to Indochina to provide him w ith a
comprehensive assessment of the forces required to defeat the Vietnamese insurgency. The final Army
report was shocking. It postulated that the mission would require five to ten American combat
divisions, plus engineering battalions, for a total of 500,000 to 1,000,(XX) US personnel. Eisenhower
promptly rejected intervention. Conversely, the Taylor-Rostow report was cursory and myopic,
concerned only with short-term relief, deliberately avoiding the complexities of a long-term remedy.
1 lalbcrstam, Best and Brightest, pp. 176-79.
49
Contrary to many journalistic accounts and statements from the participants, Taylor, the most
influential advisor on Indochina, did not include any requirements for Vietnamese political or social
change among his personal recommendations to the President. See DODPP(II) pp. 97-108.
50 George Allen, Indochina Wars, p. 173.
matters, the judgment of the Department of Defense generally prevailed over other federal agencies.
For his part, McNamara eagerly expanded the jurisdiction of the Pentagon. In response to a question
posed to senior advisors by the White House on 27 November 1961. "Whom should the President
regard as personally responsible for the effectiveness of the Washington end of this operation
[Vietnam]?" McNamara responded: "Myself and L [the Chairman of the JCS General Lyman
Lemnitzer]."3' McNamara, the consummate bureaucratic marshal, rarely let pass an opportunity to
expand his authority. The memorandum is indicativ e of the successful effort of the Secretary of
Defense to be in the forefront of Vietnam policymaking. It was a peculiar occurrence: McNamara, the
systems man, the technocrat, w ading into the murky w aters of South Vietnam; a rational American in
an alien morass. It was all faintly redolent of the Graham Greene novel The Quiet American.
McNamara was ill-prepared for the challenge; by education, by experience, and by predisposition. Yet
the Secretary displayed no doubts about his ability to manage the crisis; he was, as always, all
confidence. He sought to manage Vietnam in the same way he managed the Department of Defense
and the Ford Motor Company. His modus operandi: assemble the relev ant data, correlate and
evaluate, and decide and implement. However, one past element was notably absent. In the paramount
foreign policy challenge of the decade, McNamara did not allow the iconoclastic Whiz Kids to assist
him: the matter was too politically explosive, the JCS would raise hell. Congress might intervene.
Moreover, although McNamara was openly skeptical of the ability of JCS to formulate strategic
doctrine and supervise weapons procurement, he respected their ability to conduct combat operations.
In deference to the professional expertise of the JCS, the Secretary kept the civilian Whiz Kids from
examining the military situation in Southeast Asia. 3: Instead, McNamara relied on his new creation --
the DIA -- to collect and evaluate information on the Vietnam conflict for him. For the precocious
agency, striv ing to establish its jurisdiction and authority, the charge amounted to trial by lire. The
DIA became responsible for providing the Secretary of Defense and his staff with vital strategic
intelligence on the scope and nature of the Vict Cong insurgency, and the efforts of the Diem
government to suppress it. This responsibility inexorably brought the agency into direct conflict with
the entrenched service and field intelligence elements, who viewed the DIA's efforts as imperiling their
own. Thus the DIA, a reluctant participant, was thrust to center stage of the American defense
intelligence effort in Vietnam.
As the Secretary of Defense, with the assistance of the DIA, began to dominate Washington
reporting on the conflict, the newly-appointed American military commander in South Vietnam began
to dominate reporting from the field. In the w ake of Kennedy's November 1961 decision to send US
support troops to the Republic of Vietnam, the American command structure in the country was
reorganized. On 8 February 1962 the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV).
51 Cited in New man, JFK and Vietnam, p. 146.
52 Alain Enthoven, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis and preeminent Whiz.
Kid, remarked: "I thought — but never knew - that McNamara had a deal with the services. They
would let us run all over the rest of the defense program and ask a lot of nasty questions and overturn
assumptions, so long as they were left alone with their w ar, without unw anted civilians poking
around." Quoted in Deborah Shapley, Promise and Power: The Life and limes ofRobert McNamara.
Boston: Little, Brow n, and Company, 1993, p. 413.
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was established as a subordinate command of CINCPAC to coordinate the American military effort.
Genera! Paul D. Harkins, formerly the commander of the American Army forces in the Pacific, w as
named the commander of MACV (which resulted in the majestic acronym COMUSMACV). To the
indignation of Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting, Harkins w as granted diplomatic status equal to that of
the Ambassador, effectively making the military command independent of the Embassy. This was
significant because it meant that MACV intelligence would soon compete with, and eventually
dominate, the intelligence produced by the CIA and the Embassy. This, in turn, reinforced the nascent
tendency of senior Washington to perceive Vietnam in the military terms of MACV: as an armed
conflict which required the proper combination of military might and effective application for a
successful conclusion. The ascension of MACV intelligence was also important because it brought
the command into bureaucratic conflict with the DIA, as both agencies vied for the attention of
Washington policymakers.
In this contest MACV and the DIA submitted to McNamara's predilection to quantify whenever and
wherever possible, applying statistical analyses to the war effort in Vietnam. A staggering array of
numerical indicators were introduced by McNamara and his staff to assess the slate of the conflict ir,
Indochina. Of these indicators, one stands out as the most prominent; certainly the most
controversial. This was the enemy order of battle (OB), the comprehensive statistical profile of Viet
Cong men and material. 53 During the course of the conflict in Southeast Asia, the OB, a standard
military assessment, w ould come to be seen as the primary indicator of advancement on the battlefield.
It was often interpreted in a simplistic manner; a decrease in the aggregate enemy OB was construed as
a decline in the strength and capability of communist forces, signifying the ascendancy of the armed
forces of the United States and South Vietnam in the conflict. Conversely, an increase in the OB
indicated increased Viet Cong success. However facile, a decline in the OB came to be equated with the
successful prosecution of the war. Hence the OB came to dominate the American military intelligence
effort in Southeast Asia.
The DIA was enjoined to coordinate the OB effort in early 1962. Prior to that lime, the agency
was only marginally involved in compiling the OB: the routine assessments were normally
coordinated by the J-2, and produced by analysts at the Military Assistance and Advisory Group (the
precursor of MACV) and CINCPAC. This changed in February, 1962. That month McNamara called
a conference of the military establishment at CINCPAC Headquarters at Camp Smith, Honolulu, to
assess the state of the conflict in South Vietnam. (This was the third of eight conferences the Secretary
of Defense held on the Vietnam conflict during the Kennedy administration.) The general consensus
among the officials in attendance was that the war was going badly. The participants were aware that
an SNIE was being prepared in Washington that confirmed this pessimism. Derived from field
intelligence reports, the estimate concluded that despite the augmentation of the South Vietnamese
counter-insurgency program, the rebellion continued to prosper: Viet Cong forces had effectively
53 In military lexicon order-of-battle, abbreviated OB, refers to the identification, strength,
command structure, and disposition of the personnel, units, and equipment of a military force. Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary ofMilitary Terms, p. 290.
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doubled in the last six months.54 On 19 February the conference participants were briefed by the new
MACV commander. General Paul Harkins, and his intelligence chief, Colonel James Winterbottom.
To the surprise of all, Harkins stated that he was optimistic about the prospects for success in Vietnam
in the near future. McNamara was astonished by this judgment, for it directly contrasted the SNIE. He
questioned MACV intelligence chief Colonel Winterbottom closely, inquiring as to what specific-
factors provided the basis for such optimism. The Secretary noted that MACV's own estimate of the
Vict Cong OB had increased, presumably the strength of the insurgency was growing; was this not
contrary to the expressed optimism? He asked: "what happened to the VC; in July [ 1961j they were
reported to have a strength of 12,300, in December 17,000, in January 20-25,000. Have they increased
or have we been miscounting?"55 Winterbottom's response was evasive. He offered the Secretary a
range of 18,500-27,000 Viet Cong, and failed to intelligibly explain the methodology which yielded
these figures. McNamara was not satisfied, and pressed the issue. Ambassador Nolting and the
Chairman of the JCS General Lemnitzer joined the fray. The former argued that the MACV figures
were too low; the latter contended that they were too high. The discussion became heated. Admiral
Fell tried to end the argument, but McNamara resisted, remarking, "If we don't have a firm OB today"
the Kennedy administration would be unable to "determine w hat the changes have been."5'1 In effect,
the Secretary asserted that as long as the OB remained indeterminate, the progress of the war could not
be evaluated. McNamara angrily stated that he wanted a putative OB as soon as possible, and to this
end. he instructed the military to provide his office with a specific statement of the intelligence
resources required to execute this order as a matter top priority. He concluded; "This intelligence
problem must be solved."5" The military intelligence community scrambled to fulfill this directive.
The collection, processing, and analysis of intelligence pertinent to the OB was a formidable task.
The intelligence employed was derived from disparate sources, provided by elements of the NSA, CIA,
State Department, U&S Commands, and military serv ices. The systematic processing and evaluation
of this information was truly an intcr-dcparlmcntal effort, requiring meticulous coordination and
assertive management. As a matter of common concern, the task appears tailor-made for the DIA. The
agency was created precisely to deal with intelligence matters that transcended the competence of a
single military agency or element. The OB certainly met this criterion. Moreover, at heart, the OB
was a strategic intelligence estimate: strategic because it was employed by administration officials to
formulate policy and military plans at national and international levels. The intelligence literature
recognizes the OB as strategic intelligence, and since the DIA was nominally responsible for
coordinating military contributions to strategic intelligence estimates, one would expect the OB to fall
54 Central Intelligence Agency, SNIE 10-62, "Communist Objectives, Capabilities, and Intentions
in Southeast Asia," 21 February 1962. Cited in Gareth Porter (ed.), Vietnam: The Definitive
Documentation ofHuman Decisions. Stanfordsv illc, NY: Earl M. Coleman Enterprises, 1979,
Volume 2, pp. 160-56.
55 From CINCPAC record of the proceedings of the third Secretary of Defense conference, 19
February 1962. Quoted in New man, JFK and Vietnam, p. 191. For comparison, the South
Vietnamese OB was listed as 170,000 as of 15 January 1962.
56 Quoted in Newman, JFK and Vietnam, p. 192.
57 Quoted in Newman, JFK and Vietnam, p. 193.
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under the purview of the agency's Estimates Office.53 However, the agency's jurisdiction in this matter
was disputed. MACV asserted that the OB was not strategic but tactical intelligence, and therefore
within its domain. In fact, both were correct: there is no fundamental difference between strategic and
tactical intelligence. The distinction is derived from the level of application: strategic intelligence is
that intelligence employed by national perl icymakers; tactical is used by field commanders. The OB
was utilized by both sets of consumers for different purposes. The D1A and MACV both had
legitimate jurisdictional claims regarding it, although many disinterested intelligence analysts judge the
merits of the DIA claim to be greater.3'' Curiously, the DIA did not press the matter and acceded to the
request of the military command in Saigon to assume responsibility for the Viet Cong OB.1,0 It was an
unusual move. Several explanations hate been offered. The most persuasive is that MACV's
proximity to the conflict allowed it to exploit raw intelligence more efficiently and rapidly, offering
greater responsiveness to changing intelligence requirements from Saigon and Washington.61
Irrespective of the merits of the argument, it is remarkable that Carrol! sacrificed the organizational
interests of the DIA to placate a field commander. Analysts at the DIA feared that the OB process
would be corrupted by the operational requirements of MACV. This fear proved to be valid.
McNamara's exhortation -- "this intelligence problem must be solved" -- was resolved not in
Washington but in Saigon. The MACV OB endeavor was centered in the newly-established Joint
Evaluation Center (JEC), an inter-agency all-source intelligence organization. The JEC w as intended
to supplement MACV intelligence, providing congruent estimative intelligence. The center was
assigned personnel from MACV. CIA, and the State Department in an attempt to moderate
institutional bias. This objective was reinforced by the fact that the JEC was directed by the American
Ambassador rather than COMUSMACV, and was physically located in the Embassy in Saigon.63
In late February the DIA sent its premier OB analyst George Allen to Saigon to assist MACV and
the JEC in compiling the Viet Cong OB. At the time Allen was serving as a civilian consultant to the
director of the DIA's CI1C. Allen was an Indochina specialist, a former Army officer with sev eral tours
of duty in the region. He had personally w itnessed the futile French effort to lame the Viet Minh in
the nineteen-fifties, and was therefore inclined to view American involvement in Vietnam with a sense
of historical skepticism. He arrived in Saigon several days after the Third Secretary of Defense
Conference to receive a rude reception. When he reported to MACV's intelligence chief Colonel
Winterbottom, he found the colonel in a foul mood, admonishing a subordinate for failing to allow
Winterbottom to review communications between the officer and his superiors in Washington
(although such a review was clearly a violation of military protocol). According to Allen:
58 See Andnole in Hopple and Watson, Military Intelligence Community, pp. 99-106.
59 Confidential interviews, senior intelligence officials, military and civilian.
90 McGarvey, CIA: The Myth and the Madness, p. 134.
61 Additionally, MACV asserted that the DIA lacked the manpower and resources to supervise the
formulation of the OB. Of course, the agency lacked these capabilities because the military-
departments and the U&S Commands procrastinated in transferring them to DIA. The dilemma could
have been solved simply by assigning OB resources to DIA rather than MACV.
65 George Allen, Indochina Wars, p. 174.
He [Winterbottom] then turned to me, and mixing strong verbal and expletives in his
heated remarks, told me in no uncertain terms that though 1 might have been a "hot¬
shot," big-time, powerful blankety-blank GS-15 back in Washington, out there in
Saigon 1 was no belter than the lowest ranked private, that I would enjoy no special
privileges, that I should remember for whom I was working, that 1 was not DIA's
employee but his, and that if I tried to communicate with my home office without
clearing any message with him, he would fix my w agon (to put it politely).63
Allen, the lone representativ e of the DIA in Saigon, joined a small team of a dozen military
officers w ho were responsible for compiling the OB. The team performed fiv e w eeks of arduous
rescareh, gathering data on the Viet Cong military apparatus from field trips, combat unit intelligence
reports, signal intercepts, captured documents, and interviews with prisoners. By April the team had
collected enough evidence to begin a systematic and comprehensive analysis of the information. The
team subsequently developed a strict criterion for confirming reported Viet Cong units and a rigorous
methodology for evaluating the size, composition, and strength of the unit. The strict criterion was
intentional: the team wanted to produce a sober, if conservative, assessment of enemy strength.64
Throughout the assignment, the OB team clashed with Winterbottom. Several members later
asserted that Wintcrbottom appeared unable to understand the complexities of formulating an accurate
OB. A few accused him of professional incompetence, a serious charge, not capriciously made."5
Nearly all team members report that the J-2 repeatedly attempted to subvert cable traffic betw een them
and their commanders at C1NCPAC and in Washington. These do not appear to have been isolated
occurrences, but illustrations of Winterbottom's modus operandi, which disregarded common operating
configurations and procedures. Normally, the intelligence (G-2) and operations (G-3) divisions arc kept
separate in the command component to insulate intelligence from operational bias. However, in the
Saigon J-2 Wintcrboltom allowed operations officers to edit intelligence reports prior to submission."6
The conflict of interest is manifest: the implementors of orders were allowed to evaluate their own
performance. All pretense to objectivity was discarded. It was a dangerous precedent, which would lead
to disastrous consequences.
Why did Winterbottom exercise such control over the intelligence section? Two motives seem
likely. The first was simple organizational self-interest. Strict control allowed Wintcrbottom to limit
the dissemination of pessimistic intelligence which would contradict official MACV claims of
progress. Bleak intelligence might have been interpreted detrimentally to the command in Washington
and created misgivings concerning the performance of the US military advisory team.6* All things
considered, optimistic intelligence was more likely to preserve the autonomy and authority of military
63 George Allen, Indochina Wars, pp. 175-76.
64 See Newman, JFK and Vietnam, pp. 238-41.
65 See Newman, JFK and Vie!nam, pp. 196-97; and George Allen. Indochina Wars, p. 176.
66 See Halberslam, Best and Brightest, p. 230.
67 These institutional factors are discussed in Leslie Gelb, "How the System Worked," in Jeffrey
P. Kimball, To Reason Why: The Debate About the Causes of U.S. Involvement in the Vietnam
War. New York: McGraw Hill, 1990, pp. 157-61.
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commanders in Saigon than pessimistic intelligence, and therefore was preferred and encouraged. The
second motive was political. Since early March, Kenned)' intimate and Ambassador to India John
Kenneth Galbraith had been urging the President to seek a neutralist political solution to the conflict in
Vietnam. Galbraith's thought-provoking cables caught and held the interest of the President, for they
questioned the very foundation of American involvement in Indochina. For example, in 2 March 1962
Galbraith wrote Kenned)':
Incidentally, who is the man in your administration who decides what countries arc
strategic? I would like to have his name and address and ask him what is so
important about this real estate in the space age. What strength do wc gain from
alliance with an incompetent government and a people who are largely indifferent to
their own salvation?68
On 1 April, Galbraith met personally with the President to advocate a political compromise for
Vietnam. Predictably, the JCS were vehemently opposed to the proposal, and condemned it as naive
and inept.66 Nevertheless, Kenned) appeared to seriously consider the Galbraith proposal. While the
President contemplated, the American military effort in Vietnam hung in the balance. Thus April w as
a politically sensitive month for the military. The JCS were acutely aware that bad news from
Vietnam might influence the President to accept the Galbraith proposal. The President's Military-
Representative General Maxwell Taylor concurred with the JCS that the present American policy in
Vietnam should be pursued to a successful conclusion. Tay lor possessed outstanding political
intuition: he was well aware of the magnitude of the President's immanent decision, and adv ised
Harkins of the delicate political dynamics in Washington through private back-channel cables. It
should be noted that Harkins was v ery much Taylor's man in the field, a trusted friend and confidant.
The pair formed an formidable team: Taylor the leader, with fine political and bureaucratic instincts;
Harkins the assistant, the competent manager and team player. The relationship was tried and true.
Previously, when Taylor was named the Superintendent of West Point, Harkins was appointed the
Commandant of Cadets. When Taylor took over the US Eighth Army in Korea, Harkins was
appointed as chief of staff. Few were surprised that when McNamara was seeking a commander for the
newly-created MACV in February . Taylor recommended Harkins for the post, despite the fact that
Harkins had no experience in guerrilla warfare (his prowess lay in logistics). He was, by all accounts,
v ery much the conventional general. Yet he was appointed commander for a truly unconventional w ar.
Taylor orchestrated the appointment, as he had in the past, and Harkins was again grateful. He knew
his role. If Taylor wanted optimism from Vietnam, and he and the JCS clearly did, it w as probable that
Harkins and his intelligence chief Wintcrbotlom would provide it.
88 John Kenneth Galbraith, Ambassador's Journal: A Personal Account of the Kennedy Years.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969, p. 311.
69 Sec DODPP (XII). pp. 464-65.
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In Ihc middle of April Ihe Saigon team arrived at a new OB figure. By their conservative estimate,
the Viet Cong regular military units (mainforcc and guerrilla) totaled approximately 40,000 men. This
was a startling increase over the 25,(XX) figure presented to the Secretary of Defense eight weeks earlier.
As the team prepared to submit the revised OB, it was informed through intermediaries that
Winterbottom would not accept the statistics, that the aggregate was too high. It was suggested that
the team low er the figures, although the new range desired by the intelligence chief was not made clear.
In order to achieve this end, after some thought, the team simply introduced a new classification
category, possible units, to supplement the existing categories, confirmed and probable. In short,
the aggregate would now be divided into three (as opposed to two) groups, one of which, the possible
category, could be easily dismissed by MACV as unconfirmed (although informed military men knew
better) and therefore inconsequential. The process was analogous to dividing a deck of cards into three
portions, rather than two; then discarding one portion. The total was reduced, not through superior
methodology, but through bureaucratic sleight of hand. One participant, William Benedict, recalled its
prov enance thus:
George [Alien] and Lou [Ti.xier of ARPAC] and I sat down over a bottle of bourbon
and we tried to come up w ith some way . . . We wanted a figure of 20,000 main
force, roughly speaking, as ! recall, and so that's how we came up with the probable
and possible units, feeling that... a reasonable commander would look [at this] and
say okay, it there's 20,000 confirmed, and there's 10,000 probable, and 5,000
possible, why there's a hell of a lot of bad guys out there.-0
Note Benedict's justification for the manipulation; a "reasonable" commander would not discount
the specious probable category, and include these units in his assessment of enemy strength.
Regrettably, few commanders proved to be reasonable by Benedict's definition.
Despite the clever revision, the team again was informed that Winterbottom would not accept the
new figures, that the total was still too high. The team again reworked the figures, shifting even more
units into the possible category. Winterbottom accepted the last modification, and on 15 April
MACV endorsed the work of the OB team and issued the official Vict Cong order of battle as 16,305.-1
Disillusioned by the experience, George Allen informed Winterbottom's superior, General Harkins, that
the OB figure was inaccurate, and described the manipulation of the categories in detail. It appears that
Harkins did not investigate this allegation. Allen claims that he later learned that the orders to reduce
the OB originated from Harkins; Winterbottom simply conv eyed them.-0
The spurious MACV OB was presented to McNamara and his staff at the Fifth Secretary of Defense
Conference, held in Saigon 8-11 May. The OB was employed by MACV officers to portray the
Vietnam conflict in promising light. Harkins expressed progress in virtually all areas of the war effort.
Four of the analysts from the OB team present at the conference later claimed that the briefings were
70 Interview with William Benedict. Quoted in Newman, JFK and Vietnam, p. 243.
71 New man, JFK and Vietnam, pp. 243-44.
72 George Allen, Indochina Wars, p. 247.
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intentionally misleading, that the Secretary and his staff were not presented with an accurate assessment
of growing Viet Cong strength. ' John Newman, a historian who examined the records of the
conference in detail, asserts:
The Secretary of Defense was purposely misled on nearly all of the crucial aspects of
the war: the size of the enemy, the number and quality of friendly operations; the
territory controlled by the enemy versus the territory controlled by friendly forces;
the number of desertions from South Vietnam's armed forces; the success of the
placement of US intelligence advisors; and the problems with the Self Defense
Corps."4
The May Secretary of Defense Conference w as a watershed event in the order of battle controv ersy.
In the words of Captain Donald Blascak, a MACV analyst assigned to the OB team, "This is when the
big lie started.""5
McNamara was not the "reasonable" commander William Benedict hoped for. By all accounts, the
Secretary was encouraged by MACV's optimism. He took detailed notes during the briefings, in the
end filling several notebooks. Following the conference, McNamara told the press: "I've seen nothing
but progress and hopeful indications of further progress in the future." Many journalists were surprised
by the statement. Most had spent considerable time in South Vietnam and personally witnessed the
mounting deterioration of the countryside. They ascribed his remark, at odds with their experience, to
official propaganda. Later, Neil Sheehan of United Press International found himself alone with
McNamara and asked him, off-thc-rccord, what he really thought about the conflict. His reply
astonished Sheehan, and revealed much about the Secretary of Defense, soon to become the Secretary of
War: "Every quantitative measurement we have show s that we are winning the w ar.""6 For McNamara,
statistics were reality. If MACV stated that the number of enemy units was declining, then the
military operations of South Vietnam and the United States w ere effective: America was prevailing. It
was that simple.
Following the Fifth Secretary of Defense Conference, the OB team was dissolv ed. Responsibility
for compiling and updating the Viet Cong OB was transferred to the MACV intelligence section.
Though few realized at the time, Winterbottom won the struggle for authority over the enemy OB. It
was an easy v ictors': the other intelligence agencies were largely indifferent to the matter (Carroll was
reported to have "little interest" in the OB), and, with the notable exception of George Allen, most
were content to let MACV direct the effort. " Thereafter, the intelligence community generally deferred
73 The four officers are George Allen, William Benedict, Donald Blascak, and Samuel Dow ling.
74 Newman, JFK and Vietnam, p. 255.
75 interview with Donald Blascak. Quoted in New man, JFK and Vietnam, p. 255.
76 Quoted in Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam.
New York: Random House, 198, p. 289-90.
77 Characterization of Can-oil in T. L. Cubbage, "Westmoreland v. CBS: Was Intelligence
Corrupted by Policy Demands?" in Michael Handel (ed.). Leaders and Intelligence. London, Frank
Cass, 1989, p. 123.
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to MACV on OB intelligence, and MACV intelligence assumed new prominence. It was now an
important bureaucratic player, not only in the theater (where it was the most important player) but in
Washington. As the influence of MACV waxed, the legitimacy of the JEC, and with it the promise of
inter-departmental intelligence, waned. The CIA and the State Department did not commit sufficient
resources, both money and manpower, to the center because they suspected that any intelligence it
produced was likely to be disregarded by MACV if it contradicted the operational desires of the
command. Without true support from the civilian intelligence agencies, the JEC atrophied, it was
eventually relocated from the Embassy to MACV, where it simply supplemented Winlerbottom's
intelligence section."8 MACV's victory over its rivals was now complete.
For the D1A, the OB matter w as a neglected opportunity: a missed chance to exert its authority and
exercise its analytic capabilities. Spurning leadership, the agency was content to follow. Its growing
inability to influence the course of events in Vietnam was illustrated by the ordeal of George Allen.
After leaving Saigon for Washington in May, Allen stopped at CINCPAC intelligence in Honolulu.
There he briefed Brigadier General Patterson on the manipulation of the OB. Palerson appeared
sympathetic, but he, like Harkins, in the end took no action against Winlerbottom. Instead, Allen
later discovered, Patterson sent a back-channel message to both MACV in Saigon and Air Force
intelligence in Washington, w arning that Allen was "out to get" Wintcrbottom."9 When Allen arrived
in Washington, he was informed that General Carroll wanted to meet with him immediately. Unaware
of the back-channel cable that preceded him, Allen briefed the director of the D1A and his aides candidly.
He recounts:
I began, after taking a deep breath, with the suggestion that J-2 [Winterbottom] be
replaced, again, outlining his unsuitability for the assignment. General Carroll asked
what service the J-2 belonged to; when I replied that he was an Air Force colonel,
the general flushed, but then continued questioning me on other matters for another
15 minutes or so. Finally he thanked me, and dismissed me. After the door closed
behind me, the general asked the assembled colonels and the brigadier generals who
the hell that civilian thought he was to call into judgment the competence of an Air
Force colonel.80
75 See George Allen, Indochina Wars, pp. 174-77.
79 See George Allen, Indochina Wars, pp. 199-207.
80 George Allen, Indochina Wars, p. 199. It is interesting to compare Allen's return w ith that of
another OB team member, William Benedict. When Benedict returned toWashington, he reported to
his superior General Fitch (ASCI). He recalled: "I went in, and I told Fitch what the story was, how
they'd manipulated the figures, you know, the pressure we'd had to hold the point down. He tried to
call the [Armyj Chief of Staff, but that was just at the time when Decker was checking out of the net,
and he wasn't available ... So what happened is, Fitch sent me over to the National Board of
Estimates ... 1 went over and gave a two-hour talk to those guys where I leveled them, and they all
said, "Hey, the suspicion is confirmed, but what are you going to do?" By then the whole thing had
reached a point where there was a political implication overpowering us." Interview with William
Benedict. Quoted in Newman, JFK and Vietnam, p. 279.
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Carroll's reaction is significant, for it discloses the tacit belief of many senior officers that only
military men arc competent to assess the performance of their peers. In spite of Allen's military
background and expertise in the region, he was still a civilian, and therefore not qualified to criticize
Winterbottom. It was a curious, but by no means unique, event: the director of the DIA dismissed the
judgment of the agency's preeminent Indochina specialist in deference to a military colonel with little
experience in the region and little understanding of guerrilla warfare, simply because the colonel and the
genera! wore the same color uniform. Service loyalty came first; the integrity of the intelligence
process and the organizational interests of the DIA a distant second and third. Nonetheless, Allen's
outspoken views on the OB matter stirred controversy in Washington and finally compelled Carroll to
take action. In June, the director of the DIA announced that he would personally investigate Allen's
allegations of manipulation. Carroll assembled a team of analysts to assist him and departed
Washington for Saigon. The effort was for naught. Allen recalls:
The wind was taken out of [Carroll's] sails w hen he made the required courtesy call
[to CINCPAC in Honolulu] en route to Saigon. Admiral Felt chose to remind
Genera! Carroll that Vietnam was on CINCPAC's turf, and that as the theater
commander, he was responsible for intelligence in Vietnam; that he reported direclh
to the Joint Chiefs, that DIA was not in his chain of command and therefore had no
authority over intelligence in Admiral Felt's theater, and that he trusted General
Carroll understood this and would conduct himself accordingly. Genera! Carroll
advised his staff when they returned to their plane, that they would not conduct a
review of intelligence in Vietnam, but would simply be making an "orientation
visit" to familiarize themselves with the situation. And that's what he and his staff
did.81
Thus the authority of the DIA over the U&S Commands was revealed to be a chimera.
Thankfully Carroll w as never asked to account for the trip; Washington was soon consumed by the
Cuban missile crisis. However, later Carroll was contacted by Walt Rostov, to confirm a rumor that a
senior DIA analyst recently returned from Vietnam with critical views of the war effort. Rostow was,
of course, referring to George Allen. Carroll confirmed the rumor, and to his surprise Rostow asked to
interview the analyst. At the time, Rostow was the Counselor of the Department of State and
Chairman of the Policy Planning Council. As such, he was heavily involved in strategic planning for
Vietnam and was an influential advisor to the principal policymakers. Allen recounts:
This [request] caused quite a stir throughout DIA, which finally agreed to Rostow's
request, provided that he come to the Pentagon for the briefing. It was also decided that
a DIA genera! officer (an Air Force Brigadier) should attend the briefing session as
81
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"moderator." I was warned to retrain from criticizing MACV's intelligence competence.
While 1 could offer my own views on the enemy situation, 1 would not do it in ways
that might suggest any shortcomings in MACV's intelligence effort.82
Thus criticism of the MACV intelligence effort, which might have been constructive at this early
stage of American involvement, was proscribed. As William Perry observes, the unwritten code of
military conduct "dictates that while unquestioning loyalty to one's sere ice and commander is not a
requirement... criticizing one's service and commander to others, especially those in other services, is
absolutely forbidden."83 Carroll ensured that the D1A followed this code, even if it meant that he had to
censor his own analysts. Of course, the other military intelligence agencies abided by the code and
refrained from critiquing the reports of Winterbottom and his staff. The result was that MACV
intelligence quickly became infallible and few dared to challenge its reporting. This applied not only to
other intelligence organizations, but to internal dissenters.
The experience of Captain James Harris is illustrativ e. In late July 1962, Harris, a former member
of the OB team now assigned to MACV intelligence, completed a study of the communist insurgency
that concluded that Vict Cong strength was probably on the rise as the result of increased infiltration
from North Vietnam. The study was widely disseminated and immediately praised by CINCPAC, the
Army element (ARPAC) in particular, as a seminal and accurate analysis based on highh reliable
intelligence sources. Nevertheless, MACV rejected the Harris study, repudiating the work of its own
analyst. In fact, MACV promptly released a contradictory assessment, based on ambiguous evidence
and dubious analysis, and officially reduced the estimate of infiltration from the previous month: from
800-1000 men in June to 500-600 in July.84 Those who questioned the doctrine of optimism were
swiftly spurned by the command. Progress was the creed of MACV; a puritanical canon that abided no
dissent.
Nonetheless, heretics lurked on the steps of the temple. In the spring of 1962, intelligence reports
produced by the intelligence section of ARPAC, deriv ed from the same raw intelligence that MACV
employed, were consistently cynical about the prospects for the success of the counterinsurgeney
campaign. The historian John Newman explains the disparity thus: MACV tended to utilize onh
intelligence which demonstrated progress in its analyses and ignored contradictory information;
ARPAC objectively assessed all intelligence to arrive at its pessimistic conclusions.85 Newman
concluded that ARPAC performed honest intelligence analysis, rigorous and objective, while MACV
produced misleading intelligence in support of the wishes of its commanders. It is remarkable that at
this early stage of the conflict that Army intelligence, which presumably was proficient at accurately
assessing combat operations, was skeptical of the war effort, while MACV intelligence, directed by an
Air Force colonel with no experience in guerrilla warfare, exuded confidence.
82 George Allen, Indochina Wars, p. 204.
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In May, Brigadier General W. B. Rossen, the Special Assistant to the Army Chief of Staff Genera!
George Decker personally traveled to Vietnam to assess the state of the conflict. His final report w as
laden with gloom. In every region that he visited, from the highlands to the delta, he found near
universal skepticism among the American advisors that the Vict Cong could be swiftly defeated. The
Army Staff ignored the report.8" It too was unwilling to challenge the judgment of MACV, to doubt
the creed of progress.
Dissent was rare. Optimism was the established faith and the Secretary of Defense was a true
believer. At the Sixth Secretary of Defense Conference on 23 July 1962 , MACV presented McNamara
with an OB estimate which indicated that there was no significant change in enemy strength. The
Secretary interpreted this to be a validation of the effectiveness of the existing American policies. In
fact, the Secretary was so enthusiastic about the progress of the war, based on MACV intelligence, that
he ordered the JCS to formulate a withdrawal plan for American forces.8" DIA analysis believed that
the Secretary was overly optimistic. Several suspected that OB was static because MACV was again
altering its criteria to show no change.88 When DIA analysts in the CIIC surreptitiously queried
several fraternal MACV intelligence officers about the inert OB, they received disturbing responses.
The MACV intelligence officers believed that the evidence compiled prior to the conference clearly
indicated that the Viet Cong OB should be increasing, not decreasing. Aware that Winterbottom would
not be receptive to this information, they circumr cntcd the intelligence chief and presented the evidence
and the negative assessment to Harkins. After reviewing the intelligence provided by his staff. Harkins
rejected a increase in the enemy OB, based not on contradictory evidence or discrete analysis, but on his
intuitive belief that allied operations must be taking a toll on the Vict Cong. This discovery shocked
even a disillusioned George Allen at DIA. He was "astonished ... [that] a field commander's subjective
views could lead to the suppression of hard intelligence of mounting enemy capabilities."89
Nonetheless it had occurred. It was not the the first time; nor would it be the last.
Once again the DIA command staff did not allow its analysts to challenge the OB issued by
MACV. Additional!)', they did not inform McNamara of the disparity of judgment within the defense
intelligence community over the Viet Cong OB. The Secretary mistakenly believed that the espionage
agencies were in accord. Here the DIA clearly failed to fulfil! its responsibilities to the Secretary of
Defense. McNamara should have been advised of the disagreements over the OB, and provided with an
independent DIA assessment. Carroll did not allow the agency analysts to do this, and so failed the
Secretary. His service loyalties came first, and so he acquiesced to the wishes of the field commanders.
By doing this, Carroll removed the DIA from one of the crucial issues of the Vietnam conflict. The
exile was largely self-imposed: the director never truly confronted the military establishment over the
80 Andrew Krepinevich, The Army in Vietnam. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press,
1986, p. 76.
87 Two days later, on 25 Jul) 1962, the JCS formally ordered CINCPAC to develop the
Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam (CPSVN) to implement the withdrawal. On 14 August 1961
CINCPAC relayed the order, along with additional guidance, to MACV for formulation. The
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matter, never pressed his authority. Through silence and inaction, the DIA abdicated its strategic
responsibility for order of battle intelligence.
The apathy of Carroll in this matter has never been explained satisfactorily. Several DIA officials
have suggested that the director of the DIA believed that the OB was a prerogative of MACV, and that
the proper role of the DIA was one of support. This view is understandable, despite the fact that there
was good reason for the OB to be considered a strategic intelligence estimate, and therefore fall under
purview of the DIA. What is difficult to understand, however, is why Carroll subsequently let MACV
dominate the issue, to the point of the virtual exclusion of his own agency. As a defense intelligence
agency serving the Secretary of Defense, Carroll and his staff of analysts certainly had the right, some
would say the responsibility, to challenge OB assessments from Saigon inconsistent with DIA
intelligence. Yet Carroll tacitly discouraged these challenges in the summer of 1962; a year later he
would explicitly forbid them. Carroll, always prudent, did not wish to rock the boat. Thus the DIA
did not simply acquiesce to MACV on order of battle intelligence, it capitulated.
Congressional Oversight, 1962
On 26 March 1962, amid growing Congressional fears of over-centralization within the Defense
Department, the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee created a Special Subcommittee
on Defense Agencies which held hearings to inquire into agencies that had been created or were being
contemplated by the OSD. The inquiry focused on NSA, DCA, DSA, and the Defense Supply Agency
(the latter was established on 6 November 1961, by McNamara to coordinate military supply and
service functions). Traditionally, the House Armed Sen ices Committee had been a strong supporter of
military services, opposed to the merger of the departments or the creation of a general staff, critical of
civilian encroachment into military realms. The hearings were called because the Armed Service
Committee was concerned thai the increased centralization of military functions under the jurisdiction
of OSD was moving the Defense Department toward a "single defense concept" — an idea which the
majority of members were diametrically opposed to. McNamara's drive to consolidate defense
intelligence in the winter of 1^61-62 heightened the apprehension of the powerful representativ es.
Consequently, they moved to investigate.
The principal task of the Special Subcommittee, chaired by Porter Hardy, Jr. (Democrat-VA), and
William Bates (Republican-MA), w as to determine w hcthcr the defense agencies created by the fiat of
the Secretary of Defense had sufficient statutory basis. Since all were created under the authority of the
National Security Act, specifically the McCormack-Curtis Amendment, the subcommittee, in effect,
was trying to determine w hcthcr the agencies truly increased efficiency and eliminated duplication; thus
making them legal under the provisions of the Act.90 McNamara, senior defense officials, and General
Carroll and his staff testified before the subcommittee.
°° USC (87/2) House Armed Services, Hearings, p. 6683.
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McNamara's appearances before the subcommittee in June w ere marked by disagreement betw een
the Secretary of Defense and subcommittee members over the correct interpretation of the McCormack-
Curtis Amendment. Whereas McNamara and OSD preferred to interpret the amendment as broadly as
possible, allow ing for the possible consolidation of virtually all service functions with the exception
of training, the subcommittee, referring to the floor debate over the amendment, chose to view the
amendment narrow ly as justifying only those reforms intended to bring about substantia! savings on
common-use items.'" They accurately noted that the OSD interpretation allowed the Secretary of
Defense to enact v irtually any reform, for any reason, by the "simple allegation," true or not, that it
would bring about more efficient administration and/or the elimination of duplication."2 As
Congressman Harry Blandsford observed:
You could create these agencies; you could say that it would bring about savings;
and Congress could only say: "We don't think that it will bring about sav ings," but
we wouldn't be able to do much about it."'
McNamara failed to address this assertion adequately, repeatedly digressing and deferring to his legal
counsel. Furthermore, when questioned closely about the specific measures which would result in
greaterefficiency, his answers were vague."4
Consequently, the subcommittee members questioned General Carroll carefully as to precisely how
the creation of the D1A would save money and manpower. Despite his spirited initial claims to the
contrary, Carroll eventually conceded that it appeared that the new agency would not reduce the overall
manpower of the military intelligence effort nor would it reduce the number of serv ice personnel
assigned to intelligence duties. Where would the gains in efficiency come from? asked the
subcommittee. Carroll digressed. Still the subcommittee pressed. Finally, Carroll was forced to state
directly that he was not prepared at the time to specifically disclose how the DIA would increase the
efficiency of the military intelligence effort. " This w as a startling, and sobering, announcement by the
DIA's top official. Although he had personally drafted the organizational directive for the DIA, a
directiv e ostensibly committed to greater efficiency and the elimination of duplication, he stood before
Congress in 1962 and stated that he could not specify the exact means by which the agency would
achiev e these goals. So it w as revealed that the assertions of greater efficiency and the elimination of
duplication were mere rhetoric: simply the thin rccd on which the legal legitimacy of the DIA rested.
In reality, there was little truth to these claims. The compromise that created the DIA for the most part
31 The OSD interpretation of the amendment was stated by Cyrus Vance: "To summarize, we are
of the opinion that the National Security Act, as amended, grants to the Secretary of Defense supreme
power and authority to run the affairs of the Department of Defense and all its organizations and
agencies." See USC. (87/2) House Armed Services. Report, pp. 6609-11.
92 USC (87/2) House Armed Services. Report, p. 6613.
93 USC (87/2) House Armed Services. Hearings, p. 6697.
94 USC (87/2) House Armed Services. Hearings, pp. 6692-99.
95 USC (87/2) House Armed Services. Hearings, pp. 6772-73.
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protected the autonomy of the intelligence components armed services. The DIA did not possess the
authority to compel the armed services to reduce or eliminate resources assigned to specific intelligence
operations. The DIA simply could not impose efficiency on the recalcitrant military intelligence
community. The point was made explicit by Congressman William H. Bates, in the following
exchange with Genera! Carroll:
MR. BATES: Well, you 1 DIA] supervise, but you don't really mean
supervise, I guess, do you? You take a look at something. But you
can't tell them [the services] to do anything. You can't tell them to
change a thing.
All you might do is write a memorandum upstairs and hav e somebody
maybe—
GEN. CARROLL: If that should be necessary, that certainly would be
done.
MR. BLANDSFORD: General Carroll, isn't this basically, however, what
the Army, Navy, and Air Force have historically had?...
Well, the thing that bothers me, General: You arc taking no new responsibilities.""
Congressman Biandsford astutely located the crucial flaw in the DIA. It's authority over the
military intelligence community was nominal. In reality , the agency was largely powerless to effect
change. The status quo prevailed.
The single advantage derived from the establishment of the DIA repeatedly cited by both military
and civilian officials was the transfer of the ability to evaluate raw data from the services to the
agency."" McNamara stressed that the creation of a single intelligence estimate was the primary benefit
of the establishment of the DIA. '8 But McNamara failed to disclose the obstacles which were
preventing the attainment of this objective, previously examined in this chapter. USIB reform was
stalled; the DIA Estimates Office deprived of needed resources. Although the DIA's activation plan set
July 1962 as the operational date for the Production Center, wherein the estimative intelligence
functions of the agency would be centered, bureaucratic intransigence delayed its activation for a full
year." At best, the testimony of McNamara and defense officials on this matter was disingenuous
In the end, the subcommittee concluded that they found no faults in the DIA. They did, however,
object to its establishment under the authority of the McCormack-Curtis Amendment. This was not
surprising due to the traditional apprehension of the House Armed Services Committee to any measure
which might allow the services to be consolidated against the will of Congress. Ironically, they did
object to the only true reform that defense officials continually referred to — a single intelligence
*° I JSC (87/2) House Armed Serv ices. Hearings, pp. 6784-85, 6786.
97 USC (87/2) House Armed Serv ices. Hearings, pp. 6777-6813.
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estimate. The subcommittee, like Allen Dulles and senior CIA officials, simply feared this reform
might result in the suppression of dissent from policymakers. Its final report remarked:
[There] is a potential danger in the Defense Intelligence Agency; namely, that in an
effort to bring about an integrated intelligence estimate the minority views of
another service may be disregarded. The adoption of a single intelligence estimate
docs not assure its accuracy.100
Thus, the military found a powerful ally for its struggle to resist the centerpiece of McNamara's
reform of military intelligence — that which he had fought so hard for and giv en so much to preserve —
US1B reorganization and the consolidation of the preparation of threat estimates.
An Evaluation: The First Six Months
The first six months of the D1A w ere arduous. The agency was repeatedly confronted by what one
former Director of Naval Intelligence called, "institutional opposition and institutional sabotage."101 In
the Hobbcsian realm of military intelligence, the D1A struggled to assert its authority and forge an
identity. In several areas, notably collection requirements and current intelligence production, the
agency was able to meet its responsibilities with minimal resistance from the venerable military
departments. This was largely because these functions had been disregarded in the past. Since no
agency previously performed these functions, there was no one to contest the authority of the D1A.
Furthermore, these tasks were generally regarded as dull and mundane; other organizations were loathe
to undertake them. Thus the endeavors of the DIA in these areas went unchallenged. It was in the
more prominent tasks, particularly those relating to the analysis and production of strategic-
intelligence, that the DIA would find its tentative authority vigorously contested. Here there existed no
functional void: the military departments had long-established realms and prerogatives in these areas,
and they viewed the DIA as a usurper, out to seize traditional provinces and privileges. To the services,
it was a zero-sum contest: the DIA could gain authority and functions only at the expense of their
intelligence elements. The struggle was not over bureaucratic minutiae — greater efficiency and
increased effectiveness — although the conflict was frequently portrayed in these terms. At heart, the
struggle was for power: power over institutions, power over resources, power over estimates. AH
involved understood the slakes. If the DIA was to truly achieve the vision of McNamara — to become
a strong central manager with independent analytical capabilities — then the DIA was compelled to
challenge the role of the armed services and the field commands in the strategic intelligence process.
Based on the inability of the DIA to secure necessary personnel and resources and its egregious
performance in the Viet Cong OB, the agency failed the early tests.
100 USC (87/2) House Armed Sen ices. Report, p. 6621.
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Chapter Four
Cuba
The Sum of Their Fears
The DIA is a curious creature. It must serve two superiors whose responsibilities and needs arc
dissimilar. On one hand, the Secretary of Defense demands that the agency produce national
intelligence, purged of organizational bias, and assert control over the bellicose military intelligence
community. On the other hand, the JCS require the agency to perform miscellaneous and sundry tasks,
and for the most part, stay out of the way of the more powerful entities. The first six months of the
agency's existence conformed to the preferences of the military leaders, despite the best efforts of
McNamara to the contrary. The DIA had succumbed to the nascent authority of MACV in the Viet
Cong order of battle and yielded to the military departments in the formulation of strategic intelligence
estimates. In all it was an inauspicious beginning. Yet the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962
presented an opportunity for the DIA to turn the tide. Unlike US1B reform, the crisis was not a sterile
debate over bureaucratic procedures, but a momentous historical event. While the OB dispute was
centered in Saigon and perceived to be primarily a military matter, albeit with significant political
ramifications, wherein the DIA, an auxiliary organization based in Washington, had little role, the
missile crisis unfolded in the corridors of the White House and the Pentagon, and was viewed by
Kennedy administration officials principally as a political quandary with military implications. As
such, the burden of responsibility fell heavily on the Secretary of Defense, and his advice and counsel
to the President assumed added importance. For the DIA, McNamara's principal intelligence agent, the
crisis was an unprecedented chance to assert its nominal authority over the national intelligence
activities of the Defense Department and validate McNamara's vision of dispassionate threat
assessment. At issue was whether the agency could promulgate and maintain a stance of analytical
independence, or once again acquiesce to the command position, as it had done in the OB controversy.
In assessing the performance of the DIA, this chapter does not focus narrowly on the deeds of the the
agency; rather it broadly examines American intelligence activities during the nuclear confrontation,
for it is only in the context of this expanse that we might observe and measure the influences and
constraints on the agency, and accurately evaluate its performance. For, to borrow from John Donne,
no organization is an island, and the DIA is no exception. It is simply one amid the archipelago,
battered by the raging seas of powerful interests, eroded by the tides of antipathy. The bird's-eye view
is often the most revealing, if the most difficult to obtain. Consequently, the chapter is concerned with
the DIA's effort to provide strategic intelligence to its principal consumers: the Secretary of the
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Defense and the JCS. The first section describes the start of the crisis, focusing on the controversy
regarding military control of U-2 surveillance missions over Cuba. It notes that during this period the
actions of the DIA were marked by autonomy and self-interest. Furthermore, it chronicles the
evolution of the agency from a proponent of the common wisdom of the intelligence community, to an
outspoken dissenter. The second section details the ebb of the agency's independence, commensurate
with the intensifying military crisis. The third contrasts the motives and aims of the JCS and their
military brethren to civilian policymakers. The following section illustrates the agency's growing
obsequiousness by recounting the decisive role of the agency in formulating a significant NIE at the
height of the crisis. The subservience of the DIA to military departments near the end of the crisis is
explored in the fourth section. The final section offers an evaluation of the agency's performance.
Prelude to the Crisis: From Proponent to Dissenter
President John F. Kennedy's preoccupation with Cuba, fostered by the Bay of Pigs debacle, began
in earnest in February 1962 when he authorized the implementation of a covert program to overthrow
the Castro regime. Codcnamcd Operation MONGOOSE, an essential premise of the plan was the
willingness of the United States to employ military force to dislodge the communist government.1 In
accordance with this premise, an ad hex Defense Department group composed of officers from the
Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Command (CINCLANT) and the DIA started contingency
planning for an American naval blockade of the island in April.2 In response to the MONGOOSE
guerrilla operations mounted against the Cuban government, in the spring of 1962 the Soviet Union
began to furnish Castro's besieged regime with large quantities of conventional arms, including Soviet
MIG jet fighters and torpedo boats. The buildup accelerated in July and August: the American
intelligence community monitored an unusually large number of Soviet ships delivering military
armaments and personnel to Cuban ports. Initially neither the DIA nor the CIA were unduly alarmed
by the increased Soviet assistance to Castro. The Russian equipment was deemed to be "defensive"
material, supplied to the Cubans in the response to the MONGOOSE program and Cuban emigre raids,
and the Soviet personnel were thought to be primarily military instructors, advisors, and trainers." Yet
the DIA became concerned when Soviet military personnel began military construction projects at
several locations on the island, from Orientc Province in the east to Pinar del Rio Province in the
west. The growing apprehension of DIA analysts was shared by John McCone. The DCI feared that
1 MONGOOSE was an inter-departmental effort, under the operational control of the DOD
through the JCS. The involvement of the DIA in the operation was negligible. See USC (94/1)
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these ambitious construction projects were a prelude to the introduction of Soviet nuclear missile
forces into Cuba, although analysts in his own agency dismissed this possibility, asserting that the
buildup was defensive in nature. In high-level meetings on the tenth and twenty-first of August,
McCone conveyed his fears to Kennedy administration officials. Most were skeptical of the possibility
of such a bold deployment by the Russians, particularly McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk.
For the time being, the principals w ere content to accept the benign judgment of the intelligence
community, dismissing the dissent from its director.
On 18 August the DIA reported indications that Soviets were providing electronic counter-measures
equipment to the Castro government. This intelligence was derived from the reports of Cuban
refugees, who also reported a substantial increase in the number of Soviet and Communist Bloc
personnel on the island.""1 The presence of ECM equipment on the island further troubled analysts at
the DIA. They suspected that this sophisticated electronic "jamming" technology was a precursor to
the installation of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) in Cuba. At the end of the month, preliminary
intelligence derived from U-2 aerial photography of 29 August indicated that Soviet SAMs were
present in Cuba at eight locations, with additional locations probable.5 On 6 September the DIA
concluded that Soviet SA-2 SAMs (designated "Guideline" by NATO military planners) had arrived on
the island. This was a significant discovery, as the SA-2 was the most sophisticated contemporary
Russian air defense system. A missile from the SA-2 system had shot down the U-2 plane of Francis
Powers in May. 1960. Consequently, the American intelligence community was acutely aware of the
danger this system posed: it was a direct threat to US reconnaissance aircraft. As if this risk was not
evident to intelligence officials from the start, the point was driven home on 9 September 1962, when
a SA-2 SAM system downed a U-2 aircraft piloted by a Chinese nationalist over Communist China.
The lesson could not have been more clear. The Cuban buildup assumed a more ominous air.
In early September, the DIA noted the presence of Soviet KOMAR guidcd-missilc patrol boats on
the Cuban coast. Yct regardless of the introduction of the perilous state-of-the-art weapons systems and
a marked increase in the number of heavy tanks and artillery on the island, in a summary report to the
JCS on 6 September the DIA continued to support the putative assessment of the intelligence
community that the buildup remained defensive in nature."
On 8 September the DIA concluded that the Soviets had shipped the most adv anced Sov iet jet
fighter, the MIG-21 ("Fishbcd") to Cuba. This assessment caused considerable consternation within
military intelligence circles, for the MIG-21 was thought to be a formidable aircraft, an effective
fighter-interceptor and bomber. It was apparent to agency analysts that the stakes were increasing in
Cuba. Both the SA-2 and the MIG-21 were front-line Sov iet weapons systems. The Russians did not
4 Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Chronology of JCS Decisions Concerning Cuban Crisis," No date
(Declassified 24 June 1988) 139 pp. (Hereafter cited as JCS Chronology.) National Security Archives,
Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962. Microfilm collection. Alexandria, VA: Chadwyck-Hcaly, 1990, No.
2780, p. 1 -2.
5 JCS Chronology, p. 2; and Clifford, Counsel to the President, p. 357.
6 JCS Chronology, p. 2. It is worth noting that in a public statement on 4 September 1962,
President Kennedy had defined an "offensive" buildup to be one containing "offensive ground-to-ground
missiles." By implication a "defensive" buildup lacked these missiles.
7 JCS Chronology, p. 2.
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readily provide this equipment to allied nations: Cuba, for some reason, had been designated as a
worthy recipient. The DIA and the intelligence community strove to discover why. To its director,
John McCone, the reason was clear: the Soviets intended to establish offensive missiles sites in the
Western Hemisphere. At the time, McCone was crying in the wilderness. Yet his voice rang true. In
early September, contrary to the prevailing judgment of the American intelligence community, the
USSR installed offensive nuclear missiles on the island of Cuba.8
At McCone's promptings, BNE met in mid-September to review the military situation in Cuba.
After extensive deliberation, and in spite of the increasing scope and sophistication of Soviet military-
assistance to the Castro regime, the intelligence community (with the concurrence of the DIA)
reaffirmed the earlier assessments that buildup was principally motivated by defensive considerations.
The 19 September SNIE concluded:
Wc believe that the military buildup which began in July does not reflect a radically
new Soviet policy towards Cuba, either in terms of military commitments or of the
role of Cuba in overall Soviet strategy. Without changing the essential defensive
character of the military buildup in Cuba and without making an open pledge to
protect Cuba under all circumstances, the Soviets have enhanced Cuban military-
capabilities, repeated in stronger terms their warnings to the United States, and tied
the Cuban situation to the general questions of East-West confrontation.9
In support of the conclusion that the Soviets would not place offensive missiles in Cuba the
intelligence agencies offered the following rationale: there was no precedent for the deployment of
nuclear missiles outside of the borders of the Soviet Union; and that the USSR would be deterred from
such a deployment by the rational calculation that the risks of this act far outweighed the benefits.
Ironically, at the precise time the Soviets installed offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba. American
intelligence erroneously concluded they would not.
This now-notorious "September estimate" has been the subject of considerable comment, scholarly
and otherwise. The failure of American intelligence, both civilian and military, to predict Soviet
intentions in Cuba is frequently cited (often in conjunction with the "missile gap") as an archetypical
example of the problem of "mirror-imaging" in intelligence analy sis. The views of the respected
historian Walter Laqueur are emblematic of this criticism: "Intelligence was handicapped by its
inability to entertain the hypothesis that Soviet leaders were acting on assumptions quite different from
8 In testimony before Congress, General Carroll stated that the DIA believed, in retrospect, that the
missiles arrived in Cuba on 8 September. He stated: "Wc believe that it was then [8 September] that
the first missile shipment came in. In addition to the missiles themselves, which I described as being
of such a size that they required being hold-loaded in wide-hatch vessels, missile erectors also started to
come in . . . We believ e the missile buildup itself began shortly after the first week in September and
was continuing right up to the time that the quarantine was established." USC (88/1) House Foreign
Affairs. Hearings: Castro-Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere. GPO, 1963, p. 173.
Soviet sources suggest that the first MRBMs arriv ed in Cuba on 15 September 1962. See Blight and
Welsh, On the Brink, p. 334; and Gribkov and Smith, OperationAnadyr, p. 45.
9
Special National Intelligence Estimate 85-3-62, "The Military Buildup in Cuba," 27 February
1962 (No declassification date). Cited in McAuliffe, CIA Documents, pp. 91-93.
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what the Americans assumed them to be.'"0 In a similar r ein, Angclo Codcvilla, a Senate intelligence
committee staff member for eight years, remarked that Sherman Kent (Chairman of BNE at the lime
and and thus responsible for the production of the erroneous SNIE) for years went around telling friends
and foes alike that his judgment, embodied in the September SNIE, as to the course of action the
Soviets should har e pursued in Cuba in 1962 was better than the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's,
Coder ilia wryly notes that Kent misses the point: the challenge w as not to second-guess Khrushchev,
but predict Soviet behavior. Since Kent and the intelligence community failed to do this, Coder ilia
concludes that Cuba was an intelligence failure.1' Such criticism is misplaced. The fact is that BNE
did consider the possibility of the introduction of offensive missiles in Cuba, but rejected it. Two
factors arc reported to have been decisive. The first was that intelligence officials accepted prima facie
the statements, both public and private, of Khrushchev, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin which appeared to respect President Kennedy's repeated warnings that
the American government would not allow Cuba to become an offensive missile base for the USSR.::
These Soviet assurances reinforced the second factor, the general assumption shared by intelligence
analysts that "the opposition is acting in its best interest." " The roots of this belief lay in the Western
concepts of rationality and positivism, and the particular American creed of pragmatism. Under normal
circumstances, Western observers expect individuals and institutions to act in accordance with their best
interests, within the limitations of their environment. US intelligence analysts viewed the explicit
American commitment to a nuclear-free Cuba as a formidable constraint upon Soviet behavior in the
Caribbean region. Sov iet behavior was studied only within the boundaries of this limitation. Actions
outside of this boundary were considered irrational, and therefore improbable. With American interests
in Cuba so clearly defined, and the price of conflict so high, why would the Kremlin risk
confrontation? The intelligence community concluded it would not; a prudent, informed, logical
conclusion. Unfortunately wrong. For sometimes human behavior is irrational: men. and the
governments they create, are complex creatures, driv en by fear, prodded by reason, lured by ambition.
Many human decisions are irrational, a truth much-lamented by economists and social scientists. So,
in a sense, Sherman Kent was right: he probably did make a more rational assessment of the
international situation the Soviet Presidium faced; rational, however, in that it was based on the tenets
of Western realpolitik, rather than Russian political and institutional considerations. The view from
the Kremlin is quite different than from that of Langley. In the end no one is certain why Khrushchev
placed the missiles in Cuba, even with the full benefit of hindsight. Arnold Horclick, the Director of
the RAND-UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior and a careful student of the
crisis, remarked:
10 Laqueur, A World ofSecrets, p. 170.
11 Angelo Codev ilia, Informing Statecraft: Intelligence for a New Century. New York: Free
Press, 1992, p. 202.
12 Allison, Essence ofDecision, pp. 40-41.
13 Roger Hilsman, To Move A Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of
John F. Kennedy. New York: Delta, 1967, p. 189.
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I have thought about the question since 1962, and I have concluded that there is no
entirely plausible explanation of w hy the Soviets did what they did. Ail rationales
seem to me relevant to one degree or another. Different parts of the Soviet
government and different organizations probably came to support the decisions for
quite different reasons, and I don't know if we'll ever be able to disentangle all of the
motivations.14
Consequently, the failure of the intelligence community to predict the installation of Soviet offensive
nuclear missiles in Cuba appears ineluctable. BNE was not wholly culpable: predictive failures,
though unfortunate, are inherent to the trade.15 Like a conserv ative judiciary, BNE w as inclined to
uphold precedent in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary. At the time the estimate was
drafted, the intelligence agencies simply did not possess compelling data that the Russians planned to
introduce missiles onto the island, in spite of the intuitions of John McConc. The dearth of evidence,
not the infamous estimate, was the true intelligence failure.
The most striking deficiencies in the American intelligence operations of September 1962 were not
in analysis and evaluation, but in the collection process. Despite growing concern over the extent and
character of Soviet activities on the island, from 5 September to 14 October no U-2 reconnaissance
llights were flown directly over the isle. Hence during the critical period of the Cuban buildup, the
intelligence community was bereft of valuable high-resolution, high-altitude photographic coverage of
the central and western portions of the island. This is startling when one considers that the aircraft was
the primary intelligence collection platform for the island.The want of "hard" (that is, technical and
photographic) intelligence derived from U-2 flights was a formidable obstacle to obtaining an accurate
assessment of the Cuban buildup. If not blinded, the sight of American intelligence was certainly
impaired during this crucial span. The reason for the absence of U-2 coverage has been disputed for
years. Senior CIA officials have consistently asserted that heavy cloud cover over Cuba resulted in the
dearth of photography. In a post-mortem of the crisis commissioned by McCone, the CIA concluded:
"The delay in completing the photographic coverage was due solely to the unfavorable weather
14 Quoted in Blight and Welsh, On the Brink, pp. 36-37. Khrushchev declared that the primary
objective of the deployment was to defend Cuba and the Castro regime. Sec Nikita S. Khrushchev,
Khrushchev Remembers. Translated by Strobe Talbott. New York: Harper and Collins, 1991, pp.
388-89. This assertion is supported by a senior Soviet general involved in the planning. See Gribkov
and Smith, Operation Anadyr, pp. 11, 168.
15 See Richard K. Bctts, "Analysis, War, and Decision: Why intelligence failures arc
inevitable,"Wor/d Politics 31 (October 1975).
16 As previously noted, the intelligence community received photographic intelligence from
Discoverer/Corona satellites. However, cognoscenti have asserted that the orbits of the satellites were
ill-suited for coverage of Cuba (being primarily intended for reconnaissance over the USSR) and that
the resolution was inferior to that of the U-2. (Interestingly, satellite intelligence has been ignored in
public analyses of the crisis.) U-2 flights along the periphery of island were flown on 17, 27, 29
September, 5 and 7 October. Intelligence derived from these flights confirmed the proliferation of
SAM sites on the coast, yet the interior of the island escaped coverage. Lower-level reconnaissance
tlighls were conducted by SAC RB-47 photographic planes and Navy F8U Crusaders and F3D
Skynighls in an attempt to penetrate the interior, yet the results were "disappointing." Sec Brugioni,
Eyeball To Eyeball, pp. 151-52.
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predicted during this period.'" Testifying before Congress, General Carroll concurred, stating on the
record that the interruption was due to weather.18 Yet this official explanation has proved unsatisfactory
to many observers, and criticism of the intelligence community for the delay has endured throughout
the years. Recently, several CIA officials have suggested that "non-meteorological forces" were
responsible for the interruption in U-2 coverage during the missile crisis. They claim that the pause
was principally the result of equivocation by senior Kennedy administration officials, notably
McGcorge Bundy and Dean Rusk, who were troubled over the possible political costs of the loss of a
U-2 over Cuba. Their concern reportedly led administration officials to delay approval of the CIA's
request for additional U-2 flights to provide increased photographic coverage of the island, while
policymakers searched in vain for safer, alternative methods of surveillance and legal justification for
the overflights. The consequence of this delay was confusion within the intelligence community over
the scheduling and trajectories of the proposed U-2 missions.19
There is some merit to this claim. As previously discussed, the proliferation of the SA-2 sites in
Cuba alerted intelligence officials and policy makers to the possibility of the loss of an American U-2
aircraft over the island. The State Department was particularly concerned about this prospect, as it
feared the international opprobrium which would follow such an incident. In mid-September, largely at
the promptings of Rusk, the U-2 flight patterns w ere altered: the conventional w est to east and east to
west, two-pass Right path which penetrated Cuban airspace was replaced by peripheral Rights, no
closer than twenty-five miles to the island, over international w aters. Administration officials hoped
that the new flight path would reduce the risk to the U-2 missions by distancing the surveillance
aircraft from the SAM installations. In addition, they believed that peripheral Rights would be less
provocative to the Castro regime because American aircraft no longer directly violated Cuba airspace.
These perceived benefits were obtained at a great cost, for there is little doubt that the alteration to the
Right paths adversely affected intelligence collection. Photographic coverage of the western portion of
the island where the buildup was centered (and the SA-2 systems were reported to be ncaring
operational readiness) was difficult, and surveillance of the area waned.20 CIA officials assert thai the
agency was aware of these deficiencies, but was unable to correct them. They maintain that Rusk and
Bundy tacitly discouraged additional CIA requests for direct Rights oxer the island, preferring peripheral
flights while the policymakers explored less risky options. The implication is clear: the interruption
in U-2 coverage was the result of civ ilian interference and indecision.21
Senior administration officials sidestep these allegations w ith claims that intelligence officials were
not explicitly prohibited from making direct Right requests. To support this assertion, policymakers
point to the PFIAB post-mortem of the missile crisis. After a thorough inquiry into the performance
of the intelligence community during the crisis, the oversight board concluded in February 1963 that
the intelligence agencies, not policymakers, were responsible for the interruption in U-2 coverage. The
17 Central Intelligence Agency, "U-2 Overflights of Cuba, 29 August through 14 October, 1962,"
27 February 1963 (No declassification date). Cited in McAuliffc, CIA Documents, pp. 127-37.
18 USC (88/1) House Foreign Affairs. Hearings, p. 173.
19
Bragioni, Eyeball To Eyeball, pp. 135-38, 163-64.
20 Allison, Essence ofDecision, p. 121.
21 Gribkov and Smith, Operation Anadyr, p. 117.
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PFIAB noted that recommendations for future U-2 flights originated within the intelligence
community, in the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR), an inter-agency forum
established under the US1B to task aerial reconnaissance missions. After assessing the risk and value
of proposed Rights, COMOR recommended flights to the Special Group (an ad hoc high-level
committee responsible for authorizing covert intelligence operations) for approval. Should the
recommendation be approved by the Special Group (as was generally the case), it was referred directly
to the President for authorization. The PFIAB report contended that throughout the month of
September 1962, the President endorsed all U-2 (lights referred to him by the Special Group, which in
turn approved all Slights (in one instance with minor modifications) recommended to it by COMOR
and the intelligence agencies. The inference is that had the intelligence community recommended
increased U-2 coverage of the Cuban buildup, administration officials would have routinely granted
approval. In the absence of these recommendations, comprehensive coverage of the island was
neglected. The report staled:
Until October 3, when the Defense Intelligence Agency urged that suspicious areas of
Cuba be covered by U-2 photographic missions, it appears that there was a failure on
the part of the intelligence community as a whole to propose to the Special Group
U-2 reconnaissance missions on a scale commensurate with the nature and intensity
of the Sov iet activity in Cuba.::
PFIAB member Clark Clifford believed that this failure to recommend U-2 surveillance was the
result of "a state of mind within the intelligence community, encouraged by the negative results of
August 29 photography, w hich rejected the possibility of offensive missiles in Cuba."2' He notes
paradoxically that although DCI McConc personally believ ed that offensive missiles had arrived ir,
Cuba, his agency, the CIA, did not petition for additional U-2 aerial reconnaissance missions to prov ide
material evidence to confirm his hypothesis.:j Of course, intelligence officials retort that they w ere
discouraged from recommending these flights. The claims of both parties are reconcilable: the
evidence suggests that senior Kennedy administration officials tacitly discouraged direct U-2 Rights
ov er Cuba in September 1962, and, for its part, the intelligence community (COMOR in particular)
failed to press the issue.25 The true dispute concerns bureaucratic responsibility. Who was responsible
22 President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, "Memorandum to the President," 4 February
1963 (No declassification date). Cited in McAuliffe, CIA Documents, p. 364.
23 Clifford, Counsel to the President, p. 358.
24 Clifford, Counsel to the President, p. 358. Although McCone was in Europe during this
period of the crisis, he kept in close contact with deputy director Marshall Carter by telegraph. There
is no evidence that he urged Carter to increase U-2 coverage.
25 In his 1988 book, McGeorge Bundy was the first Kennedy administration official to publicly
acknowledge that the administration shared in the blame for the interruption of U-2 coverage: "The
photographs of 14 October were taken in good time, but they had been delayed, first by our own
caution in overflying Cuba, then by an unworthy bureaucratic squabble between the CIA and the Air
Force over control over the mission, and finally by weather." Bundy, Danger and Survival, p. 687,
note no. 45.
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for ensuring that American intelligence assets were properly deployed against Cuba? The intelligence
community believed that ultimate accountability lay with policymakers. Conversely, Clifford and the
PFIAB believed that the espionage agencies had a professional responsibility to vigorously advocate
the Hights regardless of the administration's aversion. While a full discussion of this topic is beyond
the scope of this chapter, it is apparent that the intelligence community shares accountability. Should
the espionage agencies conclude that important targets arc not receiving adequate coverage, at the very
least one would expect senior officials to be motivated by professional obligation to cogently present
their concerns to policymakers, irrespective of whether these concerns were discouraged or not. The
PFIAB report concluded that the intelligence community did not take this action in September 1962.
Circumstances aside, the indictment is accurate: COMOR did not formally recommend direct
overflights of Cuba during this period. It is therefore evident that the intelligence community bears no
small measure of blame for the delay in U-2 coverage.
Why did the intelligence agencies, the CIA in particular, fail to press for U-2 flights over western
and central Cuba in September 1962? While inclement weather and tacit discouragement were no doubt
significant factors, institutional strife played a prominent role. Throughout September 1962 the
intelligence community was preoccupied with a territorial dispute between the CIA and the Air Force
over control of the U-2 (lights over Cuba. This skirmish was one of many in the long war for
domination over the nation's aerial reconnaissance program, outlined in the last chapter. As Soviet
military assistance to Cuba increased in the fall of 1962, the Air Force saw an opportunity to w rest
control of the U-2 surveillance Slights from the CIA. In early September, the Air Staff briefed
McNamara and Gilpatric on a proposal for SAC control of the flights, arguing that the presence of the
SA-2 system and the increasing demand for U-2 missions necessitated the transfer of the operations to
SAC for it alone possessed both the resources and expertise to conduct the overflights should
hostilities occur. Initially, the Secretary and his deputy were receptive to the idea. Both were concerned
(as was Attorney General Robert Kennedy) that should a U-2 aircraft be lost over the island, the CIA's
cover story - that a Lockheed pilot delivering a plane from the United States to Puerto Rico had
inadvertently strayed over Cuban airspace — would not be plausible. Both officials were amenable to
the arguments of the Air Staff that SAC control of U-2 surveillance would eliminate the need for this
cover story, as the nature of the flight would be transformed from a covert operation to a military
reconnaissance mission. This transformation was not inconsequential. It is one matter to shoot dow n
a spy-plane; quite another to shoot down a military reconnaissance aircraft. By removing the stigma
of espionage from the mission, it would be easier to justify the flights to the international community
should an aircraft be lost. McNamara and Gilpatric were impressed by the proposal and agreed to let
the Air Force explore the possibility of SAC control of U-2 surveillance missions over Cuba.
Predictably, the CIA was opposed to the proposal. Most senior officials viewed it as pure
organizational imperialism: yet another attempt by the Air Force to sciz.e control of national aerial
reconnaissance operations. Because DCI McConc was in Europe on his honcymcxm in September
1962, the task of preserv ing the agency's prerogatives fell to deputy director General Marshall Carter.
It was no small irony that the responsibility of defending the civilian agency from military
encroachment fell to a military officer. In attempts to maintain control over the Cuban U-2 missions,
(20
Carter and CIA officials argued that the flights remained technically classified as covert intelligence
operations and therefore fell under the authority of the CIA by precedent. They asserted that the CIA
pilots were more experienced than their Air Force counterparts and therefore more capable of dealing
with the threat posed by the SAMs. They also noted that the U-2 planes employed by the CIA were
superior to those operated by SAC: the CIA planes possessed more powerful engines (allowing the
aircraft to fly higher) and improved ELINT capabilities.These attributes made the aircraft more
elusive, and therefore less vulnerable to anti-aircraft measures (notably, the SAMs). Thus the CIA
argued that it should retain control of the U-2 flights by virtue of precedence and superior men and
material.
For its part, the DIA championed the Air Force proposal. The agency joined with the .ICS and the
military departments in endorsing the SAC proposition, essentially because it would augment the role
of the agency in analyzing U-2 photographic intelligence (traditionally a CIA preserve). It was natural
for the DIA, whose staff was largely composed.of military officers, to ally with their peers in the
perennial inter-agency struggle over national surveillance programs. However, beyond these
institutional and professional considerations, Carroll was convinced that the military was in a
preferable position to the CIA to meet the immense collection requirements for tactical intelligence for
military planning in the event of armed conflict betw een Cuba and the United States. The director of
the DIA believed that such an event was likclv. In mid-September, an agency analyst, Colonel John
R. Wright, Jr. (who headed the MONGOOSE operations of the DSA), observed similarities between the
pattern of SAM sites in western Cuba and those in the USSR used to protect strategic missile
installations." (Wright had been reviewing the 29 August photographs of the San Cristobal area.)
Wright, like McConc, suspected that these SAMs were a signal of the impending deployment of
Soviet nuclear missiles. However, unlike McConc, he set out to gather evidence to support the
hypothesis. Recent refugee reports contained myriad allegations of missiles in Cuba, yet such
intelligence was notoriously unreliable and inaccurate. Nonetheless, Wright began to amass and collate
refugee information on suspected missile sightings. The breakthrough came on 18 September when he
received an intelligence report by a CIA operative who claimed to have sighted the rear profile of a
26 The CIA operated the newer U-2F aircraft, w hile SAC possessed older U-2A's and U-2C's. The
former aircraft contained the powerful J-75 engine and a more sophisticated power plant which allowed
the plane to fly five thousand feet higher and provided improv ed capability for detecting ground-based
radar and tracking SAMs. Allison, Essence ofDecision, p. 123; Brugioni, Eyeball To Eyeball, p.
182; and conversation with author, 14 June 1992.
27 One of the more persistent myths surrounding the crisis is that the SAMs were deployed in a
trapezoidal pattern. Former photographic analyst Dino Brugioni notes: "There were no SAMs
deployed in a trapezoidal pattern near San Cristobal, but neither were SAMs deployed in Cuba in the
same manner as they were deployed in the Soviet Union — i.e. a point rather than an area defense
pattern. When MRBMs were found in the San Cristobal area, the sites were not defended . . . with a
SAM at each corner of the sites. The trapezoidal SAM defense concept was also discounted by the
DOD hearings before Congress for FY 1964." Brugioni, p. 165 n. Testifying before Congress in 1963,
General Carroll also dismissed the trapezoidal SAM pattern, maintaining that the SAM sites were
composed of six launch positions, forming two entwined triangles, encircling a central guidance area,
as was common in the Soviet Union. In the majority of instances these sites were connected by roads
to create a "Star of David" pattern familiar to American intelligence analysts. USC (88/1) House
Foreign Affairs. Hearings, p. 168. Also see Brugioni, Eyeball To Eyeball, p. 104.
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Soviet ballistic missile carried on a truck on the island.28 This piece of evidence was deemed to be so
significant that General Carroll formally advanced the hypothesis that Soviet Medium-Range Ballistic-
Missiles (MRBMs) might be present in the Pinar del Rio area of western Cuba to McNamara on 1
October.29 Carroll wished to execute a south to north U-2 llighl ov er the island as soon as possible to
confirm or refute the hypothesis. He supported the SAC proposal as the most efficacious means to
obtain corroborative photographic evidence. Consequently, Carrol! appealed to McNamara to endorse
the Air Force proposal. His influence was reportedly significant.20
In fact, so great was the DIA's concern over the buildup in Cuba that on 4 October the agency
established a Cuban Situation Room within the CIIC at the Pentagon, directed by the ubiquitous
George Allen, with personnel and facilities for continuous 24-hour operation. Furthermore, General
Carroll appointed John Hughes, a talented and experienced photographic interpreter, to be his special
assistant and ordered him to personally monitor the Cuban situation and report his findings directly to
the director of the DIA. At the time there was little U-2 photograph}' to evaluate.
The bureaucratic contest for control of the U-2 flights, which pitted the CIA against the DIA and
its military brethren, lasted throughout September and into early October. While this melee w as not
the sole cause of the delay in surveillance Slights over Cuba, it was the most important, for it polari/cd
the intelligence community during a time of uncertainty over the scope and nature of the
reconnaissance missions. " Throughout September the execution of the missions were in doubt (recall
that the State Department was pressing for less risky alternatives), direct flights discouraged, and
control disputed. Given this atmosphere of dubiety, it is not surprising that the intelligence
community did not press for more U-2 (lights, for its attention was 1'ixcd not on the island of Cuba,
but the conference rooms of the Pentagon and White House. The DIA and CIA bear a large burden of
the blame for the delay in reconnaissance. Regardless of the merits of their respective positions,
neither agency ensured that Cuba received adequate surveillance coverage during the critical month of
the buildup. This was an authentic intelligence failure. National intelligence needs were overshadowed
23 USC (88/1) House Appropriations. Hearings: Department ofDefense Appropriations, FY
1964. GPO, 1963, p. 68.
29 USC (88/1) House Appropriations. Hearings, pp. 44-45, 71; and JCS Chronology, p. 3.
30 Admiral Frankel recalled: "[W|hen he [General Carroll | found, or concluded, that the U-2
overflights were better run by the Air Force than by the Central Intelligence Agency, this was done
with the highest backing, and from my point of view, since I was involved in it, with what might have
seemed unreasonable demand as far as taking pictures, getting them back, and getting them analyzed.
General Carroll properly insisted on an all out effort." Transcript, Rear Admiral Samuel Frankc! oral
history interview, pp. 448-9.
311 acknowledge that this thesis is at odds with the report of the Stennis Committee which
investigated the performance of the intelligence community in the Cuban missile crisis. The report
stated: "There is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that any conflict between CIA and SAC existed or
that there was any delay in photographic coverage of the island because of the fact that the U-2 program
w as being operated by the CIA prior to October 14. Likewise there is no evidence whatsoever of any
deadlock between the two agencies or any conflict or dispute with respect to the question of by whom
the flights should be flown." USC (88/1) Senate Armed Services, p. 9. My confidential sources
suggest otherwise. For support, see Bundy, Danger and Survival, p. 687; Allison, Essence of
Decision, p. 123.
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by organizational rivalry and bureaucratic acquiescence. Consequently, the crucial middle days of
September, wherein the Soviets introduced offensive missiles into Cuba, were lost by the American
intelligence agencies to controv ersy and timidity.
As the month drew to a close, the DIA reported that several SA-2 sites were thought to be
operational.32 The threat to American U-2 missions increased significantly. This consideration,
coupled with the advocacy of General Carroll, impelled McNamara to officially adopt the Air Force
proposal for SAC control of U-2 operations over Cuba as the Defense Department position. In a
lengthv meeting with the JCS to review military planning against Cuba on 1 October, the Secretary
instructed the Chiefs to direct SAC to formulate an operational plan for reconnaissance ov er Cuba. "
The subject was formally raised in a COMOR meeting three days later, but the debate was
inconclusiv e.34 The proposal was referred to the Special Group, an ad hoc committee established by
President Kennedy to authorize and monitor covert operations, for decision.
The Special Group meeting which considered the issue of U-2 control was held in the office of
McGcorgc Bundy on 9 October.35 The fact that the matter ended up in the office of the Special
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs was an indication of the severity of the feud.
Bund}', a favorite of the President, had become an informal chief of staff for Kenned}' on national
security issues, quickly moving to fill the vacuum created as the Slate Department's influenced waned
under Rusk. In the developing hierarchy. Bund}" was one rung remov ed from the President. If the U-2
issue could not be settled by Bundy, it would end up on the desk of Kenned} . It had become that
important. In the 9 October meeting, Marshall Carter defended the jurisdiction of the CIA over the
missions, while Roswell Gilpatric advocated SAC control of future flights. After extensive
deliberation, Gilpatric prevailed: Carter acceded to the Defense Department proposal and agreed to SAC
control of U-2 Rights over Cuba. It is likely that the military background of the deputy director of the
CIA played a role in this decision. Carter reportedly realized that in the ev ent of escalation, the CIA
lacked the operational assets (that is, airplanes and pilots) to the meet the expanding intelligence
requirements of military planners. In the aftermath of the decision, man}' at the CIA were furious at
Carter's acquiescence; the} believed an important bureaucratic battle had been lost and the precedent of
CIA authority over aerial reconnaissance programs had been effectively overturned. Privately McCone
was said to be indignant, for he believ ed that Carter failed to mount a determined resistance to the Air
Force proposal, that the Deputy Director's military background caused him to be overly sympathetic to
the demands of the Defense Department. Yet McConc did not appeal the decision, telling colleagues
that it was too late, he believed that the President had decided the issue prior to the COMOR meeting.
32 JCS Chronology, p. 2.
33 JCS Chronology, p. 4; and Brugioni, Eyeball To Eyeball, pp. 161-62. In the same meeting
McNamara also ordered Admiral Robert L. Dcnnison, Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Fleet, to
begin planning for a blockade of Cuba.
34 Allison, Essence ofDecision, pp. 122-23.
351 could not determine which Special Group met at this time. The Special Group (Augmented)
was responsible for the MONGOOSE program, but it normally met in a conference room next door to
General Maxwell Taylor's office. The fact that the meeting took place in Bundy's office suggests that
it was a Special Group meeting and thus the U-2 Bights were considered within the broad jurisdiction
of covert operations rather than the narrow confines of the anti-Castro program.
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The DCI suspected that the Defense Department had outflanked him, that McNamara had privately
consulted w ith the President and gained approval for the proposal before the 9 October meeting. To
McCone, the Special Group debate was more theatrical than deliberative; the crucial decision was
already made.16 In any event. President Kennedy formally approved of the arrangement on 10 October,
Thus the CIA lost the battle for control of U-2 missions over Cuba.
It is a mistake to dismiss this dispute as a sterile bureaucratic controversy. The quarrel exacted a
high cost, distracting the American government and espionage apparatus during the critical period of
the Cuban buildup. It was only after the dispute was settled that policymakers and intelligence
officials belatedly turned their attention to the alleged missile sites. On 9 October the Special Group
approved a COMOR recommendation of 4 October for the execution of a long-proposed south to north
U-2 ilight plan over the island that would provide detailed photographic coverage of western Cuba.
This decision was an important victory for the D1A, which had long advocated this flight path. The
mission was to be flown as soon as weather permitted.
Two days later, w hile awaiting the Right, the DIA reported, based on a Navy Photographic
Interpretation Center report of licet aerial reconnaissance photography (dated 28 September) pertaining
to ten crates carried on the deck of the Soviet ship Kas'nnov, that the Soviet Union had shipped
additional offensive weapons to Cuba. Through a form of analysis called "crateology" -- wherein
analysts seek correlations between military equipment and the ty pe and size of crate it is shipped in —
analysts in the DIA Situation Room concluded that Soviet IL-28 ("Beagle") light bombers were being
delivered to the Castro regime.38 The DIA also reported the discovery of additional SA-2 sites: by 11
October the agency believed approximately twenty sites were in disparate stages of construction on the
island.39 Apprehension at DIA became palpable, as analysts awaited the execution of the SAC U-2
overflight over western Cuba that the Special Group approv ed on 9 September.
The long-awaited U-2 Right over western Cuba, focusing on the San Cristobal area fifty miles
southwest of Havana, was finally carried out on 14 October. The first mission under control of SAC,
the U-2 aircraft was piloted by Major Richard S. Heyser and performed a single pass ov er the western
38 Confidential interview, senior CIA official. Also see Brugioni, Eyeball To Eyeball, p. 155.
37 The Defense Department assumed operational responsibility for the U-2 missions on 12 October
1962. The U-2 aircraft were assigned to 4080th Strategic Wing of SAC.
38 JCS Chronology, p. 4. In congressional testimony, General Carroll later admitted that the DIA
never received photographic intelligence verifying this conclusion: "It was a probable determination
because we never did see the aircraft as such. We did see the crates which had a configuration which we
subsequently identified as being the same as that which we had observed mov ing into Indonesia and the
UAR." USC (88/1) House Foreign Affairs. Hearings, p. 167. Contemporary Soviet sources confirm
the deployment of the bombers. Gribkov and Smith, OperationAnadyr, pp. 45-46.
39 JCS Chronology, p. 4. These findings were based on intelligence derived from the peripheral
surveillance Rights of the preceding month.
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end of the island.40 The flight did not elicit any reaction from the feared SA-2 systems.4' The raw
intelligence, in the form of two large rolls of film, was immediate!} sent to the Nav al Photographic
Intelligence Center (NAVPIC) in Suitland, Maryland, for processing. The developed film, edited and
tilled, arrived at National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) in northwest Washington the next
morning. NPIC was a multi-departmental agency tasked with exploiting strategic photographic
intelligence. Although funded, operated, and staffed by the CIA, the DIA and each military service had
special detachments at NPIC. under the administrative control of the intelligence chiefs of the military
dcparlmcnts.4: NPIC was responsible for evaluation of the intelligence derived from U-2 flights over
Cuba.
Monday, 15 October was the fateful day of discovery. In the early evening, the staff at NPIC
formed a preliminary conclusion that Soviet missiles w ere present in the Pinar del Rio area of Cuba.
Colonel David Parker, the deputy director of NPIC, contacted John Hughes and asked him to come to
NPIC to review the intelligence. Hughes arrived with a DIA photo-interpreter, John McLaughlin, and
the two reviewed the preliminary evidence. Both were quickly convinced that the discovered missiles
were offensive in nature (that is, ground-to-ground), probably MRBMs. After taking brief notes, the
two drove to Boiling Air Force Base to the home of General Carroll. In a tense encounter, the Director
of the DIA was briefed on the available intelligence. Carroll quickly telephoned Gilpatric (for
McNamara was unreachable, as he was attending a Hickory Hill seminar that evening) while Hughes
and McLaughlin set out for the home of the Deputy Secretary of Defense. After listening to a terse
summary of the preliminary evidence from the pair, Giipalric decided that little could be done that
evening: McNamara and McConc were indisposed and, in any event, comprehensive analysis of the
intelligence would not be complete until morning. Gilpatric therefore decided to keep his arrangements
for the evening. He and Carroll set out for a party at the quarters of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Maxwell Taylor, while Hughes returned to NPIC to witness the processing and analysis of the
U-2 imagery.43 Upon their arriv al at Taylor's part}, Gilpatric and Carroll discovered that Deputy
Undersecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson and Marshall Carter were in attendance. The} were
discreetly informed of developments as circumstances permitted. Taylor recalled:
40
Man} accounts of the crisis have identified the pilot of the 14 October flight as Major Rudolph
Anderson. Jr. Intelligence officials involved in the operation have informed me that this claim is
erroneous and suggested that the assertions were made perhaps in tribute to the pilot, who was
subsequently killed in a 27 October mission over Cuba. His was the only life lost by hostile action
during the crisis. It is possible that Anderson performed a peripheral role in the flight: Brugioni
claims that he was the designated backup pilot. Others have suggested that two missions were flown
that evening, one by Anderson and the other by Heyser. See Brugioni, Eyeball To Eyeball, p. 182.
For concurrent (lights sec Robert F. Kenned}, Thirteen Days: The Cuban Missile Crisis. London:
Pan, 1968, p. 95; Bundy, Danger and Survival, p. 391; Allison, Essence ofDecision, p. 123.
41 JCS Chronology, p. 4.
42
Brugioni, Eyeball To Eyeball, pp. 193-94.
43 Brugioni, Eyeball To Eyeball, pp. 206-10.
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It was in the cocktail hour that General Carroll edged over to me and whispered that
he thought they had def inite photography now showing the presence of missiles in
Cuba. So we all w ent about whispering to each other in the corners of the sun porch
at my quarters.44
Thus the principals were informed of early developments in the Cuban missile crisis largely by word of
mouth.
October 15 was the highwater mark of the DIA's role in the crisis. The agency accurately
monitored early developments — the deployment of the MIG-21s, SA-2s, and IL-28s -- and supported
the Defense Department's successful effort to gain control of the U-2 surveillance flights over the
island. More importantly, the DIA formulated and advanced the hypothesis that missiles w ere deployed
in the San Cristobal area; a thesis at odds with conventional wisdom within the intelligence
community. Subsequently, the agency fought for, and won, photographic coverage of western Cuba.
In fact, the DIA proposed the flight path of the historic 14 October flight which discovered the
MRBMs on the island. These were achievements of no small measure, especially when one considers
the youth and disorder of the agency. They proved that the DIA could make decisive contributions to
the American intelligence effort. In a very real sense, the Cuban missile crisis was a rite of passage for
the DIA. Its first chief of staff, Admiral Samuel Frankel later recalled:
Well, the Cuban missile episode was resolved and, of course, reflected great credit on
the Defense Intelligence Agency, and rightly so . . . We couldn't have had a better
episode or occurrence to have reduced the — or cause abatement of this general feeling
of suspicion [toward DIA] . . . But after the Cuban crisis had been resolved, the
agencies took a look at themselves and realized that, without the Defense Intelligence
Agency riding herd on this as a central element, the information w hich was made
available would probably have not been made available in the manner and in the time
limits it was. I believe that's right. I don't think it would. Furthermore, the people
who would have done their individual work on this could not have ended up with as
fine a product as did come out of it.4'
If the days prior to the discovery of the missiles were a credit to the DIA, the succeeding days
revealed its shortcomings. As the crisis deepened, the DIA found its influence waning. Formerly in
the vanguard, the agency found itself exiled to the rear of the intelligence effort, consigned to a
auxiliary role.
44
Transcript, General Maxwell Taylor oral history interview, 21 June 1964, b\ Elspeth Rostow, p.
8. JFK Library.
45 Transcript, Rear Admiral Samuel Frankel oral history interview, pp. 450-52.
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The Military Crisis: the Erosion of DIA Authority
Following the discovery of the Soviet missiles in Cuba, General Carroll, w ith McNamara's
approval, directed the DIA to assume control over national intelligence collection operations relevant to
the deployment and the production of current intelligence. Admiral Frankel remembered:
He [Carroll] required that ev en,' agency, including that portion of the CIA which dealt
with photography, overflights, be immediately responsive to his requirements.
Flights were laid on, Navy ships were moved about for intelligence-collection
purposes, special courier flights were established, and the photographs processed and
analyzed, with such speed that I don't think there was any photograph which was
more than twelve hours late -- within twelve hours after the picture was taken the
information was available.46
The task was immense. Immediately following the discovery of the missiles on US October.
McNamara ordered SAC to conduct additional U-2 (lights as required to achieve complete photographic
coverage of Cuba as quickly as possible. The DIA coordinated the intelligence requirements for the
intelligence community and the U&S Commands for each proposed mission. Within a week,
seventeen high-altitude missions w ere flown, providing coverage of ninety-eight percent of the island.J"
The film from each mission was processed at NAVPIC and SAC; subsequently it was sent to NPIC
for evaluation, where teams of CIA. DIA, and armed service analysts examined the photographic
intelligence. Concurrent evaluation was performed at the DIA Cuban Situation Room in the
Pentagon. The work was complex and arduous; by all accounts, the DIA staff performed admirably.
Yet the endeavors of the DIA to disseminate the current intelligence were fraught with difficulty.
For example, on the morning of discovery, 16 October, McNamara w as briefed on the deployment of
the missiles by John Hughes of the DIA..48 However, the JCS were not similarly briefed by the DIA
as one would expect. Instead, teams of Army, Navy, and Air Force briefers were assembled and
informed of ev ents by NPIC staffers. The teams then conveyed the information to their superiors in
the military departments, employing notes and briefing boards prepared by NPIC. DIA analysts were
denied the opportunity to brief the service chiefs; traditional military precedence prevailed. The
following anecdote is illustrative. The Navy team was unable to brief CNO Anderson that morning,
for he was presenting a lecture to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. In his absence a Navy
briefer, Lt. Commander Peter Brunnctte, suggested that the team alert the Commandant of the Marines,
General Shoup, of the missile installation. Although Shoup was nearby, working at his office at the
Pentagon, the proposal was immediately rejected:
46 Transcript, Rear Admiral Samuel Frankel oral history interv iew, pp. 448-49.
47 JCS Chronology, p. 6.
48 Brugioni, Eyeball To Eyeball, p. 225.
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An aide to Admiral Anderson reminded Brunette that the Marines got their
information, as far as intelligence w as concerned, from the Navy and you never brief
the commandant of the Marine Corps before you brief the Chief of Naval Operations.
When Brunette questioned that judgment, the aide said. "You just let us w orry about
that."4'' '
This talc offers a valuable insight into the way the military operates. Rank and precedence mean
everything. Unfortunately, the D1A possessed neither. In spite of the fact that the DIA was established
to perform this precise function -- briefing the JCS and the leaders of the military departments (the
Editorial and Briefing Section of the C1IC was specifically charged with this task in 1961) — for all
intents and purposes the armed services disregarded this provision and denied DIA briefers access to the
chiefs of staff. Established departmental procedures were maintained. For the duration of the crisis, the
DIA normally provided intelligence assessments and briefing boards to service officers, who in turn
briefed the senior officers of the military departments. Thus did the military sen ices preserve their
institutional prerogatives.
The dissemination of current intelligence to another important DIA consumer, the U&S
Commands, also proved to be problematic. The ability of the agency to impart intelligence to field
commanders was impaired by a system of strict compartmcntalizalion imposed in September, 1962. In
normal circumstances, the intelligence community seeks to confine sensitive information to top
staffers, general!} on a "need-to-know" basis. Security systems are established to limit the distribution
of information and thereby reduce the risk of disclosure of covert sources and methods. In the case of
intelligence on Cuba, however, a rigid security system was established principally for political reasons.
President Kennedy was concerned about the prospect that sensitive (and politically explosive)
intelligence w hich revealed the magnitude of Soviet military assistance to Cuba might be leaked to the
press. Such a leak could severely damage the administration, for it would effectively bolster
Republican claims that the Democratic President was pursuing a policy of appeasement toward the
Castro regime. To reduce this possibility, at a 31 August meeting on aerial reconnaissance over Cuba.
President Kennedy restricted the dissemination of intelligence on the Cuban buildup. Subsequently, a
new security clearance (designated PSALM) was created under the authority of the USIB to safeguard
sensitive photographic intelligence on Cuba. The system imposed an injunction on the distribution of
information on offensive weapons in intelligence publications. The rigid restrictions of the new-
security system effectively confined the information to high-level intelligence officials and
policymakers centered in the Washington area. Many officers in the military commands were not
granted PSALM clearance and, for the most part, were denied detailed intelligence on the Cuban
buildup.50 When the MRBM deployments were discovered in October, the relevant intelligence was
routinely classified under the PSALM security clearance, hence it was not disseminated to the U&S
49
Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, pp. 227-28.
50 President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, "Memorandum to the President," 4 February
1963. Cited in McAuliffe, CIA Documents, pp. 362-71; Brugioni, Eveball To Eyeball, pp. 125-28;
and conversation with author, 14 June 1993.
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Commands in military intelligence publications. In order to inform military commanders of
developments, the D1A was forced to call in high-ranking officers from the field for oral briefings.
Thereafter, the intelligence remained restricted to senior U&S Command officers and was withheld from
military planners of lesser ranks for some time. Thus the rigid system of compartmentali/.ation
hampered the DIA's capability to disseminate intelligence to the field commands and impeded early
operational planning for American military action against the Castro regime.''1
While the DIA essayed to collect and evaluate current intelligence, the Kennedy administration
deliberated the proper response to the Soviet missile deployment. On the afternoon of 16 October,
President Kennedy assembled a group of senior advisors, experts, and statesmen to advise him on the
Cuban situation. Called the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExCom), the
group met daily for the duration of the crisis to review developments, evaluate American options, and
recommend actions to the President." At the first meeting, the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff General Maxwell Taylor — the only military representative on the committee — argued that the
deployment of Soviet missiles in the Caribbean represented a major Soviet effort to alter the nuclear
balance of power. Echoing the views of military leaders, Taylor asserted that Khrushchev's bold
venture greatly increased the capability of the Sov iet Union to threaten and attack the United Stales
with nuclear missiles. However, this argument was rejected by several participants, including the
Secretary of Defense, who contended that in spite of the deployment, the United States enjoyed
incontrovertible nuclear superiority. Reflecting on the debate. McNamara later observed:
the assumption that the strategic nuclear balance (or "imbalance") mattered in any
way was wrong. As far as I am concerned, it made no difference. Now, 1 don't recall
that we had any hard evidence that there were Sov iet warheads in Cuba, though, I
suppose it is likely they were there: but what difference would the extra forty have
made to the overall strategic balance? If memory serves me correctly, we had some
5000 strategic nuclear warheads against their 300. Can anyone seriously tell me that
their having 340 would have made any difference? The military balance wasn't
changed. I didn't believe it then, and 1 don't believe it now.53
51 PFIAB, "Memorandum to the President," Cited in McAuliffe, CIA Documents, pp. 370-71.
52 Although ExCom was formally established by National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM)
No. 196 of 22 October 1962, the committee first met at 11:45 AM on 16 October. Initially composed
of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Robert S. McNamara, Secretary
of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon, John McCone, Genera! Maxwell Taylor, McGeorge Bundy, and
Special Counsel Theodore Sorenson, later participants included Robert Lovctt, Dean Acheson,
Undersecretary of Stale George Ball, Assistant Secretary of State (Latin American Affairs) Edwin M.
Martin, Roswell Gilpatric, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) Paul Nitzc,
Stale Department Soviet Expert Llewellyn Thompson, General Marshall Carter, Lyndon Johnson,
Kenneth O'Donnell, Donald Wilson, and Adlai Stevenson. Its haphazard format was characterized by
Dean Acheson as "a floating crap game for decisions." Quoted in Brugioni, Eyeball To Eyeball, p.
224.
53 Quoted in Blight and Welsh, On the Brink, p. 23.
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It swiftly became apparent that the DIA's superiors, the Secretary of Defense and the JCS. were
deeply divided over the interpretation and implications of the missile deployment. This rift was
reflected within ExCom. Those, like McNamara, who viewed the deployment as strategically
inconsequential and advocated a moderate American reaction came to be called the "doves." Conversely,
those who thought the deployment to be strategically significant and endorsed immediate military
action against Cuba came to know n as "hawks." The Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, DC!
John McCone and the JCS were numbered among the latter.54 Consequently, the ExCom participants
were divided between those who fell that the crisis was primarily a military problem and a question of
force (that is, the "hawks"), and those who believed that it was essentially a political problem wherein
military force could be applied to demonstrate national resolve (that is. the "dotes"). The critical
distinction between hawks and doves was between applying military force for military ends, and
military force for political and diplomatic objectives. Despite the disparity, common ground was
discovered: there was unanimous agreement among the President's counselors that the presence of the
nuclear missiles in Cuba could not be tolerated. Subsequent debate centered on the best means to
persuade the Soviet Union to withdraw the w eapons.
The Perceptions and Preferences of the JCS: the DIA as Accomplice
Concurrent with the ExCom meeting, the JCS convened to discuss a dozen questions posed to
them in the early afternoon by McNamara concerning possible American responses to the Soviet
missile deployment. Not surprisingly, the JCS embraced a hawkish perspective. The military
leadership viewed the installation of Soviet MRBMs in Cuba as a fundamental shift in the strategic
equation. This was not merely a theoretical assessment, based upon abstract comparisons of US-
Soviet force structures; rather it was a practical evaluation of the Russian military threat, a threat that
the JCS were professionally responsible for estimating and counteracting. Many in the military arc
quick to point out that civilian nuclear theorists had the luxury of speculating as to the precise effect of
these nuclear missiles on the strategic equilibrium; the JCS did not have the time for such musings.
For the nation's military leaders, the specter of a Soviet nuclear strike against US military bases and
population centers offered, for the first time, the very real prospect of the destruction of a large portion
of the strategic capabilities of SAC and the death of as many as eighty million American citizens. For
US military planners the threat was tangible. Some believed that the Cuban deployment -- estimated
to be 40 launchers w ilh 80 warheads — represented an eighty percent increase in Soviet first-strike
54 Dillon later recalled: "All 1 can remember is how we [the haw ks) fell at the time. / felt — and
so did the Joint Chiefs of Staff — that there was a change in the strategic balance." Quoted in Blight
andWelsh, On the Brink, p. 23. The haw ks were Acheson, Dillon, McConc, Nitze, and Taylor.
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capability.55 The implications were extraordinary. It should be recalled that the existing American
nuclear plan (SIOP-62) called for a massive preemptive nuclear attack on the Soviet Union and its
communist allies; what the Air Force called "a splendid first strike." Thus the installation of Soviet
nuclear forces in the Caribbean had dire implications for strategic planners, committed to ensuring that
the United States possessed both the capabilities and plans for nuclear victory. The comments of
Graham Allison arc instructive:
The President had a "reasonable" prospect under SlOP 1(a) of "getting them all" on a
first strike, at least according to the military folks. {The spy Colonel Oleg]
Penkovsky had been giving us hard information on Soviet bases at least until
September 1962. But after the Soviets put MRBMs and IRBMs [Intermediate-Range
Ballistic Missiles] in Cuba, things arc no longer so easy. So, clearly, from the
position of the SAC planner and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Cuban move looks
very, very big.56
Given that they were entrusted with the responsibility for ensuring the survival of the nation, it is
not surprising that most in the military desired the immediate, forceful removal of the missiles from
Cuba. The JCS preferred to deal with the threat at its source: by destroying the missile installations
in Cuba, the strategic consequences of the Sov iet deployment would be moot. Like a surgeon
operating with dispatch, the JCS were inclined to ignore the symptoms and treat the affliction.
Accordingly, in conference on the afternoon of 16 October the JCS endorsed a massive air strike
against the MRBM installations, combat aircraft, tanks, PT boats, and suspected nuclear storage
facilities on the island. In addition to this aerial assault, the JCS recommended that a naval blockade
be imposed against Cuba at least ten days prior to the attack, and that SAC be moved to Defensive
Condition (DefCon) Two (2). The latter military posture scrambled SAC's bomber force and allowed
for the mobilization of up to 150,000 American troops. The stated objectives of these acts were to
eliminate the nuclear threat to the United States and to liberate Cuba.5 The second objective is
noteworthy as it indicates that the JCS saw the missile crisis as an opportunity to not only to exercise
American strategic superiority, but remove the present communist government from power. Of course,
in this the Chiefs w ere not inspired entirely by Lockean principles; they were also looking to settle an
old score. Stung by Presidential reproach from the Bay of Pigs debacle, the JCS yearned for a second
chance to redeem themselves and settle the Cuban matter once and for all. There was a general
conviction in the military that the insolent tyrant Castro had been allowed to annoy the United Stales
for too long, that it was high time America inv oked the Monroe Doctrine and intervened in Cuban
55 SeeBundy, Danger and Survival, p. 417. The exact number of missiles present on the island is
still disputed: "Photographic reconnaissance was unable to detect precisely how many ballistic
missiles were introduced into Cuba. Prior to the Soviet announcement that 42 missiles would be
withdrawn, our photographs had revealed a lesser number. It could not be established, therefore, how
many ballistic missiles were, in fact, introduced into Cuba or specifically how many the Soviets
planned to introduce." USC(88/1) Senate Armed Serv ices. Hearings, p. 7.
56 Quoted in Blight and Welsh, On the Brink, pp. 32-33.
57 JCS Chronology, pp. 9-13.
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affairs to purge the island of communists. An earlier attempt, the CIA's Bay of Pigs operation, had
failed, but the military were not truly surprised. After all. they reasoned, w hat did civilians know
about military operations? The agency was good at cloak and dagger missions, in shadow and fog.
Authentic combat operations surpassed the CIA. This was the realm of the military. Now that the
Soviets had upped the ante by placing missiles in Cuba, many in the armed services believed that it
was time to call in the professionals, time to send in the first team. The JCS w ere confident there
would not be a second failure.
Though the performance of the American military leadership would later be harshly criticized, none
alleged that the JCS perspective was anything other than consistent. From the first day of the crisis to
the last, the Chiefs unanimously advocated an immediate response to the Soviet missile deployment
and recommended a massive bombing strike accompanied by full-scale invasion of Cuba to destroy the
missile sites. This course of action was advanced relentlessly, irrespective of whether the missile sites
were assessed to be operational or not. The resolve of the JCS was invariable; they repeatedly
dismissed alternative proposals for negotiation and conciliation in favor of a sweeping military assault
on the island. Simply stated, for the JCS the Cuban missile crisis represented a rare opportunity to
teach the Soviets a lesson in the high price of aggrandizement. The Air Force Chief of Staff General
Curtis LeMay -- who, as David Halberstam observed, "had a penchant for saying aloud what some
other military men were merely thinking"58 — remarked: "The Russian bear has always been eager to
stick his paw in Latin American waters. Now, we've got him in a trap, let's take his leg off right up
to his testicles. On second thought, let's take off his testicles, too."59
President Kennedy did not share this perspective. After meeting with ExCom in the evening of 16
October to review the spectrum of possible US responses to the missile deployment, from inaction to
an invasion, the President initially favored a "surgical" air strike against the missile sites alone.
Kennedy believed that this option offered the possibility of destroying the missiles before they became
fulh' operational while conveying, in unambiguous terms, American determination to prevent the
entrance of additional Russian offensive weapons into the Western Hemisphere. It was a "dovish"
response, the application of measured force. Yet both the President and McNamara believed, in marked
contrast to the JCS, that military might should be employed with prudence. At the conclusion of the
meeting President Kennedy instructed McNamara and Taylor to order the military to formulate plans for
this contingency immediately.
Thereafter McNamara and Taylor met with the JCS to advise them of the President's preference for
an air strike against the missile sites. The JCS were disappointed. They believed that their
recommendation for a comprehensive invasion should have been endorsed, and that the President
ignored the counsel of the military leaders at the peril of the nation. Nevertheless, they forbore their
objections and followed the instructions of their superiors.60 Yet the military deigned to draft new
58 David Halberslam, The Fifties. New York: Villard, 1993, p. 26,
53 Quoted in Brugioni, Eyeball To Eyehail, p. 469.
60 Although Taylor represented the JCS in E.xCom meetings, McNamara gave each JCS participant
full operational responsibility during the crisis: Wheeler oversaw Army deployments; Anderson
communicated directly with CINCLANT commander Admiral Robert Dennison; and LeMay instructed
SAC commander General Thomas Powers. Sec Perry, Four Stars, pp. 124-25.
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operational plans consistent with the ExCom "surgical strike" concept; instead they modified the
existing contingency plans for military operations against Cuba (which had been reviewed by the
Secretary of Defense on 1 October 1962). In this, the JCS effectively circumvented the wishes of the
President, as planning for a limited air strike directed solely at missile sites was replaced by planning
for a massive air campaign against Cuba as a prelude to an American invasion. The new mission w as
more ambitious, the operation more expansive, and the pressures to escalate would be more demanding.
It was a subtle maneuver. The critical distinction was between means and ends: was the operation
sufficient in its own right or was it a component of a larger campaign? By planning the air strike not
as an end in itself, but as an ancillary operation within a comprehensive invasion, the JCS hoped to
supplant the political objective of the President with the military end that the} desired: to destroy the
communist military threat in Cuba."1 Although the DIA provided intelligence support to military
planners, it is doubtful that its analysts were aware of the shift in objective or its policy implications.
The following day military leaders presented their version of the "surgical strike" plan to ExCom.
Committee members were surprised to discover that the concept of a limited attack had evolved into the
military recommendation to execute as many as five hundred aircraft sorties against targets in Cuba,
which were likely to result in extensive "collateral" damage. Many analysts, including several ExCom
participants, hat e been perplexed by the transformation of the "surgical strike" into the massive air
assault. In his authoritative account of the Cuban missile crisis, Graham Allison describes the affair as
a "misunderstanding," an unfortunate consequence of the disparate assumptions held by military
planners and civilian policymakers concerning the option.s: Yet this explanation is unsatisfactory, for
the parameters of the mission (that is, against the missile installations alone) were explicitly defined to
the JCS on the evening of 16 October by both McNamara and Taylor.63 The fact is that the military-
planners ignored these specifications, and alternately formulated a massive air and ground assault. The
evidence suggests that this was not a misunderstanding, but a conscious and deliberate alteration by the
JCS to utilize the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba as an opportunity to execute existing plans for
the ouster of the Castro government. In accordance with the predilection of senior military officers, the
plans were designed to employ massive, as opposed to limited, force; hence the prodigious scope of
the proposed assault. Seen in this light, the JCS recommendation for an all-out invasion appears to be
a mixture of political opportunism and military preference.
In attempts to prompt ExCom to endorse their recommendation the military leaders employed a
two-fold strategy: first, discredit those options relying on the use of limited force (the "surgical" air
strike proposal, in particular); second, forcefully advocate the implementation of existing contingency-
plans for an invasion of Cuba. In the ExCom meeting of 17 October the former followed the latter. In
order to refute the "surgical strike" concept, General Walter C. Sweeney, Commander of the Air Force's
Tactical Air Command, informed ExCom that the military could not guarantee the total destruction of
61 The JCS, especially Chairman Taylor, were well aware of the disparity between the military and
civilians over the mission. Sec Blight and Welsh. On the Brink, pp. 51-52.
62 Allison, Essence ofDecision, pp. 124-26. The author notes: "The surgical air strike the
government leaders wanted, and which they thought was being discussed, was never examined in detail
by Air Force planners during the first week of the crisis." p. 125.
63 Personal interview, Roswell Gilpatric, 23 July 1992.
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all the missiles under the "surgical strike" option. He opined that the optimal result would be the
negation of ninety percent of the MRBMs present on the island. In support of this conclusion.
Sweeney observed that the Soviet MRBMs were classified as "mobile" or "field-type" and suggested
that the missiles might be moved before or during an American attack and fired from a new position.
The calculation that ten percent of the missiles could be expected to survive the air attack was based
upon the alleged mobility of the MRBMs. Given the presumed clusivcness of the missiles, the
military simply could not offer the assurance that all would be destroyed in one attack. In response to
questions from ExCom members, Sweeney and Taylor fueled the concerns of Kennedy advisors that
Soviet field commanders might launch the missiles under an imminent American attack; further
disparaging the air strike option. In the end, both considerations, mobility and the possibility of a
launch-under-attack, were astutely and effectively employed by military leaders to discredit the proposed
air strike on the missile sites.''"1 Following Sweeney's presentation, ExCom foreclosed the air strike
option and explored other alternatives.
This was unfortunate, for Sweeney's briefing w as misleading. The next week civilian specialists
reconsidered the air strike option and found that many of the allegations made by military were
spurious. Careful examination revealed that the mobility of missiles was analogous to that of a small
house: the MRBMs could be moved and reassembled in eight to ten days."' In fact, the MRBMs were
far from elusive: for all intents and purposes they w ere stationary, and thus exceedingly vulnerable to
an air strike. The susceptibility of the missiles to attack was heightened by the delicate and
painstaking fueling, arming, and targeting procedures that were necessary for a successful launch.
These factors led two contemporary scholars to remark:
The conclusion which follows from this is that something like divine intervention
would har e been necessary to permit a Soviet second lieutenant to fire the missile
under his command successfully during an American air strike. Such a launch w ould
not hare been absolutely impossible, but the information available at the time
clear!}' indicated that it was wildly improbable. Though General Sweeney was
technically correct in refusing to guarantee that he could destroy all the known
missiles, he evidently failed to communicate to McNamara how unlikely a launch-
under-attack would be.""
What is disturbing about the performance of the DIA during this period is that the agency did not
correct the misperccptions of the Secretary of Defense and his staff. Officials at the agency were aware
that the two two basic arguments the JCS used to discredit the surgical air strike, mobility and the
prospect of launch-under-attack, were unsound. The DIA was well aware of the limited mobility of the
64 See Blight and Welsh, On Ike Brink, pp. 79-80.
65 Allison, Essence ofDecision, p. 126.
66 Blight and Welsh, On the Brink, p. 212. The military offered several other dubious premises in
their attempt to discredit the surgical air strike: assuming that all the SA-2 SAMs were operational,
employing an absurdly high (by historical standards) attrition rate for aircraft over the island, and
presuming that the strike could only be carried out in a single, massive wave (as opposed to multiple
waves).
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Soviet MRBM and its \ ulnerability to aerial attack. The former was common knowledge within the
espionage community, for the capabilities of the Russian SS-4 MRBM had been evaluated b\
intelligence analysts and confirmed by the agent Oleg Pcnkovsky.6" As to the latter, the D1A was
cognizant of the improbability of a successful launch-undcr-attack because it was advised by the CIA in
October that the Soviet MRBMs employed a volatile liquid fuel that, for reasons of safety, was kept
separate from the missile under normal circumstances. In order to fire the missile successfully under
combat conditions, the Soviet technicians had to fuel the rocket, then successfully mate the missile
with the warhead (the latter, if present, would also be stored independently from the MRBMs for
security reasons). The practical consequence of this unwieldy procedure was that in the event of an
impending US air strike, eight to twenty hours were required to prepare the missiles for launch.oR This
provided ample time for the American military to locate the missiles and neutralize them, in one or
more air strikes; in marked contrast to the impression Sweeney gave to E\Com. The DIA never
corrected this misinterpretation, nor did the agency brief McNamara or his aides on the capabilities and
limitations of the Soviet MRBMs. There is no evidence that the agency reviewed the final operational
plans presented to the Secretary of Defense and ExCom by the military leaders for accuracy. In fact, the
historical evidence available suggests that the DIA did little more than convey information from the
JCS to OSD and the U&S Commands, without analysis or comment. The DIA did not exercise its
independent evaluative capabilities (though, admittedly, they remained in a rudimentary state); it
simply transmitted information from the military to the Secretary of Defense. McNamara's vision of
the DIA as the scrupulous adjudicator of the military intelligence community proved to be an
apparition: the judge had become little more than a courier.
The reason for this transformation was neither insidious nor enigmatic. As the crisis deepened, and
the Soviet missiles in Cuba approached operational readiness, the armed serv ices prepared for battle.
Accordingly, the services mobilized and activated their intelligence assets in anticipation of the
increased demand for tactical intelligence to support combat operations of the theater commanders. As
the intelligence efforts of the military departments, in support of the U&S Commands, waxed, the
influence of joint endeavors, the Joint Staff and the DIA in particular, waned. The power and the
authority of the inter-sen ice organizations was limited to begin with, and largely confined to strategic-
planning and military policy. As hostilities approached, the significance of these bodies declined
dramatically. Policy was the realm of Joint Staff and its agents; war the domain of the U&S
Commands and the armed services. Thus as the United States was pulled to the brink of war, the DIA
was pushed aside as the military sen ices asserted their preeminence.
While this metamorphosis is understandable, it was nonetheless detrimental to the national interest,
for the Secretary of Defense and OSD lost an important source of information, and a possible
bureaucratic ally, at a perilous time. In the past the Secretary had relied on OSO to meet his
intelligence requirements; the dissolution of this office on 31 October 1961 left him dependent on the
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DIA for strategic intelligence. As the influence of the DIA waned, McNamara and E\Com were forced
to rely on the military departments for both operational planning and intelligence analysis. In fact, the
services monopolized military information on Cuba; and effectively "starved" the DIA of intelligence.
Moreover, in what appears to har e been a conflict of interest, the services both recommended military
action and evaluated intelligence germane to the operational plans to judge the probable success of the
venture. For civilians there was no effective way to challenge the sen ices; there was no competing
military agency to contest the intelligence assessments of the services and impartially advise OSD. As
the influence of the DIA diminished and its role within the military intelligence community devolved
from a dispassionate dissenter to silent accomplice, an important institutional check on the military
departments was lost. At the time when the Secretary of Defense was most in need of the capability to
evaluate intelligence, amid the cacophony of calls for military action, the DIA succumbed wholly to
the authority of the military departments. McNamara had no intelligence to support (or, for that
matter, refute) his dovish predilection; no intelligence to oppose the ascendancy of the hawks. The
Secretary of Defense had, in fact, no independent source for intelligence. The DIA could no longer, in
the words of Admiral Frankcl, "ride herd" on the intelligence elements of the Defense Department. The
reverse was now true: the DIA was being driven by the interests of the military departments. The
importance of this can not be overstated, for it revels the inherent weaknesses of the agency. The DIA
could neither challenge the intelligence assessments of the military departments and field commands,
nor could it provide adequate intelligence support to the Secretary of Defense at a time of grave national
peril.
A Propitious, But Flawed, Estimate: the DIA as Partisan
After disparaging, inaccurately as we now know, the surgical air strike, in the ExCom meeting on
17 October Generals Taylor and Sweeney proceeded to recommend an invasion of Cuba, preferably
under OPLAN-314.65 OPLAN-314 was the second of three contingency plans for military operations
against Cuba prepared by the Defense Department during the crisis/0 It called for simultaneous
amphibious and airborne assaults on the island following a comprehensive air attack. The .ICS opined
that the probable Soviet response to execution of this plan would not be general war; but an increase
in tensions at East-West confrontation points, the most likely of which was Berlin. The military-
leaders argued that the benefits of implementing OPLAN-314 justified the costs; that it w as essential
to the national interest that the missiles be forcefully removed from Cuba as soon as possible. The
65 In a memorandum to McNamara dated 17 October, the JCS formally characterized their view on
the Cuban situation as: "recommending an attack against all missile sites, all combat aircraft and
nuclear storage facilities, combat ships, tanks, and other appropriate military targets in Cuba, in
conjunction with a complete blockade; opposing a strike against the IRBMs alone; and advising that
the elimination of the Castro regime would require an invasion, preferably under OPLAN-314." JCS
Chronology, p. 15.
70 Operational Plan 312 (OPLAN-312) set out air strike options, OPLAN-314 and OPLAN-316
set out invasion options.
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JCS believed that the invasion was the only way to insure their removal; other measures were deemed
ineffective and eliminated from consideration. Thus the surgical air strike became the first casualt\ of
military thinking, of the American predilection for massive force. McNamara later recalled: "Now, 1
don't believe the military ever gave us a surgical air strike option. They always emphasized the
necessity of having an invasion follow the strike, and they told us we could expect thousands of
casualties." !
The JCS strategy to gain approval for the invasion backfired. After the surgical air strike was
discredited, the focus of ExCom turned not toward an invasion, but a naval blockade of Cuba. The
implementation of a blockade had been discussed since the early days of the crisis, normally within the
context of more ambitious military operations. However, in the evening of 17 October, the blockade
(in the less provocative semantic incarnation of quarantine ) became an option in its own right. The
reasons for this arc complex, and have been dealt with at length elsewhere. For our purposes it is
sufficient to note that the blockade was a viable compromise between the positions of the hawks and
doves: it was a military response; but an incremental and limited measure. The doves generally
viewed it as a cautious response w hich shifted the diplomatic initiative from Washington to Moscow,
providing American policymakers with additional lime to evaluate Soviet intentions and actions.
Though the hawks believed that the blockade was an insufficient reaction to the Soviet missile
deployment, they reluctant!} embraced it in the hope that it might be a prelude to further military
action. Consequently, consensus within ExCom began to coalesce around the blockade.
The next morning, McNamara asked CNO Admiral Anderson to send the current blockade
contingency plans and policy papers of CINCLANT to OSD for review. At lunch that afternoon,
McNamara and Gilpatric engaged in an informal bout of role playing in an attempt to assess which
option under consideration would be most effective. In this "war game" the Secretary of Defense
played the United States and his deputy represented the Soviet Union. Through a series of hypothetical
moves and countcrmovcs, the possible reactions of the superpowers w ere explored, and the probable
outcome assessed. Gilpatric later remarked:
And it was during that session that McNamara became convinced that this limited
form of blockade, quarantine, was the best move. It evolved from this back and forth
gaming. Not in all of the details, but it was pretty much set in his mind. He never
shifted from that ground from that point on. :
The Secretary of Defense came to prefer the quarantine over other military measures because it
represented a graduated American response to a limited Soviet initiative. Later that afternoon.
McNamara receiv ed the CINCLANT documents from General Taylor. Taylor previously had evaluated
the papers in his capacity as Chairman of the JCS, and agreed with the Navy's recommendation that the
quarantine be declared as a specific response to the deployment of Soviet missiles; justified as a
7"
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necessary act to prevent the proliferation of offensive nuclear weapons in the Western Hemisphere and
executed under the provisions of the charter of the Organization of American States and the Rio
Treaty. ' McNamara was impressed with the proposal and urged ExCom to endorse it.
Meanwhile, it was apparent to the JCS that ExCom was drifting away from the invasion, toward
the quarantine. The Chiefs, removed from ExCom deliberations, had become estranged, suspicious of
the judgments of the President and his key advisors. In an effort to turn the tide, that afternoon the
JCS demanded a face-to-face meeting with the President within twenty-four hours to personally present
their recommendation for a full-scale invasion of Cuba."4 The military leaders suspected that Taylor
had gone "soft" on the use of force, that he had become overly sympathetic to political concerns, and
that he had not cogently presented their views to the President."5 Yet the demand came too late: with
McNamara joining Sorenson and Robert Kennedy in advocating the quarantine, the resistance of the
ExCom hawks crumbled. In the evening of 18 October, President Kennedy tentatively chose the
quarantine as the American response to the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba, and ordered that it
be put into effect by 22 October.
Nevertheless, the hawks rallied and attempted to reopen the issue the following day. On 19
October, the hawks challenged the decision of the President in the morning ExCom meetings, w hile
the JCS delayed a scheduled campaign trip of President Kennedy to the Midwest to press their case.
The efforts were to no avail: the President continued to support the quarantine. Throughout the
afternoon, the administration toiled to prepare the operation for final presidential review: Sorenson
drafted a Presidential speech declaring the quarantine, McNamara reviewed the blockade strategy, and the
Navy refined its operational plans. The debate was cffectiv cly closed. Former Secretary of Stale Dean
Achcson, a prominent hawk, withdrew from ExCom discussions in disgust. Afterward, he was
scornful of the performance of civilian policymakers during the crisis, particularly the Secretary of
Defense, who he believed failed to fully weigh and consider the consequences of proposed acts.
McNamara, in the words of Achcson, was guilty of "pin-pricking the situation with erudite
nonsense." " Acheson's opinion was widely shared by military leaders. With the decision on
intervention in the balance, the pressure on the D!A to support the operational preference of the JCS.
the invasion under OPLAN-314. was intense. The demands on the agency's immediate superior, the
JCS, appears to have outweighed that of its more distant commander, the Secretary of the Defense.
There is no evidence that the DiA assisted McNamara in his review of the blockade planning. While
the limited resources of the agency were principally concentrated on intelligence collection and
analysis, the DIA also strove mightily to coordinate and formulate an important strategic intelligence
estimate; an assessment of acute concern to the JCS.
73 Brugioni, Eyeball To Eyeball, p. 279.
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Taylor denied these charges, and claimed that he faithfully expressed the views of the JCS to the
President and ExCom. Commenting on the militarism of the Chiefs during the crisis, Taylor later
remarked the he thought of himself as a "double hawk" in ExCom meetings, yet among the JCS he
felt himself to be a dove. Quoted in Blight and Welsh, On the Brink, p. 57.
76 Quoted in Brugioni, Eyeball To Eyeball, p. 304.
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To the relief of the JCS the "crash" estimate was released on 19 October, the pivotal day in ExCom
deliberations over merits of the proposed invasion vis-a-vis the blockade. The SNIE explored probable
Son let reactions to proposed US actions considered by ExCom. The estimate, prepared by BNE and
approved by USIB, suggested that an all-out inv asion of Cuba w as less likely to cause a Soviet
military response than an air strike or other form of graduated military action. The rationale behind the
judgment is obscure. The thesis appears to be an affront to common sense: one presumes that the
Russian response would be commensurate with the level of force employed by the United States: that
as the amount of American force applied increased, the probability and dimensions of an armed Soviet
response would increase proportionally. In short, escalation breeds escalation. The number of
casualties to Soviet military instructors and advisors in Cuba was likely to be l'ar greater in the ev ent
of an American invasion than as the result of air strikes against isolated missile installations, thereby
increasing the probability and magnitude of a Sov iet military response. Similarly the diplomatic
consequences of an invasion were likely more severe. An American invasion to overthrow the Castro
government would be a clear violation of the sov ereignty of an independent nation and was certain to
draw international censure. Conversely, the limited air strike was diplomatically more defensible. The
destruction of the Soviet MRBMs might be plausibly justified as a precise defensive measure to ensure
the stability of the Western hemisphere. The affair was no longer one of sovereignty, but of self-
defense. The distinction betw een limited defensive military measures and prodigious aggressive actions
appears profound. Yet the SNIE ignored this distinction, positing through obtuse analysis that the
invasion was less likely to provoke the Soviet leaders.
It was a curious argument, and one that would ultimately appear to be erroneous. However, there
is no doubt that the document reinforced the JCS proposal for decisive military action against Cuba, at
a time w hen the recommendation was clearly w aning. It is interesting to note that the SNIE employed
the polemical strategy of the JCS to support the invasion: it discredited the surgical air strike by
suggesting it was more likely to trigger a Soviet military response and implicitly endorsed the
invasion by downplaying the risks inv olv ed, concluding: "We believe that whatever course of
retaliation the USSR elected, the Soviet leaders would not deliberately initiate genera! war or take
military measures, which in their calculation, would run the gravest risks of general war."" The fact
that the estimate incorporated this design in the text suggests that the military played a dominant role
in its formulation. CIA sources confirm this explanation, asserting that the CIA had grave
reservations regarding the conclusion, but were rebuffed by the military intelligence agencies, led by
the DIA. They argue that the DIA was under ferocious pressure from the JCS to produce an estimate
w hich supported their operational preference, and that the agency marshaled the military intelligence
organizations to act accordingly."8 Confronted by a united and obstinate coalition of military agencies
and the exigency of the Cuban threat, the CIA had no choice but to submit to the tenacious majority.
The claim is credible when one considers that the USIB, the committee responsible for ultimately
approving the estimate, was dominated by the military at the time.
77 Special National Intelligence Estimate i i-18-62, "Soviet Reactions to Certain US Courses of
Action on Cuba," 19 October 1962 (No declassification date). Cited in McAuliffe, CIA Documents,
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In spite of the repeated efforts of McNamara and McCone to implement the proposals of the Joint
Study Group, the composition of the USIB was unchanged in 1962. Recall that the aim of the I960
recommendations was to reduce military representation on the USIB in order to enable the Board to take
a greater management role in the espionage community. As previously described, after assuming office
McNamara endorsed the JSG recommendations and strove to implement them, but his efforts were
regularly blocked by the armed sen ices. By the fall of 1962, the only reform the Secretary of Defense
was able to implement on the USIB was the replacement of the representative of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations with the DIA representative (the former office was
disestablished prior to the activation of the DIA). Although this reform was intended to be the first of
several measures to mitigate military influence on the USIB, in the absence of additional reform, it
paradoxically had the opposite effect. Historically, the Office of Special Operations tended to support
the position of civilian policymakers on defense issues. This is not surprising, as the office was an
agent of the Secretary of Defense, inclined by outlook and duty to favor the perspective of civilian
policymakers. The DIA representative which replaced it, however, was not so inclined. As this
dissertation proves, the military departments and the JCS exerted a powerful influence over the new-
intelligence agency, by virtue of placement and composition. As was to be expected, the DIA
frequently sided with the military leadership in matters before the USIB, effectively increasing military
influence on the Board. This was true during the Cuban missile crisis. Whereas civilians in OSD
were inclined, like Kennedy and McNamara, to view the Soviet missile deployment as a political
initiative requiring a limited American response, as the crisis progressed the DIA, under pressure from
the military leaders, gradually aligned itself with the JCS in perceiving the deployment as a significant
change in the strategic nuclear balance."9 In September 1962, the DIA had expressed a markedly
independent view on the buildup in Cuba; by mid-October, the agency faithfully lowed the official
JCS line. To repeat, the reason for this change in perspective was ev ident: as the crisis deepened,
military leaders reined in their wayward scion in order to consolidate the military position on the
Soviet deployment, to present a unified front against the civilian dissenters. This coalescence was
dramatically reflected on the USIB. where the six military representatives were prone to vote as a
block, overriding the four civilian members, to produce a durable majority.80 The DIA played a central
role in the realignment, as it replaced a presumably dovish OSD representative. On important
estimates, such as the SNIE of 19 October, the military were able to overwhelm the reservations of the
79 For example, the following day the DIA opined that the deploymcnt was more than "token
show of strength"; that the Soviet Union intended to establish a "prime strategic base" in the
Caribbean. JCS Chronology, p. 23.
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civilians by virtue of numerical superiority. Therefore is not surprising that the USIB approved the
crash estimate favoring an invasion over an air strike. What is surprising is that there was no official
dissent from the CIA. The motives of the agency remain inscrutable.
Consequently, the 19 October SNIE might be properly be viewed under bureaucratic light, more as
a political v ehicle of advocacy than an objective work of intelligence. The estimate appears to be a
desperate final attempt by the military intelligence agencies, exhorted by the D1A, to persuade ExCom
to endorse the invasion recommended by the JCS. As such, it was somewhat belated; by the date of
publication. 19 October, the doves were triumphant. Yet the dispatch which marked its formulation
resulted in several perilous errors, evident in hindsight.
Foremost among these was that the assessment of the effectiveness of proposed American military
actions presented in the estimate were based upon the presumption that in the event of an invasion US
ground forces would encounter armed resistance primarily from indigenous Cuban forces. In crafting
the SNIE, BNE dismissed the possibility of a direct encounter with Sov iet armed forces, largely at the
promptings of the DIA, asserting that the estimated 5,000 Sov iets personnel on the island were for the
most part non-combatants (that is, military instructors, advisors, and trainers), and therefore presented
little military threat. This assessment of 5,000 non-combatants, employed in the 19 October SNIE,
was swiftly proven to erroneous: both the agency and board vastly underestimated the si/.c and
composition of Soviet the military personnel in Cuba. Even as the SNIE w as being prepared in mid-
September, it became ev ident that this assumption was erroneous, that American forces w ould likely
face far greater opposition in the event of an invasion of the island, namely from Soviet combat forces.
Analysts at NPIC opined, on the basis of photographic intelligence, that far more Soviet forces w ere in
Cuba than the SNIE postulated, and that the majority were combat troops rather than trainers and
advisors. When preparing the estimate, DIA analysts had access to raw photographic intelligence
identical to that of NPIC, vet, inexplicably, had ignored its implications. The SNIE was compiled
employing the 5,000 assessment, in spite of growing evidence that it was inaccurate. It was only a
week after the SNIE was published (and. incidentally, the invasion dismissed by the President) that the
DIA and the service intelligence elements reluctantly conceded that the figure was inaccurate, and
revised the assessment of the number of Soviet personnel on the island from 5,000 to 22,000.81 As if
this dramatic increase was not startling enough, the composition of the personnel was also revised:
low-level aerial reconnaissance prov ided conclusive evidence that in addition to trainers and advisors,
four mobile armored Sov iet divisions were present on the island.82 This consequence of this revision
of the Soviet order of battle in Cuba was profound. The disciplined and well-armored Soviet
combatants greatly enhanced the strength of the communist forces on the isle and hence significantly
raised the costs, in men and material, of an invasion by the United States. More importantly, the
revision undermined the suggestion of the SNIE that an invasion was less likely to initiate a military
response from the USSR than alternate military actions, for it was now obvious that a military
encounter with the powerful Russian armored divisions during an American ground assault was
31 USC (88/1) House Foreign Affairs. Hearings, p. 174. Contemporary Russian and Cuban
sources suggest that the number of Soviet military personnel in Cuba during the missile crisis
exceeded 40,000. Sec Gribkov and Smith, Operation Anadyr, p. 6.
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probable and liable to result in significant casualties to both sides. It is difficult to envisage a possible
scenario in which the Kremlin could not respond militarily to such an incident. Indeed, it is reasonable
to assume that the high casualties which would result from such a contest would increase, not decrease,
the possibility of a Soviet military response; in contradiction to the 19 October SNIE.
Not only did the SNIE underestimate the number and constitution of Soviet forces in Cuba, it
failed to address the subject of Soviet nuclear weapons on the island. Although many w ithin the
administration and the intelligence community assumed that nuclear warheads accompanied the
offensive missiles to Cuba, at the lime the estimate was drafted there was no definitive evidence to
support this assumption.83 Despite the importance of this matter, the SNIE ignored the prospect
altogether. This omission is startling in light of the fact that a post-mortem study of the crisis
concluded that nuclear warheads were indeed present on the island in October 1962, probably stored at a
processing facility near the Mariel airfield. Ominously, American military planners had targeted the
airfield as a landing position for the 101 si Airborne Division at the start of a US invasion.84 The
prospect of American paratroopers landing in the midst of a nuclear weapons processing facility is
chilling; especially when recent Russian disclosures indicate that Soviet short-range tactical nuclear
missiles were present in Cuba and available to Soviet ground commanders, unbeknownst to US
intelligence (which was preoccupied with the MRBMs and IRBMs), are taken into account. Retired
Russian general Anatoly I. Gribkov recently provided compelling evidence that twelve tactical rockets
("Luna" missiles) with nuclear warheads were provided in support of Soviet military forces in Cuba and
that the senior Soviet commander on the island had the authority to use these weapons to repel an
American attack, without the direct approval of senior staff officers in Moscow.85 This was contrary to
the belief of most US policymakers, military officers, and intelligence officials that approval for the
use of nuclear weapons in defense of Cuba must emanate from the Kremlin. If Gribkov's allegations
arc true (and they appear to be), the probability that a nuclear exchange might have resulted from an
American invasion of Cuba was much greater than the Kennedy administration believed. The prospect
of nuclear war between the superpowers was very real in October, 1962.
83 When questioned about the subject in his first press briefing on the crisis on 22 October,
McNamara responded: "We don't know. Nuclear warheads are of such a size that it is extremely
unlikely we would ever be able to observe them by the intelligence means open to us. I think it is
almost inconceivable, however, that there would be missiles, as 1 have indicated without the
accompanying warheads." Background briefing on the Cuban situation, 22 October 1962, p. 9. On 20
October the DIA reported the discovery of a "likely" nuclear weapons storage bunker in Cuba from
analysis of U-2 photography, confirming the suspicions of agency analysts that warheads were present.
JCS Chronology, p. 23. A day later the CIA concurred: "one must assume that nuclear weapons could
now be in Cuba to support the operational nuclear capability as it becomes available." Central
Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Memorandum, "Evaluation of the Offensive Threat in Cuba," 21
October 1962. Cited in McAuliffe, CIA Documents, p. 238.
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Seen in this light, the 19 October SNIE was fundamentally Hawed. The assessment of the size and
composition of Soviet forces in Cuba was erroneous and the presence of nuclear warheads was ignored.
These deficiencies were largely caused by the haste which marked the formulation the estimate and the
policy preferences of the military. Yet, to some extent, these miscalculations w ere unavoidable.
Intelligence operates in realms of ambiguity, where nescience is the only constant. No issue is wholly
amenable to systematic analysis: data is always scarce, frequently unreliable, and notoriously
inaccurate. The best one can hope for is a rational assessment based on available information. The 19
October SNIE initially met this criterion. What is inexplicable, however, is the failure to the
intelligence agencies to revise the conclusions of the estimate when it swiftly became apparent that the
assumptions were false. As the estimate was being distributed, the intelligence community was aware
that the premise that the involvement of Soviet personnel on the island was nominal and peripheral
was fallacious; that the Soviet commitment to the Castro regime w as greater than previously assessed.
Yet the estimate was not revised accordingly. Instead the intelligence community made superficial
modifications to the estimate -- altering the troop estimates, targeting the Russian armored units -- and
allowed the conclusions to stand. Irrespective of the fact that the key assumptions of the estimate lay
in ruins, the endorsement of the invasion was not formally revised Policymakers were informed of
adjustments to the So\ iet order of battle, but not explicit!} advised of the impact of these changes on
the probable Soviet response to a ground assault. Despite the fact that the D1A was aware of the
revisions, the agency never informed MeNamara of the military implications. The requirements of the
JCS w ere paramount; those of the Secretary superfluous. Quite simply, the agency failed to provide
McNamara with accurate and timely strategic intelligence during a critical time of the crisis.
The Implementation of the Blockade: the DIA Submits to the Navy
Fortunately, President Kenned} was persuaded neither by the logic of the SNIE nor the arguments
of the JCS to endorse the invasion. The arguments of Robert Kenned} , Sorenson, and MeNamara in
support of the quarantine were decisive: on 20 October the President reaffirmed his decision to
implement the naval blockade. Kenned}' continued to harbor reservations about the effectiveness of
this act, however, and met with Sweeney and Air Force bombing experts the next da}' to ensure that
the surgical air strike option could not be executed with certitude. After he was again informed by the
military that the complete destruction of the four MRBM and two IRBM sites in Cuba could not be
assured by an aerial assault, Kenned}' gave final approval to the quarantine operation.8''
For their part, the JCS reluctantly accepted the presidential decision to impose the quarantine.
Man}' senior officers viewed the blockade not as an end in itself, but as the first stage of an expansive
program to ov erthrow the Castro regime and remov e the missiles from the island. The distinction is
86 For information on the six missile sites identified sec Central Intelligence Agency, Arthur
Lundahl, Director of NPIC, to Directors of CIA and DIA, "Additional Information -- Mission 3107 (U-
2 of 16 October)," 19 October 1962. Cited in McAuliffc, CIA Documents, p. 209.
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important: in contrast to the perception shared by a majority of the ExCom participants that the
quarantine was a communications exercise (that is, that the United States would not accept the presence
of Soviet offensive missiles in the Caribbean), the military viewed it as a prelude to greater military
action, the initial component of a full-scale invasion. The latter perspective was illustrated in a JCS
meeting on 20 October, prior to the formal presentation of quarantine plans to ExCom. In this
meeting between the JCS and the ranking officers of the armed services, the military reviewed the
quarantine plans not as an independent operation, but as part of a larger military strategy, to be executed
in conjunction with the,ambitious OPLAN-314." In other words, the military was content to accept
half a loaf insofar as they expected to receive the remainder in the near future. This disparity in
perception was not evident from the start; it became apparent only as the crisis progressed. The DIA.
preoccupied with expanding intelligence requirements and imagery analysis, displayed no awareness that
its supenors differed ewer the fundamental objective of American military policy.
Until this time, knowledge of the Soviet missiles in Cuba was still a closely-guarded secret,
confined to a handful of presidential advisors, military officers, and senior civil servants. After
President Kennedy confirmed his choice of the quarantine, the administration publicly revealed the
presence of the missiles and announced the implementation of the blockade on Monday, 22 October.
Prior to this declaration, the American government discreetly notified its allies of the imminent
activation of the quarantine through military and diplomatic channels. The Defense Department was
charged with briefing the military establishments of allied nations on the details of the operation.
Normally, one would expect that this function would fall to the DIA: the agency was intended to be
the primary point of contact between the military departments of United States the armed forces of
foreign nations. Yet on the afternoon of 22 October, the military attaches of NATO and the OAS were
briefed on the immanent blockade not by the DIA. but by the assistant chief of staff for intelligence of
the Air Force, Major General Robert A. Breitweiser, presumably because the photographic intelligence
utilized in the briefings w as derived from the U-2 Bights conducted under the auspices of SAC and the
Air Force.ss Once again the JCS slighted the DIA.
In the evening of 22 October, President Kennedy informed the American polity of the discovery of
offensive missiles in Cuba and issued the Quarantine Proclamation, to take effect on 24 October. In
the wake of this announcement, the JCS anxiously moved toward full w artime posture; the military
began, in the words of Admiral Anderson, "unsheathing the cold blue steel of power.""' Nas al task
Force 136 steamed toward the designated quarantine area w hile American ground forces (five Army
divisions and one Marine: 82nd Airborne, 101st Airborne, 2nd Infantry, 1st
Armored, 1st Infantry, and 2nd Marines) mov ed to forward bases in Florida. In a precipitous act, the
JCS ordered the US strategic posture, notoriously known as DefCon, upgraded from Fiv e (5) to Three
(3). Without the knowledge or consent of the President and senior administration officials, this order
to American military forces worldwide was broadcast "in the clear," meaning the message was not
cncry ptcd, as was common practice, and therefore subject to easy interception and translation by the
07 Brugioni, Eyeball To Eyeball, p. 280.
88 Brugioni, Eyeball lb Eyeball, p. 386.
89 Quoted in Brugioni, Eyeball To Eyeball, p. 378.
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intelligence apparatus of the Soviet Union.90 The administration did not authorize the order to be
transmitted uncoded; this irregular communication was initiated by military leaders. Their motiv e in
this is evident: to alert the Kremlin to the mobilization of US forces. Issued on the same day that the
Air Force handed over the first of fifteen operational Jupiter IRBMs to the Turkish government on the
periphery of the USSR, the message was intended to serve as an unambiguous reminder of American
strategic nuclear superiority, carrying an implicit threat to Soviet Union and its forces in the
Caribbean. In effect, the .ICS threw down the gauntlet; in such a manner that the Soviet leadership
could not help but notice that the mailed glove was replete with nuclear tips.9'
As American forces moved to strategic alert, US intelligence monitored the Soviet armed forces for
reciprocal action. In response to Kennedy's announcement of the quarantine, the Kremlin proclaimed
(at 3:00 pm Moscow time on 23 October) that Soviet forces were to be placed on war footing. It was
soon apparent that this announcement could be attributed more to political posturing than to military
necessity: the DIA reported that Sov iet strategic forces remained at a low level of alert and that theater
forces, particularly in Berlin, were placid.90 Nonetheless, tension mounted within the intelligence
community as the construction on the missile sites in Cuba advanced. The President authorized
additional U-2 Rights over the island; SAC Hew a minimum of one, normally two, missions daily.93
As the implementation of the quarantine grew nearer, the DIA attempted to coordinate the
intelligence collection requirements associated with the operation. The quarantine offered the United
States a rare opportunity to observe Soviet military vessels at close range while operating in the high
seas. The espionage community realized that invaluable intelligence on the Sov iet military could be
acquired under these circumstances. Consequently, all the intelligence organizations were eager to
exploit the occasion. The Navy , zealous in preserving its hegemony over all aspects of naval
operations, denied them the opportunity. Since the Navy was principally concerned with the
operational details of implementing the blockade, its intelligence efforts focused on naval information
germane to the mission, such as the location of Soviet vessels, their tonnage, probable cargo, and
present course. Preoccupied with this basic data, the Navy ignored chances to collect the more intricate
and sensitive intelligence (primarily SIGINT). which the other armed services coveted. Throughout the
quarantine, the Navy repeatedly rebuffed the appeals of the DIA, Army, and Air Force to provide
supplemental material and manpower for the quarantine operation, in order to free intelligence resources
90
Raymond Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis. Washington: Brookings
Institution, 1987, pp. 37-38.
91 This was one of many provocative acts undertaken by the US military during the crisis, some
deliberate, others inadvertent. According to Scott Sagan, these include: hot-wiring some American
ICBMs to bypass safety measures (ostensibly to ensure that they could be launched); allowing nuclear-
armed F-100 fighter planes to sit on the runways of Incirlik Air Force Base in Turkey; and test-firing
US ICBMs from California into the Pacific, and, more perilously, from Florida over Cuba into the
South Atlantic. With regard to the latter occurrence, Sagan writes: "No one in Washington apparently-
imagined the possibility that the Soviets might learn of the launch just as it was taking place, and
interpret it as part of an actual attack." See The Washington Post. "Missteps by Military Posed
Threat During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Book Says," 10 September 1993 (21:1).
92 Adam Yarmolinsky, Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of
Defense Operations during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Washington: GPO, 1963, p. 12; interview
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to make such efforts possible. In fact, the Navy was so intransigent that it refused additional Russian
linguists offered to assist Naval commanders in communicating with their Soviet counterparts, in spite
of the fact that these skilled interpreters were sorely needed. Its nominal authority aside, the D1A was
unable to compel the Nar y to respond to collection requirements outside of its own narrow needs.
Throughout the crisis, the Navy coveted its departmental prerogatives in intelligence gathering, at the
expense of the American military intelligence effort as a whole. Thus it was revealed that centralized
control erf the intelligence requirements of the military by the DIA was a polite fiction. After the first
week of quarantine operations, an Air Force officer characterized the situation thus: "CINCLANT and
CINCLANT Fleet is in a state of aggravated confusion . . . Operations in connection with the
quarantine and blockade arc conducted in complete absence of intelligence collection operations."94 The
DIA could do little to correct the matter.
In the evening of 23 October, approximately twenty-four hours after the President's public
announcement of the quarantine, the NSA informed CIA, DIA, and the intelligence elements of the
military departments that current intelligence reports indicated that the Soviet ships in the Atlantic
suspected of carrying missile components to Cuba had abruptly stopped or changed course. Some even
appeared to be returning to Russia. The Navy was skeptical of these reports. Naval intelligence
officers believed that the course alterations were a transparent attempt to lull American naval forces
into complacency and opined that the ships had simply stopped to pick up additional Soviet submarine
escorts.95 The Navy therefore recommended that this intelligence be held abeyance, pending further
verification. Since ONI was the "point" agency in this matter (the intelligence was provided in direct
support of the quarantine; the Navy was responsible for executing the operation; ergo ONI had
jurisdiction over the analysis and dissemination of the intelligence), the other intelligence agencies
deferred to the wishes of the service. Although the DIA was obligated to keep the Secretary of Defense
fully informed of dev elopments, it respected the jurisdiction of the Nav y and did not advise McNamara
of the intelligence. As a consequence of bureaucratic etiquette, timely intelligence on an important
development was denied to senior policymakers.
The following morning, the quarantine was officially implemented. American naval vessels moved
into position to execute search and seizure operations on violators. Other components of the US armed
forces mov ed toward full readiness for war: SAC went to DefCon Tw o (2), and American ground forces
in Florida mobilized for an inv asion. As the tension mounted, administration officials showed signs of
strain. The burden of responsibility and the dearth of sleep began to take toll. The Secretary of
Defense, who slept on a cot in his office at the Pentagon for the duration of the crisis, was widely
reported to be "coming apart at the seams." McNamara was becoming increasingly frustrated by the
failure of the DIA to provide him with timely and accurate intelligence. He believed that the agency,
engrossed with the intelligence collection requirements and imagery analysis, was grossly neglecting
his needs for national intelligence. His frustration set the stage for an infamous confrontation.
94 United States Air Force, "DIA Meeting, Cuba, Memorandum for the Record," 29 October
1962. Cuban Missile Crisis, /962, No. 1632, p. 1.
95 Brugioni, Eyeball To Eyeball, p. 391; and Hilsman, To Move A Nation, p. 215.
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!n the morning of 24 October, McNamara and his staff were briefed by the Navy on the status of
the quarantine, including the location and course of Soviet vessels in the Atlantic. Inexplicably, the
Navy again did not inform the Secretary that most Soviet ships had stopped or altered course the
prev ious day, though the preliminary intelligence reports of the previous evening w ere now confirmed
and corroborated. Instead, McNamara was given the impression that Russian ships were still advancing
on the quarantine line (approximately five hundred miles from the eastern tip of Cuba), presumably to
challenge American resolve. McNamara left the briefing with the conviction that the crisis was
escalating. Later that morning, ONI finally accepted the validity of the intelligence on the Soviet ship
movement. ONI then notified Admiral Anderson and General Taylor that the communist ships had
altered course. Taylor subsequently briefed McNamara on the intelligence; the DrA was circumvented
once more. Thus the Secretary of Defense received critical intelligence that Soviet ships were hesitant
to challenge the quarantine belatedly, through a convoluted and impromptu chain of communication.
McNamara was understandably upset both at the manner in w hich he was informed (by the Chairman
of the JCS, as opposed to the Navy brass or DIA) and by the fact that evidence which indicated that the
quarantine was proving to be effective, that the Sov iet Union apparently would not test American
determination ,was withheld from administration officials for over eighteen hours. Angered.
McNamara decided to seek intelligence at its source. That afternoon he and his deputy stormed into
Flag Plot, the Navy's control room and sanctum sanctorum, to demand a full explanation of the delay
in notification and a comprehensive briefing on the current status of the quarantine operation. CNO
Admiral Anderson attempted to placate the Secretary by providing him with a brief, and superficial (in
Gilpatrie's opinion), summary. McNamara was unimpressed with the presentation. Moreover, as the
Secretary surveyed the displays at Flag Plot detailing the naval blockade, he was disturbed to discover
that the intelligence that the Navy was employing to conduct the operation was in variance with the
intelligence provided to him in daily briefings by DIA. Gilpalric recalled:
And even when the chart room was set up to show the exact movements of the
vessels that were approaching the quarantine, it was done in the Navy [at Flag Plot],
and we found several cases where they didn't portray actually on this board what we
learned through DIA was the case. There was some discrepancy. We just weren't
sure that they were running on the very latest information. They'd run off a position
at 1800 hours and operate on that for the next six or eight or twelve hours rather than
constantly keep adjusting to moment by moment developments, it would seem.96
Disillusioned, McNamara left Flag Plot in the late afternoon to inform the President of the latest
developments. He later briefed Kennedy on military preparations for a possible invasion of the island
and asserted that the assault could be implemented within seven days of a presidential decision.
McNamara has subsequently stated that he did not believe that the President would chose this option,
that he viewed the planning for the invasion to be political stratagem to mollify the hawks.
McNamara also told the President of the incident at Fag Plot, and of the discrepancies in operational
96 Transcript, Roswcll Gilpatric oral history interview, JFK library, p. 60.
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intelligence. Both expressed Tears that the Navy w as running the blockage in a cavalier manner and
might blunder into a confrontation w ith Sov iet nav al forces. This fear was not new : it had first
surfaced on the preceding day, when MeNamara discovered that the Navy was using the quarantine as an
opportunity to practice anti-submarine warfare against Soviet vessels. During the confrontation, the
Navy forced at least four, possibly five, Soviet F-class submarines to the surface by cruising over
them, pinging the vessels w ith active sonar, and at least in one instance, dropping practice depth
charges." The Navy's intent was to deny the USSR the effective use of its submarine forces. That the
Navy lelt free to employ such provocative naval maneuvers during the diplomatic standoff suggested
that there were serious discrepancies between military and civilian perceptions of the quarantine.
Administration officials generally viewed the quarantine as a moderate display of military pow er;
intended primarily to communicate American resolve.98 Conversely, Naval officers tended to perceive
the blockade as a bold military operation, with discrete, practical military objectives. These
differences, initially obscured, became increasing!}" apparent as the crisis progressed. In an effort to
explore and reconcile these perspectives, McNamara and Gilpatric returned to Flag Plot in the evening
of 24 October. McNamara asked Admiral Anderson a scries of probing questions concerning naval
interception practices, in an effort to determine the objectives pursued and methods employed by the
Navy in implementing the quarantine. After a length}' exchange, Anderson, agitated by w hat he
perceived to be civilian interference in military matters, handed the Secretary of Defense the enormous
Manual ofNaval Regulations and remarked; "It's all in there."
Annoyed. McNamara replied: "I don't give a damn what John Paul Jones [the Scottish-born
American naval officer of the Revolutionary War] would have done. I want to know what you arc
going to do."
Anderson responded: "Now , Mr. Secretary, if you and your Deputy will go back to your offices, the
Navy will run the blockade"99
Now indignant, McNamara retorted, "You're not going to fire a single shot at anything without my
express permission, is that clear?" He advised the Chief of Nav al Operations that the quarantine was
not a military exercise, but a means of communication, and that no force was to be applied without the
explicit approv al of himself and the President. "Is that understood?" he concluded.
From Anderson came the tight-lipped response: "Yes.":<!0
97 See Blight and Welsh, On the Brink, p. 61.
98 See Blight and Welsh, On the Brink, p. 63.
99 Quoted in Allison, Essence of Decision, pp. 131-32.
100 McNamara quoted in Blight and Welsh, On the Brink, p. 64. After the encounter, McNamara
informed Gilpatric that he had lost confidence in the CNO and that he would not be reappointed to the
post. Gilpatric was sympathetic toward Anderson, and lobbied the President to offer him an
ambassadorship. Kenned} consented, and in 1963 Anderson was appointed Ambassador to Portugal. It
was rumored in the Pentagon w as that MeNamara requested that Anderson be assigned to Portugal
because the Secretary of Defense could no longer tolerate the presence of the officer on the North
American continent. Personal interv iew, Rosw ell Gilpatric, 23 July 1992; and Shaplcy, Promise and
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Thus did McNamara ensure that there would be no misunderstanding on the part of the military
regarding the objectives of the Kennedy administration in imposing the quarantine. Henceforth the
Navy would share a greater portion of its intelligence with the DIA.
The following day brought additional confirmation that most Soviet ships had altered their course
to avoid the quarantine; only one dry cargo ship continued to advance toward Cuba. Although the
danger of naval conflict in the Atlantic was receding, the danger of aerial attack over Cuba was
increasing. On 25 October, the DIA judged that all of the occupied SA-2 SAM installations were now
fully operational and that the MRBM sites were nearing operational readiness.101 All were aware of the
implications: the daily SAC U-2 missions were in jeopardy. The administration was confronted with
a dilemma, for the llighls were in greatest peril during the period they were most needed. Senior
intelligence officials worried over the possibility that the loss of a U-2 aircraft over the island might
escalate the conflict into formal hostilities. This fear was somewhat tempered by intelligence
indicating that Soviet (as opposed to Cuban) commanders controlled the SAM installations:
presumably the Soviet officers were more conservative and disciplined than their Cuban counterparts;
thereby reducing the possibility of an attack on an American aircraft. In addition, the intelligence
community believed that the risk to U-2 missions was diminished by a standing order from the
Kremlin to Soviet SAM commanders in Cuba which prohibited attacks on US surveillance aircraft.
Unfortunately, this belief was erroneous: Sov iet air-defense forces in Cuba w ere authorized to fire the
SAMs under "wartime" conditions. The term "wartime" was ambiguous; Sov iet commanders were
giv en the discretion to determine whether the condition was in existence at any given time. Two days
later, a subjective judgment on this condition would propel the crisis to the v erge of war.
Events on 26 October belied escalation, as events of the day gav e the appearance that the crisis w as
receding. That day a party from the USS Pierce and Kennedy boarded the Lebanese freighter Maruclct.
which sailed under the charter of the USSR, to search for offensive armaments prohibited under the
terms of the Quarantine Proclamation. No contraband was found, and the ship was allowed to proceed
to Cuba. When coupled with the intelligence from the previous day w hich indicated that the majority
of Soviet vessels had altered course away from the island, this discovery reinforced the American
impression that the quarantine was effectiv e.
101 jCS Chronology, p. 42. At the time, the CIA reported that the Sov iet Union was placing
twenty-four SS-4 launchers in Cuba. Each could be equipped with two missiles, for a possible total of
forty-eight MRBMs. Twelve SS-5 launchers were reported to be under construction. Similarly, each
could support two missiles, for a possible total of twenty-four IRBMs. The agency assumed that each
missile carried one warhead, resulting in seventy-two possible warheads. See Central Intelligence
Agency, "Memorandum on the construction of missile sites in Cuba," 19 October 1962 (No
declassification date). National Security Archives, Washington, DC. Raymond Garthoff claims that
although each launcher carried two missiles, only one warhead was prov ided (to counter reliability
concerns), bringing the true total to thirty-six w arheads. See Garthoff, Reflections, p. 20.
The next morning the DIA reported that which the United States government had long feared, that
the MRBMs in Cuba would likely be fully operational w ithin hours.102 Though the quarantine proved
effective in preventing additional military supplies and materia! from reaching the island, Soviet and
Cuban technicians and specialists had been working continuously to assemble to missiles with
preexisting stocks. Their labor was ncaring fruition. ExCom now faced the imminent threat of a
Soviet nuclear attack on the continental United States emanating not from the USSR, but the
Caribbean. In a report issued that morning, the DIA maintained that the dual rationale for the
deployment was the desire of the Soviet Union to improve its nuclear attack capabilities against the
United States (in contrast to the conviction of the majority of ExCom participants that the deployment
did little to alter the strategic nuclear balance) to demonstrate that the United States could not prevent
the adv ance of Soviet offensive power into the Western Hemisphere.103 In advancing this thesis, the
DIA was explicit!}" embracing the extreme views of the JCS, summoning forth the apparition of a
Soviet first strike and the repudiation of the Monroe Doctrine. The implications were clear: the
United States should employ force to purge Russian expansionism from the Caribbean in order to
remedy to strategic balance and ensure freedom in the Americas. The DIA assessment was a call to
arms, cloaked in God and Country. It was a shrewd appeal to both emotion and reason, playing on the
fears of Soviet nuclear supremacy (which w as. ironically, the powerful current that Kennedy navigated
on the rhetorical craft of the "missile gap" so successfully in the I960 presidential election) and
invoking the poignant historical theme of American opposition to European imperialism in the
Western Hemisphere. The emotional force of the report was compelling. Additionally, it served the
practical purpose of lav ing the policy foundations for the recommendations for a full-scale invasion
that the JCS presented to McNamara later that morning.
That morning the military leaders informed the Secretary of Defense that all preparations for a
comprehensive air and land attack on Cuba (in accordance w ith the provisions of OPLAN-312) were
now complete. US forces were maintaining operational readiness and, following the order of the
President, the operation could commence within twelve hours. The JCS urged McNamara to advise the
President to authorize the invasion as soon as possible. Though McNamara demurred, the Chiefs
pressed the issue. Time was on the side of the military; the administration w as clearly losing room to
maneuver as the looming activation of the missiles infused policy deliberations with a sense of
urgency. Momentum was gathering behind calls for this military option. An ill-advised and
lamentable action by Cuban military forces abetted this movement.
102 It should be noted that there was still no evidence that nuclear warheads were present on the
isle. Ray Clinc, the Deputy Director of Intelligence at the CIA during the crisis, reports that
throughout the confrontation President Kennedy routinely asked about the presence of warheads at his
daily intelligence briefing, and that CIA officials invariably responded that there was no hard evidence
to indicate this. Personal interview, Ray S. Cline, 13 October 1992. It is curious that ExCom placed
such emphasis on the operational status of the missiles when, in the absence of the warheads, the
increased risk was negligible. Sec Blight and Welsh, Or, the Brink, pp. 56-57, 70. 126.
103 JCS Chronology, p. 48.
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At 10:0() AM that morning -- 27 October - an American U-2 aircraft w as shot down o\ cr Cuba and
its pilot. Major Rudolph Anderson, Jr., was killed. Within several hours of the loss of the plane, the
NSA confirmed what many in the intelligence community suspected, that the feared SA-2 SAM
system was culpable. CIA and DIA officials scrambled to determine whether Soviet or Cuban military
commanders were responsible for authorizing the attack, in an attempt to fix the blame and assess
American alternatives for reprisal.104 US military leaders were enraged at the loss and prepared for
prompt retribution. In the event of the loss of a surveillance flight over Cuba, OPLAN-312
specifically called for a retaliatory air strike against one or more of the S.AM installations w ithin two
hours of the incident. For this purpose, sixteen F-100 fighters were poised, fully armed and fueled, at
Homestead Air Force Base in Florida. The aircraft were capable of striking targets in Cuba within
thirty minutes upon the receiving attack orders from C1NCLANT. Immediately following the receipt
of the NSA intelligence confirming the loss of Anderson's U-2 plane, the .ICS prepared to authorize the
planned retaliatory strike against the SAM sites, only to be blocked by the White House. " ' President
Kennedy refused to authorize the strikes, in spite of the fact that the contingency plan specifically
called for such measures. The Air Staff was furious: an American pilot w as dead and they wanted a
fitting reprisal. Not a few in the Defense Department viewed the President's refusal to retaliate as
another example of his predilection for delay ov er decision, for reflection over action; the corridors of
the Pentagon were filled with talk of impotence and appeasement.
Such talk was augmented by reports circulating in the media that President Kennedy was
considering an "arms-swapping" agreement with the USSR to solve tire conflict, w herein the American
Jupiter missiles recently deploy ed in Turkey and Italy (under the auspices of NATO; would be remov ed
in exchange for the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. Predictably, the JCS were repulsed by
the idea, v iewing the pact as Faustian. To the further dismay of the military leaders, the media organs
of the Soviet Politburo soon endorsed the concept: an article in the Sov iet military journal Red Star
that morning (27 October) embraced the exchange. Any ambiguity concerning Khrushchev's position
was dispelled later that morning, w hen Radio Moscow broadcast the substance of a letter from
Khrushchev to President Kennedy demanding a public trade of the missiles in Cuba for those in
Turkey.
Fearing that the administration would accept this quidpro quo (as it was later discovered, these
fears were accurate: Robert Kennedy secretly met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin the previous
evening to suggest that the United States might accept the missile trade as a basis for agreement),
military leaders vehemently expressed their opposition to such an exchange. Outgoing NATO supreme
Allied commander General Laurts Norstad and his replacement, the former Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzcr, communicated their strong opposition to the proposal to
104
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ExCom.106 When the President convened E\Com thai afternoon, emotions were running high.
Deliberations were dominated by the proposed "missile swap," w hich appeared to be favored by
President Kennedy.10" How ever, the events of the day -- the attack upon the U-2 mission and the
activation of the missiles — were pushing many participants towards endorsing the use of force.
Information av ailable in the afternoon indicated that, in w hat appeared to be another direct challenge to
American fortitude, the Soviet ship Graznyy w as approaching the quarantine line. The hawks joined
w ith the JCS in urging prompt military action and recommended that a massive air strike be executed
promptly, followed by a full-scale invasion of the island. Though this recommendation was far from
novel, the JCS position was now supported by events, the momentum was gathering in their favor.
The quarantine was intended to be a signal of intent to the Russians; by 27 October it appeared to
many in Washington that the signal was not being received. Douglas Dillon recalled:
My impression is that military operations looked like they were becoming
increasingly necessary. We were drifting without w anting to into becoming victims
of fait accompli, and some of us [ExCom participants] felt that we had to do
something about it. Military action was beginning to look like it was going to be
the only way to do it, and when the U-2 was shot down, it added enormously to the
pressure to act. By Saturday the 27th, there was clear majority in ExCom in favor of
taking militarv action ... 108
106 The two generals argued that despite the fact that the Turkish missiles were obsolete, they could
not be w ithdrawn unilaterally without damaging NATO unity: that although the missiles w ere
inconsequential from a military standpoint, they were invaluable from a diplomatic perspective. Both
generals believed that the Jupiter missiles should be withdrawn only when the USSR agreed to greater
concessions (perhaps the removal of the SS-4 MRBMs or SS-5 IRBMs from Europe) and after
American strategic forces were augmented in Western Europe through Polaris deployments in the
Mediterranean. See Brugioni, Eyeball To Eyeball, p. 468-70; and Transcript. Lyman Lemnitzer oral
history interview, 3 March 1982, by Ted Gittinger, pp. 30-31, LBJ Library.
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The crisis had reached the breaking point. Even McNamara. the champion of the quarantine,
conceded that afternoon that the invasion w as "almost inevitable."10" That evening SAC w ent on full
alert. A flurry of diplomatic activity followed: Robert Kennedy met with Soviet Ambassador
Dobrynin and President Kennedy sent Khrushchev a carefully worded letter in an effort to discover a
basis for settlement. The details need not detain us.
The follow ing Sunday morning (28 October) McNamara authorized the Air Force to call additional
units to duty. Meanwhile, the Army and Marine divisions deployed to Florida prepared for the invasion
of Cuba, in anticipation of an order from Washington. Thankfully, these orders w ere not forthcoming.
Shortly after 9:00 AM, Radio Moscow announced that the USSR would dismantle the missiles in
Cuba. Kennedy and Khrushchev had reached an agreement: the United States offered a public guarantee
against an invasion of Cuba and private assurances that the Jupiter missiles would be quietly removed
from Turkey in the near future in exchange for the withdrawal of Soviet offensive weapons from Cuba.
The accord shocked the JCS, for they believed that approval of the long-planned invasion w as
imminent. After the compromise was announced, General LeMay, true to his ironic nickname "the
Diplomat," was reported to have declared, "We attack Monday in any case."110 Ignoring the agreement.
General Taylor advised ExCom that the JCS recommend further military action against the Castro
regime that day. Alluding to the invariable and interminable counsel of the military, Robert Kennedy
remarked sardonically, "That was a surprise."11!
The JCS were simply not convinced of the sincerity of the Russian offer. They suspected that the
agreement was a ruse to lure the United States into complacency and gain time to assemble the
missiles in Cuba. ("We have been had," remarked CNO Admiral Anderson when he learned of the
agreement."2) The military leaders enjoined the DIA to support this perspective. The DIA dutiful!)'
complied and issued an estimate the following morning, 29 October, which concluded: "Khrushchev's
28 October message to the President ordering the dismantlement of Soviet bases in Cuba appeared to
be an attempt to ward off any contemplated US action that might destroy the bases." The estimate
warned that at present there was no evidence that the Soviets were dismantling the missile
installations.'1' Moreover, on 31 October the DIA sent a memorandum to Roswel! Gilpalric based on
103 Sec Marc Trachtenberg, "White House Tapes and Minutes of the Cuban Missile Crisis."
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analysis of reconnaissance photographs taken 27 and 29 October observing that available ev idence
indicated that additional construction was underway at the Cuban missile sites and that Soviet
personnel were engaged in sophisticated and extensive efforts to conceal this from scrutiny by
American intelligence assets."4 By all accounts, civilian policymakers were not influenced by these
skeptical reports, and continued to view Khrushchev's proclamation as a pledge made in good faith.
Nevertheless, the D1A backed this assessment until 2 November, when, confronted with
incontrovertible photographic intelligence from NPIC that the Soviets were abandoning all know n
MR8M and IRBM installations and removing all launching equipment and camouflage materials from
these sites, the agency revised its position and concluded, belatedly, that the Soviet withdrawal was
proceeding in earnest.115 The DIA subsequently performed an impressive feat of bureaucratic versatility
by issuing, on the very same day, an assessment of future Soviet actions in Cuba, in which the agency-
appeared to cast aside its previous appraisals that the USSR regarded Cuba as indispensable strategic
asset by concluding that the Soviets were unlikely to respond militarily to the loss of the missile sites
in the Caribbean. Agency analysts dismissed retributive measures in Berlin, asserting:
military actions which were, or could be construed to be. related to Cuba are probably
viewed by the Soviets as too dangerous. Military actions which were not related to
Cuba, or which could not be so construed, will depend on local issues and, in the
main, are not indicated."''
This estimate was a far cry from earlier agency analyses which concluded that the USSR perceived the
island and its missile installations to be an essential component of the Soviet Bloc, inferring that the
Soviets could not suffer its loss lightly, if at all. Now the DIA concluded that the USSR would
capitulate and suffer diplomatic humiliation with scarcely a struggle. The logic of the revision
suggests that the Kremlin did not view Cuba as an integral strategic asset, but a valuable resource
subject to relinquishment. This reappraisal was nothing short of a sca-changc. With this estimate
the DIA, for the first time since the start of the crisis, broke from the JCS perspective and asserted
analytical autonomy. Of course, by then it was inconsequential, as the crisis was effectively ov er.
The JCS were loathe to accept this reality. Concurrent with the publication of the aforementioned
DIA estimate, the military leaders were opposing diplomatic initiatives in an effort to re-focus the
attention of the Kennedy administration on military operations. Commenting on the composition of a
"4 JCS Chronology, p. 60.
115 JCS Chronology, p. 64.
116 Defense Intelligence Agency, DIA to Director J-5 (Plans and Policy), "Evaluation of Next
Actions by USSR in Respect to the Cuban Situation, 2 November 1962. Cuban Missile Crisis,
1962, No. 1866, p. 3.
117 The conclusion of the DIA that the USSR was unlikely to respond militarily to the loss of
Cuba as a strategic base could be based on two premises: that the Soviets lacked the will or the
capabilities to do so. The latter seems untenable: the Soviets possessed ample means to escalate
regional conflicts, particularly in Berlin and Laos, with little risk of inv oking an American nuclear
reprisal. The fact that they rejected such recourse, clearly within their military means, suggests that
the former factor was determinative.
proposed international United Nations observation team to monitor the withdrawal of Soviet offensive
weapons from Cuba, the JCS repudiated the proposal and "advised that the threat from Cuban-based
offensive weapons could not be entirely eliminated until a friendly government controlled the island,
for the weapons in question could be easily hidden.""8 As Robert Kennedy might remark, no surprise
there.
In the succeeding weeks, the DIA closely monitored the withdrawal of Soviet weapons from Cuba.
Diplomatic struggles ensued between Washington and Moscow over the criteria for "offensive
weapons" and the precise armaments to be withdrawn. After some dispute, on 20 November, the
disagreement was resolved: the Soviets agreed to remove its IL-28 aircraft, and the United States
allowed the MIG-21s to remain on the island. When tasked by General Taylor to evaluate the
capabilities of the military forces that remained on the island, the DIA issued a cautious assessment.
The agency noted that in the aftermath of the Soviet evacuation the Castro regime retained an
impressive array of modern equipment and weaponry. This, in combination w ith the disciplined and
proficient indigenous Cuban militia, resulted in a formidable communist military force on the island.
Additionally, the agency drew attention to the continued presence of Soviet combat units on the island
and contended that they would be a pow erful source of support for the Castro regime.!" The remaining
Soviet forces were a source of concern for the intelligence community. The DIA enigmatically stated
that their presence on the island indicated that Moscow had not fully abandoned the concept of Cuba as
a future military base. Subsequently, the Watch Committee and the US1B supported this proposition,
affirming that the presence of Russian troops "suggested" Soviet planning for the establishment of a
permanent military installation in the Caribbean.1:0 ExCom, however, did not seriously consider the
issue, dismissing the Soviet military units as a token show of support for the Castro government.1"
As the Kennedy administration grappled with the complex and politically sensitive questions of
monitoring and verifying the Soviet withdrawal, reports that the Soviet Union was concealing missiles
and storage equipment in the caves of Cuba resurfaced. The most prominent allegations were made by
New York republican Senator Kenneth Keating, who on 4 November charged that the USSR was
sequestering offensive weapons in tunnels and caves in the Matanzas province of the island.
Summoned by the administration to rebut these reports, the intelligence community strov e to discredit
his allegations. After a thorough inquiry, on 11 December the DIA reported:
It is recognized that for the most part this information [the Keating allegations],
carried in CIA Reports and other message traffic, originates from sources of
unevaluated or questionable reliability. Yet the consistent frequency of these reports
is disturbing, and the speculative interest generated by them in planning and policy
circles cannot be disregarded.1::
"8 JCS Chronology, p. 66.
119 JCS Chronology, p. 85.
120 JCS Chronology, p. 95.
121 Memorandum from Evans to Hilsman, "Debriefing re Executive Committee Meeting," 29
November 1962. JFK Library. Cited in Brugioni, Eyeball To Eyeball, p. 537.
122 Defense Intelligence Agency, Director Carroll to DCI McCone, "Possible Concealment of
OffensiveWeapons in Cuba," 11 December 1962. Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, No. 2723, p. 1.
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Despite the best efforts of the administration to refute these allegations, they endured in the press
and the media well into the new year. In a final attempt to resolve the issue, the Secretary of Defense
and the Special Assistant to the Director of the DIA, John Hughes, appeared on national television on
6 February 1963 to give a detailed review of the Cuban situation. Employing briefing boards with
detailed photographic intelligence, the pair presented a synopsis of the Soviet buildup and withdrawal,
and repeatedly asserted that all offensiv e weapons had been remov ed from the island. Thus, the
Keating allegations were rebutted and the DIA, through the efforts of John Hughes, for a short lime
came to command the attention of the nation.
An Evaluation: the Cuban Missile Crisis
It should be remembered that the DIA was — and is — an entity born of two discrete visions:
distinct and irreconcilable. As a practical result the agency is Janus-faced: displaying dissimilar
visages to its superiors. Yet, as the Cuban missile crisis clearly demonstrated, it is the JCS
incarnation which most often prevails, particularly in times of national duress. It is then when the
agency is enjoined to support prev ailing military judgments and the influence of the military leadership
becomes irresistible. The metamorphosis of the DIA during the crisis is revealing. Prior to the
discovery of the missiles, the agency charted an independent course, in an admirable attempt to satisfy
both of its constituents. However, after the missiles were uncovered, the analytical autonomy of the
agency swiftly eroded. As the Defense Department moved toward the precipice of war, the DIA's
discretion decayed. The causes of this decline are apparent and undisputed. Quite simply, the DIA
lacked the will, authority, and manpower to challenge the threat assessments prepared by the military
services in the face of an armed confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The
dearth of will w as unfortunate; the depriv ation of pow er and resources intentional. After all, military
men argue, intelligence is a function of command, subordinate to the operational requirements of the
military leaders (that is. the JCS and the general staffs). Civilians find the argument less convincing.
For while the subjugation of intelligence is desirable, perhaps essential, to the military establishment,
it is objectionable, maybe untenable, to the Secretary of Defense. At the very lime that McNamara
was in the greatest need of objective intelligence, free of organizational bias, to exercise civilian
control over the Department of Defense, he was effectively denied it. When the DIA fell v ictim to the
influence of its military brethren, McNamara lost his only independent source of intelligence and
evaluation. The DIA became just another organ of the military establishment; peddling the sanctioned
positions of the American generals and admirals. It did not dare diverge from the command on matters
of substance. For instance, although the agency was well aware of the flaws in the proposed
operational plans to invade Cuba, it did not advise McNamara of them. The DIA served the Secretary
123 McCone and much of the intelligence community was av erse to such publicity, yet McNamara
prevailed. It was not without its costs, however. Adam Yarmolinskv observed: "It did result in some
significant losses in intelligence potential. It told the Russians how much we knew about crateology."
Transcript, Adam Yarmolinsky oral history, third interview, p. 77.
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poorly in the darkest days of the crisis. In the absence of objective DIA analyses, McNamara was
forced to rely on perception and intuition to combat what he and other civilians judged to be a \ irtual
obsession on the part of the American military to invade Cuba. Fortunately, his instincts were
accurate: he correctly sensed the errors in military intelligence estimates and flaws m the operational
plans, without the benefit of supporting DIA assessments. Through the efforts of McNamara and the
doves, a potential nuclear disaster was av erted. His labors did not go unappreciated. On the day that
the superpower confrontation ended. President Kennedy remarked: "An invasion would have been a
mistake -- a wrong use of our power. But the military arc mad. They wanted to do this. It's lucky
that we have McNamara over there."1:4 There is no doubt that the President was grav ely disappointed
by the performance of the JCS during the crisis. "The first advice I am going to give my successor,"
Kennedy announced to his advisors, "is to w atch the generals and avoid feeling that just because they
were military men their opinions on military matters were worth a damn."i:" The President and his
staff believed that the Chiefs had fallen prey to their dread of communism and so were unable to view
the Soviet deployment in a rational and objective manner. For the Kennedy team the crisis
demonstrated the truth of Winston Churchill's aphorism on the Chiefs of Staff system: "You may take
the most gallant sailor, the most intrepid airman, or the most audacious soldier, put them at a tabic
together - what do you get? The sum of their fears. At the height of the crisis, this fear infected
the DIA. It was only w hen the crisis receded, when the political pressures from the military brass
subsided, that the agency dared to diverge from the command position. Of course, by then it was too
late: the crisis was effectively over and the need for national intelligence was no longer so urgent. The
achievements of the DIA in discovering the Soviet missiles was largely overshadowed by its
pusillanimity during the escalation. Let us be blunt: despite the acknowledgement that the DIA was
hampered by a lack of authority and resources, its behavior during the crisis was marked by timidity; a
demonstrable av ersion to challenging the prev ailing military assumptions and preferences. The Cuban
missile crisis revealed the agency to be far from the the powerful independent intelligence organization
that McNamara desired and closer to the ancillary coordinating body favored by the JCS.
'2a Quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White
House. Boston: Houghton and Mifflin, 1965, p. 83!.
125 Quoted in Benjamin C. Bradlec, Conversations with Kennedy. New York: W. W. Norton,
1975, p. 122. Also see Bundy, Danger and Survival, p. 457-58.
126 The Oxford Dictionary ofQuotations. Third Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979.
p. 150.
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Chapter Five
Vietnam
Bowing to the Wind
The Cuban missile crisis demonstrated the susceptibility of the D1A to the operational preferences
of the military leadership. In an ideal w orld, intelligence is formulated apart from policy: an iron w all
divides the two functions to ensure that intelligence is not "tainted" by partisan influences. In reality,
the process is quite different. Intelligence is inexorably affected by policy considerations, some subtle,
some blunt. Espionage operates in the realm of pragmatism wherein estimates and recommendations
must be practical; practical in the sense that they are comprehensible, reasonable, and acceptable to
high-level consumers. For if they arc not. they possess no value. Thus intelligence analysis arc
always influenced, consciously or intuitively, by personal judgments of w hat will be practical to the
consumer; their products are drafted accordingly. This process in neither insidious nor maleficent;
rather it is natural when w riting for an audience. In this regard, intelligence analysts arc no different
from other authors: one writes to be read and understood, perhaps accepted. Giv en these inclinations,
the objective of intelligence professionals should be to curtail them as much as possible. Insofar us is
feasible, objectivity should be cultivated, and outside influences kept to a minimum. As the forgoing
chapter described, the DIA often falls far short of attaining this objective. It appears to regularly
succumb to the operational aspirations of military leaders. Several factors contribute to this
predilection: a dearth of analytical resources, limited jurisdiction, organizational subordination to the
JCS, continuing opposition from the military departments, and. most importantly, the historical
precedent that intelligence defer to command. While this propensity is by no means unique, it is
especially disturbing in the case of the DIA because the agency is the primary intelligence agent of the
Secretary of Defense. The principle of civilian control of the military establishment is contingent on
equal access to information; data for the most part untainted by organizational bias. Although the OB
controversy and the Cuban missile crisis demonstrated that the DIA could be sw ayed in its judgments
by the military leadership, to date we have not witnessed a reciprocal relationship betw een OSD and the
agency. The DIA has displayed no tendency to provide intelligence assessments skewed to support
those policies promoted by OSD, This chapter explores the persistence of this disparity, centering on
strategic intelligence produced by the DIA regarding South Vietnam. As the conflict defined the
modern American military establishment, so too did it sculpt the temperament of the young
intelligence agency. With the activation of the long-awaited Production Center in January 1963. the
DIA finally possessed the evaluative resources to match the military departments and the U&S
l5&
Commands. In theory, the DIA was now the equal of the other military intelligence elements; in
practice, its stature was still disputed, as events in 1963-64 clearly demonstrated. The first section of
the chapter explores the provenance of sanguine intelligence on the Vietnam conflict, which infected
not only the DIA but other organizations as well. It discusses the consequences of this officially-
sanctioned optimism on the agency and recounts the labors of the DIA to combat it. The second
section chronicles the growing sense of disillusionment with the war in Southeast Asia that descended
upon Washington in the winter of 1963. It describes the endeavors of the .ICS to prevent the DIA from
affecting American policy in the conflict, contrary to the wishes of Robert McNamara. The third
section illuminates the parallel efforts of the JCS and the military departments to oppose US1B reform,
and so defeat the intent of the recommendations of the Joint Study Group. The JCS were ultimately
successful in both efforts: further restraining the authority and jurisdiction of the DIA and increasing
its vulnerability to manipulation. The consequences of these acts arc explored in the fifth section,
which details the inability of the DIA to influence the debate within the Johnson administration in
1964 over the future of American intervention in Southeast Asia. The final section provides an
assessment of performance of the DIA after its first three years.
The Creed of Optimism: Vietnam, Summer 1963
Robert McNamara and Joseph Carroll were frustrated b\ the DIA's analytical deficiencies during the
Cuban missile crisis, in the aftermath of the confrontation, the two renewed their efforts to compel the
military departments to provide the long-promised intelligence officers required activate to the DIA
Production Center. They were rewarded for their efforts in January 1963, w hen the Production Center
became operational. Although the 1961 activation plan of the DIA stipulated that the Center would be
activated in July 1962, disagreements between the agency and the military departments over the transfer
of resources (described in Chapter Three) delayed its activation until 1963. The Production Center was
responsible for integrating the military intelligence production activities of the armed services. To
achieve this ambitious mission, the Center was staffed with 1692 billets.1 The Center produced and
disseminated the highly-regarded "Defense Intelligence Digest" (later renamed the "Defense Intelligence
Summary"), a daily publication which synthesized basic, current, and estimative intelligence on
contemporary matters of national interest for use by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff,
U&S Commands, and other Defense Department elements. The Center also compiled basic
intelligence for the Defense Department and managed relevant reference files, libraries, and data
processing systems. In late 1963 the JSTPS, formerly located at SAC Headquarters, was moved into
the Production Center. Thereafter, the Center provided intelligence support to this clement and assisted
in the perennial formulation of the National Strategic Target List and the SIOP. To facilitate these
tasks, the Center was designated the overall manager of target data inventory, including related resource
Dcane Allen, DIA, pp. 59, 96. With the activation of the Production Center, the Production
Planning Group (DIAAP-1) was abolished.
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management.1 One of the most important activities of the Center in this realm was the preparation of
the Bombing Encyclopedia, a comprehensive locational file which assigned numbers and terms to
Soviet and Communist Bloc targets. Compilation of the tome was a demanding chore, requiring the
Center to assemble, corroborate, assess, and designate, millions of disparate pieces of intelligence. By
all accounts, the DIA's performance in this task was exemplary. With the assistance of SAC. the
Production Center pioneered the use of computer data storage and retrieval s\ stems.'
With the addition of the Defense Intelligence School (activated on 1 January 1963) and the
Production Center to existing operations, the DIA swiftly outgrew its meager Pentagon offices. On 3
March 1963 several elements of the DIA were relocated across the Potomac into the former offices of
the US Army Signal Communications Agency in Building A of Arlington Hall Station. (Building B
was subsequently occupied by the agency, in September 1963.) The expansion was timely: ten days
later McNamara elevated the Science and Technology Division of the Office of Estimates to a
directorate (DIAAP-4) and assigned additional personnel to the clement.4 The Secretary ordered the
reorganization to ensure that the DIA possessed sufficient capabilities to fulfill its management
responsibilities for technical intelligence analysis. He was specifically concerned about the escalating
requirements for this type of intelligence generated by the protracted conflict in South Vietnam. There
the Viet Cong insurgency continued to prosper, in spite of the routine projections by the American
military to the contrary.
Irrespective of the widely-reported disaster at the Battle of Ap Bac on 2 January 1963, where two
companies of Viet Cong rebels thrashed three battalions of South Vietnamese soldiers and an armed
personnel carrier (M-l 13) company. Harkins and MACV remained confident about the future prospects
of the conflict. Two days after the battle, Admiral Felt (CINCPAC) declared it a South Vietnamese
victory because the insurgents had abandoned their positions. He then announced that the defeat of the
Vict Cong was "inevitable." When an incredulous Peter Arnctl (later of Gulf War lame) challenged this
assessment, the irritable admiral barked, "Get on the team."5
Get on the team. As the exhortation was directed at cynical reporters in Saigon, so too was it
directed at skeptical DIA analysts in Washington. The seeds of doubt sown in the summer of 1962
now bore fruit: by the spring of 1963, agency analysts were openly cynical of official claims of
progress in South Vietnam. In general, DIA intelligence officials agreed with their CIA counterparts
that the situation remained a slowly escalating stalemate. Many analysts at both intelligence agencies
were still skeptical of the OB statistics and the casualty figures issued by MACV. For example, in an
intelligence report issued in January, the CIA noted that MACV claimed the South Vietnamese forces
had indicted 30,000 casualties on the Vict Cong, and observed the the Viet Cong OB was estimated
only at 22,000-24,000 men. The discrepancy, remarked the agency, suggested, "that the casualty
2 On 9 February i963, the charter of the DIA was modified to broaden the responsibilities of the
agency in automatic data processing. The result of the revision was the establishment of the DIA
Automatic Data Processing Systems Center on 19 February 1963. See Dcane Allen, DIA, p. 60.
3 Confidential interview, retired JSTPS analyst.
4 Dcane Allen. DIA. p. 101.
5 Quoted in Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History. New York: Viking, 1983, p. 262.
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figures are exaggerated or that the VC have a remarkable capability — or both.""
MACV moved to mollify critical commentary like this on the war from Washington in mid-April,
as the intelligence community prepared to draft an estimate on future prospects in South Vietnam. In
preliminary meetings, analysts from the D1A, CIA, and I NR. agreed that substantive progress in the
counterinsurgency program was improbable in the short term: consequently, the initial draft of the
estimate was pessimistic. Informed of the content of the draft, General Harkins prompt!} contacted
General Carroll and suggested that the DIA revise its stance to coincide with the position of MACV
and CINCPAC that the counterinsurgency program was showing impressive gains. His message to the
military intelligence officers in Washington was blunt: Get on the team. The DIA at once deferred ti¬
the wishes of the command and modified its position accordingly. The military intelligence
organizations were now unified against the civilians over the content of the estimate. Faced w ith this
fissure, McCone, in his capacity as Chairman of BNE, ordered the estimate "remanded" or redrafted.
MACV's bureaucratic strategy of unanimity was successful. The final estimate was balanced, if
circumspect, concluding, "The situation remains fragile."
Thus the activation of the Production Center did little to shield the agency from the powerful
influences of the military leadership. MACV constantly appealed to Washington military
organizations, particularly the DIA, to support its assessments of the conflict. There is no doubt that
organizational unanimity (some would say conformity) was an aspiration of MACV from the start of
the conflict in Southeast Asia.8 MACV exerted pressure on DIA officers to subscribe to its perspective
through a subtle device, back-channel cables. These "eyes only" messages had a vcr\ limited
distribution, normally restricted to two or three officers, which allowed military commanders
communicate among each other with little Scar of disclosure. The back-channels were an enduring
source of consternation for civilian officials, who suspected that military leaders employed the cables to
privately discuss and decide important matters pertaining to American military operations and policies
without civilian involvement and overnight. They feared that the back-channel w as frequent!} used by
military officers to resolve disputes without interference from civilian policymakers. This method of
discreet resolution allowed the military to build unanimity and thereby strengthen the bureaucratic
position of the Defense Department in policy deliberations. One DIA official confirmed these fear,
remarking:
6 Central Intelligence Agency, Current Intelligence Memorandum, 11 January 1963. Cited in
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United Stales, 1961-63: Vietnam. (Hereafter cited as
DOS) Volume IV, Document 11, GPO 1988-91, pp. 19-22.
7 Central Intelligence Agency, NIE 53-63, "Prospects in South Vietnam," 17 April 1963, DOS,
1963, Volume III, Document 94, pp. 232-5.
8 In the field, MACV achieved this aim through the suppression of contradictory (that is, critical)
reporting on the war effort from American intelligence advisors by a mechanism called the "directed
report." All intelligence submitted to MACV from military intelligence units w as reviewed by
Winterbottom's intelligence shop, and altered if judged by the command to be overly pessimistic. The
command assumed responsibility for the alterations, thereby removing the moral burden from the
intelligence officer who submitted the report. The justification appears dubious. See Shechan, A
Bright Shining Lie, p. 328.
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I have seen "eyes only" cables come in from the United States military commanders
in Honolulu and Saigon to the director of DIA. requesting that he give more than
passing consideration to the command viewpoint about this or that. The language is
always moving. Such a cable is likely to start off complimenting the recipient for
the fine job he is doing and then to work in high-sounding phrases which evoke
motherhood, apple pic. the American flag, and, of course, the uniform It then
implies that the sender would like to see a judgment or a particular set of figures
changed to conform to the command view point. It rarely offers any evidence to
support this request. It is sure to close with a veiled threat that the recipient's career
is in jeopard} if he doesn't play the game and "get on the team." Manx estimates
have been changed or reworded because of an "eves only" cable from a field
commander. In one instance the Air Force chief of intelligence called my boss at
DIA about a nearly completed estimate on United States bombing in Laos. He told
him that he was sending a team dow n to change the estimate and thai my boss had
better remember what color his uniform was. Of course it was the same as the
general's blue. The team arrived, and over the protest of the DIA analysts, a
compromise was reached.'1
The proclivity of the agency to acquiesce to the entreaties of the field commanders is illustrative of the
DIA's deference senior military officers and commands, a subservience born of tradition and rank. Since
the creation of the modern Defense Department in 1947. the JCS and its affiliated agencies have been
conspicuously reluctant to question the tactics and intelligence of field commanders. The field
commander is ultimately responsibility for the performance of the forces under his command, and
presumably has access to superior information due to his proximity to the battlefield. Thus the .ICS.
who arc not themselves in the statutory chain of command (recall that they arc advisors), arc loathe to
second-guess his judgment. Remarking on the role of the JCS during the Vietnam conflict, Alain C.
Enthovcn and K. Wayne Smith wrote:
They viewed their role as supporters of the commanders in Vietnam and the Pacific.
They used the vast flow of data from Vietnam as input material for keeping
themselves informed of daily events in the war so that they could better argue General
Westmoreland's case to top civilian officials. They did not attempt to organize the
data for systematic assessment of strategy. They did not ever, establish an analysis
group until late 1967, and then denied it the leeway necessary to analyze basic
questions. In short, the JCS had not desire to second-guess General Westmoreland.
The President and the Secretary of Defense always consulted the JCS before making
decisions, but the advice was absolutely predictable: do what General Westmoreland
and Admiral Sharp ask, and increase the size of the remaining forces in the United
States.10
9 McGarvey, CIA: The Myth and the Madness, p. 155.
10 Enthovcn and Smith, How Mitch Is Enough?, pp. 299-300.
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As an agent of the JCS, the DIA shared this view. The agency's propensity to acquiesce to the
requirements of command was reinforced by the ancillary position of intelligence to operations in the
American military. Historically, American military intelligence has suffered the impairment of low
rank. In the U&S Commands, the so-called staff "lions" -- .1-3 (Operations) and J-5 (Plans) -- arc
normally flag officers, w hile the J-2 (Intelligence) deputy is typically a colonel. The J-3 and J-5 arc
not only senior officers, but often decorated veterans. As one Air Force intelligence analyst observed,
"Here [in the military commands] the intelligence ram is outgunned, outflanked, and outranked.'" '
Intelligence officers are understandably reluctant to challenge the judgment of their superiors. The DI A
is no exception. After all, the agency is staffed largely by military officers on temporary loan from
their parent service. They arc acutely aware of the reality that they w ill eventually return to the
military departments, and that any confrontations with superiors while assigned to DIA might
adversely affect their prospects for future promotion. Carccrism is a powerful incentive for unanimity.
This unanimity made the military a formidable bureaucratic fix? for the civilian intelligence
organizations, often fragmented and diffident about aspects of the war. Given this fragmentation it was
not surprising the military intelligence agencies swiftly began to dominate reporting from Southeast
Asia. The ascendancy of military intelligence posed three acute problems for civilian policymakers.
The first was the intrinsic optimism of military intelligence from the field (in contrast with the more
sober intelligence produced by Washington organizations). There arc several explanations for this
optimism; the majority related to policy requirements and institutional predilections. With regard to
the former, following the commitment of American forces to Vietnam official optimism was seen as
necessary to maintain domestic support for the effort and the morale of our Vietnamese allies. .As
concerns the latter, the operative factors were cogently summarized in the Defense Department study
that is now known as the Pentagon Papers. A compendium of top-secret assessments of the Vietnam
conflict, the Pentagon Papers were commissioned in 1967 by McNamara, exhausted and disillusioned
from the war effort, to explore the origins and evolution of American involvement in Southeast Asia.
The completed work contains over three thousand pages of narrative history and more than four
thousand pages of appended documents. Leaked to the The New York Titties in 1971, and
subsequently published in several forms, annotated and unedited, the Pentagon Papers are an invaluable
source to historians. The contributions of the anonymous historians and analysts arc frequently cogent
and insightful. This is especially true of the examination of the sources of military optimism, and
will therefore by quoted in some length here. Commenting on the disparity betw een the optimism of
MACV intelligence and the pessimism of Washington intelligence, an anonymous defense analyst
observed:
Quoted in John Macartney, "Intelligence and Bureaucracy," in Keaglc and Ko/ak, Bureaucratic
Politics and National Security, p. 34. The other support deputies -- the J-1. J-4, and J-6 -- are also
outranked by J-3 and J-5, but they work within their own specialties, whereas J-2 works directly w ith
the "lions."
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Most of the senior officers in-field in the direct line of operational responsibility
tended to accept the more optimistic interpretation ... The lives of most senior
officers charged with operational responsibility have been pointed to giving
leadership in situations of stress. This leadership includes setting an example of high
morale, by their own conduct, to encourage enthusiastic esprit <fe corps among
subordinates, and to project an unfailing image of confidence to the outside w orld.
Such men are likely to find it almost impossible to recognize and to acknowledge
existence of a situation seriously adverse to their assigned mission. It is contrary to
their lifetime training never to be daunted. This characteristic makes them good
leaders for difficult missions but it docs not especially qualify them for rendering
dispassionate judgments of the feasibility of missions or of the progress they are
making. Admiral Felt and General Harkins in the field, and General Krulak in
Washington, appear to have been more cautious reflective weighers of complex
circumstances and feasibilities, including political complications.
Officials and agencies in Washington who depended directly or primarily upon these
officers for an understanding of the situation tended, very naturally, to put their
greatest faith in the judgment of those in the field who were administratively
responsible and w ho had access to the most comprehensive official reports and data.
If there were disadvantages in the position of these people, a major one w as that most
of their information was supplied by GVN [South Vietnamese] officials, who often
had a vested interest in making things look good. Moreover, the U.S. officials in
positions of operational responsibility had a professional commitment to programs
which, often, they had had a hand in establishing. This normally inhibited them
from giving the worst interpretation to evidence that was incomplete, ambiguous, or
inconclusive -- and most evidence was one or more of these. Moreover, the public
relations aspects of most positions of operating responsibility make it seem
necessary to put a good face on things as part of that operating responsibility. The
morale of the organizations seemed to demand it. Finally, the intelligence provided
on an official basis generally followed formats devised for uniform formal
compilation and standard statistical treatment. All along the line, lower echelons
were judged, rewarded, or penalized bv higher echelons in terms of the progress
revealed by the reports they turned in. This practice encouraged and facilitated feeding
of unjustifiably optimistic data into the reporting machine.
The darker view was easier for those who lacked career commitment to the success
of the programs in the form in which they had been adopted. The more pessimistic
interpretations were generally based, also, upon sources of information w hich were
intimate, personal, out-of-channcls, and w ith non-official personages. They were
particularistic rather than comprehensive, intimate and intuitive rather than formal,
impressionistic rather than statistical.13
In short, good news suggested competence, and the military, like all specialists, are always keen to
display their proficiency. One anecdote is particularly felling. When General Harkins first arrived in
Saigon, he told American journalists that he w as an optimist and that he would have only optimists on
his staff.'' True to his word, Harkins' weekly reports to his superiors in Washington were titled
"Headway Reports." lest anyone doubt the inexorable progress of Ihc military effort.
'2 GPP (III), pp. 24-25
13 Halbcrstam, Rest and Brightest, p. 229.
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The second problem with the military intelligence agencies was their penchant for evaluating and
judging situations and events outside of its exclusive sphere of competence. Ironically, this propensitv
was a direct consequence of the Bay of Pigs debacle. President Kennedy was exasperated by the failure
of the JCS to evaluate those aspects of the mission crucial to its success which were unrelated to the
narrow domain of the military operation. He held the Chiefs culpable for the failure of the invasion.
Subsequently, Kennedy instructed the JCS to advise him on all aspects, military and otherwise, of
operations submitted to them for review .14 This directive greatly expanded the policy jurisdiction of the
JCS, effectively amplifying the power and influence of the military in policy deliberations. The
civilian agencies, especially the State Department and the CIA, were not given a comparable scope of
commentary on military operations: military assessments remained the exclusive province of military
men. The perils of this incongruity were soon revealed in Vietnam. MACV intelligence estimates
were not confined to (he state of the war: they also examined political and social phenomena, and
ranged from assessments of popular support for the Diem gov ernment to the effectiveness of
pacification efforts in the country side. These estimates frequently contradicted the intelligence reports
of the CIA and the Embassy, explicitly challenging the competence and credibility of the civ ilian
intelligence analysts. While few doubted the prowess of the military to judge the progress of war in
South Vietnam, many were skeptical of its capability to evaluate the subtle dynamics of Vietnamese
culture. Civ ilians observ ed that the relationship was not reciprocal: whenever analysis from the State
Department or the CIA questioned the validity of a military intelligence report on the war effort,
military officers were quick to cry foul, asserting that these analyses were the solitary domain of the
Defense Department. Thus the military sought to confine other agencies to their respective fields of
expertise, w hile they themselv es roamed freely through the prov inces of others.
Ironically, it is not altogether clear that the Defense Department w as competent at the time to judge
the progress of the w ar in Indochina. The third problem with military reporting on Vietnam was thai
the principal defense intelligence organizations were directed by Air Force officers. In 1962, Colonel
James Winterbottom was the chief of the MACV intelligence section; General Arthur Patterson
directed CINCPAC intelligence; General Joseph Carroll ran the DIA. All were Air Force officers.
The experience and expertise of the three men lay in nuclear targeting, strategic reconnaissance, and
counterintelligence, respectively. The competence of these men to accurately measure and evaluate the
state of a ground war, especially a guerrilla war, in Southeast Asia is questionable. The question is
14 National Security Council, National Security Action Memorandum Number 55, 28 June 1961.
DDRS: 1985-11567. "I expect the Joint Chiefs of Staff to present the military v iew point in
government councils in such a way as to assure that the military factors are clearly understood before
decisions are reached ... While I look to the Chiefs to present the military factor without reserve or
hesitation, I regard them to be more than military men and expect their help in fitting military
requirements into the overall context of any situation, recognizing that the most difficult problem in
government is to combine all assets in a unified, effectiv e pattern." Maxwell Taylor remarked: "He
[Kennedy] looked to the Joint Chiefs not as military specialists, but as men of experience who had
been about the world and had seen many aspects of foreign policy problems. He wanted the Chiefs to
advise him in those terms as broad generalists in the field of foreign policy, not narrow military
specialists. [Lyndon Johnson] neither approved nor disapproved, but with the knowledge that it was on
the books he tacitly approved it because he nev er changed it." Transcript, Maxwell Tay lor oral history
interview, 9 January 1969, by Dorothy McSwccny, pp. 9-10, LBJ Library.
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particularly salient in the case of Winterbottom, as several subordinates accused him of gross
incompetence; in the military, a rare and serious charge. They claimed that his background in SAC
intelligence was ill-suited for the demands of Vietnam, for he tended to focus on enemy threats as static
military targets and field units, rather than ambiguous dynamic insurgent factions.15 In short, they
charge that he lacked the political sophistication and intellectual flexibility necessary to evaluate
guerrilla war. After experiencing the manipulation of the OB under Winterbottom in the spring of
1962, the D1A analyst George Allen met with General Harkins to complain about the MACV
intelligence chief. When the commander began to defend Winterbottom, Allen intervened:
"General Harkins," the civilian [Allen] interrupted, "your intelligence chief doesn't
understand the threat at all. He's an Air Force officer and his specialty is SAC
reconnaissance and I'm sure he's very good at picking nuclear targets, but he doesn't
understand this war and he's not going to giv e you any feel for it.""'
To the surprise of the intelligence analyst, no action was taken. Apparently. Winterbottom retained
the confidence of his commander, if not his subordinates, for Harkins, like Winterbottom, was an
optimist. Given the optimism of the command staff, it is not unexpected that the intelligence
produced by MACV reflected this proclivity and were routinely confident about the progress of the
military effort. In contrast, as previously noted, the reports produced by the intelligence section of
ARPAC, derived from precisely the same intelligence sources that MACV employed, were consistently
doubtful about the prospects for the success of the counterinsurgcney campaign during this period. The
discrepancy between the Army intelligence element in the Pacific and the MACV intelligence shop in
Saigon is stunning. The disparity lay in the statistics, the numbers listed in the OB. It was to be one
of the peculiar aspects of the conflict in Vietnam that the war would be contested on paper with
statistics as well as in the delta with carbines
This creed of optimism, promulgated and enforced by MACV, had a pow erful effect not only on
DIA intelligence analysts, but civilian officials. This was illustrated at the Eighth Secretary of
Defense Conference on 6 May 1963. The sanguine reporting on Vietnam heartened McNamarato such
an extent that he ordered concrete plans to be drafted for the withdraw al of up to one thousand American
forces by the end of y ear.1" The hopefulness of the Secretary was short-lived. Three days later South
15
George Allen, Indochina Wars, p. 173.
16 Quoted in Halbcrstam, Best and Brightest, p. 23!. The DIA officer was likely George Allen,
who recounted the anecdote to John Newman. See Newman, JFK and Vietnam, p. 242.
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GPP(II), p. 180; and New man, JFK and Vietnam, pp. 359-66, 407-10. The order was
implemented as NSAM-263 of 11 October 1963. The w ithdrawal plan is a controversial historical
issue, as it is often cited as evidence that Kennedy wished to reverse the course of American
intervention in Vietnam. There is no doubt that at the time, the President expressed private doubts
about the wisdom of remaining in Indochina, but it is difficult to discern whether this was a deliberate
political posture or a candid personal assessment. Sec Newman, JFK and Vietnam, pp. 321-25; and
Shapley, Promise and Power, pp. 262-64. Incidentally, the 1000 man withdrawal plan was
implemented in December 1963, but by then had become largely an accounting exercise, with no true
reduction intended nor executed. See GPP (II), pp. 190-91.
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Vietnam was engulfed by the Buddhist Crisis, which would last five months. The affair strikingly
revealed the incompetence and foolishness of the Diem regime, which miscalculated and mismanaged
the political crisis from the beginning, resulting in discord between the governments of the United
States and South Vietnam at all diplomatic levels."5 After extensive analysis, the intelligence
community concluded that the although the Diem government was deficient, there was no alternative
leadership for the United States to support. The Diem regime continued to receive American assistance
by default; in the absence of a surrogate non-communist faction he was deemed to be capable of
prov iding "reasonably effective leadership for the government and the war effort."19 The essence of the
precarious American policy was captured in the journalistic aphorism: "Sink or swim w ith Ngo Dinh
Diem"""1
The DIA monitored the hazardous situation in South Vietnam throughout May and June. During
this period the DIA consolidated its nascent evaluative assets. On 28 June 1963 the J-2 clement of the
Joint Staff was dissolved and its staff support functions were formally transferred to DIA on ! July
1963." Thereafter the agency assumed planning and policy responsibility for COM1NT. ELINT, and
non-SIGINT functions, target intelligence support, security support of the Joint Staff, and Secretariat
functions,"
The DIA had always answered to two masters, yet now the demands of the JC.S were more
immediate. The precarious state of Vietnam consumed the attention of the Chiefs, and the DIA labored
to fulfill the intelligence requirements generated by the military leaders. The pressure from the JCS
and MACV to find rays of encouraging information amid the gathering darkness was intense.It was
not coincidental that the DIA's assessment of the South Vietnamese counterinsurgency program shifted
perceptibly in July 1963. On 17 July 1963 the agency reported on the number of Viet Cong-initiated
military actions during the first six months of the year. The agency commented that the present trends
were auspicious: insurgent combat operations during the period w ere considerably lower than those
over the same period of the previous year. Battalion and company-size attacks were initiated at
approximately half the 1962 level. However, the agency discreetly concluded that despite the reduction
in rebel-initiated actions, Vict Cong capabilities remained essentially unimpaired. Once a critic, the
18 NYTPP, p. 113.
19 Central Intelligence Agency, SNIE 53-2-63, "The Situation in South Vietnam," 10 July 1963.
Cited in DOS, Volume III. Document 188, pp. 482-85.
20 NYTPP, p. 165.
21 Two thirds of the J-2 staff, the Current Intelligence Division and the Estimates Division, had
been transferred to the agency when it was activated in October 1961. Thereafter, in accordance w ith
the provisions of the activation plan, the DIA's activities had slowly protruded into the jurisdiction of
the J-2. Finally, in June the agency formally absorbed all J-2 functions.
22 Deane Allen, DIA, pp. 60-61.
23 Confidential interview, former DIA intelligence analyst.
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agency was now cautiously optimistic about the prospects for the war, asserting the prospects of the
Diem government "are certainly better than they were one year ago."24
The agency's prudent remark that Viet Cong capabilities largely w ere intact proved accurate. In late
July and early August the DIA reported a steady increase in the number of rebel military operations,
and concluded that the insurgents were on the offensive, in a belated bid to profit from the Buddhist
Crisis."3 The analy sts who monitored the cables from MACV to Washington observed that the field
reports disclosed a marked deterioration of war effort.36 In the past, the DIA and CIA had been
consistently skeptical of the ability of Diem government to resolve its social and political difficulties.
Now this skepticism extended to the military countcrinsurgency campaign. The intelligence analy sts
were not alone in their doubts; the State Department was openly cynical of MACV intelligence. Led
by Undersecretary of State George W. Ball, the versatile W. Averell Harriman (at the time
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs and Chairman of the Special Group on Countcrinsurgency)
and Assistant Secretary of Stale for Far Eastern Affairs Roger Hilsman, the department began to
challenge the military's optimistic interpretation of the war effort in high-level policy meetings.
Hilsman, the former Director of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), was the most
outspoken critic, repeatedly questioning the accuracy and validity of MACV reporting. A West Point
graduate who fought with Ramon Magsavsay in the successful American counter-guerrilla campaign in
the Philippines against the Huk insurgents, Hilsman possessed the credibility to challenge military
judgments. He swiftly became a formidable bureaucratic foe of Robert McNamara and the JCS.
In response to these challenges from the State Department, the Defense Department strove to
consolidate its position on the conflict in Vietnam. Dissent was discouraged; adherence to the creed of
interminable optimism was encouraged. General Victor Krulak, the Special Assistant for
Countednsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA), became the defender of the faith, the designated
disciplinarian of the JCS on matters pertaining to Vietnam. Surprisingly, he, like Harkins, had no
personal experience in guerrilla conflicts, suggesting that his assigned role was not analytic, but
bureaucratic. Krulak assured that all factions in the Pentagon supported the command position on
Vietnam, that everyone was on the team. "Don't knock Vietnam," went the Pentagon maxim, "it's the
only war we have."
In the face of the challenges from the State Department, the DIA's lukewarm embrace of the
countednsurgency program appears to have been no longer acceptable. On 14 August 1963 Krulak
sent a memorandum to McNamara that discounted the increase in Viet Cong activity over the past
24 GPP(II), p. 183. It should be noted that on 12 August 1963, the charter of the DIA was
revised to include responsibility for establishing and operating facilities to provide military
photographic processing, printing, interpretation, analysis, and library sen ices for the Secretary of
Defense, JCS, U&S Commands, military departments, and other DOD agencies and officials. The
charter was again modified on 6 September 1963, to include the development and supervision of a
Defense Department intelligence dissemination program to provide information to all defense elements
and related organizations. This responsibility ultimately resulted in the DIA Dissemination Center.
See Dcane Allen, DIA, pp. 58-60. Both revisions were a consequence of the rapid evolution of
technical intelligence collection systems, developed in response to the Soviet strategic threat and
deepening American involvement in Southeast Asia.
25 Defense Intelligence Agency, DIA Intelligence Bulletin, 4 August 1963. GPP(II), p. 183.
26 Interview with George Allen. Cited in New man, JFK and Vietnam, p. 367.
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month.: The report was a straightforward challenge to the D1A. as it directly contradicted an agency
assessment issued ten days earlier. The leadership of the DIA understood its implications. Soon
thereafter, agency analysts were discreetly instructed to mitigate their criticism of the war effort in
Vietnam. Over the next few weeks, the pressures to conform to the MACV position mounted. DIA
analysts were directed to refrain from commenting on MACV assessments and incorporate MACV
information into DIA intelligence products without comment. The analysts reluctantly complied.
George Allen, now on the DIA's Current Intelligence Review Panel, which edited intelligence articles
before publication, deplored the agency's tendency to simply summarize field reports without pro\ iding
judgments as to their significance. "It was like the nightly network news coverage of Wall Street," he
observed.
Because any such interpretation could only call into question the overly optimistic
views reflected in MACV and Embassy reporting, DIA's attempts (resulting from my
editorial "pinging") drew unfavorable complaints from the field, and attracted
criticism from elements in the JCS and DOD. As a result we were instructed to
refrain from any analytical remarks which could not be directly attributed to the
military command in Vietnam. If MACV failed to point out that there were more
battalion-sized attacks this week than last, DIA was not able to make any such
observation. Even if the statistical data in the annex to MACV's weekly report
clearly showed an increase in the number of assaults on strategic hamlets, we were
not to point out this to consumers of DIA intelligence summaries, unless MACV
had explicitly noted the fact. General Carroll would not have DIA expressing an
independent analytical or interpretive judgment on the course of events in Saigon.
Disillusionment: Autumn, 1963
The JCS were able to influence intelligence in Washington, but they were unable to influence
events in Saigon. In spite of pledges to the Kennedy administration to adopt a more conciliatory
towards domestic dissenters (made through Ambassador Nolting), on 21 August 1963 the Diem
gov ernment ordered its Special Forces to execute midnight raids against Buddhist pagodas throughout
the nation. As a consequence over fourteen hundred people, many of them monks, were arrested and
beaten. The raids stunned Washington. Diem again proved to be an capricious ally. The DIA, in a
flash of its renegade former sell', concluded that the raids and the ensuing declaration of martial law
"will have serious repercussions throughout the country." The agency remarked that a coup attempt
was probable as there was widespread discontent among the South Vietnamese military. However, in a
57 GPP(II), p. 184.
28
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extraordinary noil seqmhtr the agency paid the obligatory homage to the MACV creed of optimism by
remarking that the dissatisfaction had little military effect on the war effort. "
In the aftermath of the pagoda raids, American policy toward South Vietnam fell into disarray. The
Kennedy administration was deeply divided over whether to support a coup or not On 22 August a
new American ambassador arrived in Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge. Jr.. charged by President Kennedy
to "get tough" with Diem. While Lodge settled in, indecision wracked the White House. The
administration was clearly adrift. President Kennedy responded to this dissension as he had in the past,
by sending a fact-finding mission to Vietnam. The selected envoys were General Krulak (McNamara's
choice) and Joseph A. Mcndcnhall, the former political counselor in the Embassy in Saigon (Kennedy's
choice). The two arrived in Saigon on 8 September and returned to Washington two days later to
present their respective reports to the President. The reports were strikingly dissimilar: Krulak stated
the the shooting war was progressing at an impressive pace, Mendcnhal! asserted that the war was
being lost. At the end of the briefings, Kennedy inquired, "You two did \ isit the same country, didn't
you"'0 The conflicting reports were a reflection of the grow ing rift between State and Defense over the
war effort. Krulak, as expected, endorsed the optimism of MACV; .Mcndcnhall embraced the growing
pessimism of the State Department. The trip did not resolve the debate, the President's advisors
remained hopelessly divided ov er Vietnam. Kennedy ordered yet another fact-finding trip to the region,
this one led by McNamara and General Taylor. The pair arrived in South Vietnam on 24 September
and. through a series of meetings and briefings, were presented with a peculiar amalgam of battlefield
optimism and political pessimism. This ambivalence was embodied in their final report to the
President, which recommended a mixture of diplomatic pressure and persuasion towards the Diem
regime. More importantly, the report concluded that the current American policies and tactics in
support of the activities of the South Vietnamese military would ultimately result in victory." After
reviewing the report, the President decided to go forward with the one-thousand man phased withdrawal
ordered by McNamara in May.
The McNamara-Tax lor mission was significant for another reason: McNamara left Vietnam with
serious doubts about the accuracy of the statistical reporting on the war. As Hilsman observed, the
Secretary departed "doubting the statistics he loved so well and grasping that 'unquantifiable' political
factors might be 'more important' than he previously allowed.'"2 McNamara also saw the discrepancy
between the opinions of military officers in the field and those at Headquarters (that is, MACV). The
military advisors in the field tended to be more pessimistic about the progress of the war and the
effectiveness of the Diem government. Their opinion was illustrated in verses sung to the tune of
'Twinkle, twinkle, little star:"
29 Defense Intelligence Agency, Special Report, "Martial Law in South Viet-Nam," 21 August
1963. DOS, Volume III, Document 188, pp. 600-601.
30 Quoted in NYTPP, p. 175.
31 Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, p. 89; also NYTPP. p. 176.
32 Hilsman, To Move .4 Nation, p. 509.
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We are winning, this we know.
General Harkins tells us so.
In the delta, things are rough.
In the mountains, mighty tough.
But we're winning, this we know.
General Harkins tells us so.
I!" you doubt this is true,
McNamara says so loo. "
In late October, the State Department launched its long-anticipated bureaucratic attack on the
optimism of CINCPAC and MACV. On 22 October INR released a studs entitled "RFE-90: Statistics
on the War Effort in South Vietnam Shows Unfavorable Trends." The report asserted:
Since July 1963, the trend in Viet Cong casualties, weapons losses, and defections
has been downward while the number of Vict Cong armed attacks and other incidents
has been upward. Comparison with earlier periods suggests that the military
position of the government of Vietnam may have been set back to the point it
occupied six months to a year ago. These trends coincide w ith the sharp deterioration
of the political situation."
Its release caused a furor in Washington because it challenged not only the command perspective, but
was shrew dly derived from MACV and DIA statistics. The military brass in Washington were enraged,
claiming that State had no right to comment on military operations clearly outside of their sphere of
diplomatic expertise.
Interestingly, the DIA was not allowed to respond to RFE-90, although the study bluntly disputed
recent agency analyses. Instead, Krulak, the defense disciplinarian, was assigned the task of formal
rebuttal. The assignment was complicated by a military coup in Saigon on 1 November 1963, a coup
that the Kennedy administration rashly encouraged.,3 In the end. President Diem and his brother Ngo
Dinh Nhu were killed and the former Vice President of South Vietnam Nguyen Ngoc Tho and several
military generals took control of the government. The incident delayed Krulak's response. The general
finally responded to RFE-90 on 6 November. His criticisms were three: (1) "Neither the memorandum
itself nor its conclusions were coordinated with the Defense Department," (2) the State Department
study employed a "few select statistical indicators over a short period of time, w hile ignoring many
others, to form an extrapolated military judgment:" and (3) although the study was of "little
importance" its disclosure might lead foreign governments to conclude that the Defense Department and
33 Cited in Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 897.
34 DOS, 1963, Volume IV, Document 205, pp. 418-19, "Editorial Note"; Also see DODPP
(XI/), pp. 579-82.
35 See NYTPP, p. 189; and New man, JFK and Vietnam, pp. 411-16.
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the Skile Department were divided over the war in Vietnam, resulting in the "embarrassment of both
Departments and of the Government."3"
McNamara joined the battle. On 7 November the Secretary sent a copy of RFE-90 and Kruiak's
comments to Rusk. Also included was a personal note, which read, "Dean: If you promise me that
the Department of State will not issue any more military appraisals without getting the approval of the
Joint Chiefs, we w ill let this matter die. Bob.'" The note is emblematic of the informal means
McNamara often employed to suppress dissent on Vietnam and so buttress the power and influence of
the Defense Department. Rusk, a man averse to discord and predisposed to acquiesce to the military,
agreed, but pointed out that RFE-90 was the result of close "contact" between INRand Krulak and the
DIA."'
The following day the director of INR Thomas Hughes responded to Krulak's criticism of RFE-90.
In a memorandum to Rusk he answered the charges of the general: (1) "You may be assured that our
working level officers maintain close contact with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and with
General Krulak's office," and (2):
As noted m the first page of the Research Memorandum, all statistics used in this
report were compiled by the DIA and by General Krulak's office. Recognizing
limitations in these statistics, we have explained at some length, in the first two
pages of our report, how the statistics arc incomplete, sometimes unreliable, and
omit other factors that are important but cannot be quantified. However, the
statistics selected arc among those regularly highlighted by the Military Assistance
Command (MAC) and DIA in its weekly briefings of State's Vietnam Working
Group. We recall that Generals Kmlak and Wheeler, during last spring's discussions
at CIA on the South Vietnam National Intelligence Estimate, declared that these
statistics, then running in favor of the Vietnam Government, were not given
sufficient emphasis in the estimate. *"
Hughes apparently believed Krulak's remark that the disclosure of the study might by exploited by
foreign governments to embarrass the United States was puerile, for he deigned to address to it.
Hughes concluded by noting that a recent CIA analysis produced independently of RFE-90 agreed w nh
the findings of the INR report.40
Hughes effectively placed the DIA back in the line of fire. In fact, he shared working relationships
with agency analysts, who frequently shared their doubts and reservations with him. The DIA's role
w as spared further scrutiny, however, for the matter had already been settled by McNamara and Rusk.
36 Quoted in New man, JFK and Vietnam, p. 422.
37 Cited in Halberstam, Best and Brightest, p. 316. Halberstum adds parenthetically, "The note,
so revealing of the period, is now framed and hangs in the living room of one of the dissenters from
that period."
38 Newman, JFK and Vietnam, p. 422.
39 DOS, 1963, Volume IV, Document 306, pp. 582-86; Also sec "Memorandum from the
Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to the Secretary of State," pp. 582-83.
40 DOS, 1963, Volume IV, Document 306, pp. 582-86. Sec "Memorandum from the Director of
the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to the Secretary of State," p. 584
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RFE-90 was not without consequences: the State Department report alarmed the JCS, "questioning as
it did the basis foundations upon which MACV had set its counterinsurgency program."'11 Their
concern was exacerbated by ominous developments in Vietnam. Following the demise of the Diem
government, the elaborate South Vietnamese intelligence system collapsed, revealing itself to be
corrupt and perfidious.42 For the first time since the United States committed troops to the defense of
the nation. American intelligence received candid and accurate reports from the ARVN on the progress
of the South Vietnamese counlerinsurgency campaign, largely free of political bias. The intelligence
was alarming: the Viet Cong had far greater control of the countryside than the United States was led
to believe; the acclaimed Strategic Hamlet program was in complete disarray.J' As November
unfolded, the Vict Cong launched a dramatic series of attacks on South Vietnamese forces. Reports
from the State Department and the CIA to Presidential advisors were filled with gloom and
foreboding.44 Policymakers viewed MACV accounts of battlefield progress with mounting cynicism.
Even the President was concerned about the deterioration of the war effort and toyed with the
possibility of American disengagement.4"
Kennedy's life, and with it the possibility of a dramatic shift in American policy toward Vietnam,
ended abruptly on 22 Nov ember 1963. Word of the assassination of the President reached Washington
shortly after one o'clock in the afternoon. The Army Signal Corp. who routinely monitored the White
House switchboard, intercepted the frenzied telephone communications from the Presidential staff in
Dallas and alerted the DIA of the demise of Kennedy. The D! A immediately informed McNamara of the
tragedy (although Lhc Secretary mistakenly believes that he was told by the CIA).4" McNamara's
response w as, in the words of General Maxwell Taylor, "shocked disbelief."4 Later that afternoon
Lyndon Johnson was sworn in as the President of the United States. Four day s later, on 26 November
1963, Johnson signed NSAM-273, directing a continuation of the basic Vietnam policies of the
Kennedy administration.4'
By December the counterinsurgency campaign had deteriorated to such an extent that the Army
Staff, dubious of the endeavor from the beginning, became openly skeptical of the claims of progress
from the command.49 When confronted with unequivocal evidence that the vv ar effort w as atrophying.
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the military leaders in Washington started to distance themselves from MACV reporting. Apparently,
the pressure on the D1A to conform to the command position eased On 13 December General Carroll
sent McNamara the most pessimistic D1A report on the Vietnam conflict to date. The report concluded
that Viet Cong-initiated combat actions had increased significantly, and that the insurgents had
strengthened their force structure and improved their battlefield effectiveness. The report commented
that there were discrepancies between the reported Viet Cong casualties and the existing enemy order of
battle. The implication was that the current OB was inaccurate, a conviction held by D1A analysts
since the spring of 1962. The conclusion was grim:
In summary, the Communist capability to extend or escalate the insurgency has not
been significantly negated. Available evidence indicates that w hile the Viet Cong
hav e not made spectacular gains, they hav e prev ented the RVNAF [South Vietnamese
armed forces] from gaining effective control over much of the countryside.
Communist safe havens, bases, and transient areas are available to them in North
Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia."
The memorandum is remarkable, aside from its sense of foreboding, in that it directly contradicted a
report Krulak sent to McNamara in late October, a sanguine review of progress in the
counterinsurgency campaignV The situation in Southeast Asia had decayed to the point that Carroll,
ever the prudent general, was confident enough to challenge both MACV and Krulak.
On 19 December McNamara personally v isited South Vietnam to assess the condition of the
theater. He left the country disillusioned: his suspicion that MACV was manipulating the statistical
indicators, a suspicion fed by Carroll's memorandum of the preceding week, were confirmed during the
brief tour. Two days later, he wrote President Johnson:
Viet Cong progress has been great during the period since the coup, with my best
guess being that the situation has in fact been deteriorating in the countryside since
July to a far greater extent than we realized because of our undue dependence on
distorted Vietnamese reporting ... The situation is v ery disturbing."
50 Defense Intelligence Agency, S-18982/P-3, "Memorandum from the Director of the DIA to the
Secretary of Defense; Subject: The Viet Cong Improved Combat Effectiveness and Insurgency
Posture," 13 December 1963. DOS, 1963, Volume IV. Document 366, pp. 707-10; also GPP(llj, p.
192.
51 The report was titled "An Overview of the Vietnam War, 1960-63," and is summarized in GPP
(II). p. 192.
52 Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the
President," 21 December 1962. DOS, 1963, Volume IV, Document 374, pp. 732-35.
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Although McNamara explicitly blamed the South Vietnamese for the erroneous intelligence, he noted
that United States intelligence was also deficient, commenting, "As to the grave reporting weakness,
both Defense and CIA must take major steps to improve this. John McConc and 1 have discussed it
and are acting vigorously in our respective spheres.'"'
To correct these deficiencies, McNamara and MeCone proposed to send a joint CIA-DIA team of
intelligence analysts to survey the situation in South Vietnam and make recommendations. It is
indicative ofMcNamara's despair with MACV intelligence that he advocated the proposal. He simply
no longer trusted the MACV-ARVN reporting system and wanted an independent analysis of the region.
When they learned of the proposal, the JCS immediately protested. In spite of the fact that the D1A
was an agent of the JCS. the Chiefs opposed its participation in the survey. It was a matter of
tradition: the Chiefs believed that agency analysts were not qualified to judge field commanders.
Because of their vehement protests, McNamara acceded to the wishes of the JCS, yet he privately
instructed McCone to proceed unilaterally with the survey. McCone then drafted a new proposal w hieh
called for a twelve-man team of CIA analysts to perform a comprehensive intelligence review of South
Vietnam. Again the .ICS protested: the new proposal appeared to establish an independent reporting
system, undermining the authority of MACV. McNamara reviewed MeCone's proposals, and reassured
the Chiefs that this was not true. The JCS were not mollified and remained skeptical of the proposal.
McNamara approved the proposal on 16 January 1964; thereafter the CIA team w as assembled and
briefed for its mission.'4 Although the DIA did not participate in the survey, the mission was still
denoted to be a "joint" effort. The JCS sent a back-channel cable to MACV to advise them that the
appellation was not accurate; it w as entirely a CIA project."
The "joint" survey team arrived in Saigon in late January to a wary reception. MACV provided
little assistance to the CIA team and on sev oral occasions hindered its efforts to collect information on
the insurgents. As always, the military was protectiv e of its exclusive prerogativ e to judge the war,
and viewed the CIA team as interlopers. When the team returned to Washington to prepare their report,
the Chairman of the .ICS Maxwell Taylor kept MACV informed of developments through a series of
back-channel cables. Harkins response to the third revision of the team's report is revealing, as it is
illustrative of the perspectiv e of military leaders on competing intelligence analyses during the Vietnam
War. On 2 1 February 1964, Harkins w rote Tay lor:
As a general comment this message [from Taylor on the draft report of the survey
team] appears to be a combination of rehashing of old information previously
reported, plus the reporting of unevaluated individual observations not necessarily in
consonance with an overall analysis of the situation in a divisional tactical area. 1
am concerned ov er the disregard of the terms of reference for this group that is
demonstrated by the scope of this report. JCS message 362-64 January 1964,
indicates that the role of this group is to "assist in developing techniques to improve
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] intelligence collection." This
example of unilateral reporting on matters outside their quarter and competency,
53 OSD, "Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the President," p. 733.
54 See GPP {III), p. 33.
55 Halberstam, Best and Brightest, pp. 374-75; and George Allen, Indochina Wars. pp. 215-18.
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without the benefit of the advice of this headquarters and other interested agencies
can only be detrimental to the achievement of a joint, inter-agcncy intelligence effort
and more important, is likely to introduce misleading, if not incorrect, information
into the national decision making process.
We have nothing to hide but do have updated info on many of the problems covered
by the [less than I line ofsource text not declassified j team report, and feel that such
reports should be coordinated before being dispatched/"
This cable was indicative of MACV's attempts to challenge intelligence analyses which were not
under its direct control and impede alternative assessments of the state of the conflict.
As the command feared, the final report of the "joint" team was highly critical of the American
espionage apparatus in Southeast Asia. The report stated that there were serious "intelligence gaps" in
the present system, concluding that the Viet Cong OB was probably understated." This finding
coincided with a DIA report of late February that acknowledged the need to correct analogous
"intelligence gaps," particularly with regard to the flow of Viet Cong men and material along Laotian
infiltration routes.58 To correct the situation, the "joint" team report recommended the creation of an
inter-agency intelligence component, comparable to the forsaken JEC. Surprisingly, in spite of
rampant dissatisfaction with the present espionage system, the report largely was ignored in
Washington. The fact that the DIA did not participate in the survey damaged the legitimacy of its
findings, for it enabled the military command to dismiss the criticism as typical of cynical civilian
analysts. Had the DIA participated, it might have been more difficult for military leaders to disregard
its findings, for the DIA would have lent military credibility to the conclusions. But because the
report was prepared by civilians the .ICS spurned its 1'indings, and McNamara, occupied by other
matters, let the paper die. Thus the "joint" report was consigned to bureaucratic oblivion. For the
DIA, it was yet another missed opportunity.
A Pyrrhic Victory: USIB Reform, 1963-64
The shortcomings of American espionage operations in South Vietnam w ere symptoms of a deeper
affliction: that of an intelligence community adrift, void of effective leadership. Recognizing this, and
the perils it entailed, in December 1963 McNamara strove to resolve the matter of USIB reform once
and for all. In accordance with the Joint Study Group recommendations, he attempted to consolidate
military membership on the board by replacing the representatives of the military departments with the
DIA. It should be remembered that this reform was intended to mitigate conflict on the board and
enable it to take an active role in the management of the sprawling intelligence community. The
56 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, "Telegram from the Commander, MACV to CJCS;
Subject: CAS Survey Team." 21 February 1964. DOS, 1964, Volume I, Document 58, pp. 99-102.
57
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58 Defense Intelligence Agency, "North Vietnamese Support to the Viet Cong and Pathet Lao," 29
February 1964. GPP (HI), pp. 119, 158.
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reorganization would not only enhance the power of the I'SIB. but it would increase the power of the
Secretary of Defense and the DCI on the Board (as the potent military departments could no longer
directly contest their decisions) and within the espionage community. In fact, USIB reform was yet
another McNamara management tool; the centerpiece of his strategy to control the military
intelligence organizations and, through them, the formulation of strategic intelligence estimates. Of
course, the armed services swiftly perceived this threat to their traditional autonomy, and resisted the
reforms with robust. Although the sen ices had accepted the reforms in principle at the inception of
the DIA, they fought specific proposals for implementation. As recounted in Chapter Three,
McNamara discovered, much to his chagrin, that policy execution is neither foreordained nor
inexorable. Rather implementation is simply another v ehicle to impede or dilute disagreeable policies.
Thus, despite its public rhetoric, the JCS priv ately continued to resist USIB reform. On this issue
Gilpatric observed that the "services dug in their heels."50
McNamara met with little success. At his behest, the charter of the DIA was altered on 17
December 1962 to authorize the agency to coordinate, and where necessary provide finished intelligence
and supporting information, all defense contributions to the National Intelligence Survey and the
USIB."° These activities were centered in the DIA Estimates Office, which w as fully activated on 2
January 1962. However, the military services ignored the DIA, and continued to submit contributions
directly to the USIB. The services justified this practice as necessary to ensure that the judgment- • >f
the military departments were faithfully and accurately presented to the USIB (a variation on. the
versatile suppression of dissent argument). The military argued that the DI A, with its large component
of civilian analysts, could not be trusted to integrate and impart military analyses because it was
"liberal" and "gun-shy.""' The services also claimed that the DIA could be easily swayed by OSD, that
the agency might represent the interests of McNamara rather than the JCS on the USIB. An Air Force
officer on the staff of ONE at the time, summarized the concerns of the services thus: '"McNamara
could get Carroll to tow the line.""" A senior CIA official who witnessed the dispute dismisses ihese
59 Personal interview, Rosweil Giipatric, 23 July 1992.
60 Deanc Allen, DIA, p. 59. The National Intelligence Surv ey was an enormous (sixty chapters
plus) encyclopedia detailing ev ery nation on the globe. It contained terrain studies, ethnographic and
demographic information, political and economic analysts, and military assessments. The Survey was
commonly distributed throughout the American military establishment and to federal departments, and
was continually revised by the intelligence agencies. The DIA coordinated all Defense Department
contributions to the work. See MeGarvcy, CIA: The Mvth and the Madness, p. 85.
61 Confidential interview, former ASCI.
62 Personal interv iew, Daniel Graham, 12 October 1992.
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military explanations as a ruse to preserve military representation on the USIB. which he portrayed as
"bureaucratic and particularistic."63
Finally in December 1063. w ith the situation in South Vietnam deteriorating precipitously,
McNamara attempted to resolve the fate of the USIB reforms once and for all. He and McCone sent a
memorandum to President Johnson on 21 December which stated:
Since the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was created in 1961 to coordinate and
supervise all intelligence functions in the Department of Defense (except those of the
National Security Agency), it has been contemplated that the intelligence chiefs of
the Army, Navy, and Air Force would be removed from membership on the U. S.
Intelligence Board at such time as the Director, DIA, had sufficient authority and
resources to represent all the military services. Secretary McNamara and 1 believe
that this change in membership on the Intelligence Board is now warranted in the
interest of better management and more effective administration.64
The memorandum did not immediately reach the President. The .ICS voiced strident opposition to the
proposal, and asked McGeorge Bunds, who as the Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs functioned as an informal gatekeeper for national policy papers, to hold the proposal
for further consideration. After consulting McCone, Bundy consented. The .ICS again presented their
objections to McNamara, but the Secretary was unmoved. After a three day delay the Chairman of the
.ICS General Taylor informed Bundy that the proposal should now be forwarded to the President.,
although the JC.S continued to express reservations. He noted, ominously:
63 Personal interview, Ray Cline,13 October 1992. In one memorable interview with a general
who served in Air Force intelligence during this period and was subsequently transferred to DIA, I w as
lectured on the value of the Dl A's mission to coordinate and consolidate national estimates, and the
need for greater compromise and accommodation within the intelligence community. 1 pointed out that
the genera! had himself fought off the DIA's efforts in this realm in the sixties, bypassing the agency
and submitting Air Force contributions to national estimates directly to the USIB. 1 suggested that
there might be a contradiction between his past behavior and present perspective. He paused for a
moment, then remarked, "As a representatives of the Air Force, I was obligated to present the position
of the Service to the USIB." I wondered aloud if all representatives of the armed services continued to
honor this obligation, as they had in the past, was the mission of the DIA not doomed to failure? He
replied that greater efforts must be made to emphasize the value of "joint-thinking" (that is,
nonparochial perspectives). It is interesting that his personal epiphany did not occur until he was
assigned to DIA late in his career. Yet another example of the veracity of the bureaucratic dictum of
Arnold Miles that w here you stand (on a given issue) depends on where you sit.
64 Director of Central Intelligence, Memorandum for the President, "Proposed Reorganization of
the United States Intelligence Board," 21 December 1963. National Security File, Agency File, Box 8,
"Central Intelligence Agency, Volume 1," LBJ Library .
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The indiv iduul Chiefs are not in favor of this action, preferring to keep their
inlclligcncc officers as members of USIB. in their discussion yestcrdav they decided
to note the action being taken and indicate to the Secretary of Defense that they may
desire to reopen the matter after a reasonable trial period.""5
In effect, the JCS threatened to drag out a matter that had gone unresolved for two years.
The proposal went forward to the President and Johnson promptly approved it and set the
implementation date for I January 1964. It appeared that MeNamara had finally prevailed over the
opposition of the military departments. The appearance was deceiving, however, for the JCS
immediately attempted to reopen the matter. The documentary record is vague in this area, but it
appears that the JCS directed Carroll to press their case to McCone. It is curious that Carroll assented:
he was, in fact, weakening the authority of his own agency by supporting the desire of the militan
departments to retain USIB membership at the expense of the DIA. Yet this seemingly paradoxical act
was consistent with his past behavior. Carroll was an Air Force officer first, the director of the DIA
second. Whenever the interests of the military services collided with those of the DIA, Carroll tended
to promote the former. Carroll proved to be a fine moderator, but a poor executiv e. He often became
an advocate of the militan departments rather than a disinterested intelligence officer. With the
assistance of McGcorgc Bundy (whose motives were unclear), Carroll pressed McCone to support the
JCS contingency position: the armed services would participate on the USIB not as full members but
"observers." The distinction was purely semantic. Although nominally termed "observers," the
military departments would be allowed full participation in all USIB committee and subcommittee
proceedings; tantamount to their priv ileges of the past. Any pretense to reform was, in the words of
one Air Force general, "a polite fiction.
McCone, after some thought, endorsed the JCS proposal. His change of heart is interesting: after
all, he and McNamara championed the USIB recommendations since 196!. His reasons for abandoning
his former stance at this late date are a mater of speculation; bureaucratic considerations w ere probably
decisive. The alliance betw een McCone and McNamara was always fragile, being one of com enience.
The two joined forces only when their interests coincided. McCone supported McNamara's driv e to
implement the JSG recommendations because the DC1 believed they would buttress his authority ov er
the intelligence community. This objectiv e was especially important in view of the enduring struggle
between the CIA and the Air Force over aerial reconnaissance. Desptle President Kennedy's directive of
16 January 1962 that affirmed the primacx of the DCI in matters of national intelligence, the Air Force
continued to contest McCone's authority. The friction between the CIA and the Air Force increased
later that year, when Kennedy appointed Brockway McMillan, a Bell Telephone Laboratories executiv e
who served on the defense committee of the Kiilian Technical Capabilities Panel in 1955, as the
Undersecretary of the Air Force. McMillan was determined to break CIA's monopoly on the design and
65 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum from Maxwell Taylor to McGcorge Bundy, 24 December
1963. National Security File, Agency File, Box 8, "Central Intelligence Agency, Volume 1." LB.I
Library.
66 Personal interview, Dante! Graham. 12 October 1992.
procurement of strategic surv eillance systems. Under his direction, the efforts of the Air Force to wrest
control of aerial reconnaissance from the CIA grew holder. McMillan challenged the strategic authority
of the CIA not only In equipment but in analysis. In 1963, the Air Force attempted to gain control of
the national estimates on Soviet missile capabilities from ONE, arguing that it alone possessed the
necessary technical expertise to coordinate and draft the influential assessments. In response, the CIA
enhanced its scientific research and development capabilities by creating the Directorate of Science and
Technology in August 1963. McCone hired the scientist Albert Wheelon to head to directorate. It w as
a daring move by the DC1: the new organization was an unmistakable assault on the missilery
expertise of the Air Force."" It added more fuel to fire. As the battle raged throughout 1963, CIA
officials became uneasy with the prospect of a consolidated Defense Department representative on the
US1B. Their apprehension was heightened by the dominance of the Air Force in the DIA; they
worried that the DIA might be the Air Force in shecps' clothing. The old fear of Allen Dulles was
revived, that of a potent impenetrable military foe on the USIB. These officials urged McCone to
oppose the JSC recommendation for the consolidation of military representation into a single DIA
representative. It was preferable to preserv e the status quo, they argued, in order to keep the military
divided and relatively innocuous. In January 1964, McCone accepted this advice.
The .ICS now had the support of McCone, Carroll, Bundy, and, of course, the military departments
in their opposition to the removal of the service representatives from the USIB. Acknowledging the
strength of the forces arrayed against the reforms, McNamara conceded the contest. It was not an easy-
decision for him to make, for it was an important cause, one in which he had invested considerable
time and energy. But by 1964, USIB reform had lost much of its allure to the Secretary. The
counterforce / no-cities doctrine, wherein putativ e NIEs on the Soviet strategic threat were essential,
was in tatters. Time had shown it to be fiscally destructive, for the armed services tried to employ the
doctrine to justify interminable appropriations for nuclear forces. (For example, the Air Force
incessantly identified new Soviet targets and asserted that additional American nuclear weapons were
required to strike the targets; if the supplemental weapons were approved and deployed, it was probable
that the Sov iet Union would respond w ith a comparable deployment, thereby generating new targets for
the Air Force, ad infinitum.) The counterforce doctrine was officially abandoned on 6 December 1963
when McNamara sent a Draft Presidential Memorandum to Johnson that advocated a new nuclear
doctrine that would come to be known by the acronym MAD, for Mutual Assured Destruction. The
doctrine was a return to deterrence, forsaking the nuclear war-fighting doctrine. MAD was the result of
computer analyses designed to answer Enthoven's timeless question, "How much is enough?" MAD
postulated that a US nuclear force of four hundred megatons was sufficient to deter the Soviet Union
from nuclear attack. Under the doctrine, each "leg" of the American nuclear triad — land-based missiles,
67
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sea-based missiles, and bombers — would carry four hundred megatons; providing the United States
with three times the nuclear capability necessary to deter a Soviet attack. This excess capability was a
conservative measure deemed prudent to ensure deterrence. The MAD doctrine targeted the more
capacious "war-making capability " of (he Soviet Union, rather than individual military and industrial
targets."8 The effect of this distinction on the American intelligence effort was profound. Under the
discarded eounterforce doctrine there had been a direct correlation between the size of the Soviet nuclear
force and the US force structure, as each individual Soviet nuclear weapon was targeted by a
corresponding American weapon. Consequently, the strategic intelligence requirements for counterforee
centered on accurate and reliable assessments of the number of Sot iet nuclear weapons and their precise
location for targeting purposes. There could be no reoccurrence of the missile gap. McNamara
recognized this, and perceived USIB reform to be a partial solution. It was his contention that the
removal of the armed services from the USIB would reduce organizations bias from strategic estimates
and improve precision. However, under MAD the American force structure was not contingent to the
size of Soviet strategic forces; rather it was linked to demographic factors and industrial capabilities.
Accurate strategic intelligence estimates on the Soviet strategic nuclear threat were no longer
paramount to McNamara and his staff. There was little need for the putative and accurate strategic
intelligence required for precision targeting. Thus the import of USIB reform to McNamara declined
appreciably by 1964.
Moreover, the abstract intricacies of nuclear deterrence were overshadowed by more mundane
matters. Events in Southeast Asia increasingly dominated McNamara's itinerary."9 Crisis management
demanded much of his attention; lie often found himself reacting to events, rather than initiating them.
At this time, the pressures on McNamara were enormous. In addition to crisis response, he was
fighting the Pentagon bureaucracy on many fronts: pushing his Planning-Programming-Budgeting-
System, MAD, systems control, and other organizational and management initiatives simultaneously.
There was so much to do; no effort could be wasted. Given these conditions, it is probable that
McNamara, recognizing the strength of the military opposition to USIB reform, simply decided that
this issue was not worth the fight. Employing cost-benefit analysis (as w as his wont), it appears thai
he concluded that the battle could not be won, that despite expending considerable time and prestige,
his view was not likely to prevail. His predominant objective was to revolutionize the Pentagon: to
introduce modern management controls, making it more efficient and more responsive to policymakers.
Unfortunately, military intelligence reform was only a small facet of a much larger goal; a small battle
in a great campaign. It was a battle that McNamara reluctantly conceded. As the Secretary once
observed, "One can only slay so many dragons each day."-0
36 Civilians in OSD confide that MAD w as adopted primarily as a policy tool to ward off military
appropriations requests. The practical mechanics of the retaliatory force posture, which need not
concern us, allowed McNamara to set a force ceiling of 400 megatons, and restrict military spending
accordingly. In fact, for several years thereafter, the small Russian ICBM force allowed the United
States to employ counterforce doctrine; not in rhetoric, but in practice. See Kaplan, Wizards of
Armageddon, pp. 315-17; and Shapley, Promise and Power, pp. 187-201.
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As a result, the March 1964 reorganization of the USIB was largely superficial. 1 hereafter:
The Director, DIA. will represent on the USIB all elements of the Department of
Defense (DOD) with the exception of the National Security Agency (NSA).
However, the Military Departmental Intelligence Chiefs are invited and encouraged to
attend as observers all USIB meetings which are of interest to them collectively or
individually.
The intelligence chiefs of the military departments retain the right to express
divergent or alternative views as they deem significant and to have such views
footnoted in appropriate USIB documents such as NIEs, SNIEs, and Watch
Committee reports. They are also encouraged to make such views known to the
Board of National Estimates during the coordination of draft NIEs and SNIEs."'
In the end, the alterations were entirely semantic. The military departments retained membership
on the USIB — as "observers" rather than "participants" — and kept the independence and prerogatives
that they enjoyed in the past. They were allowed to submit intelligence assessments directly to the
Board and express dissent in footnotes. More importantly, the aimed services retained full membership
privileges on USIB committees and subcommittees, w here the actual staff work on the estimates was
performed. Although Carroll was instructed in March to review the activities of the military
departments on these committees and make further recommendations for reform, additional
recommendations were never made. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the Air Force at
the time reflected on the reorganization years later and concluded that "nothing changed.""
The significance of the defeat of the USIB reforms cannot be overemphasized. McNamara's vision,
however unrealistic, of a pow erful USIB as the central manager of the American espionage community
was shattered. So loo was the promise of the DIA as the arbitrator of the intelligence elements of the
armed services. Both proved to be will-o'-w isps; ephemeral illusions that dissolved before the cold
reality of the might of the military departments. As a consequence there was no effective reduction of
the military role in intelligence, which had been the original objective of the Joint Study Group
Report. In fact, the converse was true: military representation on the USIB was increased by the
addition of the DIA representative The irony was poignant: it was intended that the DIA would reduce
military influence; in the end, the agency augmented military influence. The agency was not the
singular voice of the Defense Department, but another cry amid the cacophony.
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One Foot in the Fire: Vietnam, 1964
The defeat of USIB reform left the intelligence community adrift; all the while the situation in South
Vietnam continued to atrophy. A SNIE of 12 February 1964 concluded:
That the situation in South Vietnam is very serious and prospects uncertain. Even
with U.S. assistance as it is now, we believe that, unless there is a marked
improvement in the effectiveness of the South Vietnamese government and armed
forces, South Vietnam has, at best, an even chance of w ithstanding the insurgency
menace during the few weeks or months. '
A month later, the DIA ominously informed McNamara that recent aerial reconnaissance indicated
that the South Vietnamese government w as in control of far fewer fortified hamlets than it claimed. ;
In the spring of 1964, the consensus of senior American officials, both military and civilian, was that
the insurgency campaign in South Vietnam was on the v erge of collapse. A strategy conference at
CINCPAC in early June marked a turning point in American policy towards Vietnam. The
deterioration of domestic South Vietnamese politics -- the abandonment of social reforms, grow ing
conflict among the leadership, and the proliferation of coup rumors — led United States policy makers u
reject further attempts to compel the military government to implement fundamental political reforms.
Instead, policymakers decided to support the moribund gov ernment irrespective of the progress of the
reforms. The only other alternative was to withdraw support from the South Vietnamese regime; in
the end it w as a Hobson's choice. As a consequence, the focus of American assistance shifted from the
unorthodox pacification campaign toward a conventional military buildup.
Concurrent with this conventional buildup in South Vietnam, the American espionage agencies
embarked on covert operations against North Vietnam. Codenamed Operation Plan 34-A, the program
started in February 1964 and was scheduled to run for twelve months in a escalating series of cov ert
actions, including U-2 and electronic intelligence collection flights, psychological operations (that is,
leaflet droppings, radiobroadcasts, etc.) and twenty sundry "destructive undertakings . . . designed to
result m substantial destruction, economic loss, and harassment." "" The operation, concealed from
Congress and the American public, was supervised by an interagency committee in Washington (with
the explicit authorization of the President and McNamara) and directed by General Harkins at MACV.
The American intelligence community concluded that the operation had little chance of coercing North
Special National Intelligence Estimate 50-64, "Short Term Prospects in Southeast Asia," 12
February 1964. GPP(II), pp. 8, 42.
" Defense Intelligence Agency, "Status of Vietnamese Hamlet Survey," 17 April 1964. GPP(II),
p. 420.
75 C. 2. (a), "Evolution of the War: Military Pressures Against Vietnam, Action and Debate,
February - June 1964," DODPP(IV), p. 5.
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Vietnam to terminate its assistance to the Vict Cong and Pathct Lao."" Nevertheless, the program went
forward: a feeble act by the United States government, but an act nonetheless. As such it was
emblematic of the mood of frustration and impotence in American policy circles at the time.
In early August the operation bore fruit. On 2 August, the destroyer USS Maddox w as reported!}
attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin by North Vietnamese torpedo boats while supporting 34-A operations
along the coast of North Vietnam. The response of the Johnson administration was restrained.
Congress was notified of the 34-A covert program (though not the role of the destroyer in the
operation, which was to provoke North Vietnamese radar systems) and additional missions were
authorized. Two days later, at 8:30 AM the new DIA Intelligence Support and Indications Center (a
merger of the Office of Estimates and the Current Intelligence and Indications Center) received
intelligence from the NSA (presumably based on SIGINT intercepts) that another attack on the
Maddox by unidentified vessels appeared immanent. The DIA promptly informed McNamara and the
new Chairman of the JCS General Earle Wheeler of the impending action. McNamara telephoned the
President and advised him of the situation. Subsequently, it was unclear whether the Maddox was
actually attacked by North Vietnamese forces: poor weather in the gulf impaired communications and
added to the uncertainty of events. The DIA could not confirm if the Maddox or an accompanying
destroyer, the USS Turner Joy. had been attacked."" In exasperation McNamara contacted Admiral
Ulysses Grant Sharp, who replaced Admiral Felt as CINCPAC, and demanded a determination. Sharp
tentatively concluded that the American ships had been attacked. ~s The President ordered an immediate
reprisal. F-102 fighter-bombers from the American aircraft carriers Ttconderoga and Constellation
subsequently bombed four North Vietnamese naval bases that harbored torpedo boats and an oil depot at
Vinh. The administration did not publicly reveal the link betw een the 34-A covert operations and the
alleged Tonkin incidents. In fact, in testimony before Congress McNamara denied that the two events
were related, a claim he knew to be false. In the mistaken belief that the alleged North Vietnamese
assaults were unprovoked, on 7 August Congress passed the infamous Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
which granted the President broad authority to execute American military operations in Southeast Asia.
Armed with the legal authority to strike at North Vietnam, the JCS urged the President to order
bold reprisals. The Chiefs advocated a comprehensive bombing campaign of North Vietnam in order to
dissuade the communist regime from providing assistance to the Viet Cong and Pathet Lao.
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McNamara. w ho w orried thai the massive scope of the proposed campaign might incite a response
from Communist China, preferred a moderate graduated approach, modeled on the American actions in
the Cuban missile crisis. Again the D1A supported the position of the JCS. The agency assessed the
most probable North Vietnamese response to the Tonkin reprisals to be an increased communist
movement of men and supplies to the south.'" This was certain to aggravate the precarious situation
in South Vietnam, where the affairs of Khanh government were engulfed by turmoil. Dramatic actions
were needed to turn to the tide, the agency argued, and the bombing campaign might be a partial
remedy. The argument was persuasive: at a White House strategy meeting on 7 September 1964 the
Johnson administration reached a "general consensus" that air attacks against North Vietnam would
likely be required within the next four months. However, the President accepted the the prudent advice
of his civilian advisors and postponed execution of the campaign.sl The Presidential election loomed
in November, and Johnson wished to portray himself as the candidate of moderation.
As the election approached, the disintegration of South Vietnam continued unabated. By now, the
intelligence community was profoundly pessimistic about its prospects for the future. On 1 October
1964, a SN1E concluded:
we believe that the conditions favor a further decay of GVN {the government of
South Vietnam] will and effectiveness. The likely pattern of this decay, will be
increasing defeatism, paralysis of leadership, friction with Americans, exploration of
possible lines of political accommodation with the other side, and a general petering
out of the war effort.82
As the DIA predicted, infiltration from North Vietnam increased significantly during the month of
October."* The JCS continued to press for the implementation of the bombing campaign. Something
must be done, they argued, to counter the increasing North Vietnamese support for the Viet Cong.
Johnson reluctantly responded to their exhortations after the Viet Cong staged a devastating assault on
the American air base at Ben Hoa on 1 November, killing four American soldiers. The President asked
William Bundy, now the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, to draft
political and military options for direct action against North Vietnam. The result was the NSC
Working Group on South Vietnam ' Southeast Asia. The DIA participated on the Intelligence Panel of
the Working Group, with the CIA and INR.
The Intelligence Panel first met on election day, 3 November, when Johnson defeated Barry
Goldwater with sixty-one percent of the national vote; the largest landslide in American history to
date. The Panel assessed the South Vietnamese political situation as "extremely fragile," with the
national gov eminent "plagued by confusion, apathy and poor morale" and the new leadership hampered
s" GPP (III), p. 192.
81 NYTPP, pp. 314-16.
82 SN'IE 53-2-64, "Short Term Prospects in South Vietnam," 1 October 1964. DOS, 1964,
Volume I, Document 368. pp. 806-11.
83 See cable from Ambassador Maxwell Taylor, 14 October 1964. GPP(III), p. 307.
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by traditional factionalism. It was a fertile ground for insurgents: Viet Cong control of the
countryside was slowly spreading. The future prospects w ere grim/4 The Panel was doubtful that
diplomatic and military pressure on North Vietnam would effect the conflict in the South. This
assessment was based on the premise that the strength of the insurgency was derived largely from
indigenous support. In the improbable event that aid from the North was w ithheld, the insurgency was
likely to continue, albeit at a reduced intensity . The Panel suggested that she pacification and reform
programs were essential if South Vietnam was to persevere and recommended substantial increases in
American assistance in both areas.
The Intelligence Panel also examined the burning topic of the moment, the proposal to bomb
North Vietnam. In this inquiry the intelligence agencies were influenced by the Sigma war games
conducted by the JCS Joint War Games Agency in April and September. The simulations were, in
fact, a test run for the Vietnam escalations of 1965; senior policy makers and military leaders
participated in both games. The results were disappointing to American officials. They revealed that
North Vietnam was surprisingly in\ ulnerable to conventional bombing, even if executed on a massive
scale. Moreover, in response the North could escalate the conflict at very little cost, by simply
increasing its assistance to the Vict Cong. The bombing therefore provided no strategic leverage. It
was also an ineffectual method to convey American resolve, for the actions of both America and North
Vietnam were amenable to disparate interpretations. As the State Department official Robert Johnson,
a member of the "Blue" { that is. United Slates) team, claimed that "the problem of communicating
from one team to another a determination not to give in, or of intent to escalate the conflict, was
evident in Sigma ll."85 The civilian intelligence agencies were skeptical that the bombing would be
effective. The D1A was somewhat hopeful, despite that fact that its director. General Carroll, had
participated in Sigma 1 on the "Red" (that is. North Vietnam) team, and personally witnessed the
futility of the air campaign.86 In the end, the Panel compromised, and concluded that bombing would
injure South Vietnam, but not overly so.8" Though ambiguous, by bureaucratic standards it was still a
clear warning against the air campaign.
The JCS were incensed by this warning. Most of the principals supported the bombing proposal;
the JCS desired an intelligence assessment to verify its effectiveness to persuade (or counter) the
dissenters. Consequently, the assessment was promptly challenged by the JCS representative on the
NSC Working Group Admiral Lloyd Muslin as being too "negative." The JCS persuaded the DIA to
urge the Intelligence Panel to reconsider the assessment. A Pentagon Papers analy st reported;
34 GPP {III), p. 212.
85 Quoted in John Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since
World WarII. New York: William Morrow and Co, 1986, p. 206.
86 The Sigma 1 simulation was held from 6-9 April 1964. The Blue Team was composed of
McGeorgcBundy, George Ball, U. Alexis Johnson, John McCone, John McNaughton, Maxwell
Taylor, and Curtis LcMay. The Red Team w as William Bundy, Earle Wheeler, Joseph Carroll, and
Rollin Anthis (the successor of Krulak). Sec Prados, President's Secret Wars, pp. 204-06;
Haiberstam, Best and Brightest, pp. 558-61; and Shapley, Promise and Power, p. 310.
87 GPP (III), p. 213.
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Apparently as a result of these criticisms and their influence on other Working
Group members, the Group's final assessment of DRV [North Vietnam)
susceptibility to military pressures was somewhat modified. While continuing to
emphasize that affecting Hanoi's will was important, the criticalily of it was obscured
by concessions to the possible impact of damage to DRV capabilities and by greater
reliance on conditional phrasing ... In general, the final assessment of DRV
susceptibility to pressures was less discouraging than the intelligence panel's initial
submission, although it could not be considered particularly encouraging either.ss
The DIA again demonstrated its susceptibility to the political and organizational interests of the
.ICS. The estimate was notably deficient in failing to address the probable consequences of the
bombing: il did not predict how Hanoi would respond to increased American pressure. It was a crucial
issue, and the omission was startling. The Sigma war games offered the most likely response: North
Vietnam would send additional men and material South. This was clearly not the response that the
President and his advisors desired, which may explain why it w as absent from the assessment of the
Intelligence Panel. Now that senior administration officials were on board, the intelligence agencies
were loathe to rock the ship.
In the end, the NSC Working Group offered Johnson three options in Southeast Asia, ranging from
periodic covert operations to a sustained bombing campaign. On 1 December the President chose the
"middle course," the moderate, graduated approach advocated by Taylor and McNamara. New 34-A
covert operations w ere mounted by the South Vietnamese and "armed reconnaissance" (lights by United
States aircraft were authorized over Laos (under the code name YANKEE TEAM). These missions
were supplemented by the clandestine bombing of infiltration trails in the Laotian panhandle
(BARREL ROLL). The JCS were bitterly disappointed with the Presidential decision. They had
hoped for the prompt implementation of the bombing campaign for North Vietnam; its execution was
again delayed.8"
Moreover, on 1 December -- in response to intelligence requirements from General Krulak's
successor General Rollin Anthis (as Special Assistant for Counlcrinsurgcncy and Special Operations,
Joint Staff) — the DIA produced a country analysis of South Vietnam. What is noteworthy about the
report is that in it DIA analysts abandoned a conviction that they had held since the establishment of
the agency and expressed as recently as a fortnight ago: that the Vict Cong insurgency was an
indigenous movement. The DIA reversed its established position, and now argued that the insurgency
was a product of North Vietnam."' It was an analytic sea-change, with clear implications: the
bombing of North Vietnam would degrade Vict Cong strength and capabilities. The timing of the
turnabout is suspicious, coming as it did when the JCS were relentlessly advocating a massive
bombing campaign of North Vietnam. Given the absence of evidence to support the curious reversal,
86 GPP (ill), p. 214.
89 Sec Perry, Four Stars, pp. 145-47.
90 Defense Intelligence Agency, Production Center, "Cold War (Counterinsurgency) Analysis —
Republic of Vietnam," 1 December 1964. DDRS: 1990-3095.
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one suspects the report was the product of political considerations rather than disinterested evaluation.
Once more the D1A endorsed the policy aspirations of the JCS.
The American BARREL ROLL operations proceeded throughout November and December 1964.
McNamara and his staff were amazed that the bombing missions elicited no public comment from
North Vietnam or China. In the middle of December, defense officials asked the D1A to explain the
dearth of response. The D1A observed that BARREL ROLL operations consisted of two missions b\
four aircraft per week, for a total of eight sorties per w eek over a vast region composed of thousands of
square miles. Consequently, the communists were not able to differentiate between the meager
BARREL ROLL missions and existing 34-A covert operations, which often employed combat aircraft.
The agency concluded:
On balance, therefore, while the Communists are apparently aware of some increased
use of US aircraft, they probably have not considered the BARREL ROLL strikes to
date as a significant change in the pattern or as representing a new threat to their
activities."1
The finding was important because it illustrated a fundamental flaw in the graduated Vietnam
policies of the Johnson administration: that the enemy frequently did not interpret escalations in the
manner that American policymakers hoped they would. The Sigma war games highlighted this
dilemma, but the administration chose to ignore the lesson. The perils of gradualism were many. The
other side did not use the same language, interpret events in the same fashion, and play by the same
rules. The DIA's warning, like those that preceded it, went unheeded.
Full Activation, 1964
Throughout 1964, the D1A strove to become fully operational in the midst of widening American
intervention in Southeast. For good or ill, after June 1964 McNamara and the Defense Department
were the preeminent players in Vietnam policymaking. The DIA was the principal provider of
quantitative intelligence on the conflict to the Secretary and his staff. In addition, the DIA also
monitored and assessed the Soviet strategic buildup, China's successful attempt to detonate an atomic
bomb, the growing disorder in Africa, and regional conflicts in Malaysia and Cyprus. To meet the
disparate requirements of these assignments three reorganizations were executed in 1964. On 21
March, the DIA Dissemination Center was created to coordinate the distribution of agency intelligence
products. On 30 April, the DIA Scientific and Technical Directorate was established, mimicking and
challenging the CIA's corresponding directorate. As previously noted, on 1 August the Office of
Estimates was merged w ith the Current Intelligence and Indications Center to form the Intelligence
91 GPP (111), p. 254.
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Support and Indications Center (ISIC or DIAAP-2). The reorganization was noteworthy as it was the
result of pressure from the armed services to improve the agency's capability to evaluate current
intelligence and anticipate foreign crises. The new organizational arrangement made it easier for DIA
analysts to monitor incoming cable traffic from the field — traffic that had increased tremendously in
the preceding two years, as American involvement in Southeast Asia deepened - by abolishing the
operational distinction between the current intelligence and estimates. This eliminated many of the
complexities of inter-agency coordination and streamlined the reporting requirements."'
The advent of the ISIC marked the full activation of the DIA, an arduous process that had taken
almost three years. In August General Carroll informed the PF1AB that:
All of the major organization transfers contemplated in the initial and subsequent
organizational directives have been effected. We arc therefore devoting our major
efforts now to refinements in organization, plans, management controls, and
intelligence techniques in order to improve our intelligence production, support, and
management capabilities for the job ahead."
PFIAB members reportedly w ere concerned that the sen ices might attempt to replace the personnel and
resources transferred to DIA, thereby offsetting the long-promised reductions in the intelligence budget.
Carroll's answer, reminiscent of his testimony before the House of Representatives Special
Subcommittee on Defense Agencies in 1962 (recounted in Chapter Three), was ambiguous and cvasi\ e.
He asserted that there were savings in some areas of intelligence operations, increases in others, and
refused to provide an aggregate assessment. Rather, he slated that further efforts by the DIA were
likely to increase economy and efficiency, but doubted whether these actions would result in a reduction
of overall manpower.94 What Carroll did not tell the PFIAB was that an internal study group recently
recommended a radical reorganization of the DIA. Unbeknownst the the board, Carroll personally
commissioned the study in early 1964 to examine future organizational arrangements for the DIA. The
director was concerned about the spiraling cosls of technical intelligence collection and the escalating
requirements for data processing systems. In May, the group recommended a fundamental
reorganization of the functions and activities of the DIA. It was a remarkable finding: the agency was
92 The ISIC was composed of five divisions: Indications, Soviet Bioc, Eastern, Western, and
Latin America. Three groups were established: Administration, Liaison, and Editorial and Briefing.
See Deane Allen, DIA, pp. 102-105.
93 Quoted in Deane Allen, DIA, p. 108.
94 Carroll: "... while savings had been effected in certain areas, these savings are offset by
increases in other areas; further, that while the resources transferred to DIA were those identifies some
time ago, the workload being carried today was not the same workload that equated w ith the resources
which were initially identified." Furthermore: "... it was now incumbent upon DIA to give added
stress to economy and efficiency after essentially completing the period of organizing, manning and
transfer of functions; and that while further economies will be forthcoming, they will not likely result
in a reduction of overall personnel." Quoted in Deane Allen, DM, pp. 110-11. These statements arc
almost identical to Carroll's statements before the House subcommittee in 1962. See USC (87/2)
House Armed Services. Hearings, pp. 6772-73.
181
not yet fully operational and already serious deficiencies were evident. After deliberating the
recommendations carefully, Carroll approv ed sev eral superficial "structural refinements" but decided
against a comprehensive reorganization, which he deemed "too disruptive." The D1A historian
concluded that Carroll rejected the organization because, "More time was needed to allow the initial
structural arrangements to gel."9' To critics of the agency, this explanation is disingenuous. The
agency had been in existence for almost three years: How much additional time w as required? The
decision should be viewed in the political context of the limes, recognizing that Carroll w as under
considerable political pressure from the Defense Department and, more importantly Congress, to get
the agency fully operational. McNamara, the .ICS, and the military commands were eager for
intelligence support on the conflict in Southeast Asia. Congress was impatient to achiev e the long-
promised sav ings resulting from the consolidation of military intelligence. None of the parlies would
view further reorganization and the accompanying delay and disruption kindly. Therefore it seems
likely that Carroll, ever the shrewd professional, rejected the reorganization due to political, as opposed
to organizational, considerations. It was a familiar pattern. Though many academics and professionals
like to believe that organizational reform is initiated or rejected by purely objective factors such as
economy and efficiency, in fact political concerns arc most often decisiv e. Despite lofty rhetoric to the
contrary, the DIA was no different from other government organizations. In. the end intelligence, like
agriculture and commerce, is an intensely political affair.
McNamara found himself encumbered by similar political concerns. Summoned before Congress
in the summer of 1964, McNamara conceded that the consolidation of the military intelligence effort
was far from complete. The question of whether the DIA would truly provide a more effective
intelligence capabilities for the Defense Department remained unanswered. He observed that there were
"divergent views" within the espionage community over the efficiency benefits of the DIA, but insisted
thai in the "long run" greater efficacy would result. McNamara reassured Congress that the "capability
within the individual scrv ices for preparing detailed intelligence reports has, of course, been transferred
to the DIA" and that the service representatives were being removed from the USIB.9" The Secretary of
Defense knew better: the claim was simply untrue. Yet had he told the truth, that USIB reform had
been effectively abandoned, the implications would have been grave. For USIB reform was the
singular achievement that McNamara, She JCS, and the military departments could (and did) cite
repeatedly before Congress to justify the existence of the agency. If this claim was shown to be false.
Congressional wrath would be inevitable. The legislature could rightly ask. What then had the DIA
truly accomplished?
What had the agency truly accomplished? The question was surprisingly difficult to answ er. Aside
from several functional consolidations, in the three years since its creation the DIA had done little to
reform the American strategic intelligence process -- the original intent of the Joint Study Group and
McNamara in establishing the agency. By 1964, the primary vehicle of reform -- USIB reorganization
-- was for all intents and purposes defeated. The agent of reform — the consolidated military
intelligence agency — had repeatedly proved itself unwilling and incapable of managing the strategic
95 Deane Allen, DIA, p. iio.
95 USC (88/1) House Armed Services. Hearings, Washington: GPO, 1964, p. 221.
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intelligence process. Defenders of the agency assert that the failings of the DIA during the order of
battle controversy and the Cuban missile crisis — its timidity and imprecise reporting -- were primarily
the result of its Sack of analytical resources. Yet the events of 1963-64 appear to refute these claims.
Following the activation of the Production Center in January, the DIA certainly possessed sufficient
expertise to objectively assess the state of the conflict in Southeast Asia. Indeed, the agency did
evaluate nascent trends in the counterinsurgency effort, and repeatedly offered its pessimistic findings.
In nearly all eases, these conclusions were rejected by MACV and SACSA; consequently the agency
revised its position, typically adopting a more sanguine perspective. It is surprising that the agency
was so amenable to the influence of both organizations: after all, the DIA nominally outranked both
and possessed comparable intelligence and analysts. Why should the DIA value the judgments of
MACV and SACSA analysts over its own? The probable answer, as this chapter has gone to great
lengths to demonstrate, is that DIA intelligence assessments were subordinate to the operational and
policy preferences of the military leadership. When military aspirations and DIA intelligence came
into conflict, the latter consistently yielded. Sometimes the pressure to conform was subtle, like the
back-channels; sometimes veiled, as in the case of Krulak's rebuttals of the DIA reports of August
1963; and sometimes blunt, as occurred during the deliberations of the NSC Working Group on South
Vietnam / Southeast Asia. Yet the messages were identical: the DIA was allowed to exercise its
evaluative function insofar as it did not conflict with the reporting of the commander in the field and
the preferences of his superiors in Washington. For the most part, the DIA accepted its fate quietly,
with neither protestations nor resistance. One can not fault the agency for the precarious situation into
which it was bom, nor for relenting to the powerful pressures placed upon it. However, the fact that
the agency did not contest its fate, did not defend the judgments of its analysts, is a notable failing:
one which demands our attention and disapproval. Like the young willow, the DIA survived the
v iolent storms of Vietnam policy deliberations by yielding to the powerful gales of the military
chieftains.
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Chapter Six
Vietnam
The Air War
The trials of Vietnam and Cuba in the early 1960s revealed a disturbing passivity in the DIA, a
predilection to support the common military wisdom. Events in Southeast Asia in 1965 made this
propensity more prominent: the commencement of the sustained bombing campaign of North
Vietnam, codenamcd ROLLING THUNDER, tested the ability of the agency to conciliate military
tenets with disinterested analysis. The military departments, particularly the Air Force (whose officers,
it should be recalled, composed much of the leadership of the DIA), were great believers in strategic
bombing, contending that it was an effective means of destroying enemy military and industrial
capabilities and rupturing national resolve. This belief was so fundamental to many officers that it was
rarely questioned: in many ways it was an article of faith. God, country, and ordnance. Intelligence
analysts, on the other hand, were not similarly convinced. They tended to be skeptical of the
assumption that enduring aerial assault could force an enemy to the brink of capitulation. They
pointed out that the ev idence from the American bombing campaigns ofWorld War II and Korea was, at
best, inconclusive; at worst, unpersuasive. DIA analysts, many both intelligence professionals and
military officers, were caught between conv iction and judgment. Whereas the civilian intelligence
organizations were consistently doubtful that the bombing campaign would have any effect on North
Vietnam, the DIA was initially confident. This optimism faded swiftly as it became apparent that the
aerial assaults were largely ineffectual. For the next year, as the JCS modified the campaign and
groped for alternative program rationales, the DIA strove to reconcile its grave doubts about the
potency of the air war with its inclination to endorse the operational aspirations of the military
leadership. It was an impractical goal: the disparity between the JCS and the civilian espionage
organizations was simply too great to overcome. In attempting to placate both sides, the agency
ultimately satisfied neither. Moreover, in the process the DIA alienated the Secretary of Defense, who
viewed the agency's attempts at accommodation as v acillations that revealed its pusillanimity. This
chapter describes the events that led to this estrangement. The first section recounts the stubborn
initial optimism of the DIA concerning the bombing campaign, despite the skepticism of civilian
intelligence officials and policymakers. The gradual disenchantment of the agency in the face of
renewed justification for the operations is detailed in the second section. The third relates the failure of
air strikes against North Vietnamese oil facilities and the disillusionment of the Secretary of Defense
nz
with the military leadership and its chosen instrument of intelligence, the D1A. The fourth section
briefly describes a bitter legacy of the air war: the DIA's search for American prisoncrs-of-war. The
chapter ends with an evaluation.
Clinging to Hope: Rolling Thunder, Spring 1965
In the spring of 1965, a presidential decision on escalation in Vietnam, long-postponed, was
imminent. As the decision loomed, tensions within the Johnson administration intensified. The
President felt cornered. The critical decisions on bombing and combat troops were ineluctable. He.
more than anyone else in the American government, clearly perceived the political risks present and the
threat they posed to the posterity of the Great Society programs. He confided to his close friends:
If we get into this war I know what's going to happen. Those damn conservatives
are going to sit in Congress and they're going to use this war as a way of opposing
my Great Society legislation . . . They hate this stuff, they don't want to help the
poor and the Negroes but they're afraid to be against it at a time like this when
there's been all this prosperity. But the war, oh, they'll like the war. They'll take
the war as their weapon. They'll be against my programs because of the war. I
know what they'll say. they'll say they're not against it, against the poor, but we
hav e this job to do, beating the Communists. We beat the Communists first, then
we can kxrk around and maybe give something to the poor.1
Johnson found himself in a dilemma: he believed that intervention was essential if he was to
protect his administration from political attacks by the Right that he was soft on communism, yet
such interv ention might ultimately destroy his domestic agenda. In the end, it was a Hobson's choice:
he thought there was no real alternativ e to escalation. This recognition (accurate or not) made Johnson
bitter, and as he moved closer to a decision on Vietnam, he became more reticent, more insular. The
circle of adv isors from whom he sought foreign policy adv ice contracted. Consequently, the influence
of McNamara, strong from the start, strengthened still further. Yet McNamara was now a compromised
figure, his celebrated objectivity corroded, for he was increasingly affected by the demands of his
constituency, the JCS. The Chiefs relentlessly pressed for bombing, and the Secretary, who had few-
alternatives to offer, grew more amenable as the situation in South Vietnam deteriorated. McNamara
did not ask the DIA to examine the JCS bombing proposals. Echoing the circumstances of the fateful
decision to send American combat forces to South Vietnam in the fall of 1962, the Secretary neither
solicited the judgment of the DIA on the proposal, nor did the agency offer one. As in the past, the
DIA had little affect on the formulation of defense policy.
1
Quoted in Halberstam, Best and Brightest, p. 615.
Once again events outpaced due deliberation. On 7 February 1965. the Viet Cong attacked an
United States military advisors' compound at Pleiku in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam,
killing nine Americans and wounding seventy-six. Though the attack was not unprecedented - it was
staged by a company or less of local insurgents with no evidence of complicity by Hanoi — the assault
proved to be a watershed event. The Johnson administration was poised to strike the North.: The
President promptly authorized a military reprisal under the code name FLAMING DART. Within
fourteen hours, forty-nine United States Nar y jets bombed targets in North Vietnam. This raid set in
motion a succession of events that culminated in the Presidential decision of 13 February to implement
a sustained bombing campaign against North Vietnam under the now infamous code name ROLLING
THUNDER. Despite considerable misgivings, McNamara did not oppose the operation. Tragically,
when the exigency was greatest. McNamara set aside his war experience in the Statistical Control
Division of the Air Force that demonstrated the limits of conventional bombing, and endorsed the
military campaign. It was a telling action, for it showed McNamara to be the consummate team
player. Though he had grave reservations about its prospects for success, McNamara was unwilling to
dissent from the policy and so compromise his considerable influence w ith the President. In the end.
the Secretary of Defense would remain on the team. "Bob is a company man," remarked his old friend
Willard Goodwin, as good an insight as any into the former President of the Ford Motor Company.'
The approval of ROLLING THUNDER was primarily the result of the desperation of American
policymakers. Its punitive program of "sustained reprisal" was supported by different parts of the
government for different reasons. Numerous arguments were advanced — some substantive, some not —
for bombing the North. Yet, in the end, the decision to implement the policy was the result of the
dearth of alternative proposals rather than an act to attain a common policy objective.4 It was vet
another example of planning driving policy.5
The President, Secretary of Defense, and civilian advisors generally viewed the bombing as a
political act, a means to communicate the American resolve to support South Vietnam to communist
leaders. Like the naval blockade imposed against Cuba during the missile crisis of 1962, ROLLING
THUNDER was seen as a limited military measure to achieve a diplomatic objective. This perspective
was evident in a memorandum of 17 February 1965 from McNamara to the Chairman of the JCS
2 Several weeks later, a reporter asked McGeorge Bundy the difference between Pleiku and other
similar incidents. Bundy paused for a moment, then replied. "Pleikus arc like streetcars" (that is,
there's one along every ten minutes). Recounted in Halberstam, Best and Brightest, p. 646.
3 Quoted in Shapley, Promise andPower, p. 58.
4 See NYTPP, p. 344.
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George Kennan, a diplomatic historian of distinction, remarked on the phenomenon thus:
"When, in a given military establishment, the idea of a possible war w ith a specific power is laid down
as a basic framew ork for military planning, the months and years that follow see the emergence of
many thousands of documents, and the holding of a comparable number of planning conferences, in
which the presumed adversary figures as 'the enemy.' Gradually, but inevitably, as this long planning
process runs its course, what was first considered a hypothesis insensibly becomes a probability, and
finally attains, in the minds of those who conduct it. the status of an inevitability. When this
happens, people find that they arc planning and preparing not for a possible conflict but for one which
they regard as unavoidable and inevitable, the occurrence of which is now only a mater of time."
George Kennan, Around the Cragged Hill: A Personal and Political Philosophy. New York: W. W.
Norton, 1993, pp. 226-27.
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General Earle Wheeler. Commenting on the FLAMING DART reprisals (and by implication, its
successor ROLLING THUNDER), McNamara emphasized: "Our primary objective, of course, w as to
communicate our political resolve. This I believe we did."6 Years later the Secretary elaborated:
I had been an Army Air Force's officer during World War II, and I knew
something about bombing. I never did believe bombing could w in wars. And I
didn't believe bombing could slop infiltration or destroy the war-making capacity
of North Vietnam.
1 did not believe it was likely we could win a military victory. 1 did believe that
the military action should be used as a prod towards moving to a political track:
to increase the chance of initialing or achieving movement on the political track.
It is an interesting perspective; bombing as pedagogical experience. Wisdom and prudence arc not
the result of reflection and contemplation, but sufficient quantities of ordnance. As a polemical
practice, it was remarkably simple: Why struggle with complex logic w hen a w ell-placed pay load w ill
achieve the same effect? The quotation is noteworthy because it sheds light on McNnmara's motive in
endorsing the bombing. He perceived it as one of two complimentary means (the other being
negotiations) to resolve the conflict; not as an end as itself.8
The American military did not share this perspective. The admirals and generals perceived
ROLLING THUNDER to be a conventional military operation to degrade enemy combat strength and
capabilities. Though several officers referred to the bombing as a means of "strategic persuasion," for
the most part this was mere rhetoric, to placate civilian concerns.9 Most military men understood the
bombing to be a routine military operation, and executed it with clan. The political aim of the
6 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman
of the JCS, 17 February 1965. GPP(III), p. 333.
7 McNamara interview, quoted in Shapley, Promise ami Power, p. 323.
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Cy rus Vance — who served as General Counsel of the Defense Department, Secretary of the
Army, and Deputy Secretary of Defense during the Vietnam conflict -- later recalled: "I think that the
great concern of the civilians, and again I'm talking in generalities, was particularly -- in relation to the
North — that if there was too large an application of force, that one ran the risk of bringing the Chinese
and/or the Soviet Union into the war and this expanding the war, which is certainly contrary to the
stated objectives and contrary to the interests of the United Slates. You've got to go back on this. I
think that a lot of us felt that by the gradual application of force the North Vietnamese and the NLF
would be forced to seek a political settlement of the problem. We had seen the gradual application of
force applied in the Cuban missile crisis, and had seen a very successful result. We believed that if this
same gradual and restrained application of force were applied in South Vietnam, that one would expect
the same kind of result; that rational people on the other side would respond to increasing military
pressure and w ould therefore try and seek a political solution. We did not sufficiently understand the
North Vietnamese, nor what would motivate them; and I think that this is one of the great problems
that faced us and the whole conduct of the war in Vietnam." Transcript, Cyrus Vance oral history
interview, 9 March 1970, by Ted Gittinger, p. 11, LBJ Library.
9 In a speech to Detroit Economics Club on 6 December 1965, Air Force Chief of Staff General
John R MeConncll publicly referred to the bombing campaign as "strategic persuasion," and
characterized it as "a heavily flexible tool in inducing the North Vietnamese eventually to accept |the
President's] offer of unconditional discussions."
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operation was rarely explored. The assumption appeared to be that so long as the enemy was swiftlv
subdued there would be no conflict between the disparate objectives. The perspective was similar to
that of the French General dc Boissdeffre, who remarked to his Russian counterpart in 1894: "Let us
begin by beating them; after that it will be easy."10 Thus did history repeat itself: as in the Cuban
missile crisis, civilian and military officials did not share common objectives. As a result, ROLLING
THUNDER operations would be impaired by mispcrceplion and controversy.
The absence of finite political aims also complicated the efforts of the American intelligence
community to assess the bombing campaign. It was difficult to assess the effectiveness of an
operation when there was confusion as to its goal. In any event, the opinions neither the CIA nor the
DIA were solicited on the probable effectiveness of ROLLING THUNDER prior to Presidential
approval. The President and his advisors made the decision with virtually no intelligence support. It
was only after the operation was approved that the intelligence community w as asked for a strategic
assessment. The assessment appeared to be a mere formality: the decision to bomb had already been
made and the espionage agencies could do little more than assent. In a tactful SNIE of 18 February, the
intelligence community concluded that ROLLING THUNDER might cause North Vietnam to reduce
its support to the Viet Cong. The estimate asserted, however, that this reduction in assistance was not
likely to degrade Vict Cong strength and capabilities in the near future.'1 The SNIE was. at best, a
lukewarm endorsement of the operation.
The cautious nature of the estimate was a reflection of the skepticism of intelligence analysts
towards the bombing campaign. World War II and Korea had made much of the American intelligence
community doubt the effectiv eness of strategic bombing. In the aftermath of the Second World War.
the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey refuted the notion that massive bombing had been decisive in the
defeat of Nazi Germany.10 Similarly, American strategic bombing campaigns during Korea failed to
hasten the end of the war. To many intelligence analysts, the lesson of both conflicts was not to
overestimate the consequences of strategic bombing. They were well aware of the fact that North
Vietnam was not suitable for conventional strategic bombing. To be effective, strategic bombing
should be conducted against modern industrialized nation w ith a fully developed infrastructure. North
Vietnam was the antithesis of this archetype. The country possessed only sparse and rudimentary
industry (the industrial sector was merely twelve percent of a Gross National Product of 1.6 billion
dollars), with embryonic lines of communication.'' In short, the communist nation was a poor choice
for air attack. The American threat to destroy North Vietnamese industry if the nation did not stop its
support of the insurgency in the South was a hollow one: there was little to destroy. Consequently,
although they gave the JCS the benefit of doubt in the 18 February SNIE, intelligence analysts
watched the campaign unfold with critical eyes.
10 Quoted in Kennan, Around the CraggedHill, pp. 216-17.
11 Central Intelligence Agency, SNIE 10-3/65, 18 February 1965. GPP(III), pp. 277, 400.
'2 The survey is neatly summarized in Bruce Bobbit, Law rence Freedman and Gregory Trev erton.
U.S. Nuclear Strategy: A Reader. London: Macmillan, 1989, pp. 38-57.
13 NY'TPP. p. 469.
ROLLING THUNDER was made public on 28 February, two weeks al ter President Johnson
endorsed it. The first air strike of the operation was executed on 2 March, when American F-100 Super
Sabres and F-105 Thundcrchiel's jets bombed a North Vietnamese ammunition depot at Xombang.
Additional strikes were performed on 14 and 15 March. Thereafter McNamara instructed the D1A to
compile "a standardized and streamlined system of after-action reporting so that prompt and responsive
analysis of strike results can be made available to those who require it."14 For subsequent strikes, the
agency compiled data from MACV. CINCPAC, and the NSA; assessed the results; and evaluated the
effectiveness of individual strikes. These evaluations were disseminated to the White House and
Defense Department agencies. In mid-March, Johnson routini/.ed the bombing campaign. Air strikes
were no longer authorized in response to specific communist atrocities, but implemented automatically
and systematically. Targets were now selected in weekly packages with the precise timing of strikes to
be determined at the discretion of the field commander. Consequently, DIA evaluations were
standardized and disseminated weekly to the JCS and senior policymakers. The preliminary evaluations
by the agency were encouraging and suggested that the recurring strikes had impaired communis!
capabilities in South Vietnam.15
In light of these sanguine assessments, senior military men w ere eager to expand the scope of the
operation. They were led by CINCPAC Admiral Sharp, w ho had long advocated air strikes on North
Vietnamese radar equipment and lines of communication (abbreviated LOCs: that is, roads and rail
lines). In March, the LOC proposals of Sharp w ere adopted by the JCS and formally recommended lev
the President and the Secretary of Defense. In support of the policy, the JCS offered a February 1465
DIA analysis of Viet Cong attacks on the South Vietnamese railway system from 1963 to 1964 that
concluded the strikes had effectively impaired South Vietnamese military operations. The JCS inferred
that a comparable campaign against the rail lines of North Vietnam would yield similar results.
McNamara and Johnson found the inference unpersuasive.They rejected a discrete LOC program,
but, in a concession to the JCS. allowed numerous LOC targets to be incorporated into the weekly
target packages.
As a result of the routini/.ation of the air strikes and the inclusion of LOC targets, by the spring of
1965 -- against the wishes of the civilian war managers -- ROLLING THUNDER had ev olved from an
exercise in air power dominated by diplomatic and psychological considerations to a substantive
military campaign to destroy North Vietnamese military capabilities,1" The military objectives had
prevailed over the diplomatic. This w as the result not only of the growing influence of the JCS ov er
Vietnam policy, but of the recognition of Johnson administration officials that strategic persuasion had
14 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the
Chairman of the JCS. 17 February 1965. GPP(III), p. 333.
15 Sec GPP (III), pp. 336-42.
16 Sec GPP (III), p. 341.
17 See NYTPP, p. 398.
failed: North Vietnamese support to the Viet Cong continued unabated. Consequently, in early April
the President crossed the Rubicon and committed American ground forces to offensiv e operations in
South Vietnam in an attempt to stem the tide of insurgents.18
The intelligence community monitored ROLLING THUNDER operations with mounting
apprehension. In early June it published a SN1E which explicitly stated what had been apparent to
official Washington for several months: that is was improbable that North Vietnam would seek respite
from the bombing campaign through negotiations.19 Though all the intelligence organizations agreed
with this judgment, they were divided ov er the military effectiveness of the air strikes. In general, the
CIA and State Department believed that the strikes had not significantly damaged North Vietnamese
military and industrial capabilities, while the military agencies -- led by the DIA — were convinced of
the converse. DIA damage assessments bolstered the latter claim, concluding that the aggregate result
of the aerial campaign had "eroded national capabilities in such areas as ammunition storage, supply
depots. POL Ipelrolcum, oil, and lubricant facilities], power plants, and military facilities, as well as
causing near paralysis of many facets of the national economy."-0 This 26 June assessment represented
the pinnacle of optimism for the agency. July 1965 would be a month of disillusionment.
The May and June damage assessments belied the disquiet of many DIA analysts over ROLLING
THUNDER operations. In early July the DIA collaborated with the CIA on an extensive evaluation of
the consequences of the bombing campaign. The evaluation was distinct from earlier DIA reports in
that it was not based exclusively on damage assessments but on an exhaustiv e review of all-source
intelligence. The completed evaluation concluded that despite numerous B-52 bomber air strikes
(codenamed ARC LIGHT) upon North Vietnam {combined United States-South Vietnam sorties totaled
approximately 3,600 in April; 4,000 in May; and 4,800 in June), the ability of the communist
regime to defend its borders, train forces, and infiltrate men and supplies into South Vietnam and Laos
was not reduced appreciably.-1 The implications of the evaluation were obvious: the bombing
campaign had caused considerably less damage than prev iously judged. It was significant because the
two most prominent members of the intelligence community concluded that ROLLING THUNDER
had little effect, explicitly refuting the JCS stratagem of strategic intimidation.
In what might be described as a non sequitur de profnndis, the response of the JCS to the
evaluation that ROLLING THUNDER was ineffectual was to recommend not the cancellation of the
operation, but its augmentation. CIA analysts were bewildered by the proposal: as the prescription
was clearly ineffective, additional dosage was foolish. Undeterred by the skeptics, the JCS pressed
McNamara to expand the number of ROLLING THUNDER sorties from two thousand to five thousand
a month; concentrating the attacks upon communist airfields, SAM sites, and LOCs (especially from
18 In a White House strategy conference on 1-2 April, Johnson changed the mission of the US
Marine battalions at Danang from defensive to offensive. The decision is embodied in NSAM-328 of 6
April 1965. See GPP(III), pp. 354-54.
19 Central Intelligence Agency, SNIE 10-6-65, 2 June 1965. GPP(III), pp. 283-84.
20 Defense Intelligence Agency, Summary, "Impact of Air Strikes on North Vietnam," 26 June
1965. George C. Herring (ed.), Vietnam: National Security Files. Volume III: LBJ Library, Vietnam:
National Security Files, Special Subjects, 1963-69. Bcthesda, MD: University Publications of
America, 1989, film no. 3, frame no. 319.
21 See GPP (III), p. 384.
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China); targets previously restricted by policymakers apprehensive about provoking a Chinese
response. The intelligence community was split along military and civilian lines over the proposal.
The CIA maintained that if the proposed sorties were executed the Chinese might deliberately engage
American aircraft over North Vietnam from airbascs in China. The CIA thought the chances were
"about even" that this might occur; State thought the chances were "belter than even."; and the D1A
and the service intelligence agencies thought the clashes were "unlikely."2: When presented with these
differences in judgment. McNamara and White House policymakers requested that an SN1E be prepared
to evaluate fully the JCS recommendations to intensify ROLLING THUNDER.
It was a critical estimate. By mid-July, the sustained bombing campaign was perceived by
President Johnson and his counselors to be ineffective: the looming political decision was whether to
escalate or moderate it. The JCS vociferously advocated the former. Since the start of ROLLING
THUNDER they had consistently promoted air strikes against the North Vietnamese LOCs and POL
facilities, as the decisive blow to break the will of the communist regime. The CIA and State, and to a
lesser extent the Army, were dubious of this claim. They believed that the strikes would be militarily
ineffective and diplomatically perilous, and risked bringing China into the conflict (a concern shared by
McNamara). Since the estimate was likely to influence the President's imminent decision to escalate
the bombing campaign, its judgments were contested. The Air Force and D1A argued vigorously in
support of the JCS, asserting that increased bombing would significantly injure Hanoi. However, by
now many intelligence analysts found this claim unpersuasive. Even the Army and Navy, normally
great believers in the use of force, were skeptical that further bombing would be effective. The DIA
lobbied to persuade them otherwise. Banished were its earlier reservations on ROLLING THUNDER;
for the purposes of the SNIE, the DIA embraced the escalation with uncharacteristic certitude. It was a
curious, if timely, change of heart. Although the military circumstances in Southeast Asia had
changed little, the political circumstances in Washington had altered drastically. The continuation of
the bombing campaign was threatened. Military unanimity was imperative to preserve ROLLING
THUNDER; individual reservations were set aside.
The estimate, published on 25 July 1965, examined three bombing options against North Vietnam:
(1) additional sorties against purely military targets. (2) strikes against LOCs, and (3) strikes directed
against POL facilities. It concluded that the extension of air attacks to military targets in the Hanoi
and Haiphong area was not likely to affect the resolve of the government of North Vietnam. The
estimate conceded that sustained bombing of LOC from China would probably hav e a serious impact
on the economy of North Vietnam and make communist assistance to the Vict Cong more problematic;
yet it would not have a "critical impact" on communist determination nor would it seriously impair
Viet Cong capabilities in the South, "at least for the short term." Finally, it opined that POL strikes
on targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area might cause some strains on war effort, possibly forcing the
communists to consider negotiations.2' In short, the SNIE concluded that additional bombing would
have little effect; LOC strikes might cause some pain; and POL strikes might injure, but not
22 Sec GPP (IV), p. 24.
23 SNIE. 25 July 1965. GPP (IV). p. 25.
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seriously threaten the communist regime.24 In spite of the best efforts of the D1A and Air Force to the
contrary, the Army and the State Department (strange bcdfclkws, indeed) dissented on the proposed
LOC strikes. In a footnote both argued that bombing the targets was futile: they were expansive and
remarkably durable, sufficient to support the war effort in South Vietnam despite the most optimistic
results of American bombing. Yet both agencies reluctantly endorsed the POL strikes, the centerpiece
of the JCS recommendations. In all, the SNIE came close to predicting that the intensification of the
air war would favorably affect the situation in South Vietnam, in spite of the reservations of the
majority of the intelligence community. More importantly, the estimate did not conclude that
additional bombing would be ineffective, and so contradict the assertions of the military leadership.
The SNIE was sufficient for the purposes of the .ICS: an endorsement of increased bombing;
albeit guarded, but an endorsement nonetheless. Neither McNamara nor Johnson was impressed with
the estimate. Ultimately, the President approved a modest, gradual increase in the bombing campaign.
The JCS were disappointed by this result for they believed the nascent policy of gradual escalation w as
doomed to failure. Many military leaders believed that the Army dissent ion the SNIE had crippled the
JCS recommendations. Thereafter, the Chairman of the JCS General Earlc Wheeler implemented an
informal rule of unanimity and mutual accommodation among the JCS. Dissent was discouraged in
order to preserve unity of purpose. Whereas in the past. MACV had brooked no dissent, now the JCS
censored itself. Individual reservations were to be set aside to assure agreement and prevent outside
agencies from wielding differences within the military establishment to their advantage. The strategy
was remarkably successful. According to one source, from 1966-68 the JCS split (that is, cast
dissenting votes) on only two-thirds of one percent of all the issues they considered. In 1969, she JCS
were unanimous on all but eight-tenths of one percent of the issues considered.21 General Wheeler
himself played down the rare dissents, recalling: "Insofar as the war in Southeast Asia, there hasn't
been a divergency of views among the Joint Chiefs of Staff since the fall of 1964.Thus the
military hierarchy promoted unanimity at the expense of critical evaluation; evaluation that was by its
very nature often a fractious process. Accordingly, DIA assessments which bolstered the command
position were praised; the rare assessment which questioned it was censured.
24 GPP (IV), p. 25. A former head of BNE, John Hui/.enga, remarked on the bureaucratic politics
of the era: "In doing Estimates about Vietnam, the problem was that if you believed that the policy
being pursued was going to be a Hat failure, and you said so, then you were going to be out of
business. In expressing such an opinion you would lose all influence. You'd be written off as
unprofessional or irrelevant or some such euphemism." Interview cited in Ranelagh, The Agency, p.
455.
25
McGarvey, CIA: The Myth and the Madness, p. 126. This rule w as not unprecedented: from
1955 to 1959 the JCS recorded 2977 decisions; in only 23 cases was a dissenting r ole cast. See
Hadley, Straw Giant, p. 129.
23 Transcript, General Earle Wheeler oral history interview, p. 15.
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From Negotiation to Interdiction: Growing Disenchantment
An important transformation occurred in the summer of 1965, a subtle shift in the American w ar
objectives. At its inception, the primary objective of the bombing campaign was to bring Hanoi to
the negotiating table. As it became apparent that this was improbable, a new objective replaced
negotiations: that of interdicting the flow of men and materials from the North to the South.
Strategic persuasion had failed; now the bombing campaign would serve conventional military ends.
McNamara reluctantly endorsed this transformations"
Throughout the summer and fall of 1965 the D1A continued to monitor ROLLING THUNDER
operations and prepare damage assessments. Despite the shift in objective and a moderate increase in
the number of sorties, it was apparent to agency analysts that the bombing campaign had little affect
on North Vietnamese support to the Viet Cong. In mid-November the DIA informed McNamara that,
"The air strikes do not appear to have altered Hanoi's determination to continue supporting the war in
South Vietnam." More importantly, further bombing would be ineffective because "the primarily rural
nature of the area permits continued functioning of the subsistence economy." In spite of the
escalations of the summer, the DIA believed that the resolve of North Vietnam had not diminished, its
military and industrial capabilities w ere largely intact, and therefore it was probable that the communist
regime would continue to assist the insurgents in the South.:s
Nevertheless, the JCS advocated a sharp intensification of ROLLING THUNDER. They repeatedly
urged the Johnson administration to authorize air strikes on North Vietnamese POL facilities currently
restricted.""' The DIA provided tepid support for these proposals, concluding (parallel to the 23 July
SNIE) that POL strikes might cause some strains on the war effort and force the communists to
consider negotiations. McNamara, aware that the charged political environment might be corroding the
impartiality of the DIA, was skeptical of this intelligence and asked the CIA to duplicate the DIA
study. Specifically, the Secretary asked the CIA to assesses the probable impact of air attacks on the
POL facilities of North Vietnam and whether the general escalation of the American war effort w ould
appreciably change the course of the war in South Vietnam. The request was a watershed event. For
the first time, McNamara looked outside the Defense Department for evaluations of the war effort. It
was a sign of his grow ing disenchantment with the defense apparatus, particularly with the intelligence
that the DIA was providing him.
27 In response to a request from President Johnson, McNamara reviewed and evaluated ROLLING
THUNDER in July. In a memorandum of 30 July 1965, the Secretary of Defense set forth the
rationale for the bombing as: (a) To promote a settlement, (b) to interdict infiltration, (c) to
demonstrate to South Vietnam, North Vietnam and the world the US commitment to see this thing
through, (d) to raise morale in South Vietnam by punishing North Vietnam, the source of the suffering
in the South, and (e) to reduce criticism of the Administration from adv ocates of a bombing program.
This document officially espoused interdiction as the program rationale. Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Memorandum to the President, 30 July 1965. GPP (III), p. 385.
28 Defense Intelligence Agency, Memorandum from the Director of the DIA to the Secretary of
Defense, 17 November 1965. GPP (IV), p. 2.
29 GPP (IV), pp. 58-62.
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The CIA's BNE responded to McNamara's requests by issuing two intelligence assessments, on 27
November and 3 December respectively. The first concluded that POL strikes would cause minor
dislocations but no major military or economic impact. The second concluded that a general escalation
of American military efforts would not palpably alter the insurgency. The assessments were by fur the
most gloomy to date. A Pentagon Papers analysts remarked: "The Board's [BNE] picture of Hanoi
was one of almost unbelievably strong commitment and dogged determination, by contrast with
previous estimates.""' After he received the POL assessment. McNamara immediately sent a copy to
General Wheeler, in a vain attempt to halt the torrent of JCS recommendations for POL strikes.
Wheeler promptly sent McNamara a Joint Staff-DIA study of the POL target system accompanied
by a short personal memorandum which commented that the destruction of the POL system would
force Hanoi into a compromised position which would likely result in negotiations. Curiously, the
accompanying report did not support Wheeler's assertion. In fact, the studx concluded the opposite:
that it was improbable that POL strikes would seriously damage North Vietnam, causing only minor
dislocations and obstacles." It is not known if the Secretary of Defense or his staff noted the
incongruity. It is known that Wheeler's comments caused McNamara to ask the CIA to explicate its
earlier assessments. This, coupled with pressure from the JCS for an updated estimate, led BNE to
prepare a new SNIE on the probable effects of bombing POL facilities in North Vietnam.
From the start, it was a contentious estimate. In line w ith the informal rule of accord, the militarx
intelligence agencies were unanimous in supporting the position espoused by the JCS. Because the
bombing campaign was widely perceived to be ineffective against North Vietnamese industrial and
military capabilities, the JCS and its agents subtly modified their past position and now argued that
bombing would be an effective instrument of interdiction and a means of destroying communist
resolve. Where one program rationale had failed, it was hoped that another might succeed. Though the
CIA and the State Department were skeptical of the efficacy of further escalations of the bombing
campaign, it was difficult for the civilian intelligence agencies to refute both claims, as there was
insufficient evidence to disprove (or, for that matter, prove) cither '.me. It was difficult enough to
measure the North Vietnamese supply efforts; virtually impossible to calibrate communist w ill. In
the end, it was largely a matter of faith, and the military were great believers in bombing. CIA and
State did not share that faith. Their interpretation of American bombing efforts in the Second World
War and Korea made them pessimistic about its effectiveness in Southeast Asia. After considerable
dispute, the CIA grudgingly supported the interdiction argument while it opposed the communist will
proposition. The tactic was simple: calculating that it could not oppose the military on both
rationales and prevail, the agency concentrated its opposition on one. Ultimately, the tactic was
30 GPP (IV), p. 64.
31 The Pentagon Papers analyst summarizes the report thus: "The Joint Staff-DIA study showed
that NVN's bulk POL storage capacity was greatly in excess of what NVN required to sustain current
consumption levels -- 179,000 metric tons available as compared with 32,000 metric tons needed --
indicating the strikes would have to be very damaging in order to cause NVN any major difficulties.
They study also hinted that an adequate substitute system could be improvised, w ith lighterage from
ocean takers and dispersed storage, but it nonetheless concluded that the strikes would result in 'a
reduction of essential transport capabilities for military logistic and infiltration support operations,' i.e.
as a result of a deprivation of necessary POL." GPP (IV), p. 6.
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effective. The final SNIE, approved on 10 December 1965, asserted that intensified American air
attacks, beginning w ith POL facilities (and later including power plants and mining harbors), would
not alter North Vietnamese policy, but might hamper its efforts to support the insurgency in the
South.Thus the estimate supported intensified bombing as a legitimate means of interdiction, but
rejected any appreciable impact on communist resolve. The military were annoyed by this rejection,
yet somewhat mollified by the endorsement of interdiction operations. They limited their dissension to
a footnote, wherein the DIA, NSA, and the three service intelligence elements suggested that
intensified air strikes, combined with the projected augmentation of American ground forces in South
Vietnam might ultimately result in a change of heart in Hanoi:
. . . that as time goes on and as the impact of sustained bombing in NVN [North
Vietnam] merges w ith the adv erse effects of the other courses of action as they begin
to unfold, the DRV [North Vietnam | would become clearly aware of the extent of US
determination and thus might reconsider its position and seek a means to achieve a
cessation of hostilities."
The dissent is significant because it demonstrated that the DIA once again inexplicably modified its
estimativ e posture, presumably under pressure from the JCS. Two weeks prior to the publication of
the estimate, the DIA had been skeptical that POL strikes would effect Hanoi's military capabilities,
vet alone her determination. Now the Dl.A asserted that North Vietnamese will might be destroyed
through POL operations; a remarkable change over a mere fortnight. In the absence of new evidence
or improved methodology, it appears that the DIA's change of heart was principally the result of
bureaucratic pressure. The DIA succumbed to the military code of unanimity.
In contrast, the State Department rejected both arguments, interdiction and resolve. In a
compelling dissent in the estimate the Director of INR Thomas L Hughes asserted that escalation
would cause a stronger reaction in Hanoi than the SNIE posited, remarking:
The distinction between such operations and all-out war would appear increasingly
tenuous. As these attacks expanded, Hanoi would be less and less likely to soften its
opposition to negotiations and at some point it would come to feel that it had little
left to lose by continuing the fighting.'4
32 The SNIE stated: "We believe that Hanoi's leaders would not decide to quit and that PAVN
[North Vietnamese] infiltration southward would continue. Though damage from the strikes would
make it considerably more difficult to support the war in South Vietnam, these difficulties would not
be immediate. Ov er the long run, the sustained damage inflicted upon North Vietnam might impose
significant limitations on the numbers of PAVN [North Vietnamese] and VC mainforce units which
could be actively supported in South Vietnam from North Vietnam." See GPP (IV), p. 66.
33 See GPP (IV), p. 66.
34 GPP (IV), p. 66.
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Hughes suggested that, contrary to the belief of the American military, escalation is not a one-sided
affair. Provocation by the United States might result not in communist capitulation, but in
communist escalation. Hughes had learned the lessons of the Sigma vvargamcs well. The Korean War
had instilled many State Department intelligence analy sts with a robust skepticism of strategic
bombing. They recalled that the then-acclaimed aerial interdiction campaigns, "Operation Strangle" and
"Operation Saturate," failed miserably . Between 10 August 1950 (one month after the start of the w ar)
and 25 September 1950, the United Slates Far East Air Forces Bomber Command leveled every urban
and industrial target above the thirty-eighth parallel in Korea (with the exception of several naval oil
tanks in close proximity to the Russian border). Yet the war continued for three years. McNamara,
never a believer in strategic bombing, found the arguments of the State Department analysts
persuasive. He again rejected the POL proposals and pursued a more conciliatory policy toward North
Vietnam by advocating a bombing pause.
By December 1965, McNamara, unbeknownst to nearly all government officials, was privately
convinced that the war in Southeast Asia could not be won militarily. He had long been skeptical of
the promises of the military leadership concerning the bombing, and embraced the campaign
reluctantly. As the operation unfolded the Secretary grew increasingly distrustful of the reliability and
accuracy of the statistical indicators provided by the military and disillusioned by the strategics pursued
by his generals.35 Nearly tw enty years later, an evasive McNamara recalled that he was:
skeptical as to whether a military victory could be achieved and 1 believed
considerable emphasis should be put on developing what was called a political track,
which would lead to negotiations with the North Vietnamese ... The view that a
political track should be developed to complement the military action I held early on
and 1 don't want to put a date on it other than to say that it was probably as early as
1965 or earlier.36
He formally informed the President of his personal epiphany in a memorandum 6 December 1965.'
Thereafter, although the Secretary of Defense continued to publicly support the policies of the
administration, in private McNamara pressed Johnson for a bombing pause: a proposal fiercely resisted
by the the JCS, who were convinced that it would ease the pressure on Hanoi without achieving
substantive concessions from the communist regime. McNamara, nothing if not persuasive, convinced
35 The first indications of McNamara's change of heart were made known to the President in early
March, when McGcorgc Bundy informed Johnson of a private conversation he had with the Secretaries
of Defense and State. Bundy wrote: "Last night for the first time Bob McNamara said what many
others have thought for a long time — that the Pentagon and the military have been going at this thing
the wrong way from the very beginning: they have been concentrating on military results against
guerrillas in the field when they should have been concentrating on intense police control from the
indiv idual villager on up." McGcorgc Bundy, Memorandum to the President, 6 March 1965, Aides
Files, LBJ Library.
36 Westmoreland, Deposition, Robert S. McNamara, 26 March 1984, fiche no. 331, pp. 8-10.
37 Robert McNamara, Memorandum to the President, NSF Country File, Vietnam Box 74, 75,
File Folder "Vietnam LEE," Document 39a, LBJ Library.
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Ihc President to temporarily suspend ROLLING THUNDER operations in order to provide an
opportunity for the communists to enter into negotiations. On 24 December 1965 Johnson announced
a bombing pause that would last thirty-seven days.38
Four days later, BNE sent McNamara an explication of its POL assessment of 27 November. The
report concluded that there was no probable combination of POL targets in North Vietnam that might
be bombed to alter North Vietnamese support for the insurgency in the south.39 The BNE report w as
in stark contrast to the SNIE disseminated two weeks earlier wherein the intelligence community, with
the exception of the State Department, v iewed the bombing favorably. Here then was the CIA's true
judgment of the bombing campaign, unobscured by compromise and unencumbered by bureaucratic
concessions. The JCS were shocked by the assessment, and promptly tasked the D1A to duplicate the
study. The DIA hastily produced a report more favorable to the operational desires of the JCS. but not
by much. The document asserted that the exceptionally high ratio of storage capacity to consumption
allowed the North Vietnamese POL system "to absorb a high degree of degradation," and concluded that
the dispersed sites were "relatively invulnerable." Oddly, the report then asserted that despite the near
inv ulnerability of the system, the loss of storage capability at the Haiphong facility would be "critical
to the entire bulk distribution system" and the destruction of the other facilities would produce local
POL shortages and transportation bottlenecks until substitutes and alternatives could be obtained and
devised.40 In other words, the POL strikes probably would cause some unpleasant short-term disorders.
This was hardly a ringing endorsement of the JCS recommendations for a POL campaign. The report
is especially interesting when coupled with a strategic assessment issued by the agency two weeks
later. In a Special Intelligence Supplement entitled "The Big Picture in Southeast Asia" the agency
stated:
In conclusion, as the year 1966 commences on a note of increased pressures and
pow er in Southeast Asia, there is a strong foreboding of greatly intensified combat
and escalating political tensions. The continued US buildup will be recognized by
the Communists that US determination is still strong and that the forces in Vietnam
face a long struggle. Nevertheless, the Communists certainly believe that their
motivation is superior, that lack of clcarcut victory combined with domestic and
foreign pressures will erode US determination, and that they can outlast the LIS in
this contest — ev en in the face of extremely heavy troop losses.41
38 It was the second bombing pause of the conflict. The first, from 8 May to 13 May 1965, was
ineffectual: McNamara complained that it was hastily arranged and too short to be productive.
39 Central Intelligence Agency, Board of National Estimates, Memorandum to the Secretary of
Defense, 28 December 1965. GPP (IV), p. 65. The report noted that POL strikes would cause
dislocations, however: "Although there presumably is a point at which one more turn of the screw
would crack the enemy resistance to negotiations, past experience indicates that we are unlikely to have
clear evidence when that point has been reached. . . Though granting that each increase of pressure on
the DRV bears with it the possibility that it may be decisive, we do not believe the bombing of the
Haiphong facility is likely to have such an effect."
40 GPP (IV), p. 68.
41 Defense Intelligence Agency, Special Intelligence Supplement, "The Big Picture in South East
Asia," 13 Januarv 1966. Herring, Vietnam: National Security Files, Volume III, film no. 4, frame
no. 71.
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Taken together, both intelligence reports represented a retreat from the agency's posture in the
hawkish 10 December SNIE. A mere month after its publication, the DIA abandoned the twin
foundations of the argument for increased bombing — doubting the additional strikes w ould interdict the
flow of supplies to the south and weaken communist resolve -- despite bureaucratic pressure to
conform to the command position. This was nothing less than a reassertion of the DIA's analytical
autonomy. It was largely lost on McNamara and his staff however.
The DIA's change of heart gave the CIA and the State Department the opportunity to overturn the
10 December SNIE. On 4 February BNE released a new SNIE that concluded that an increase in the
scope and intensity of bombing, including attacks on POL facilities, would not prevent Hanoi from
assisting the Viet Cong to a greater extent than in the preceding year.4: In short, the POL attacks w ere
not an effective means of interdiction. This time only the Air Force, its self-interest manifest,
dissented. The February SNIE was an explicit reversal of the December SNIE, which postulated that
the POL campaign might be efficacious. The bombing pause had strengthened the hand of the doubters
on BNE, and w cakencd that of the true believers. The bureaucratic equilibrium appeared to be shifting.
Both interdiction and resolution were refuted as plausible program rationales for continued ROLLING
THUNDER operations.
This shift in opinion within the intelligence community coincided with the disenchantment of
senior defense officials. During the bombing pause, McNamara and his top aide, the former Harvard
Law School professor John McNaughton, wrote lengthy memoranda outlining their growing
skepticism. McNaughton concluded in a 19 January 1966 memoranda that, "We arc in an escalating
military stalemate."43 McNamara echoed this pessimism in a memorandum to the President on 24
January.44 When the hoped for negotiations did not ensue, the Johnson administration resumed
ROLLING THUNDER.
Subsequently, the JCS grew more strident in their advocacy of the POL strikes. Their cause was
bolstered by a political crisis in South Vietnam instigated on 12 March 1966, when the Premier, Vice
Air Marshall Nguy en Cao Ky, dismissed the powerful military commander General Nguyen Chanh Thi
from his post. Buddhist monks and students hastily joined demonstrations, and Saigon w as rife w ith
coup rumors. The administration felt compelled to take action. Lacking other alternatives, McNamara
42 Central Intelligence Agency, SNIE 10-1-66, "Possible Effects of a Proposed US Course of
Action on DRV Capability to Support the Insurgency in South Vietnam," 4 February 1966. Paul
Kcsaris (cd.), Vietnam and Southeast Asia, Supplement. CIA Research Reports Scries. Frederick,
MD: University Publications of America, 1987, reel 1, no. 985. The conclusion: "The combined
impact of destroying in-country stockpiles, restricting import capabilities, and attacking the southward
LOCs w ould greatly complicate the DRV (North Vietnamese] war effort. The cumulative drain on
material resources and human energy would be severe. The postulated bombing and interdiction
campaign would harass, disrupt, and impede the movement of men and material into South Vietnam
and impose great overall difficulty on the DRV. However, we believe that, with a determined effort,
the DRV could still mor e substantially greater amounts than in 1965." The Air Force dissented from
the estimate, arguing that the omission of psychological factors (that is, communist resolve) from the
estimate resulted in a grave miscalculation of the overall impact of the postulated bombing program.
43 Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, "Some Paragraphs on
Vietnam," Third Draft, 19 January 1966. NYTPP pp. 491-93.
44 NYTPp p 473
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reluctantly referred the JCS recommendations for POL bombing to Johnson for approval. Johnson
delayed a decision, as several international leaders were attempting to bring Hanoi and Washington to
the negotiating table.4'1 It seemed an inauspicious moment for escalation.
The POL Strikes and the Disillusionment of Robert McNamara
As the POL decision, and with it the fate of ROLLING THUNDER, hung in the balance in March
1966, McGcorgc Bundy resigned from his post as Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs. Bundy was privately said to be disillusioned with the war in Southeast Asia, and left
the tumultuous White House for the placid environs of the Ford Foundation. Bundy was replaced by
Walt W. Rostow, Bundy's former deputy and the then director of the Policy Planning Staff at the Stale
Department. The appointment had profound implications. Bundy had acted as an informal gatekeeper
for Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, filtering and integrating intelligence and memoranda from
government agencies for the encumbered chief executive. Under Johnson. Bundy's role grew more
influential, for the President was indifferent toward the espionage community and rarely read unabridged
intelligence assessments. Since McNamara often employed DIA intelligence to support Defense
Department positions, Bundy, to preserve interpretive balance, became the informal champion of CIA
intelligence in the renowned Tuesday Luncheons.46 Above all, Bundy ensured that Johnson was
exposed to the incongruous opinions of disparate organizations on controversial matters; that the
President heard wide counsel before making a decision. His successor did not share this commitment
to equity. Rostow, who had served in the Office of Strategic Services (the precursor of the CIA) during
the Second World War and helped plan and evaluate the bombing campaign against Nazi Germany, was
a staunch supporter of strategic bombing, forthright in his commitment to air power. He was, in the
colloquialism of the time, a true hawk, and as the Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs he displayed a commitment not to objectivity and discourse, but to ideological fervor
and prejudice. He could always find the silver lining in the dark cloud; even if. as in the case of
Southeast Asia, the ominous cumulation foretold a terrible eruption. After a grim briefing on Vietnam
in 1967 by John Paul Vann, Rostow — seeking light amid the darkness — approached Vann and asked.
45 These include endeavors by President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Prime Minister Harold
Wilson of Great Britain, President Charles De Gaulle of France, and Secretary General Thant of the
United Nations.
48 Personal interview, McGcorge Bundy, 21 September 1993. Ray Cline noted the significance of
this forum and the importance of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: "As the Vietnam
War became more worrisome, Johnson retreated more and more from an orderly reviewing of evidence
and systematic consultation. Kennedy had converted Eisenhower's methodical NSC process to a fast-
break, executive task force process, which worked well if the President really focused on the problem.
Lyndon Johnson further narrowed the circle of participants in the NSC to the principals, whom he
began to meet at a weekly [Tuesday] luncheon ~ Dean Rusk, McNamara, and Bundy, who was replaced
later by Walt Rostow. There were other groups: but this was the critical policy forum, and
intelligence did not have a place at the table." Clinc, The CIA under Reagan, Bush, and Casey, pp.
225-26.
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"But you do admit that it'll all be over in six months?" "Oh." replied Vann loftily, "I think we can
hold out longer than that."'' As American involvement in Vietnam deepened, and the White House
was beset by melancholy, an aide observed that Rostow's relationship to Johnson was "like Rasputin
to a tsar under siege."J8
Accordingly, Rostow immediately began to slight pessimistic CIA and Stale Departments
assessments on Vietnam in the spring of 1966, while enthusiastically forwarding sanguine military
estimates to the President. Optimistic D1A assessments were favorably received by the Rostow:
gloomy assessments were often ignored. Accordingly, the JCS discovered a w illing supporter and
collaborator Rostow. As expected, Rostow endorsed the POL strikes with ardor. On 6 May, Rostow
wrote Johnson:
With an understanding that simple analogies arc dangerous, 1 nevertheless feel it is
quite possible that military effects of systematic and sustained bombing of POL in
North Vietnam may be more prompt and direct than conventional intelligence
analysis would suggest.4"
Soon thereafter. Johnson approved the POL campaign. Air strikes against targets in North
Vietnam w ere scheduled for June.
To assist Pentagon planners, the D1A collected and evaluated intelligence on probable POL
facilities. These efforts were temporarily disrupted on 12 May 1966, w hen an American aircraft on a
bombing run over North Vietnam was shot down. The incident was promptly reported to espionage
agencies in Washington by field intelligence collection stations in Southeast Asia. Av ailable technical
intelligence, in the form of radar tracking data, indicated that the American plane had inadvertently
penetrated Chinese airspace before it was attacked. However, this data contradicted the personal
accounts of the American pilots who accompanied the lost aircraft, which arrived in Washington an
hour alter the radar tracking data was received. The pilots claimed that the aircraft did not stray over
Chinese airspace, rather it was engaged by Chinese fighters over North Vietnam. The discrepancy was
serious: if the accounts of the pilots was accurate, the incident might result in a widening of war and a
direct confrontation between the United Slates and the Republic of China. In recognition of the greater
precision of technical intelligence, the CIA accepted the radar tracking data and dismissed the claims of
the pilots. In reporting the incident to the President the civilian agency concluded that the American
plane had violated Chinese airspace. In contrast, the DIA did not resolve the discrepancy between both
sources, in spite of the fact that technical intelligence was regarded to be far more accurate and reliable
than human intelligence, and issued a now partly-declassified intelligence assessment to the Defense
Department which concluded:
47 Recounted in Halberstam, Best and Brightest, p. 774.
48 Quoted in Halberstam, Best and Brightest, p. 763.
49 See NYTPP, p. 478.
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Based on information now available, the true picture of events in somewhat clouded.
There are distinct discrepancies between [One line deleted] US pilot reports of the
shootdown. Therefore, as of now, a true determination as to which side of the border
the actual shootdown occurred cannot be stated with certainly/"
The failure of the DIA to resolve the incongruity troubled one agency analyst. Patrick McGarvey
believes that the report should have cmphasi/.cd that the discrepancy in the incident was between
SIGINT and HUMINT and stressed the fact that the former was more credible. "1 He notes that this
omission was another example of the propensity of the DIA to defer to a military department: it
evaluated the word of the pilots to be equatable with SIGINT, a facile symmetry. It was a costly error.
The Air Force Chief of Staff John P. McConncIl read the DIA report and, unaware that SIGINT
contrasted the reports of his aviators, publicly discussed the incident and categorically denied that an
American plane had entered Chinese airspace. Johnson was enraged. He demanded to know why the
intelligence provided to him by the CIA was at odds with the information provided to the JCS by the
DIA. To exacerbate the error, the following day the Chinese government released photographs of the
captured pilot and the wreckage of his plane, indisputably on Chinese soil. On 1ft May Mc.Namara
informed the President that, "Careful re-evaluation of the evidence . . . leaves no doubt that the incident
took place over China and was the result of a US intrusion into Chinese airspace. A US
reconnaissance aircraft accompanied by fighter cover got off course and flew across the Chinese
boider."': Four days later, the Chairman of the PF1AB Clark Clifford confirmed this finding/' In all,
it was a dangerous mistake: the DIA invoked needless confusion through a lack of precision.
Fortunately, there was ample time to discover the mistake; unlike the Gulf id' Tonkin incident, the
exigency of events did not result in a precipitous American response.
Throughout June, while the United Stales military prepared to execute the POL strikes the CIA
reiterated its skepticism that the operations be an effective means of interdiction. On 8 June, the
agency concluded: "It is estimated that the infiltration of men and supplies into SVN (South Vietnam]
can be sustained."54 The POL campaign began in earnest on 29 June 1966, amid great fanfare. The
Seventh Air Force, based in Saigon, praised the initial bombing strike, calling it "the most significant,
the most important strike of the war."55 The campaign continued throughout July and August.
McNamara monitored the bombing through specially commissioned reports compiled by the DIA. The
early reports were encouraging: by 20 July the DIA reported that almost sixty percent of North
50 Defense Intelligence Agency, "Peiping Claims US Fighters Downed A Chinese Aircraft," 12
May 1966. Herring. Vietnam: National Security Files. Volume III. film no. 3, frame no. 943.
51 See McGarvey, CIA: The Myth and the Madness, pp. 28-29.
52 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Memorandum to the President, 16 May 1966. Herring,
Vietnam: National Security Files. Volume III, film no. 3, frame no. 940.
53 President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Memorandum from the Chairman to the
President, 20 May 1966. DDRS: 1991-589.
54 The estimate, requested by the principals, was disseminated on 8 June 1966. See GPP (IV), p.
104.
55 NYTPP. p. 480.
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Vietnam's original POL capacity was destroyed; by 1 August the figure rose to seventy percent.5" The
CIA was critical of the DIA intelligence reports, asserting that they tended to be myopic, focusing
exclusively on the effectiveness of the strikes in destruction of some percentage of North Vietnamese
POL storage capacity without directly relating this statistical information to industrial requirements and
import potential.5- DIA analysts themselves expressed frustration w ith the pedantic and mechanical
nature of the intelligence reports, often citing the agency's truck inventory for illustration. Throughout
ROLLING THUNDER, the DIA compiled and updated a database of the truck inventory of North
Vietnam. The Air Force and the Navy regularly sent computerized reports to the DIA that specified the
number of trucks observed on North Vietnamese roads and designated the vehicles as operable, damaged,
or destroyed. These statistics were entered into the database and contrasted against figures of
communist truck imports and repair capabilities in an attempt to predict exactly when North Vietnam
would run out of trucks, and presumably abandon the war. Events revealed the methodology or the
computer program was flawed (perhaps both). One analyst who worked at the North Vietnam desk at
the DIA recalled that the truck inventory was reduced to zero seven or eight times during his tenure,
indicating that the communists were out of trucks. In all incidents, it was at once apparent that the
intelligence was erroneous, as numerous trucks were sighted on the roads in the North. When his
superiors demanded an explanation for the error, the analyst explained that the raw intelligence, in the
form of the computerized reports submitted to DIA, were summaries of the personal observations of
American pilots during flights over North Vietnam. As such, they were highly subjective: it was
difficult for pilots to discern and count the vehicles, as they were frequently traveling at high altitude at
high speeds. Furthermore, there was a natural tendency for the lighter pilots to exaggerate the trucks
they had damaged and destroyed to enhance their reputation and demonstrate their prowess. All things
considered, the analyst concluded, the raw intelligence was unreliable and inaccurate. The analyst
recalled:
The J-3 [intelligence element of the Joint Staff] would not accept reasoning which
suggested the possibility of error in American pilot reporting. In rev erent tones such
arguments were rebutted with, "The data base indicates that the truck kill for 3 June
was 182. Can you disprove that figure?" This kind of thinking prevailed in all
aspects of the war which could be quantified -- body count, North Vietnamese
infiltration, MIG sorties, SA-2 [SAM) missile firings, weapons captured, and
pacification statistics.5®1
56 See GPP (IV), p. 110. By 1 August, the residual POL storage capacity had declined from
approximately 185,000 metric tons to almost 75.000 tons; two-thirds of which remained in relatively
vulnerable large storage centers (two of the sites were at airfields designated off-limits for bombing) and
one-third in smaller dispersed sites. It was, in the words of the anonymous Pentagon Papers analyst,
"a fat cushion."
57 GPP (IV), p. 111.
58 McGarvey, CIA: The Myth and the Madness, pp. 113-14.
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As the summer progressed it was manifest to Defense Department officials that although a large
portion of North Vietnam's POL storage capacity was destroyed by the bombing campaign, the nation
retained a sufficient dispersed capacity (supplemented by stead} imports) to meet its industrial and
military requirements. Moreover, the remaining POL capacity was located in smaller, dispersed sites
that were v irtually impregnable to air attack. Assaults against these sites would incur a substantial
cost in munitions, fuel, aircraft, and men. By August, it was evident to McNamara and his staff that
the costs of attacking the remaining sites were prohibitive. It was simply impractical and infeasiblc to
continue the POL campaign.59
Not only had the bombing failed to destroy critical POL reserves, but by early September both the
CIA and the DIA concluded that the bombing failed to interdict the supply of men and materials into
South Vietnam; that North Vietnamese assistance to the Viet Cong proceeded "undiminished."
Furthermore, the two intelligence agencies asserted that there w as no ev idence of insurmountable
transport difficulties from the bombing, no significant economic dislocation and no weakening of
popular morale in North Vietnam.60 In fact, in a bitter irony it appeared that North Vietnam actual!}
benefited from the campaign. A SN1E of 4 August concluded that the communist regime was
employing the American POL attacks as a lever to extract more aid from the Red China and the Soviet
Union.6'
For McNamara, the failure of the POL strikes to prov ide the United States with the decisive
advantage the .ICS had promised left him profoundly disillusioned. By September 1966, it was
manifest that the POL strikes had failed, that they had not staunched the How of men and material from
the North to the South. To his mind, ROLLING THUNDER was thoroughly discredited and the
grandiose claims of the JCS proven to be spurious. In the spring of 1965 the JCS claimed the
bombing would bring Hanoi to the negotiating table; it did not. The JCS claimed that the bombing
would injure the military capabilities of North Vietnam; it did not. The JCS claimed the bombing
would interdict the flow of men and materials south; the}' continued unabated. Finally, the JCS
asserted that the bombing would destroy the resolv e of the communists; yet the}' persevered.6' The
POL strikes were the last major escalation of the air war recommended by McNamara. Afterward
McNamara delighted in recalling the glaring discrepancy between the optimistic military estimates for
the POL and the indisputable failure of raids to reduce infiltration whenever the Air Force and Navy
pressed for further escalations.
As a consequence of this disillusionment, the Secretary of Defense was now a compromised figure.
Publicly, he defended the American military effort in Southeast Asia; privately, he wanted to withdraw
from the conflict. In December 1965 he had concluded that the war could not be won militarily;
thereafter he viewed American military operations as a necessary evil to promote negotiations. By
59 GPP (IV), p. 109.
60 The Joint CIA/DIA Assessment of POL Bombing was released on 12 September 1966. GPP
(IV), pp. 6, 111, 354.
61 Central Intelligence Agency, SN1E 13-66, 4 August 1966. GPP (IV), p. 6.
62 In August 1966 the CIA issued the mast damning indictment of the bombing to date. The
memorandum, entitled "The Vietnamese Communists' Will to Persist" concluded that the resolve of
the communists, both North and South, was probably greater than that of the United States. By all
accounts, the memorandum had a profound effect on the Secretary of Defense.
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September 1966 he had come to hate the bombing campaign as a cruel and indiscriminate tool of
statecraft. Some months before, in March of 1966, when his disquiet was grow ing, McNamara had
approached a group of intellectuals, academics, and social scientists and asked them to perform a
comprehensive evaluation of ROLLING THUNDER. McNamara instructed his top assistant John
McNaughton to supervise the project (an indication of the importance the Secretary attached to the
study) and directed the forty-seven scientists selected for the study to explore the feasibility of
constructing an anti-infiltration barrier across the demilitarized zone in Vietnam. The ostensible
justification for the barrier was to stop the How of men and material from the North to the South, but
McNamara's real motive was more subtle, to take the rationale for the bombing campaign away from
the military. That the Secretary was willing to take the dubious concept of an interdiction fence
seriously, and examine its feasibility, was an illustration of his desperation to hall the bombing. The
study was performed in secret from June to August 1966 under the aegis of the Jason Division of the
Institute for Defense Analyses. The Jason Group submitted four proposals on the Vietnam war to
McNamara on 19 August 1966 which stressed the ineffectiveness of the bombing campaign (including
the POL strikes) and recommend the construction of an anti-infiltration barrier across northern South
Vietnam and Laos."' The Group was particularly critical of the military intelligence effort. They
suggested that the enemy body count was probably inflated, as were the American bomb damage
assessments. The Group concluded:
The fragmented nature of current analyses and the lack of an adequate methodology
for assessing the net effects of a given set of military operations leaves a major gap
between the quantifiable data on bomb damage effects, on the one hand, and policy
judgments about the feasibility of achieving a given set of objectives, on the other.
Bridging this gap still requires the exercise of broad political-military judgments that
cannot be supported or rejected on the basis of systematic intelligence indicators. It
must be concluded, therefore, that there is currently no adequate basis for predicting
the levels of US military effort that would be required to achieve the stated objectives
-- indeed, there is no firm basis for determining if there is any feasible lev el of effort
that would achieve these objectives."4
Thus the Jason Group implicitly condemned the mechanical methodology of the D1A. It was that
last straw for McNamara; he had been repeatedly frustrated by the D1A intelligence throughout
ROLLING THUNDER -- which he believed to be parochial and superficial -- and the predilection of
agency analysts to modify their products in accordance with the policy aspirations of the military
53 GPP (IV), p. 6. The anti-infiltration barrier was never constructed. Years later, with the full
benefit of hindsight, Jason Group member Marvin Goldberg concluded that the barrier was naive; "It
was part of our arrogance at the time to believ e that if the system worked perfectly, the military w ould
support us and abandon the air war. I learned then a fundamental aspect of the military mentality: Any
incremental advantage is worthwhile. I regard this as a fundamental mistake that I made, and that all of
the rest of the 'gang' made. It was the only thing that we could see to direct the war against
combatants. But what we should hav e done when Mr. McNamara came to us with this proposal was to
spit in his eye." Quoted in Gregg Hcrken, Counsels of Wcr. New York: Knopf, 1985, p. 212.
64 GPP (IV), p. 120.
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leadership. The agency's bungled investigation of the May 1966 loss of the American aircraft, the
erroneous enemy truck inventory, and the consistently inaccurate bombing evaluations finally took
their toll. To McNamara, the DIA was discredited. Consequently, he proposed to the President that a
special bombing evaluation unit be created in the CIA. to monitor the progress of the bombing
campaign apart from military influences. Johnson agreed and ordered the new DC1 Richard Helms to
form the element. McNamara recalled the decision years later:
[the] special bombing evaluation unit was established in the CIA at my request for
just the reason that I hare referred to earlier, I didn't believe the DIA was trying to
deceive me on the results of the bombing, or for that matter, strength figure. But I
did believe that parties of interest frequently looking at their operations through rose,
what I call "rose colored glasses." That started in World War II. it has been true in
every human enterprise that I've ever been part of — business, academic, military:
and I've always sought to have the evaluation of one's actions made by a person other
than the actor. And particularly with respect to the bombing operations, I believed
that we needed an independent evaluation. I asked the president for his permission to
ask CIA to do that . He authorized me to do so.'"
Thereafter McNamara valued CIA intelligence over all else. Beginning in September 1966
throughout the remainder of his tenure as Secretary of Defense, he met with the CIA officials in person
every Monday morning to be briefed on the situation in Vietnam."6 McNamara continued to read DIA
products and commission evaluations, but w as skeptical of the findings, believing them to be myopic
and biased. The former Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswcll Gilpatric remarked:
McNamara has told me subsequently that he placed his principal reliance on
information that came to him through CIA rather than through the military channels.
He didn't have the confidence in military-generated intelligence that he did have in the
agency. He read them all; saw them all, but he's indicated to me that his principal
reliance was on intelligence that came from the CIA."
The iron\ is poignant: McNamara created the DIA to serve his intelligence needs, but in 1966 he
abandoned it. He judged that the agency had been compromised from the beginning, and could not
effectively fulfill his intelligence requirements.
McNamara traveled to South Vietnam in mid-October to confirm his doubts about the war. The
trip served its purpose only too well. On the plane ride back to Washington, McNamara was
uncharacteristically taciturn. Two defense officials who had accompanied the Secretary, Daniel Ellsbcrg
and Robert Komer, discussed the situation in Vietnam among themselves. Ellsbcrg argued that the
85 Westmoreland, Deposition, Robert S. McNamara, 26 March 1984, fichc no. 331, pp.87-88.
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situation had deteriorated; Komer maintained that it was no worse than six. months ago. "But it is
worse." McNamara interjected, "because if things arc the same, then they're worse, because \tc have
invested so much more of our resources.""" When he returned to Washington McNamara sent the
President a gloomy report w ith recommendations for leveling off the American military effort and
seeking a solution through diplomatic channels."9
The reaction of the JCS to the McNamara recommendation was, in the words of the Pentagon
Papers analyst, "predictably rapid — and violent."-0 The Chiefs urged the President to intensify the
bombing and called for a full-scale mobilization of 688,500 Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine
reserv ists to provide more personnel for Vietnam and augment American forces worldwide.
McNamara was opposed to any escalation, and advocated the anti-infiltration barrier as a substitute for
increased bombing. 3 Determined to check the air war. the Secretary at last allowed the Whiz Kids,
based in the Office of Systems Analyses (OSA) in the Pentagon, to perform statistical control
assessments on the ROLLING THUNDER operation.
Thereafter OSA substituted for the DIA as the primary prov ider of assessments of the air w ar in
Southeast Asia to the Secretary of Defense and his staff. On 6 October Systems Analyses fired the
first shot in the bureaucratic battle to limit the bombing campaign. The office released twenty-eight
"issue papers" which in loio argued that additional deployments of air power in Southeast Asia would
not be effective. The JCS were enraged. They recognized that the thrust of the OSD analysis was to
make a case for the barrier at the expense of the bombing, and were diametrically opposed to any
div ersion of resources to barrier construction. •* The military attempted to rebut the OSA ev aluations
in a 4 November memorandum. Later the CIA issued a comprehensive analysis of ROLLING
THUNDER which concluded that the campaign was politically and militarily ineffectual. 4 The
estimate marked a turning point for the CIA. Thereafter, the position of the CIA on the air war was
constant and immutable -- the bombing had a marginal effect at best — irrespective of proposed
escalations. " Thus analytical support for McNamara" s opposition to the air war was provided by OSA
and CIA; the DIA was no longer a player. For the rest of the conflict, its impact on the policy debate
over ROLLING THUNDER was marginal at best.
08 Recounted in Halberstam, Best and Brightest, p. 768.
69 GPP (IV). p. 125.
70 NYTPP, p. 519.
7" GPP (IV), pp. 128-29.
72 GPP (IV), p. 107.
73 GPP (IV), pp. 132-33.
74 Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Memorandum,"The Effectiveness of the Rolling
Thunder Program on North Vietnam, 1 January - 30 September 1966," 7 November 1966. Herring,
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2H
A Bitter Legacy: The Search for POWs and MIAs
Though removed from policy deliberations, in 1966 the D1A inherited an important set of
responsibilities derived from the air war: that of invcstigating and c\ aluating the reports of American
pilots and soldiers assumed to be prisoners-of-war (POWs) and missing-in-aelion (MIAs) in Southeast
Asia. Prior to 1966, the military departments (specifically the Secretaries) had the legal responsibility
for making POW/MIA determinations for lost personnel under the provisions of the Missing Persons
Act. " This task was complicated by the nature of the conflict in Vietnam: the armed services had
little proficiency in classifying soldiers unaccounted for by guerrilla activity; their experiences and
procedures were derived from conventional wars. In the absence of a formal declaration of war, the
military services were unsure if the 1948 Gener a Cont ention applied to captured sen icemen. This
ambiguity was exacerbated b\ the semantic decision of the White House, motivated by political
considerations, early in the conflict to refer to American prisoners as "detainees." In spite of these
problems, in September 1963 the Defense Department began to compile information on POW/MIA in
order to replace lost soldiers and determine entitlements for the family members of missing
servicemen. Before and during the 1965 American military buildup in South Vietnam the DIA
established procedures for the collection and processing of raw intelligence relevant to POW/MIA
matters by units in the field. s The DIA had only limited responsibility for analysis, the bulk of which
remained with the military departments.
The expansion of the responsibilities of the DIA in this realm was a consequence of the increased
loss of American servicemen by 1966. In July the agency assumed the chairmanship of the
Interagency POW Intelligence Ad Hoc Committee, which enhanced its role in the processing and
evaluation of POW information. 9 The task of the agency was facilitated by a coinciding Defense
Department directive that stipulated "United States military personnel captured in Vietnam will be
categorized as captured or interned rather than detainees."80 Later that year, the .ICS assigned the DIA
primary responsibility for POW intelligence. Although the military departments continued to account
for lost personnel and assess intelligence concerning the fate of casualties, the D!A supervised the
collection of intelligence related to POWs. Accordingly, the armed sen ices sent copies of their detailed
weekly casualty lists to the DIA POW/MIA Office, where the information was collated with other
sources (enemy news, captured documents, prisoner interrogations, and COM!NT) and stored in files
and databases.
6 USC (103/1) Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. Final Report, GPO, 1993. pp.
134, 139.
77 USC (103/1) Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. Final Report, p. 134.
78 USC (103/1) Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. Final Report, p. 136.
79 The Interagency POW Intelligence Ad Hoc Committee was composed of representativ es from
the military departments, DIA, CIA, and the State Department. USC (103/1) Senate Select
Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. Final Report, p. 136.
30 USC (103/1) Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. Final Report, p. 135.
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The assignment was complicated by the failure of the military departments to establish a
authoritative criterion for POWs. The legal authority to determine the status of missing servicemen
remained with the services; each established dissimilar standards. Consequently, the DIA was forced to
compile unofficial "working lists" of POWs. The military departments and the DIA often differed on
particular judgments: the same serviceman might be listed by the agency as POW, while listed by his
sen ice as MIA. Inclusion on the "w orking lists" of the DIA w as a subjective matter. Surprisingly, no
written criteria or procedures were established, during and after the war, to determine POWs. It was an
"analytical judgment."8' This judgment was impaired by the failure of the agency to place formal
collection requirements with the NSA for SIGINT related to POWs and the ignorance of DIA analysts
about current Escape and Evasion symbols employed by American pilots solicit assistance.82 Later,
the decision of the While House to falsify "location of loss" information on American casualties to
conceal military operations in Cambodia and Laos added to the plight of agency analysts in tracking
prisoners.81 Once again the DIA did not actively coordinate and manage the intelligence operation:
rather it fell into a reactive, largely passive, role in deference to the efforts, however feeble and
fragmented, of the armed serv ices. It is not surprising that the families of missing military men were
outraged by Ihc the performance of the Defense Department and the DIA.
The DIA and the Air War: An Evaluation
The final verdict on the performance of the agency in assessing the military and diplomatic
effectiveness of ROLLING THUNDER is split. On one hand, the lingering optimism over the results
of the bombing campaign is understandable given the military character of the agency . Later the
agency adopted a consistently pessimistic position on further bombing, asserting that increased
ordnance and additional targets were unlikely to have a significant impact on North Vietnamese
capabilities and will. It was a gallant posture, as the political pressure to conform to the military
aspirations of the JCS was formidable. On the other hand, such pessimism was ineluctable in the face
of overwhelming evidence that the bombing was ineffectual. Moreover, the agency did appear to
succumb to the influence of the military leadership on two critical estimates — 25 July and 10
December 1965 — during the period under consideration. Though the agency later recanted, by then it
was too late: its credibility had eroded among civilian defense officials; the damage was done.
McNamara subsequently spurned the v ery agency he had created in his search for impartial military
intelligence and turned to the CIA to confirm his doubts about the bombing. Similarly, the JCS
disregarded the agency out of fear that the agency, like its creator, had gone "dovish." In the end, the
DIA voiced its apprehension over the air war to a vacant theater, for its audience had forsaken it.
32 USC (11)3/1) Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. Final Report, p. 137.
8? USC (103/1) Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. Final Report, pp. 17.24.
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Chapter Seven
Vietnam
The Order of Battle Dispute
As chronicled in Chapter Three, the communist OB estimate emerged as a conspicuous American
intelligence dispute in early 1962. At that time, the DIA was compelled to draft the estimate in
accordance with the desires of MACV; the agency offered surprisingly little resistance. Although
further dispute surrounding the estimate for the most pari w as obscured for several years, in laic 1966
the estimate assumed renewed prominence. General Westmoreland based his celebrated "scarch-and-
destroy" strategy on an attrition methodology w hereby American and South Vietnamese military forces
would eradicate the communist insurgents at a greater rate than they could be replaced. As the OB w as
the central measure of the success of this strategy, MACV had effectively slaked its credibility on a
declining OB. Goaded by the skepticism of CIA analyst Sam Adams, by late 1966 much of ihc
American espionage community w as doubtful that the communist OB in fact was declining, despite
recurrent assessments of MACV to the contrary. The implications were clear: victory was not
imminent. Accordingly, for a military intelligence agency to doubt the accuracy of the official MACV
OB was tantamount to heresy. Yet events in 1967 compelled the DIA, in the name of analytic veracity,
to do just that. It was in many w ays the great moment of truth for the agency. Could the DIA — now
in its sixth year of existence — effectively challenge the prevailing powers of the American military
establishment? Or w as the agency consigned to secondary status, a perennial dw arf among giants? As
men arc defined by great trials, so too arc organizations. Rcspccl and trust are attained not through
departmental directive, but bold words and deeds. In 1967, the DIA was given a rare opportunity to
compensate for past failures; a chance at redemption. Its failure to sci/e the extension is recounted in
this chapter. The first section review s the importance of the OB, its evolution, and the considerable
doubts that came to be associated with it. The following section explores the efforts of MACV to
quell the mounting apprehension of its peers and reassert primacy over the estimate. The third details
the disillusionment and dismissal of Robert McNamara; hts hopes for the DIA and the future of
military intelligence destroyed. The fourth section examines the ignominious contribution of the DIA
to the capture of the USS Pueblo by North Korea. The fifth section recounts the Tct Offensive, the
fallibility of the MACV, and the tempestuous search for a precise OB. The actions of the DIA are
shown to be Protean, marked by inconstancy and irresolution.
21 7
Anxiety over the Enemy Order of Battle
In the spring of 1965, the counterinsurgcncy campaign in South Vietnam was going badly. The
Viet Cong were growing in strength and boldness, and the military efforts of the Army of South
Vietnam were hampered by political disorder. Many intelligence analysts, particularly those of the
civilian organizations, thought it unlikely that the situation could be soon reversed. It did not believe
that the domestic political conditions would improve in the coming months; thus the nation would
remain bereft of the political stability necessary for a successful counterinsurgcncy campaign.1 When
it became apparent that ROLLING THUNDER would neither bring North Vietnam to the negotiating
table nor deter it from supporting the Vict Cong, the JCS lobbied the President to allow American
troops in South Vietnam to mount offensive operations in support of the South Vietnamese Army. On
1 April 1965, Johnson agreed to this proposal and committed additional American troops to Southeast
Asia to augment the two United States Marine Corp battalions at Danangz DCI John McConc
resigned thereafter, believing that his influence with the President had reached us nadir. The
intelligence community judged that the decision would hav e little effect on the battlefield. In an
assessment prepared with the assistance of the CIA and INR, on 21 April the DIA opined that the
large-scale introduction of US ground forces into South Vietnam would not initially cause the enemy
to pull back. The new DCI William Raborn shared this judgment.' Nevertheless, the deployment
went ahead.
The military leadership was not content with the additional forces approved by the President. The
JCS and the new American commander in Vietnam General William Westmoreland petitioned Johnson
for further forces to implement a new strategy in Vietnam. They wished to abandon the static enclave
strategy for a more aggressive posture. Johnson was initially hesitant to approve the rev ision, for the
bold strategy was likely to result in greater American casualties. The position of McNamara on the
recommendation is unclear. An anonymous Pentagon Papers analyst observed:
It is difficult to be precise about the position of the Secretary of Defense during the
build-up debate because there is so little of him in the files. There are plenty of
other indications in the files that the Secretary was very carefully and personally
insuring that the Defense Establishment was ready to prov ide efficient and sufficient
support to the lighting elements in Vietnam. From the records, the Secretary comes
out much more clearly for good management than he docs for any particular strategy.4
1 Central Intelligence Agency, SNIE 53-65, "Short Term Prospects in South Vietnam," 4
February 1965. GPP (III), p. 276.
2 GPP (III), p. 16. The President's decision is embodied in NSAM 328 of 1 April 1965.
3 CIA-DIA Memorandum, "An Assessment of Present VC Military Capabilities," 21 April
1965. GPP (111) p.416; Central Intelligence Agency, Director of Central Intelligence William Raborn
to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 6 May 1965. DDRS: 1989-3207.
4
NYTPP, p. 415.
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Events in Southeast Asia buttressed the recommendation of the JCS. In June the DIA reported that
the Vict Cong had started the anticipated summer campaign. The insurgents mounted regiment size
attacks against South Vietnamese forces and casualties multiplied on both sides.5 The South
Vietnamese military was ill-prepared to meet these assaults, and labored to meet the growing challenge.
Washington watched the situation with alarm.
By July, the plight of South Vietnam w as desperate. President Johnson reluctantly approved the
deployment of forty-four United States combat battalions to Vietnam and endorsed the aggressive
"search-and-destroy" strategy of General Westmoreland. With the change of command in Saigon, a new
MACV intelligence chief was appointed, General Joseph McChristian. For the preceding two years
McChnstian had serv ed as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence for ARPAC. He approached his
new assignment warily, for he was know ledgeable about the dispute over the communist OB and
skeptical of the sanguine intelligence disseminated by MACV. Prior to his departure for Saigon, the
Army Chief of Staff General Harold K Johnson instructed him to "Find the enemy."" McChristian
arriv ed in Saigon on 13 July 1965, to an unexpected welcome. General Carroll, in Southeast Asia to
review Defense Department intelligence requirements, greeted him and informed him that McNamara
would arrive in Vietnam in three days later to assess the resources needed by American personnel to
transform their role from that of war advisors to participants." Subsequently, McChnstian and Carroll
were briefed by the chief of intelligence production at MACV Colonel William H. Crosson.
McChristian recalls that Crosson "told me that he could not write a valid estimate of cnemv
capabilities and vulnerabilities because intelligence available was neither timely nor adequate and we
were unable to evaluate much of it accurately."8 Thus the OB reemerged as the critical intelligence
issue of ground war.
McChristian took immediate steps to separate intelligence from operations w ithin the command,
and thereby reduce the lnllucncc of operation bias on intelligence production. Within a week, the Viet
Cong OB was rev ised, retroactiv e from 17 March 1965. Within the OB, the most significant category,
regular communist combatants, was increased from 37,(XX) to 53,(XX).'5 The alteration was reminiscent
of the rev ision of the OB made by then-Ambassador Maxwell Taylor almost precisely one year before.
On 15 July 1964 Taylor raised the Viet Cong OB from 28,000 to 34,000. In a cable to Washington at
the time he explained:
5 Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Report, "Casualties High in South Vietnam as Viet
Cong Activities Increase," 2 June 1965; Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Report, "DIA
Report on Viet Cong Activities." 17 June 1965. George C. Herring (ed.), Vietnam: National Security
Files. Volume II: Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Vietnam: National Security Files, November 1963 --
June 1965. Bcthcsda, MD: University Publications of America, 1989, film no. 17, frame no. 41;
and film no. 17, frame no. 703.
6 McChristian, Military Intelligence, p. 3.
7 McChristian, Military Intelligence, p. 4.
3 McChristian, Military Intelligence, p. 4.
5 GPP (III), pp. 276, 406, 441.
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This is not a sudden or dramatic increase but rather the acceptance of the existence
of units suspected for two or three years for which confirmatory e\ idence has become
available only in the last few months.
This increased estimate of enemy strength and recent upw ard trend in VC activity in
the North should not occasion over-concern. We have been coping with this strength
for some time without being accurately aw are of its dimensions.1"
One year later McChristian offered a similar explanation. Due to the use of a new OB
methodology and increased infiltration from the North, by November the number of regular forces in
the Viet Cong OB swelled to 63,550.'1 The precise size of the so-called "irregulars" (that is. combined
guerrilla, self-defense, and secret self-defense forces) remained unknown, but was estimated to be
approximately 100,000.
In Washington General Carroll instructed his analysts to assist the efforts of McChrislian and
MACV to assess the communist build-up. For the most part, this assistance centered on the
compilation of the Vict Cong OB. The estimate w as by then the primary indicator of the progress of
the ground war. This w as due in part to the unconventional nature of the w ar. The fluid character of
the guerrilla conflict militated against the use of conventional measures of battlefield success, land held
and cities captured. The results of guerrilla combat were more ambiguous; consequently, judgments
were more subjective:
Since progress could not be measured by such traditional yardsticks as miles gained
or cities w on or armies destroyed, both Secretary of Defense McNamara and the upper
echelon of his military followers sought other ways to compute the relative
advantage of the United States over its adversaries . . . The "solution," acclaimed by
both military and civilian parties, was to apply statistics to the battlefield: search for
significant factors that would lend themselv es to statistical manipulation; tabulate
relative position semiannually, or monthly, or weekly, or daily, or hourly, then do it
again and compare results with those previously determined.':
The ascendancy of the OB as a meter of progress can also be attributed in part to emphasis on
quantification in the Defense Department during the ninetcen-sixtics. The predilection to quantify the
war effort, w hich would later become a celebrated idee fixe among the military brass, is commonly
blamed on McNamara and his civ ilian staff. Critics allege that the Secretary was only receptive to
military operations and policy proposals couched in numbers, his language of choice. What the high-
ranking military establishment derided as "Hitchcraft" (alter the Defense Department Controller Charles
10 DOS, 1964, Volume 1, Document 233, pp. 547-8; and GPP(III), p. 80.
11 NYTPP, p. 465.
12 "Cincinnatus," Self-Destruction: The Disintegration of the United States Army during the
Vietnam Pro. New York: Norton, 1981, p. 84.
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Hitch) -- the emphasis on quantification, statistics, and systems analysis in the McNamara Pentagon —
was, paradoxically, their own creation. Al'tcr all, McNamara and Hitch were products of the Air Force
and its affiliates: McNamara cultivated his management craft at Statistical Control Division of the Air
Force during the Second World War, while Hitch wielded systems analysis in support of the strategic
programs of the sen ice at RAND in the nineteen-fifties. Prior to McNamara's appointment as the
Secretary of Defense, the Air Force embraced quantification: to prove the effectiveness of strategic
bombing, to demonstrate SAC vulnerability, and to advocate the counterforce / no cities nuclear
doctrine. They spurned quantification only when it failed to serve their purposes. As we shall sec, the
military departments were eager to generate statistical studies to support the policies and programs they
advocated. In fact, the sendees aided and abetted the trend toward quantification in the early years of the
Vietnam conflict in order to bolster their arguments for increased intervention. It was only after the
war went bad that the military leaders condemned this proclivity, blaming McNamara and his statistical
requirements for their present plight. The allegation is spurious: it was the policies, not the
measurements, which failed the defense establishment. Both the Secretary of Defense and the military
departments arc culpable for this failure. Quantification was not the cause, but the symptom of a
deeper affliction.
Finally, the prominence of the OB us a statistical Indicator was enhanced by ihe decision of the
American military establishment during the February 1966 Honolulu Conference to pursue a strategy
of attrition against the Vietnamese communists. The fundamental objective of American forces in
South Vietnam thereafter was to "attrit |sic 1, by year's end, VC/NVA [South and North Vietnamese]
forces at a rate as high as their capability to put men into the field."1' The order of battle — a synopsis
of the body count, estimates of North Vietnamese infiltration, insurgent recruitment, and the condition
of specific enemy units — was employed to measure progress in attaining this elusiv e objective.14
Although Carroll promised McChristian that the D1A would assist MACV in compiling the Vict
Cong OB, the pledge was more symbolic than practical. The DIA simply lacked the manpower and
resources to provide substantive support to the MACV effort. The agency normally assigned less than
a dozen analysts to the OB who had minimal technical support. In contrast. MACV ultimately
committed over fifteen hundred intelligence officers to the OB and provided them with extensive
computer support. Acknow ledging the deficiencies of the DIA to generate the OB, a former agency
analyst wrote:
Needless to say, DIA simply became a transmission belt for the Saigon view, rather
than an active, supervisory participant in the process of informing the President of
the enemy's strength and capabilities as their charier requires.15
13 Department of Defense, Memorandum, "1966 Program to Increase the Effectiveness of Military
Operations and Anticipated Results Thereof." Westmoreland, Joint Exhibit 215-B
14 The Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense from 1966-70 Pierre M. Sprey
observ cd: "The OB . . . were the critical indicator of progress — or lack of progress — in the war in
Vietnam." Westmoreland, Affidavit, Pierre Sprey, 18 April 1984, p. B5999.
15
McGarvey, CIA: The Myth and Madness, p. 134.
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As he had in 1962, General Carroll continued to defer to the commander the OB matters. As might
be expected the military analysts in Saigon (MACV and CINCPAC) tended to focus their intelligence
efforts on proximate, tactical issues, while the DIA concerned itself with strategic matters. These
included assessments contrasting American and communist strategics; North Vietnamese and Soviet
perceptions of the conflict; North Vietnamese capabilities to wage a protracted war; evaluations of
communist solidarity; and North Vietnamese dependence on external aid.'" The DIA also regular!}
published a Bibliographic Register of communist officials and military officers. The strategic
intelligence responsibilities in support of the military operations in Vietnam resulted in large staff
increases in the current intelligence and indications elements of the agency. However, the
preoccupation with strategic and warning intelligence resulted in a general neglect of basic intelligence.
For example, the National Intelligence Studies series, started in 1962. gradually withered away.'
As was time of intelligence assessments of the air campaign, the DIA displayed a troubling
predilection to indiscriminately support the operational preferences of the command. It was rare for the
agency to actively participate in and influence policy decisions; more often than not the agency
provided post facto analysis; placing its imprimatur on decisions already made. A former agenex
analyst observed:
J-3 [operations] is king. All career sen icemen aspire to this role, the command of a
combat unit. All the staffs bow in deference. At DIA the common expression
among the working troops is "DIA exists solely to provide justification for whatever
J-? w ants to do." During the crucial years of the Vietnam War, from 1966 to 1969,
the major strategic decisions on how the w ar was to be fought came out of the
Pentagon's Joint Staff, where DIA serves in the function of J-2. The J-3 staff never
consulted with intelligence about the effect of United States strategy from the enemy
viewpoint. Since DIA was studying the enemy and his style of fighting, J-3 could
have benefited by asking intelligence what they thought might be the best way to
thwart the enemy's plans and the impact of the plans on US operations.'"
Moreover, the strategic assessments of the DIA had a tendency to be rather narrow and mundane,
concerned with specific events, measures, and consequences. The larger conceptual issues were often
left unexplored: the trees were scrutinized at the expense of the forest. Accordingly, the DIA never
performed a serious systematic exploration of the importance of South Vietnam to the national
interests of the United States. This is surprising given the fact that in 1964 BNE discredited the
infamous "domino effect," which posited that the fall of South Vietnam would precipitate the collapse
16 See Palmer, The Twenty-Five Year War, p. 163.
17 Personal interview. Captain Richard Bates, 12 Max 1992.
18
McGarvcy, CIA: The Myth and the Madness, p. 149.
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of additional Southeast Asian nations to communist aggression.!' In spite of this assessment, South
Vietnam was commonly perceived by policymakers to be an indispensable American ally: in the
judgment of one analyst, "Endless assertions passed for analysis."20 Furthermore, the agency never
evaluated the long-term objectives of the American military strategy and assessed the prospects for
success. At the start of American intervention, such an evaluation seemed extraneous because
preventing the fall of South Vietnam was an unequivocal purpose. But as the war progressed American
interests grew muddled and murky. The new military objectives were left largely unexplored, however,
simply because the JCS did not hav e an alternativ e to Westmoreland's search-and-destroy strategy and
therefore no inducement to request intelligence assessments that might call into doubt the strategy of
attrition. Options from outside the Defense Department (such as General James M. Gavin's "enclave
strategy") were viewed by the current military leadership as threatening criticisms, not to be considered
seriously, but rebutted.21 For this reason, no systematic evaluation of the allocation of American
resources to different missions was undertaken. The DIA never developed the analytical capability to
assess the performance of United Slates and South Vietnamese military units. The agency did employ
some crude statistical measures such as casualty ratios, but as the former director of the American
pacification effort observed, "Even these were regarded mostly as progress indicators. Little systematic
attempt (comparable to that of OSD/SA [OSA]) was made to discern operationally meaningful
patterns."22 The failure of the DIA to prov ide McNamara with comprehensive systematic assessments
of the war led the Secretary to turn to OSA. the bastion of the Whiz Kids in the Pentagon, for these
products. In late 1966, OSA began to produce Southeast Asia Reports, released monthly or
bimonthly. The reports were valued by senior Defense Department officials; all but ignored by
MACV and the JCS. The military were not receptive to external analyses of their performance. The
Chairman of the JCS General Wheeler at least twice formally complained to McNamara about OSA
reports critical of the field command. The Secretary ignored the complaint, for OSA was prov iding
him with sorely needed intelligence, intelligence that the DIA failed to provide. The director of the
American pacification campaign called the Southeast Asia Reports "by far the best running analytical
account of the war."2'
In contrast, the strength of the DIA lay in current intelligence. The agency consistently produced
and disseminated consolidated intelligence on ev ents in Southeast Asia. Although the quality of these
reports was high, timely evaluation was impaired by complicated dispersal procedures and the sheer
volume of raw intelligence. The DIA received most of its raw intelligence from MACV.
19 On 9 June 1964, in response to President Johnson's question, "Would the rest of Southeast Asia
necessarily fall if Laos and South Vietnam came under North Vietnam control?" BNE concluded: "With
the possible exception of Cambodia, it is likely that no nation in the area would quickly succumb to
communism as a result of the fall of Laos and South Vietnam. Furthermore, a continuation of the
spread of communism in the area would not be inexorable, and any spread which did occur would take
time — time in which the total situation might change in any of a number of ways unfavorable to the
communist cause." DOS, 1964, Volume 1, Document 209. pp. 484-87.
20 Leslie Gelb, "How the System Worked," in Kimball, To Reason Why, p. 157.
21 Enthoven and Smith, How Much is Enough?, p. 199.
22 Korner, Bureaucracyat Wcr, pp. 75-76.
23 Komer, Bureaucracyat Wcr, p. 75. The reports were produced on the 15th day of each month.
For examples see "Southeast Asia Analysis Reports," DDRS: 1982-73-90.
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Consequently, the intelligence required an inordinate amount of time to travel from Saigon to
Washington. Once at the Pentagon, the field intelligence reports slowly passed up the chain of
command before arriving on the area desks of DIA analysts. As a result, D1A analysts often received
information several days after their MACV counterparts. Evaluation was also delayed by the bulk of
information. By 1966, the agency receiv ed over three thousand intelligence reports every week. Upon
receipt, the reports and documents were copied and distrrbutcd to the DIA's geographical area production
elements, related intelligence agencies, and the Minicard Section of the Automatic Date Processing
Center (the latter copy was reduced in size on film clips for filing). When a report arrived at the
geographical area elements it was promptly scanned by a reading panel of four to five area analysts, for
an initial determination as to significance. Important ("hot") intelligence was sent directly to the
Dissemination Center or to ISIC. As the foregoing suggests, the copying and screening process took a
considerable amount of time. An 1968 review of DIA operations by the House Appropriations
Committee concluded that within the agency it took an av erage of eight workdays from the time of
receipt of a document for it to reach a staff analyst. It noted that the locations of various DIA
directorates in separate buildings contributed to the delay.24 After dispersal, routine documents and
reports were assigned to desk analysts for processing, corroboration, and evaluation. Finished
intelligence was disseminated daily in a documentary formal and an electronic bulletin, with Secret and
Top Secret supplements. By 1968, the Daily Intelligence Summary (DIS) was distributed to over two
hundred consumers in the Defense Department, While House, and espionage community. The
summary averaged fifty-five pages in length, but could range as high as seventy-five pages. Weekly
summaries were slightly longer.2"
Throughout the spring of 1966 the DIA monitored the growing strength of the Viet Cong with
trepidation. In February the agency confirmed that the insurgents were now equipped with powerful
7.62-millimeter weapons (carbines and mortars) that enabled them to defeat American armored units.2"
In the face of improved communist capabilities, the .ICS pressed McNamara and Johnson for more
ground forces, to double American military might, to "square the error" as the British counter¬
revolutionary strategist Sir Robert Thompson wryly observ ed.2 The Secretary and the President were
reluctant to grant approval: McNamara because he believed that military victory was unattainable;
Johnson because he wished to avoid mobilization and reveal the true dimensions of the conflict to
Congress and the American public. Thus the dynamic of escalation evolved: the Chiefs would
recommend more troops, Johnson would demur, the Chiefs would press, and Johnson would ev entually
relent, agreeing to a smaller deploy ment than the Chiefs desired. Half the pic, instead of the whole.
When considered alone, each step up the ladder of escalation appeared small and incremental. Yet when
viewed in its entirety, the deployment was great, and American combat forces rapidly accumulated in
24IJSC (90/2) House Appropriations. Hearings: Department ofDefense Appropriations,
FY!969. GPO, 1968, p. 438.
25 USC (90/2) House Appropriations. Hearings, pp. 424, 436, 437-40, 484.
2t> Defense Intelligence Agency, DIA Intelligence Summary Supplement, "The Communist 120-
mm Mortar in South Vietnam," 26 February 1966. Herring, Vietnam: National Security Files,
Volume II, film no.7, frame no. 331.
27 Quoted in Shechan, A Bright Shining Lie, p. 667.
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South Vietnam throughout 1966. By November 1966, President Johnson had enough. He informed
the JCS that he would not approve any additional deployments, that he would hold the line at 500,000
American forces in the theater by the middle of 1968.
In the summer in 1966 the intelligence organizations in Washington remained dissatisfied w ith the
MACV Vict Cong OB. They believed that the command was collecting OB intelligence too slowly,
noting that official confirmation of changes in the OB by Saigon were typically one to two years
behind the fact. This delay was largely the result of the refusal of MACV to incorporate communist
units on the OB until the units physically arrived in South Vietnam. Washington intelligence
agencies, notably the Watch Committee, believed that the units should be listed into the OB as soon as
they were mobilized (or "called-up") in North Vietnam. A comprehensive study of the OB by the
National Indications Center fueled the debate by concluding that, in contrast to the modest increase of
about 40,000 in the North Vietnamese military accepted by MACV in the official OB over the last
year, an increase of 200,000 to 250,000 appeared justified and might in fact be conservative. The study
assessed the MACV OB criterion to be too rigid, dismissive of open source intelligence and
preoccupied with COMINT.28
The National Indications Center study paralleled the work of a young CIA analyst named Samuel
Adams. In August 1966 Adams reviewed captured Vict Cong documents and other intelligence and
arrived at the conclusion that the official MACV OB was too low, that it should be increased by at
least 200,000. In the two preceding y ears (1964-65) three of the four categories in the OB (guerrilla-
militia, serv ice troops, and political cadres) had not been altered; only the regular forces were increased.
Adams recalled:
Basically the only number that changed for a long period was the regulars — the guys
with uniforms and pith helmets and little red stars attached. The other ones, the
guerrilla self-defense, the serv ice troops, and the political cadres, hadn't changed for a
long time. In a guerrilla war, we hadn't tried to discover the number of guerrillas!
We carried roughly 100,000 guerrillas for years.29
28 Cynthia Grabo, "The Watch Committee and the National Indications Center: The Evolution of
US Strategic Warning, 1950-75." International JournalofIntelligence and Counter-intelligence 3
(Fall 1989), pp. 376-77.
29 Interv iew with Ranelagh, The Agency, p. 456. Adams later asserted: "Prior to late 1966 the
problem about strength estimates was mainly that the intelligence community did virtually no research
on any enemy force components other than the Main and Local Forces . . . Also it might be noted . . .
that the probable reason the Washington intelligence community "largely deferred" to J-2's analyses
prior to mid-1967 was not because of J-2's greater access to raw intelligence data, but because of a
general unwillingness to rock the boat." Central Intelligence Agency, "Comments on Draft Memo to
the Director, 19 March 1968," 19 March 1968. Kcsaris, Vietnam and Southeast Asia, Supplement,
reel 5, no. 911.
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Adams believed that the discovery was significant:
All our other intelligence estimates were tied to the order of battle: how much rice
the VC ale, how much ammunition they shot off, and so forth. If the Vietcong
Army suddenly doubled in size. our w hole statistical system would collapse. We'd
be fighting a war tw ice as big as the one we thought wc were fighting.1"
Senior CIA officials were impressed with Adams' analyses, but treated them with caution. They
were well aware of the political volatility of the matter and initially restricted the dissemination of his
reports. Adams, eager to challenge the MACV OB, pressed his superiors to send the reports to Saigon
for comment. His superiors reluctantly consented, and on 9 September the CIA sent a "draft working
paper" — a synopsis of Adams' assessments that concluded that the official OB was 200,000 men to
low — to MACV. The working paper was personally carried to Saigon by George Fowler of the DIA.
Fowler, the chief of the DIA OB section, was amenable to Adams' analysis. As previously discussed,
DIA analysts had long been skeptical of the MACV OB. In the summer of 1966, they re\ iewed copies
o the same captured communist documents exploited by Adams. One DIA analyst in the I SI C
recalled: "Well, w hen we started translating these captured documents and everything, it suddenly
appeared to some of the best analysis in the business that, hey, there ain't 44.000 guerrillas. There
could be as many as 112,000 guerrillas.""1 The DIA believed that the MACV OB needed to be
increased, although the total should not be as high as Adams advocated."
In Saigon McChristian was receptive to Adams' analyses. He instructed his new OB chief.
Colonel Gains Hawkins to commission two comprehensive studies of the Viet Cong guerrillas. The
studies, codcnamcd RITZ and CORRAL, examined the composition and size of the self-defense forces
and the political cadres, respectively; two of the three OB categories that Adams observed to be static.
The studies were completed in spring 1967. Both concluded that Adams analyses were essentially
correct: that the size of the guerrilla forces w as grossly underestimated.
The widespread dissatisfaction with the official OB led General Wheeler to direct General Carroll in
January 1967 to convene a conference to resolve the intelligence estimate.13 Carroll invited MACV,
CINCPAC, CIA, NSA, OSA and of course DIA officials to attend the conference, held from 6-12
February at Camp Smith, Hawaii (the home of CINCPAC). In a heroic effort to reconcile the
numerous and contradictory estimates, participants attempted to establish procedures and guidelines for
30 Adams, "Vietnam Cover-Up," p. 44.
31 Westmoreland, Deposition, Major John B. Williams, 29 September 1983, fiche no. 438, p. 20.
32 By January 1967, the DIA believed that the Viet Cong OB (277,150 as of 3 January 1967)
should be increased by approximately 100,000. The CIA thought the OB should be doubled. See
Central Intelligence Agency, Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs to Deputy Director for
Intelligence, "Revising the Vict Cong Order of Battle," 11 January 1967. Kcsaris, Vietnam and
Southeast Asia, Supplement, reel 4, no. 54.
33 Joint Chiefs of Staff [CM-2068-67] Chairman of JCS (General Earic Wheeler) to Director of
DIA (General Joseph Carroll),"Statistics on Order of Battle and Infiltration," 19 January 1967.
Kcsaris, Vietnam and Southeast Asia, Supplement, reel 5, no. 218.
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formulating the OB. The disparity between competing estimates was so great that military men wryly
referred to the affair as "the Tower of Babel Conference." Although the representatives concurred that
the current MACV OB was loo low, the magnitude of the increase was disputed. In general. MACV
and CINCPAC desired modest increases in all four OB categories; CIA and D1A favored substantial
additions; and NSA and OSD oscillated.'4 In the end, to the delight of civilians, MACV agreed to
increase the number of insurgents in all OB categories. Sam Adams, a CIA representative, was
particularly surprised by Hawkins' admission regarding the irregular forces (based on the preliminary
results of the RITZ and CORRAL studies) that "there's a lot more of these little bastards out there than
we thought there were."" Although the MACV J-2 did not agree with Adams proposal that the
guerrilla-militia should be raised by 200,000, he did agree to an increase of 95,000; from 103,573 to
198,000. These changes were unofficial: due to unresolved differences over the communist desertion
rate and the composition of irregular forces (notably the so-called "assault youths'), representatives
agreed that the irregular units required further study to quantity precisely. Pending the completion of
these studies, the irregular unit category was held constant, while the aggregate OB was slightly
increased.*" Nevertheless, the CIA was encouraged by the earnestness of Harkins and the military
analysts. "The fight's over," Adams thought. "They're reading the same documents that 1 am. and
everybody's beginning to use real numbers.'"
MACV Asserts Primacy: "Ballpoint Analysis'"
In the aftermath of the OB conference, the military intelligence agencies endeavored to assess the
nature, composition, and size of the communist irregular units. A team of four DIA analysts traveled
to Saigon in early April to consult with MACV on the matter. Discord resulted. The DIA analysts
recommended to General McChrislian and General Carroll "that 'irregular' figure be scrapped and only
'guerrillas' carried as part of military force figure.'"K Consequently, the self-defense, and secret-self
44 CINCPAC invariably supported the MACV position. One CINCPAC representative recalled:
"CINCPAC didn't have, to my knowledge, its own order of battle clement. They just took MACV's
stuff wholesale, with occasional questions of course. But generally speaking, MACV and CINCPAC"
absolutely read off the same sheet of music." Westmoreland, Deposition, Colonel George M.
Hamschcr. 7 November 1983, fiche no. 263, p. 50. The DIA delegation w as led by Brigadier General
Burton R. Brown.
35 Quoted in Adams. "Vietnam Cover-Up," p. 62.
36 During the conference, MACV indicated that its analyses resulted in 250,000-300,000 Viet
Cong irregular units. This was in contrast to the official MACV OB of May 1966 which posited
112,760 combatants; not broken down by component. After the conference, pending the completion
of further studies, MACV held the irregular forces in the OB to 112,760. The putative aggregate OB
was 339,000. Sec "Report of the Honolulu Intelligence Conference To Standardize Methods for
Dev eloping and Presenting Statistics on Order of Battle, Infiltration Trends and Estimates. 6-12
February 1983." Kesaris, Vietnam and Southeast Asia, Supplement, reel 4, no. 145.
37 Adams, "Vietnam Cover-Up," pp. 63-64.
36 Central Intelligence Agency, Classified Message. Saigon to Washington, Reference: Director
88258, 1 April 1967. Kcsaris. Vietnam and Southeast Asia, Supplement, reel 4. no. 392.
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defense unit categories would be eliminated.39 This proposal w as opposed by MAC.V. The command
had always dismissed the self-defense and secret self-defense forces as militarily inconsequential,
characterizing them as "old women and children," occasional insurgents that harassed American soldiers
by laying traps. Although these forces were included in the OB, for operational purposes MACV
largely ignored them and concentrated on the more conventional enemy units, the mainforce, local
forces, and irregulars. Consequently, the command did not want to these "old women and children" to
be upgraded into the guerrilla category and assessed as true combatants rather than civilians, as the DIA
proposed. MACV resisted the DIA proposal, despite the fact that the agency wanted to lower the
figures in both categories before reclassifying them as guerrilla. The explanation for this curious
position is subtle but important. Recall that in 1962, when presented with Winterbottom's order to
reduce the OB. the joint intelligence team simply created a new category for the insurgents called
possible and transferred man) probable units into it. Subsequently, Winterbottom and Harkins
disregarded these units as unverified. In 1967, the self-defense and secret self-defense force categories
served the same purpose that the possible category had five years earlier. They w ere analytic disposal
sites, wherein MACV could place enemy units that it wished to ignore, for political or organizational
reasons. MACV did not want these sites abolished, and their contents transferred to the official MACV
OB. The command opposed the DIA proposal and eventually, to no one's surprise, prevailed. MACV
preserved its predominance over the communist OB.
In March 1967 Westmoreland broke the agreed troop limit in Southeast Asia by requesting 210,000
additional American forces. McNamara instructed OSA to evaluate the request. On 19 May McNamara
sent a twenty-two page single-spaced memorandum to the President opposing the buildup.
Incorporating analysis from the OSA evaluation, the Secretary broke from official policy and argued
that the ground war should not be expanded and the air war should be constrained.40 When the JCS
learned of (he memorandum, they w ere incensed. They produced numerous rebuttals, asserting that
significant escalations were essential to preserve progress in the region. Johnson, skeptical of both
claims, subsequently approved modest increases in the air and ground campaigns. (In Jul)-, the
administration agreed to a 55,000 force increase, bringing the total number of American troops
33 The American intelligence community posited four different types of enemy military units:
North Vietnamese forces, Viet Cong main force units, Viet Cong local force units, and Viet Cong
irregular units (including guerrilla, self-defense, and secret self-defense). NVA units were trained and
commanded by North Vietnam and composed primarily of North Vietnamese soldiers; VC mainforce
units were subordinate directly to the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN),VC Headquarters, or
a military region or subregion headquarters; VC local force units were directly subordinate to the
communist part)' committee of a province or district and normally operated within its respectiv e
confines; irregulars were organized units subordinate to v illage and hamlet VC organizations that
performed v arious and sundry missions in support of VC activities and provided a manpow er base for
NVA and VC combat units. Guerrillas were full-time forces organized into squads or platoons that did
not necessarily operate within their village or hamlet of origin. They commonly engaged in tax
collection, propaganda, terrorism, and sabotage. Self-defense forces were part-time paramilitary units
that defended hamlets and villages controlled by the VC and did not stray from their home. Secret self-
defense forces were a clandestine VC organization that conducted similar covert operations in areas
under the control of the South Vietnamese gov ernment (as opposed to VC controlled areas, which w ere
the domain of self-defense forces). See Wirtz, "Intelligence to Please?" p. 243 n. 12.
40 NYTPP, pp. 577-85.
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deployed in Southeast Asia to 525,000.) However, the disillusionment ol" the Secretary of Defense
with the war in Vietnam was now manifest, and Washington watched the contest between McNamara
and the military over the future of American intervention w ith fascination.
it is in this context that the dispute over the communist OB dev eloped. Throughout the spring,
McChristian and Harkins reappraised the Viet Cong irregular forces. By the middle of May, both w ere
convinced that the Irregular forces totaled approximately 300,000. McChristian drafted a cable to
convey the new assessment to C1NCPAC in Honolulu and the JCS in Washington, noting that the OB
should be revised accordingly to approximately 500,000 (the current OB was slightly under 300,000).
When shown the cable, Westmoreland would not grant approval, telling Harkins, "If I send this cable
to Washington, it will create a political bombshell."Ji Westmoreland had recently informed the
President that the long-sought "cross-over point" had been reached in the two northern prov inces of
South Vietnam, that American and allied forces were now killing communist insurgents at a rate
greater than they could be replaced through recruitment and infiltration.J: For the last year, the "cross¬
over point" had been the Holy Grail of the military command: the elusive key to victory over the
immoral enemy. The concept was basic: manpower output now exceeded input, therefore it was onl\
a matter of time before the reservoir of communist insurgents ran dry. Victory was on the horizon.
The irregular assessments of Haw kins and McChristian challenged the validity of the "cross-over point"
by positing a vast increase in the number of Viet Cong insurgents, the input. Consequently,
communist force output no longer exceeded input: the enemy was not succumbing to attrition and the
war would grind on. McChristian's analysis showed the "cross-over point" to be a false Grail.
Westmoreland, w ho had staked his credibility on the attrition strategy and the promise of a "cross-over
point." was not amenable to such an epiphany.
ThereforeWestmoreland instructed McChristian to rev iew the assessment to confirm its accuracy
and validity. McChristian complied, found the results to be reliable and accurate, and subsequent!},
briefed Westmoreland twice more on the findings. At the last briefing on 28 May, Westmoreland
simply rejected McChristian's findings and suppressed the MACV assessments of communist
irregulars. Westmoreland prov ided no empirical basis for the repudiation; MACV intelligence analysis
assumed the political implications of a significant increase in the insurgency were too grave for the
41 Quoted in Brew in and Shaw, Vietnam On Trial, p. 124. Also see Adler, RecklessDisregard, p.
74.
42 John McNaughton recorded the following statement by Westmoreland in a conversation with
President Johnson and CJCS Wheeler on 19 May 1967: "The VC and DRV strength in SVN now
totals 285,000 men. It appears that last month vvc reached the crossover point in areas excluding the
two northern provinces. Attritions will be greater than additions to the force . . ." NYTPP, p. 568.
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commander to endure.4' In spite of the promises of the February OB conference, the MACV estimate
of communist irregulars remained static.
On 1 June 1967 McChristian was replaced as chief of MACV intelligence (J-2) by General Philip
Davidson. In contrast with McChristian, Davidson was skeptical that the Vict Cong irregulars were
increasing and. more importantly, that they represented a tangible military threat. Dav idson embraced
the "cross-over point" with fervor. His appointment was auspicious, for it transpired just as the
intelligence community prepared to draft a prominent strategic estimate on Southeast Asia, SNIE 14-3-
67, "The Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists for Fighting in South Vietnam." The estimate
included an assessment of the Viet Cong OB, and the CIA w ished to employ the "unofficial" figures of
the February OB conference of approximately 500,000 communist forces. Yet Westmoreland and
Davidson opposed the use of this figure. They desired to keep the OB constant (at the 15 May 1967
OB of 292,000), despite the fact that both CIA and MACV intelligence analysts were reporting that the
communist irregular forces were much larger than presently estimated. Neither side was in a mood to
compromise. The result was bureaucratic warfare ov er the 1967 order of battle.
As noted in the introduction, previous accounts of the so-called "order of battle controversy" have
characterized the dispute as one between the maverick analyst Sam Adams and prudent officials at
MACV and the CIA. This characterization is inaccurate. As the rest of this chapter will demonstrate,
in fact the dispute arrayed MACV against Adams and the intelligence community. Adams was no
renegade; rather he was in the majority. The preponderance of opinion in the espionage community
was cynical of the MACV OB. Nevertheless, as had happened so often in the past, the DIA was
enjoined to support the command position. When open conflict erupted between MACV and the CIA
over the SNIE, the DIA promptly cast reside Us reservations and staunchly supported MACV. A DIA
analyst recalled:
Initially, before the SNIE got underway, process got underway, I believe George
Fowler (the head of the DIA OB section] had some different figures, but there was
accommodation there and we all went in, in effect, the military versus the civilian
agency, to characterize it that way . I am not aware of any time [thereafter] w hen a
DIA separate estimate was promoted.44
13 Westmoreland claims that he docs not recollect the 28 May briefing. He justifies his refusal to
endorse the assessment on the grounds that further analysis was required. McChristian dismisses this
assertion, claiming that Westmoreland rejected the report outright. Moreov er. McChristian released the
following letter from Westmoreland for the 1984 trial. Received by McChristian on 2 March 1982. the
former COMUSMACV wrote: "Joe, here is the letter I mentioned on the telephone |regarding the
CBS documentary "The Uncounted Enemy"]. CBS has. maliciously or through ignorance, confused
my demurring in increasing the OB, without further analysis with your constant theme that the enemy
had the capability to pursue a war of attrition to which I fully agreed." (Italics added] Reproduced in
Brevvin and Shaw, Vietnam On Trial, p. 325. The evidence clearly supports McChristian.
44 Westmoreland, Deposition, Colonel George M Hamscher, 7 November 1983, fiche no. 263, p.
158. Also see Deposition, Major John B. Williams, 29 September 1983. fiche no. 438, pp. 20-23.
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It was an all-too-familiar occurrence.
BNE first met on 23 June 1967 to consider the SNIE. As was standard procedure, the CIA
(through ONE) submitted the first draft of the estimate to the board for review. In the initial draft, the
communist OB was listed as approximately 500,000 forces. The increase, of approximately 200,(XX)
from the MACV was largely the result of the quantification and addition of the communist irregular
forces to the official OB. (In the past, these units were not listed numerically in the official OB. but
noted in a section of the text.) MACV had previously protested the listing of irregulars in the OB, so
the participants were prepared for military resistance. At the start of the meeting, the Chairman of
BNE General Richard Collins announced that the "numbers game," the communist OB, was "the guts
of the estimate."4" Then George Fowler, the chief of estimates at the DIA, stated that he represented
the views of all of military representatives -- the DIA, Army. Navy, and Air Force — and asserted:
"Gentlemen, we cannot agree to this estimate as currently written. What we object to are the numbers.
We feel we should continue with the official order of battle."4" The official MACV OB was then
295.000.4 All the military agencies were arrayed behind MACV; all reservations oxer the OB were
cast aside. For example, the minutes of the meeting reveal that, when pressed. "The Army
representative, prefacing his remarks that he would just as soon not gel involved, said that it would
probably be best to use the MACV order of battle studded with caveats."4* The great bureaucratic
strength of the military lay in unanimity. The Slate Department supported the position of the CIA.
Thus the battle lines were drawn, military versus civilian. As neither side was disposed to
compromise, the BNE meeting ended in deadlock.
Though the DIA continued to support the MACV OB in meetings on the estimate, Carroll was
privately dissatisfied with the command figures. The director let it be known to the CIA that he
wished to revise the OB upwards, but w as uncertain how large the increase should be. Carroll cabled
Saigon and informed Westmoreland that the estimate would be delayed until August so that the DIA
could re-evaluate its position. Lest MACV be alarmed, he commented that he was not anxious to get
into a "knock-down, drag-out fight ox er the strength figures."4 '
McNamara w as advised of the OB controversy by General Carroll. The Secretary was not overly
concerned u ilh matter; he later recalled:
45 Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum for the Record, "NIE 14-3-67 — The USIB
Representatives Meeting," 23 June 1967. Kesaris, Vietnam and Southeast Asia, Supplement, reel 4.
no. 829.
46 Adams, "Vietnam Cover-Up," p. 64.
"
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, "Measurement of Progress Briefing, Commanders
Conference," 11 June 1967, DDRS: 1990-679, p. 2. In spite of Westmoreland's claim to the
President on 19 May 1967 that the "cross-ox er point" had been reached, the conference rejected the
notion, yet noted it remained the objective for the year.
48 Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum for the Record, "NIE 14-3-67 -- The USIB
Representatix cs Meeting," 23 June 1967. Kesaris, Vietnam and Southeast Asia, Supplement, reel 4,
no. 829, p. 4.
49 Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum for the Record, 5 July 1967. Kesans, Vietnam and
Southeast Asia. Supplement, reel 4, no. 844.
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By 1967 we had a lot of information on the number of men who had infiltrated, the
number killed (from the body count) and current enemy strength. By then it was clear
to me that the figures did not add up; if the body count was correct, then the figures
were wrong. That's why I was losing confident in the figures and in optimistic
military reports.
My whole point was: Don't let's kid ourselves that we are winning the war.*"
In Saigon, Davidson appointed Lt. Colonel Daniel Graham to head the MACV current intelligence
and estimates shop. The appointment was important because Graham was the progenitor of the "cross¬
over point." In a controversial memorandum, Graham asserted that the "cross-over point" had been
reached in South Vietnam in June 1967. Though numerous claims had been made in the past
concerning the "cross-over point," including Westmoreland's 19 May briefing to the President, it was
officially embraced by MACV in the June Measurement of Progress Report.51 Graham llatly rejected a
revision of the MACV enemy strength figures. He clearly had a vested interest in this perspective. as
an increase in the OB would invalidate the "cross-ox er point." Like Pcrcival, Graham found his Grail
through faith and tenacity; and like the Arthurian knight, he was determined to defend it against heresy.
Graham swiftly became MACV's point man on the OB dispute.
The intelligence community strove in xain to find a basis for compromise on the enemy OB
throughout July and early August. The civilian agencies, led by the CIA, wanted an OB of about
500,000. The military organizations favored a modest increase, yet disagreed oxer magnitude. To
resolve these differences, a meeting was called in August at the Pentagon. Held in a narrow room next
to the offices of the .ICS, the gathering was confined to the military intelligence agencies: C1NCPAC.
MACV, and DIA. However, for all intents and purposes, the actual debate was between MACV and
the DIA, for CINCPAC was ordered to support MACV unconditionally on the OB. The C1NCPAC
representative Colonel George Hamscher recalled his instructions: "My charge was from General
Peterson [CINCPAC], go back [to Washington] and support MACV; support them all the way; it's
important."32 Lt. Colonel Daniel Graham was sent from Saigon to assist the head of the MACV
delegation General George Godding, who was then perceived by the command as being too tolerant of
the DIA's indecisixencss on the Viet Cong OB. The Vietnam Desk officer at the DIA, Major John B.
Williams -- a West Point graduate and thirty-year x eteran of the Army airborne corps -- observed that
Graham's role was to "put some starch into General Godding's backbone.'"' The positions of both
organizations were clear. MACV wanted the OB to remain under 300,000 irrespective of
circumstances; the DIA favored a slightly higher OB, with the analytic versatility to reach
accommodation with the CIA. Major Williams characterized the agency's posture thus: "We just
50 Interview with Robert McNamara in Shapley, Promise and Power, p. 431.
61 See Wirtz, "Intelligence to please?" p. 245. Also sec Douglas Kinnard, The WarManagers
Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1977, pp. 69-70.
52 Westmoreland, Deposition, Colonel George M. Hamscher, 7 Noxember 1983, l'iche no. 263, p.
109.
53 Westmoreland, Deposition, Major John B. Williams, 29 September 1983, fichc no. 438, p. 26.
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found it [the MACV OBJ difficult to support in the estimative arena and we asked for some
flexibility.'"4 Such flexibility was not forthcoming. Graham and the MACV representatives refused to
consider the arguments of the DIA for a higher OB. Williams recalls:
We at DIA were a little queasy over the MACV position, believed that their numbers
should be a little bit higher, but we were having difficulty actual 1\ persuading them.
What we generally got is the old thing again and we got alol of this from Danny
Graham. "We arc the soldier in the field. You arc enjoined to support us. You are a
military voice with CIA.'"4
As the meeting progressed it became apparent to the DIA analysts that MACV would simply not
accept a communist OB of over 300,000; the command had established a defacto ceiling. The DIA
representatives could not get Graham and his staff to increase the OB above the ceiling, ev en when they
insisted that MACV be telephoned directly for consultation. Williams recalled: "And every call to
MACV was an absolute stone wall, that, 'We are here in the field. These are the numbers. They go
with us and you, DIA, are enjoined to go with us also.'"" When it became evident that the DIA could
not prev ail and the OB would remain under 300,000. the military men proceeded to arbitrarily
manipulate the categories and numbers in the OB to arrive at an aggregate beneath the ceiling.As in
1962, w hen George Allen and the joint OB team reduced the Viet Cong OB ov er bourbons, whim and
caprice replaced analysis. When asked in 1983 if there were flaw s in the methodology employed at the
meeting. George Hamschcr responded:
Oh, I will come on stronger than that. It wasn't the methodology; it was a way of
reducing figures, and at one point I remember clearly saving look, Danny [Graham|.
we can't do this, this is wrong. And he looked at me and said, Hamschcr, if you've
got a better way of doing this, let's have it. And, of course, what he meant was if
you've got a better way of bringing down these figures, let's have it. I had no better
way, so 1 shut up.48
54 Westmoreland, Deposition, Major John B. Williams, 29 September 1983, fichc no. 438, p. 26.
55 Westmoreland, Deposition, Major John B. Williams, 29 September 1983, fichc no. 438, p. 25.
5S Westmoreland, Deposition, Major John B. Williams, 29 September 1983, fiche no. 438, p. 25.
57 Subsequently, five officers present at the meeting testified under oath that MACV enforced the
300,000 man ceiling. They are George Godding, George Hamscher, Gains Hawkins, John Williams,
and Kelly Robinson. Sec Westmoreland, Depositions, George Godding, pp. 98-99, 236-37; George
Hamschcr, pp. 108, 354; Gains Hawkins, pp. 261, 457; John Williams, p. 17; and Affidavit, Kelly
Robinson, 10 October 1983, p. 24.
58 Westmoreland, Deposition, Colonel George M. Hamscher, 7 November 1983, fiche no. 263.
pp. 238-39.
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Major Williams of the DIA called it "ballpoint analysis" -- "That means you cross out a number and
add a new one."" Thus the military achieved unanimity on the Viet Cong OB, a product not of
disinterested analysis, but of political and organizational inclinations.
Neither General Carroll nor George Fowler reportedly w ere happy with the OB that resulted, but the
pair did not protest.60 The estimate subsequently became the putative Defense Department OB. Years
later. George Hamscher observed: "In other words, MACV had made the estimate, DIA and CINCPAC
acceded to it in varying degrees of reluctance over time, but they acceded to it and supported it."" Once
more the DIA proved to be exceptionally malleable to the preferences of the command, displaying a
disturbing degree of analytic dexterity. It is worth pondering why the agency let itself be manipulated
by MACV, As in the past, a tradition of deference to the command is a large part of the answer. Yet
in August 1967 political considerations were also at work.
That month the Senate Armed Sen ices Committee, led by Senator John Stcnnis of Mississippi,
held public hearings on the air war. The hearings were politically motivated, called by conservative
senators to balance previous hearings by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which had been
markedly critical of the Johnson administration and the war in Vietnam. Both McNamara and the JCS
testified before the committee, and the sharp disagreement betw een McNamara and the military over the
war became public. The JCS testified first, and openly criticized their civilian superiors for restricting
the scope of the air war in Southeast Asia, specifically referring to fifty-seven targets designated off-
limits by the Johnson administration which the military judged to be strategically significant.
McNamara followed the Chiefs. It w as a defining moment for the Secretary of Defense: prior to his
open testimony before the committee McNamara's cynicism tow ard the war effort was know n onh to
Washington insiders. Thereafter it was common know ledge. The consummate corporate man chose to
publicly oppose the corporation. Appearing before the committee on 25 August, McNamara bluntly
asserted that the bombing was ineffective. To support this assertion, the Secretary referred to a massive
CIA study of ROLLING THUNDER that he had commissioned. It is notable that the CIA compiled
the study: by August 1967. McNamara no longer had faith in the DIA. His statements caused a great
stir throughout the nation, for he w as commonly seen as the strongest proponent of the w ar w ithin the
administration, which made his dissent all the more shocking. (The Pentagon Papers were not yet
released, so few at the time knew of his private doubts, w hich were substantial.) The Chiefs were
furious: there was talk of a joint resignation, but nothing ever came of it.": However sensational
McNamara's testimony was, in the end it had little practical effect. The committee dismissed
McNamara's argument and criticized the administration for current restrictions on the fifty-seven targets
59 Westmoreland. Deposition, Major John B. Williams, 29 September 1983, fichc no. 438, p. 30.
60 Major John Williams recalled: "1 can tell you that General Carroll, w ho was the director in
those days, had some queasincss over it. Mind you, Carroll sent me back 6 times on TDY out of DIA
over these numbers problems. 1 know George Fowler, w ho was our chief of estimates at the time and
our representative out at the place, was not easy with it, but it was subsequently printed."
Westmoreland, Deposition, Major John B. Williams, 29 September 1983. fichc no. 438, p. 28.
61 Westmoreland. Deposition, Colonel George M. Hamscher, 7 November 1983, fichc no. 263, p.
157.
62 See Shapley, Promise and Power, pp. 428-33; Perry, Four Stars, pp. 163-66; and personal
interview, Lt. General William Quinn. 8 May 1992.
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which the JCS wished to bomb. (By December 1967 Johnson removed these target restrictions, w ith
no appreciable change in war.) Wheeler insisted that he be allowed to attend the important Tuesday
lunch at which administration policy was debated. To quell the anger of the Chiefs, Johnson agreed.
Thereafter, JCS members could hardly bring themselves to speak to McNamara. Official meetings
between the Secretary and the military leaders degenerated into tense and silent affairs. For the
remainder ofMcNamara's tenure, civilian-military relations were marked by an icy cordiality.
Viewed in this light, the OB dispute assumes added prominence. From the military perspective, in
August 1967 civilians were simultaneously challenging the effectiveness of the air war and the strength
of the enemy on the ground. The officers were insulted; they bclic\cd their professionalism was being
impugned. The former CIA official R. Jack Smith recalled:
Nev er before had a civ ilian intelligence organization challenged an army in the field
about its order of battle. This is one principle which military men hold dearest to
their hearts, and it is the sccurity-of-forces principle. Any lime you presume to tell
them their forces arc not in danger to the extent they say they are. they get outraged.
Their job is to keep their forces secure. But here were a bunch of civilians telling
not only the Pentagon but also the forces in the field that the number they were
facing was higher. That created a very difficult position: it was their war. They w ere
the ones getting killed. There was a lot of emotion in\ oh ed in that.""'
As a result of the Pentagon meeting the military was unified behind the MACV position while the
civ ilian agencies were united in opposition. An effort to compromise failed on 18 August after the
CIA's ONE released a revised draft of the SNIE that listed the size of the contentious communist self-
defense and secret self-defense forces as 120,000.65 The inclusion of these units in the OB resulted in
protests from MACV and effectively ended direct dialogue between the military and civilian
organizations. Soon thereafter the JCS asked Richard Helms to send a team of CIA analysts to Saigon
to resolv e the dispute once and for all. Helms, acting in his capacity as the chairman of the USIB.
assembled a party of CIA analysts, led by George Carver, and sent them to Saigon on 8 September to
resolve the order of battle for the SNIE. Again compromise was elusiv e. CIA analysts claimed that
MACV would not allow the OB to exceed 300,000, despite the preponderance of evidence to the
contrary."" Arguments over the size and composition of communist forces in each OB category,
particularly the problematic irregulars, raged. The CIA analyst Richard Kovar recalled:
63
Perry, Four Stars, p. 169.
6" Interview with R. Jack Smith. Quoted in Ranelagh, The Agency, p. 465.
65 Sec Central Intelligence Agency, "Joint C1A-DIA-1NR Representatives' Position of Vict Cong
Strength Estimate," 12 September 1967. Kesaris, Vietnam and Southeast Asia. Supplement, reel 5.
no. 5.
66 On 11 September 1967 Carv er cabled Helms: [A] v ariety of circumstantial indicators —
[including] MACV's juggling of (the] figures . . . corridor admissions by MACV officers — all point
to [the] inescapable conclusion that General Westmoreland . . . has given instructions tantamount to ja]
direct order that |the] VC strength total w ill not exceed [a] 300,000 ceiling. {The| rationale seems to
be that any higher figure would not be sufficiently optimistic and would generate [an] unacceptable
lev el of criticism from the press." Westmoreland, Joint Exhibit No. 256.
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representatives of the military services used every tactic from horse trading to
browbeating in their efforts to induce the CIA to change its position. There was no
suggestion that the military representatives had better estimates based on superior
analysis or more extensive intelligence source material. Indeed. I am not at all sure
that they pretended to har e analyzed the data themselves. They simply insisted that
MACV's figures be accepted.6"
As the conference ncarcd collapse, Richard Helms, appraised of the situation by Career, instructed
the CIA team to abandon their insistence that the two contentious irregular categories, the self-defense
and the secret self-defense forces, be quantified and listed in the OB. Instead he proposed that the units
be noted in a separate narrative section, independent of the "aggregate" (that is, not added to the formal
OB). In effect, the self-defense and the secret self-defense forces -- the units which MACV deemed to
be substantial and perilous in February 1967 -- were dropped from the OB. Consequently, the total
enemy strength would not exceed 299,000-334,000. MACV agreed to the compromise on 14
September 1967.
CIA analysts were dismayed by the concession. They bclicred that Helms had forsaken accuracy
for accord on the SNIE. They maintained that the communist irregular forces represented a measurable
combat threat to American soldiers and therefore should be counted and included in the OB. Richard
Kovar remarked:
These are the people, as 1 understood it. who harassed and sniped our forces . . . when
they patrolled and swept through an area, laid booby traps and ambushes for them . .
. As such, these people killed our troops. They inflicted casualties . . . We counted
these people when we found them dead . . . This was an important, essential clement
of the Vietnamese communist capabilities for fighting in South Vietnam.
In his opinion, an assessment of communist military strength which excluded these forces "did not
fulfill its purpose. It did not describe or estimate accurately or completely the capabilities of the
Vietnamese communists for fighting in South Vietnam.""" After all, as Sam Adams is fond of
67 Quoted in Brew in and Shaw, Vietnam On Trial, p. 309.
88 Quoted in Brew in and Shaw. Vietnam On Trial, p. 311.
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pointing out, in a guerrilla war how could you ignore the guerrillas?'"' The American military was in
the paradoxical position of asserting for the purpose of the SN1E that the irregulars were an
inconsequential military force at the same time that the command w as attempting to destroy this force
through the covert PHOENIX operation. 0 The command included these forces in previous estimates;
MACV discarded its ow n methodology when it no longer suited the predilections of the command.
Even the prudent George Career, chief of the CIA delegation, was upset by Helm's terms of
compromise and cabled the DCI:
MACV juggling the figures, all point to the inescapable conclusion that General
Westmoreland . . . has given instructions tantamount to direct orders that the VC
strength will not exceed 300,(XX) ceiling. A rationale seems to be that any higher
figure would not be sufficiently optimistic and would generate an unacceptable level
of criticism from the press. 1
For its part, MACV argued that it was impossible to classify guerrilla units as self-defense or the
secret self-defense forces, for the categories implied a level of analytical precision thai was not practical
in the ambiguous military conflict. Furthermore, the American military still did not view the irregular
forces as legitimate military units. General Creighton A brums, the deputy commander of MACV,
remarked:
From the intelligence viewpoint, the inclusion of the SD [self-defense] and SSD
[secret self-defense] strength figures in an estimate of military capabilities is highly
questionable. These forces contain a sizable number of women and old people. They
operate entirely in their own hamlets. They arc rarely armed, have no real discipline,
°9 Commenting on the importance of the irregulars Sam Adams staled: "I felt fairly strongly at
the time for a number of reasons, which reasons incidentally Hawkins and General MeChristian agreed
w ith. 1 suppose the most important single one w as that the prime job of the self-defense militia w as
to lay mines and booby traps, and here's why that's important. In World War II, for example, when wc
were fighting a conventional war, something on the order of 3 per cent of American casualties were
caused by mines and booby traps. In the Vietnam War, 33 per cent were caused by mines and booby
traps, ten. twelve times higher. It seemed to mc that if you have a group of people that arc planting a
device which caused one-third of our casualties, this group of people ought to be counted as enemies.
Now let mc say here that they didn't plant every single mine and booby trap in Vietnam, but they
planted probably the bulk of them." Transcript, Samuel Adams oral history interview, 20 September
1984, by Ted Gittinger, p. 6, LBJ Library.
70 The PHOENIX program was initiated by the CIA in the 1966 to identify and "neutralize" Viet
Cong leaders at the village level. The former head of the program and future DCI William Colby
estimated that over 20,000 Vict Cong activists were killed by the operation. William Colby and Peter
Forbath, Honorable Men: My Life Willi the CIA. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978, p. 270:
and Powers, Man Who Kept the Secrets, pp. 205-207. According to American military records,
combat (ambushes and firefights) was responsible for all of those captured and killed under the
program, suggesting some military capability. See Gibson, The Perfect W<r, p. 301.
71
Quoted in Ranclagh, The Agency, p. 458. Sec Central Intelligence Agency, Cable, George
Carver to Richard Helms, 13 September 1967. Kcsans, Vietnam and Southeast Asia, Supplement.
reel 4, no. 824.
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and almost no military capability. They are no more effective in the military sense
than the do/.ens of other non-military organizations which serve the VC cause in
various roles."'
Note the contradiction in the command position: MACV rejected pedantic analytical distinctions
among the guerrillas while it simultaneous!}' employed those very distinctions. Although the
American military repeatedly acknowledged the unorthodox composition of the enemy in Vietnam, in
practice it treated them in conventional terms. Accordingly, MACV desired that only conventional
military units (that is, mainforcc and local force) be included in the Vict Cong OB. The guerrillas were
to be listed in a separate category; almost as an afterthought. It was an archaic and fatuous
perspective: one rejected by most professional intelligence analysts in private. Even after the 14
September compromise CIA officers remained contemptuous of the methodology of MACV. Richard
Kovar observed that, "There was no suggestion that MACV had persuaded anyone of the logic of its
case; it was simply a matter of asserting its primacy in determining what the figure would be." '
Nevertheless, the CIA abided by the terms of the compromise and BNE revised the drafts of the
SNIE in accordance w ith its provisions. Surprisingly, the DIA objected to the defacto exclusion of
the self-defense forces from the SNIE. Carroll sent DIA analysts to Saigon in mid-October to debate
the problem with MACV. The DIA agreed with the command that the self-defense forces should be be
omitted from the OB aggregate tables, but insisted that the Viet Cong political cadre, estimated to be
75,000-85,000 strong, be enumerated in the text of the SNIE. When MACV would not consent to
this stipulation, the DIA registered formal dissents in the draft NIEs."4 Finally, Richard Helms,
anxious to avoid a "split" on the estimate, intervened. The DCI proposed that the strength of the
political cadres be noted in the estimate, albeit with a disclaimer that the units were not primarilv
military to appease MACV. The compromise was accepted by both parties. John William of the DIA
was frank about the nature of the deal: "So what happened ... is wc rccategorized the enemy, if you
will. It was suddenly decided that the political infrastructure was not to be part of the military
threat." 5 "The whole session was painful," Williams told Sam Adams. "It was clear that wc were
double-dealing."""
72 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Cable, Crcighton Abrams to Earie Wheeler et ah, 20
August 1067. Westmoreland, Joint Exhibit No. 252B. pp. 1-2.
73 Quoted in Brew in and Shaw, Vietnam On Trial, p. 309.
74 Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Economic Research, "RE: SNIE 14.3-67:
Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists for Fighting in South Vietnam," 23 October 1967.
Kesaris, Vietnam and Southeast Asia, Supplement, reel 5. no. 222.
76 Westmoreland, Deposition, John B. Williams, 27 September 1983, fiche no. 438, pp. 20-21.
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The Dismissal of Robert McNamara
McNamara was advised of the enduring controversy over the OB by General Carroll and OSA. At
the request of the Secretary, OSA examined the results of September Saigon conference, reinterpreting
the OB in terms consistent w ith prior quantification. Its analysis concluded that the new OB estimate
should have been 395,000-480,000 if computed on the same basis as prior estimates. The office
commented: "The computations do not show that enemy strength has increased, but that the previous
estimates of enemy strength w ere loo low." This analysis confirmed McNamara's intuitive belief that
the MACV OB was spurious. He later recalled:
I tried to make it [the order of battle] add up. in a judgmental rather than arithmetic
way. 1 wasn't trying to get these figures to reconcile within a few thousands, that
wasn't what I was trying to do. What I was trying to find out was how the hci! the
war went on year after year after year when we stopped the infiltration or shrunk it
and when we had a very high body count and so on. It didn't make sense. And the
fact is that it didn't add up."8
He claimed that he did not pursue the matter, for he had a greater purpose: "I just stopped arguing
about the figures and went on to say that I didn't think that we were winning the war; not to argue
about the figures.""" Yet this was his public position, coaxed from a recalcitrant witness for the 1984
trial Westmoreland v. CBS. In priv ate he denounced MACV, telling the journalist George Crilc. "You
can't trust these people [the military] when they arc talking about things with their sclf-intcrcst at
stake."80 In 1967 McNamara knew that MACV was manipulating the OB to demonstrate that the
American strategy of attrition was effective. Yet the Secretary of Defense, a man renowned for his
penchant for challenging the military, failed to rectify the matter. The inconsistency is troubling, but
an. accurate reflection of the contradictions embodied in McNamara at the time. In the autumn of 1967
the Secretary was a divided and tormented man. He had completed the long journey to Damascus: he
now clearly saw the futility of the war, and struggled to come to terms with the revelation. Joseph
Califano, his former special assistant, observ ed McNamara's epiphany and recalled:
77 Cited in CIA: lhe Pike Report. Nottingham, England: Spokesman Books, 1977, p. 132.
78 Westmoreland. Deposition, Robert S. McNamara, 26 March 1984, fiche no. 332, p. 112.
79 Westmoreland, Deposition, Robert S. McNamara, 26 March 1984, fiche no. 332, p. 119.
80 Westmoreland. Joint Exhibit No. 33 A-D, McNamara interv iew with Crilc, OlT-thc-record, 16
June 1981, p. 2.
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The whole thing affected him personally. No doubt at a lot of levels. He had come
in with a view that you could measure with some precision victory in a guerrilla war
and there was some rational, calibrated way you could raise the level of escalation.
And it affected everybody, the whole question of the multisided nature of
communism. Personally, it took its toll."'
After seven years as the Secretary of Defense, McNamara was exhausted, physically and mentally.
If the war strategy of attrition was ineffectual in Hanoi, it was effective in Washington. McNamara had
spent an enormous amount of energy opposing the Chiefs, resisting their calls for further escalation, to
little effect. Where he viewed military pressure as means of persuasion and communication, the .ICS
perceived it to be an end in itself. The distinction between means and end w as now, in 1967, blurred
beyond distinction. The air war was now an end in itself; not the bargaining tool that McNamara had
initially envisaged. The requirements of the ground war constantly mounted, with no reasonable end in
sight. Events had their ow n momentum, and this momentum carried them away from McNamara's
rational designs. Despite his best efforts to the contrary, the war continued to grind on; slowly,
methodically, inexorably. By October, McNamara despaired that it could be stopped. Frustrated, the
Secretary commissioned the massive Pentagon Papers study, to explore the evolution of American
military intervention in Southeast Asia. On 1 November McNamara sent Johnson the most radical
proposal to resolve the Vietnam conflict to date, recommending that the United States halt the
bombing campaign and stabilize its force deployment at 525,000. In a foreshadowing of the
"Vietnamization" strategy of the Nixon administration, McNamara recommended that the United States
gradually shift combat operations to the South Vietnamese military.82 Johnson promptly rejected the
proposal. If McNamara's testimony before the Stennis committee seriously damaged his credibility
with Johnson, a President who valued loyalty above all else, the 1 November memorandum destroyed
it. Thereafter Johnson warned his advisors to be wary of McNamara, that he was no longer on the
team: "He's gone dovish on me." With a presidential election only one year away, Johnson could not
tolerate a Secretary of Defense who publicly dissented on the most significant foreign policy issue of
the day. McNamara's days were numbered.
Unbeknownst to the Secretary, on 13 November Johnson nominated McNamara to be the president
of the World Bank. McNamara later learned of the nomination through the Financial Times of
London. "To this day, I do not now whether 1 resigned or was fired," McNamara later remarked.83
Thus McNamara, the consummate company man, parted with his superior over the war in
Southeast Asia and so earned his disdain. All the management mechanisms he introduced — systems
analysis, organizational studies, and PPBS — and the alternativ e sources of evaluation — OSA and D1A
-- did not prevent him from blundering into Vietnam. In the end, his own biases and preconceptions
81 Interview w ith Joseph Califano, Shaplcy, Promise and Power, pp. 434-35.
82 Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Memorandum for the President," 1 Nov ember 1967.
National Security Files, Box 74, 75, LBJ Library.
33 Telephone interview, Robert S. McNamara, 13 September 1992.
2^0
blinded him to the reality of the conflict; his vaunted statistical indicators belied the truth. David
Halbcrslam later w rote:
Years later, w hen McNamara had turned against the war, he talked w ith John Vann,
the lieutenant colonel who had left the Army in protest of the Harkins policies, and
the one who had shown statistically how bad the war was going. McNamara had
asked Vann why he had been misinformed, and Vann bluntly told him it was his own
fault. He should have insisted on his own itinerary. He should have traveled w ithout
accompanying brass, and he should have taken some time to find out w ho the better-
informed people were and learned how to talk to them.84
The Pentagon hierarchy and the D1A did not accurately advise the Secretary of the disparity of
opinion within the military over the effectiveness of both air and ground operations in Southeast Asia.
Instead, the Defense Department enforced its peculiar code of unanimity and optimism w hich, in turn,
contributed greatly to the increased American intervention. Consequently, the McNamara revolution
ended right where it began: with a dearth of disinterested analysis. Policy could not be effectively
separated from intelligence. Despite the best intentions to the contrary, organizations and individuals
continued to project biases into evaluation. Passion and interest were potent motives, difficult to
mitigate. What McNamara referred to as "rose-colored glasses" proliferated within the American
defense establishment. In the end McNamara discovered, much to his horror, that he had succumbed to
their distortions. It w as a painful and tragic discovery. Though the epiphany no doubt tormented the
Secretary, it did not destroy his faith in modern management. As the Washington Star reporter Saul
Pett observ ed on his last day in office: "He [McNamara] leav es w ith what he came, a continuing faith
in reason and logic and the processes of objective analysis."85 McNamara accepted the post at the
World Bank, and agreed to remain as the Secretary of Defense until Johnson could select his
replacement.
Ironically, on the day that Johnson fired McNamara, 13 November, the final draft of SNIE 14.3-67
"Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists for Fighting in South Vietnam." with the DIA dissent
w ithdraw n, was signed by Richard Helms. The estimate utilized a OB total of 299,000-334,000
combatants. However, if the irregular forces, enumerated in sections of the estimate separate from the
84 Halberstam, Best and Brightest, p. 305.
85 Quoted in Shapley, Promise and Power, p. 459. In a trenchant epilogue, the Washington Post
columnist Joseph Kraft wrote: "Nobody should be be under any illusions as to what his departure
means. It expresses the failure in the managerial faith, a crisis of the whole postwar generation ... He
embodies perfectly the change in outlook which took place in this country with the transition from
depression to prosperity. The mean pickings of the depression had bred an emphasis on harsh
philosophical disputes . . . along fundamental lines of political and moral conflict. But prosperity
meant enough to go around for everybody if only a way could be got round the embarrassing conflicts
of yore. In the daw ning atmosphere of success, accordingly there emerged a faith that transcended
ideology. That faith — the preeminent faith of the postwar generation — was a faith in manipulated
settlements that went beyond old-fashioned conflicts, in arranged solutions that took all interests into
account." McNamara at Pentagon was "its Daniel come to judgment." The Washington Post. 27
February 1968(6:23).
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OB tables with disclaimers ("Though in aggregate numbers these groups are still large and constitute a
part of the overall Communist effort, they are not offensive military forces. Hence they arc not
included in the military order of battle total . . ."), were included, communist strength was assessed to
be 500,0)0-600.000."" Of course, MACV. and more importantly, Johnson administration officials,
generally ignored the irregulars and concentrated on the more conventional units, for combat purposes
and to measure progress. This is precisely w hy the command fought so hard to relegate them to the
text.
The CIA concurred with the DIA on the quantification of the political cadres, a reflection of the
general conviction of both agencies that the OB understated the strength of communist forces, but did
not press the issue as it acknowledged "the apparent obligation for the estimate to be consistent w ith
the figures agreed at Saigon."8" Accordingly, CIA officials were infuriated to discover that MACV
violated the agreement soon after the publication of the SNIE. On 22 November General
Westmoreland held a press conference to announce that enemy strength declined from 285,000 to
248,000. But in reality this decline was not the result of attrition in the field, but of administrative
reclassification. Two categories contained in previous OB estimates amounting to 250,000-350,000
were simply removed from the aggregate OB and exiled to separate sections distinct from the total.88
The analytical shell game continued.
In the autumn of 1967 MACV progressively reduced the OB, from 235.852 in late November, to
224,581 in late January.*" The command asserted that communist strength was declining as a
consequence of effective allied militarv operations in South Vietnam and reduced infiltration from the
North. The latter was a contentious allegation: the CIA believed that there was a marked increase in
communist infiltration into South Vietnam in late 1967. From September 1967 to Januarv 1968.
MACV estimated that approximately 8,000 communist forces infiltrated each month. The CIA
assessed the infiltration figures to be much higher, approximately 25.000 per month. The DIA
publications, particularly the Defense Intelligence Summary, supported the MACV estimates during
this period. However, this support was not the result of parallel analysis. As Major John Williams of
the DIA observed: "basically we [DIA) took what MACV gave us on infiltration and published it to
the Washington community.""" The DIA received infiltration statistics in the Weekly Intelligence
Estimate Update (WIEU) from the Current Intelligence Indications and Estimates Division of MACV
J-2. The WIEUs were finished intelligence products, derived from field intelligence reports, captured
86 Central Intelligence Agency, SNIE 14.3-67, "Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists for
Fighting in South Vietnam," 13 Nov ember 1967. Kesaris. Vietnam and Southeast Asia, reel 5. no.
303. Regarding the political cadres, the estimate stated: "Its functions arc not primarily military and it
is therefore not included in the military order of battle."
87 Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Economic Research, "RE: SNIE 14.3-67:
Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists for Fighting in South Vietnam," 23 October 1967.
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documents, prisoner interrogations, and SIGINT. The latter source is particular!) noteworthy, for the
NSA provided important SIGINT directly to MACV for corroboration and analysis. The NSA did not
provide the DIA with corresponding intelligence; thus the agency was dependent upon MACV for vital
"all-source" information.91 It was an peculiar arrangement. Though the DIA was responsible for
corroborating MACV intelligence, the agency did not possess the capability to independently
substantiate and validate the infiltration estimates. It could do little more than rubber stamp the
judgments of the command. When MACV asserted that infiltration was 8,000 per month, as it did in
the autumn and winter of 1967, the DIA could do naught but agree.
Conversely, the CIA, w hich directly liaised with NSA and therefore had access to raw SIGINT.
contested MACV's assessments of communist infiltration. CIA analyses in the fall and winter of 1967
concluded that approximately 25,000 communist forces infiltrated into South Vietnam each month.9:
Assessments by the Office of Systems Analyses confirmed these analyses. Beginning in late 1966. at
the behest of McNamara, each month OSA formulated an assessment for the President, based primarily
on NSA SIGINT, on the effects of the bombing campaign. Preparation of the assessments was
supervised by the OSA Deputy Director for Vietnam Philip Odeen and Leslie Gelb. later the director of
the Pentagon Papers project. When asked in 1984 to reflect on American intelligence activ itics in late
1967, Gclb stated:
Well, there's one other thing about data. This was the How of North Vietnamese into
the South, and there -- again, my memory is very clear on it -- there was a sharp
contradiction between what MACV was reporting for infiltration and what we were
getting from the same sources available to MACV, the COMINT, special
intelligence. He [Westmoreland] was reporting sc\en thousand or whatever the hell it
was, and this was w hat he was saying publicly. But we knew from all these other
sources that they running over 20,000, between twenty and thirty thousand a month.'"
Those agencies in a position to verify MACV infiltration rates — that is, those agencies with direct
access to raw signals intelligence — contested the military estimates. The DIA, deprived of this
privilege, naturally endorsed the command posture.
By December 1967, it was evident that the communists were mustering their military strength in
the far northwestern corner of South Vietnam, near the United States Marine Corps base at Khe Sanh.
MACV was convinced that the Vict Cong were preparing for a massive assault against the American
military outpost, reminiscent of the 1954 communist siege of the French garrison at Dienbienphu,
which resulted in the defeat of the French in Indochina. The DIA was skeptical of this prospect.
9' Westmoreland, Deposition, Major John B. Williams, 29 September 1983, fichc no. 438, pp.
45-52.
92 Transcript, Samuel Adams oral history interv iew, pp. 28-30.
93 Transcript, Leslie H. Gelb oral history interview, 30 April 1984, by Ted Gittingcr, p. 16, LB.!
Library. Ronald Smith. Chief of the CIA's South Vietnam branch concurred: "We found that the
enemy infiltrated 20,000 to 30,000 men per month in the several months leading up to the Tct
offensive." Westmoreland, Affidavit, Ronald L. Smith. 23 April 1984, p. B582.
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Several analysts who specialized in North Vietnamese tactics and strategy produced an analysis that
concluded that the Vict Cong were likely* engaged in a feint at Khc Sanh. designed to draw American
forces to the defense Marine base and leave the populous coastal plains vulnerable to attack. This
analysis, which contradicted the command perspective, was presented to the deputy director of the D1A
during a briefing in early January of 1968. The analysts suggested that the assessment be sent to
MACV for comment. An analyst present at the briefing recalls the resprin.se the suggestion elicited:
This recommendation was the cause for much laughter in the room, first by the
general and then in cadenced order by the six colonels present. "How could you
possibly know more about this situation than General Westmoreland?" we were
asked. We suggested that perhaps our perspective would add to his own and at least
allow him to entertain a different point of view from what his staff was feeding him
everyday. The paper never left the DIA. The general stated that he was not in the
business of contradicting field commanders, but rather was there to support to
commanders in the field.94
Though subsequent events proved the DIA analysis to be accurate, it was ignored. As January
progressed, the Defense Department and the While House become obsessed with Khc Sanh. Johnson
ordered that a sand table map and photographic murals of the base be set up in the basement of the
White House so that he could personally follow developments.
Interlude: The Capture of the Pueblo
As the attention of the administration focused on South Vietnam, the American espionage
community was surprised by an event in the North Pacific. Shortly before midnight on 22 January, a
scries of distress calls from an American intelligence ship, the USS Pueblo reached the Pentagon.
Soon thereafter, it was determined that the ship had been boarded by North Korean military forces and
forced to proceed to the port of Wonson. Word of the capture of the Pueblo reached the DIA Signal
Office in Room 2D901A of the Pentagon swiftly, causing turmoil in the Far East Division of the
DIA. The Joint Staff, the JCS. and OSD were immediately notified. Agency intelligence analysts
strove to discover the answers to two critical questions: (1) where was the Pueblo seized? and (2) had
she violated North Korean w aters? The incident was comparable to the 12 May 1966 shootdovvn of the
American aircraft over Chinese airspace in that available human intelligence contradicted the technical
intelligence on both matters. Where American naval sources suggested that the Pueblo was in
international waters at the time of the incident, COMINT sources monitoring the air and sea radars of
North Korea indicated that the intelligence ship had violated North Korean waters on at least four
occasions within three days of her seizure. As in 1966, the DIA dismissed the more accurate and
94 Incident recounted in McGarvey, CIA: The Myth and the Madness, pp. 127-28.
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reliable COMINT in favor of the subjective human source intelligence. When informed of the
COMINT, the D1A Far East Division Chief was reported to have remarked: "Bullshit. I'm not
believing the Communist radar. Those bastards were probably sending false radar tracks. Until we get
something better than that, give the Navy the benefit of the doubt.'"" Early DIA intelligence
assessments to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the capture were based on Navy
operational reports and excluded the contradictory COMINT.
A surprised White House wondered why the Pueblo was in such close proximity to North Korean
waters and asked the Defense Department to detail the mission of the vessel. The DIA was uncertain;
the North Korean current intelligence desk and the collection requirements staff could not determine the
mission. In confusion, the DIA contacted the Navy, who, in turn, consulted with the NSA. The NSA
informed the White House that the Pueblo was assigned the following missions: "(II determine the
nature and extent of naval activity at North Korean ports, (2) sample electronic intelligence along the
cast coast of North Korea, and (3) keep surveillance on the Soviet fleet operating in the Sea of
Japan.'"'"
The ignorance of the DIA on the mission of the Pueblo is startling, for the agency was
responsible for assessing the risk of the mission. The \cssc! was constructed and operated by the Navy
to collect COMINT, and w as tasked by both the Na\ \ and the N'SA. Proposed missions were compiled
into a six month schedule of nine missions, and forwarded to the Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC) of
the JCS for review. The JRC sent the schedule of proposed missions to the DIA for risk assessment.
In the specific case of the captured Pueblo mission, the schedule was sent to the DIA North Korea
desk in Building B of Arlington Hall Station. The w ar in Southeast Asia placed great demands on
North Korean Affairs staff, and at the time the schedule arrived the desk was extraordinarily busy.
Tw enty-eight year old Army Major Donald Alexander was instructed to rev iew the mission schedule for
risk assessment. Alexander was formally instructed to consider "five specific anticipated reaction
criteria and five anticipated sensitivity criteria" in the assessment. In later testimony before Congress,
Alexander declined to say whether or not he weighed these criteria, nor did he estimate how much time
he spent reviewing the proposal. Nonetheless, Alexander evaluated the risk to be "minimal," and
returned the schedule to the JRC for implementation."" Upon close examination it appears that the
DIA did little more than rubber-stamp the proposed missions. One DIA official offers the following
scenario:
The way it probably worked in this case is that he got the book on his desk one
morning at nine o'clock with orders to return it by noon. That book is the size of
Scars, Roebuck catalog. It would be a physical impossibility for him to study each
mission in detail.
35 Quoted in McGarvey, CIA: The Myth and the Madness, p. 97.
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A subsequent Congressional investigation revealed that the military claims that the risks and benefits
of proposed intelligence missions were carefully evaluated were disingenuous. A Special
Subcommittee of the House Armed Sendees Committee reported:
General Carroll was queried at length concerning the specific and detailed criteria used
in risk evaluation which include five specific anticipated reaction criteria and five
anticipated sensitivity criteria. General Carroll stated categorically that each of these
criteria were considered in the risk evaluation process by his agency. However, he
conceded that he could produce no written ev idence or supporting document indicating
that these criteria had been reviewed in the case of the Pueblo mission . . . When
asked "how do you know that your staff people hav e done this'.'" General Carrol!
replied, "because they are charged with doing it, because they arc professionals."'"
Moreover, General Carroll later stated that he did not recall any instance in which DIA had disagreed
with a minimal risk assessment on a mission after the monthly reconnaissance schedule had been
formally prepared and disseminated throughout the intelligence community. This prompted Senator
Otis G. Pike of New York to remark: "If ev erybody characterizes them [the missions] all as minimal
risk in order to get them approv ed in the field, it is sort of a meaningless characterization, isn't it"
After the mission was designated as minimal risk, it was entered into the "Monthly Reconnaissance
Schedule for January 1968," This schedule was approved by the .ICS. CIA. NSA, OSD and the 303
Committee (that is. the Senior Interdepartmental Group) in late December. Thereafter the Deputy to
the Assistant Director of Production at the NSA reviewed the schedule as part of his routine
responsibilities. He noted that the approved Pueblo mission was to sail in close proximity to the
Wonson region, territory which North Korea traditionally regarded as sacrosanct. Although the NSA
was not formally charged with risk ev aluation, on 29 December 1967 the official sent a "warning
message" to the .ICS expressing his concern that the mission might be more hazardous than presently
designated. Copies of the message were sent to the DIA Signals Office and to the National Military
Command Center (NMCC) in the Pentagon. The former copy was lost and the latter w as ignored. (A
DIA analyst explains the last was lagged "information" and filed, when it should have been tagged
"action" and forwarded to the North Korea desk, prompting a reassessment.)101 Not only did the DIA
fail to properly assess the risks of the proposed mission, it neglected to respond to new intelligence
which called earlier judgments into question. As if these mistakes were not damning enough, several
DIA analysts assert that the mission was unnecessary, despite the fact that military officers repeatedly
99 USC (91/1) House Armed Serv ices. Report: Before the Special Subcommittee on the L'.S.S.
"Pueblo" and PC 121 Plane Incidents. GPO, 1969 pp. 1653-54.
100 USC (91/1) House Armed Services. Hearings: Before the Special Subcommittee on the
U.S.S. "Pueblo" and PC 121 Plane Incidents. GPO. 1969, pp. 699-701. The Final Report of the
subcommittee concluded: "The risk assessment criteria established by the .ICS were not observed by
responsible naval authorities and it is questionable whether the DIA observed these criteria when
approving the minimal risk category for the Pueblo mission." USC (91/1) House Armed Services.
Report, p. 1623.
10' Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability, pp. 167-98.
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testified before Congress that the missions were a "vital element" of the American intelligence effort.
The analysis point out the there was one COMINT station in South Korea and two in Japan with
capabilities to monitor North Korean ports. Furthermore, the United Slates Air Force conducted an
average of sixty missions a month in the Wonson region collecting ELINT to accurately compile the
North Korean order of battle. Finally, two COMINT stations in Japan provided detailed daily reports of
the movements of the Soviet fleet.152 Seen in this light, the analysts' claim that the Pueblo mission
was at best ancillary, at worst redundant, is persuasive. The Congressional inquiry revealed that in
assessing the necessity and risk of proposed intelligence missions, the DIA did little more than rubber
stamp the recommendations of other organizations. The act was consistent w ith the past behavior of
the agency.
The Tet Offensive and the OB: Doubt and Indecision at the DIA
The intelligence community was still grappling with the implications of the capture of its
espionage vessel when the communist Tct offensive erupted. Launched on 31 January 1968, on the
Lunar New Year holiday, Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces simultaneously attacked five major
cities, dozens of military bases, and scores of towns and villages in South Vietnam while the American
military was distracted by Khc Sanh. Despite numerous official claims to the contrary, the Tct
offensive surprised the United States. Three days after the start of the offensive, the President told
White House reporters that the attacks had been "anticipated, prepared for and met." This w as not true.
Although MACV anticipated some combat action during the Tet holiday, it did not expect the
102 McGarvey, CIA: The Myth and the Madness, pp. 98-99. Staffers on the House Armed
Services Committee suspected that the missions w ere not vital, but could find no evidence to support
their intuition.
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magnitude, ferocity, and timing of the general offensive.After all, in the three months prior to the
offensive, the Ambassador to South Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker and General Westmoreland w ere loudly
proclaiming that enemy strength w as on the decline and American victory lay on the horizon. The Tet
offensive shattered both claims. Intelligence analysts at the NMCC in the Pentagon on the night of 30
January were stunned by initial reports of the scope and potency of the communist attacks.104 When
notified by the D1A of the dimensions of the offensive McNamara and his staff were surprised.: " For
Lyndon Johnson, the shock of the Tet attacks was severe because he previously dismissed the
pessimistic analyses from the CIA, OSA, and more recently, his Secretary of Defense. He endorsed the
sanguine assessments of Westmoreland and MACV, embraced the creed of progress, and now, in
February 1968, Johnson realized that it was all a phantasm. The enemy was not on the run, w eak and
demoralized, as Westmoreland reported four days before the Tet offensive in MACV's annual assessment
of the war.1"" Rather, the enemy was strong and confident, willing to contest American control over all
of South Vietnam. It was a startling, and painful, discovery for Lyndon Johnson.
In the early days of the offensive, the DIA and the military services monitored developments
through the NMCC. A former DIA analyst described the NMCC thus:
It is the heart, the brain center for the entire defense establishment with the computer
checkup and control center. I am not try ing to sound facetious, but did you see
Doctor Strangelove with everybody sitting there and all the big glasses and stuff.
That is what the NMCC is. And it had 24-hour desk officers. There were people
there from CIA, State, DIA. all the Joint Staff elements that worked the desk 24-
hours a day , 24-hour w atch. ''
03 Daniel Graham, the chief of MACV current intelligence and estimates at the time, recalled:
"There was one thing that surprised us, and 1 har e to admit that this w as an intelligence error. We were
not surprised that Tct occurred when it did. We were not surprised that it was countryw idc. What w e
were surprised at, and we har e to accept it as an intelligence failure, is that they attacked the cities."
Transcript, Daniel O. Graham oral history interview. 8 November 1982, interview 1, by Ted Gittingcr.
p. 39, LBJ Library. The Pentagon Papers state that the offensiv e took the Johnson administration and
the Pentagon "by surprise, and its strength, length, and intensity prolonged this shock." NYTPP. p.
592. A West Point textbook concludes: "Giap's Tet Offensive . . . gained complete surprise." Quoted
in Dav id R. Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet: US-Vietnam in Perspective. San Rafael, CA:
Presidio, 1978, p. 180. Although some military men subsequently claimed that the offensive w as
predicted, such claims arc false and misleading. There was some cable traffic which indicated that
communist attacks were imminent, y et these were part of the normal flow of intelligence messages
from Saigon to Washington. Nothing in these cables suggested that the attacks would be anything
other than minor skirmishes. A general communist offensive was neither predicted nor insinuated.
See Clifford, Counsel to the President, p. 468; George Allen. Indochina Wars, pp. 321-23; and
Transcript, Samuel Adams oral history interview, p. 26. The final word on this subject goes to Clark
Clifford, w ho replaced McNamara as the Secretary of Defense: "In my view, the military reassessment
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the reaction of our military leadership approached panic, and their intelligence failure w as a critical
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Although the NMCC possessed advanced communication capabilities which allowed the center to
confer with American military forces throughout the world, it lacked modern map displays.
Conversely, the CIA possessed possessed state-of-the-art imagery equipment which it employed to
systematically plot and track enemy deployments so that developing troop concentrations w ere made
evident. As a result, the CIA situation room was the axis of attention in the early days of the Tel
offensive, visited by defense officials, military officers, and Johnson advisors to view the progress of
the campaign. One analyst observed: "If you \\ anted to understand the war in Vietnam, you had to go
to the CIA, at least for a few days."10* The DIA was effectively upstaged by the CIA. After some
time, in exasperation, the DIA asked the CIA to assist it in duplicating the unique maps of enemy
deployments. The CIA assented, and the maps were promptly installed in the NMCC. It was a
humbling experience for the DIA. After all. intelligence on military operations was to be its forte.
Despite the scope and magnitude of the attacks, MACV estimated that only 84,000 communist
forces participated in the offensive.109 The CIA and the DIA were skeptical of this estimate. George
Allen, the deputy chief of Vietnamese Affairs at the CIA at the time, remarked:
MACV's post-Tct analysis estimated that only a fraction on the enemy's available
forces -- about 85,000 or so — were committed to the offensive. This is sheer
nonsense, and is based on an excessively narrow definition of the term "committed."
The assault on the cities and principal towns, to which this figure relates (and even
there it understates the forces involved), was only one facet of the onslaught that
extended over a period of two w eeks or so in January -- February 1968. Concurrently
with this effort, there were attacks on every major allied base and supply installation
in Vietnam, attacks on hundreds of hamlets in the countryside, and an active siege in
Khe Sang. In addition, main force and local units were deployed to intercept and
block allied troop movements reacting to the offensive. MACV's figure of 85,000
(or less) makes no allowance for any of the forces engaged in these other activ ities.
The fact is, virtually the entirely of the Viet Cong and PAVN forces in South
Vietnam participated in active combat operations during the "Tot Offensive";
probably as many as 400,000, including hamlet militia troops integrated into main
force and local force units for the purpose/10
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The MACV estimate was, however, consistent with the January 1968 communist OB. This
estimate assessed enemy strength to be 235,941. It represented a marked decline from the December
1967 OB of 286,438."' MAC.V's January OB angered the CIA because the decrease of insurgents was
not attributable to attrition on the battlefield, but yet another clerical revision. Three guerrilla
components -- the self-defense forces, the secret self-defense forces, and the political cadres -- were
eliminated from the aggregate OB. Inexplicably, the sizable contingent of communist forces
participating in the siege of Kite Sanh (estimated to total over 27,000) were also omitted from the
estimate.1" CIA analysts also noted that the communist OB excluded enemy units in Laos and
Cambodia. They believed that the omission of the guerrilla units, the forces participating in the siege
of Khc Sanh, and the so-called "third country" units from the January OB severely compromised the
credibility of the estimate. It misled the Johnson administration into believing that the enemy strength
was deteriorating. The Tet offensive shattered this belief.'
In the wake of the offensive, McNamara swiftly discovered that the MACV January OB was
spurious. Briefed by George Gainer of the CIA on 4 February. McNamara was surprised to find that
approximately half of the enemy units that were engaged in attacks in South Vietnam were not listed in
the January estimate. M Though the discovery shocked him. the Secretary was unable to pursue the
matter for he was to retire at the end of the month. He did. however, convey this finding to his
successor.
The January OB posed a grave problem for MACV. The command was aware that many of the
enemy units engaged in the offensive were not listed in the estimate, but Westmoreland and ho staff did
not w ish to acknowledge their presence and so admit past error. However, the command wanted
recognition for the casualties United Stales forces inflicted on the communists during the attacks. The
dilemma: How could the command acknowledge only those enemy units w hich it had defeated while
excluding those it had not? MACV overcame this predicament through the dev elopment of an input-
output formula, ingenious if illogical, that was designated the "attrition methodology." Under this
See Wirt/., The Tet Offensive, pp. 247-48.
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dubious procedure, communist guerrilla units that were defeated in the field were added to the official
OB, then promptly subtracted. Yet enemy units sighted and confirmed but not destroyed were not added
to the OB, but held in abeyance pending "further verification." an ambiguous and interminable event.
The DIA disparagingly referred to this procedure as the "spring methodology." the implication being
that MACV designed order to battle methodologies for every season, each tailored to the operational
wishes of the command. The DIA Vietnam Desk officer John Williams was sent to Saigon in
February 1968 to confer with MACV on the communist OB estimate. William pointedly recalled that
if a MACV intelligence officer w as pressed into a professionally unsupportablc position.
that sonofabitch would call MACV. They would pump the numbers in the computer
in the spring methodology and bounce it right back again to where his estimate
worked. Probable the most frustrating thing you have ever been into. You were
sent out there by General Carroll to do this (revise the OB] and you go back with
your hat in hand and say "Sir, 1 can't get them to come off a dime." Thee were
playing with the machine."5
For the CIA and the DIA, the "spring methodology" was the last straw. Thee had endured MACV's
manipulation of the OB for too long: noev thee were determined to end the analytical shell game.
Both agencies viewed the Tet offensive as a repudiation of the MACV OB and a confirmation of their
higher estimates of enemy strength."6 Accordingly, thee sought to reopen the OB dispute. In a 18
February cable to the CIA's Saigon Station George Carver explained the rationale thus:
Recent events indicate that we should reopen the question of excluding numerical
military order of battle holding all communist components other than Main and
Local Force, Administrative Service and Guerrillas, strictly defined. We strongly
suspect that much of the recent excitement was caused by personnel draw n from
Secret Self-defense components, perhaps the Assault Youth, and other elements
currently out of the record by J-2 MACV on the ground that they "have no military
significance."''
"5 Westmoreland, Deposition, Major John B. Williams, 29 September 1983, fichc no. 438, pp.
35-36.
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Two days later Carver elaborated:
Our belief that the MACV OB too low founded in part on following reasons: First,
large numbers of small specialist units (sapper, special action) which undoubted!)
participated in attacks were almost certainly absent from MF/LF [Main Force/Local
Force] OB. Second, city units (which almost certain!)' involved in urban offensive)
are by and large missing from OB. Third, some large units identified in attack
apparently not in OB. Fourth, a review of recent evidence indicates enemv made
large scale recruitment drive prior offensive. And finally, certain classes of enemy
manpower (who probably in attack) not in OB at all — for example, secret guerrillas,
secret self-defense, and assault youths/18
The CIA estimated that an accurate communist OB would be in the range of 515,000 to 589,000.
The D1A favored an OB that would lav somewhere between the CIA estimate and the current MACV
assessment of 235,941. Needless to say. MACV opposed a revision of the OB, in spite of substantial
evidence that the estimate was inaccurate. The battle over the communis! OB was again joined.
For its part, the response of the JCS to the Tel offensive was dilatory and fatuous. On 3 February,
the Chiefs requested a partial remov al of bombing restrictions from Hanoi and the port of Haiphong to
reduce "enemy capability for waging w ar in the South." A Pentagon Papers analyst dismissed the
recommendation as a superb nott sequilnr due to "the ev ident ineffectiveness of the bombing in
preventing the offensive.""' President Johnson rejected the proposal. Thereafter the attention of the
.ICS centered on Westmoreland's possible troop requirements. The Chiefs had long-desired the full
mobilization of the armed forces of the United Stales (including a call-up of the reserves), an ev ent they
perceived to be essential for a decisive American victory in South Vietnam. The the Tet offensive
provided an opportune pretext for such mobilization. Accordingly, the Chairman of the JCS General
Wheeler repeatedly prodded Westmoreland to request additional forces, for he knew that supplemental
units could not be granted without a full mobilization."1
Westmoreland was understandably loathe to ask for additional forces. For the last four months the
American commander had proclaimed victory to be imminent. To now request substantial
reinforcements would destroy the credibility of the command, alreadv eroded, by casting doubt on the
MACV estimates of communist strength and enemy units committed to the Tet offensive. Such a
request would place Westmoreland in the incongruous position of asserting that the enemy was
moribund while simultaneously seeking more American forces to defeat the enemy. He suspected,
correctly, that the paradox would be difficult to explain to the American polity. Westmoreland was
118 Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum from George Carver to Saigon Station, 20
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therefore reluctant to solicit reinforcements. Under pressure from Wheeler, Westmoreland consented,
tind on 12 February cabled the President to request an as yet indeterminable number of reinforcements.
In late February, President Johnson sent Wheeler to Saigon to confer with Westmoreland on the
precise number of additional troops needed in the theater. During a briefing at MACV. Wheeler was
confronted by the incongruity of Westmoreland's position:
The J-2 [intelligence officer] stood up and said, "We have just destroyed the encmx
in Vietnam. He is going to die here. He has shot his wad."
And he sits down and the J-3 [operations officer] stands up and says, "We need
260,(100 more troops."
And the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs almost fell out of his chair.1'1
The MACV intelligence shop, led b\ Davidson and Graham, refused to revise its estimates of
communist strength and alter its assessment that the Tct offensive was a "last-gasp, go-for-broke"
military effort by an enemy on the verge of expiration. To do so w ould be tantamount to an admission
that past intelligence estimates, including the order of battle estimates that MACV had fought so hard
for, were in error. As in the case of ROLLING THUNDER, the command stubbornly clung to its past
position, irrespective of the preponderance of evidence to the contrary. Yet doubts were beginning to
emerge among the JCS. While Wheeler toured South Vietnam, Army Chief of Staff General Harold
Johnson asked the D1A to confirm MACV's estimates of enemy capabilities in South Vietnam, North
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia for the following thirty, sixty, ninety, and one-hundred and eighty da>s. ::
The assignment was notable because it revealed that Johnson, who knew that the MACV communist
OB was confined to enemy units in South Vietnam and was therefore not a true indicator of communist
military strength in the region, was troubled by the dimensions of the Tct offensive and skeptical of
Westmoreland's assertions that tt would be easily contained. D1A analysts labored night and day to
complete the assessments.
Westmoreland returned to Washington on 28 February and submitted a report which became perhaps
the most disputed document of the w ar. Wheeler presented the President with a bleak assessment of the
situation in Vietnam and recommended that 265,176 additional American troops be deployed to the
region in three phases. Although Westmoreland and Maxwell Taylor later asserted that the request was
a "contingency plan" and Wheeler maintained that the forces were not intended for Vietnam but the
"strategic reserve" (as opposed to the theater reserve), both claims were simply wrong. The request,
made jointly by Westmoreland and the JCS. was for 205,179 reinforcements, to be deployed to
Vietnam or held in the theater reserve intended for Vietnam by the end of 1968.13:1 The magnitude of
12' Westmoreland, Deposition, Major John B. Williams, 29 September 1983, fichc no. 438, p. 41.
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the request astonished Washington and triggered a fundamental debate over the course of American
involvement in Southeast Asia.
The request first reached Washington by cable on 27 February, a day before Wheeler's arrival. It
sparked a fierce exchange betw een Dean Rusk and McNamara at a meeting ov er a proposed presidential
speech in the State Department. Dean Rusk argued that the deployment should be approved and voiced
his belief that additional bombing of North Vietnam was necessary to defeat the enemy. In response.
Robert McNamara lost his fabled composure. Clark Clifford recounts his emotional reply:
"The goddamned Air Force, they're dropping more on North Vietnam than we
dropped on Germany in the last year of World War 11, and it's not doi ng any thingl" he
said. His voice faltered, and for a moment he had difficulty speaking between
suppressed sobs. He looked at me: "We simply have to end this thing. 1 just hope
you can get hold of it. It is out of control."1'4
It was a extraordinary admission: McNamara, the consummate manager, had lost control.
After receiv ing the Westmoreland-Wheeler request for 205,179 additional troops, Johnson asked
McNamara's successor Clark Clifford to gather a senior group of advisors for a comprehensiv e review
of American policy in Vietnam in light of the proposed deployment. (Although Clifford was
confirmed by the Senate on 30 January, he w as not sworn in until 1 March, so that McNamara might
complete the defense budget for 1969 before his departure.) Subsequently Clifford assembled an
informal adv isory council composed largely of civ ilian defense officials. The most influential of these
was the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Paul Warnke. Under the
direction of Warnke, a lawyer and Massachusetts native, the Office of International Security Affairs,
often called "the Pentagon's little Stale Department," became a bastion of dissent or. Vietnam policy .
The influence of the dissenters in the Clifford Group was strengthened by Clifford's decision to solicit
intelligence estimates on conditions in South Vietnam from the CIA instead of the DIA. The civ ilian
intelligence agency was far more pessimistic, or "dovish" in the parlance of the day , than its military
counterparts. Naturally its intelligence assessments prepared for the Clifford Group reflected this
cynicism. Throughout early March 1968 the Clifford and his advisors strove to evaluate the stale of
American interv ention in Southeast AsiaW5
Prior to the Tct offensive, DIA analysts had substantial doubts concerning the situation in South
Vietnam as portrayed in MACV intelligence estimates. However, for the most part these doubts were
suppressed, either by the analysts themselves or superiors. It was important to stay on the team; to
support the command position. Yet the Tet offensive changed this organizational imperativ e. The
communist offensive greatly eroded the credibility of MACV intelligence and allowed the other
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military intelligence components to openly question the command position. After Tet, a former DIA
analyst noted: "Everybody on the service staffs, with DIA leading the pack, started writing gloomy
estimates w ith unaccustomed forthrightness and clarity."12'5 In response to General Johnson's request
for intelligence assessments on communist strength in Southeast Asia, the DIA provided the Army
Chief of Staff with pessimistic appraisals: the enemy remained potent and resolute.
The President was troubled by the incongruity of the modest MACV order of battle and the
magnitude of the communist attack. In early March he asked the former Secretary of Stale Dean
Acheson to review the military situation in Vietnam and provide him with an independent assessment.
Rusk was subsequently briefed by both the CIA and DIA. On 14 March Acheson met with Johnson
and provided his personal assessment: the military situation in the country was far worse than MACV
was admitting, the enemy was strong and skilled. Acheson simply did not bclie\e the command's order
of battle and enemy casualty figures. He told Johnson bluntly: "Mr. President, you are being led dow n
the garden path."12 At a While House meeting later that week, Johnson instructed Helms to resolve
the conflicting order of battle estimates immediate!). Helms consulted with Wheeler, and decided to
hold an OB conference in early April. When questioned later by Clifford, Wheeler conceded that the
conference was futile, that the OB quarrel was insoluble.128 Nevertheless, the intelligence communitv
prepared to reexamine the communist order of battle estimates.
In the meantime, the Johnson administration essayed, fitfully and painfull), to plot the future
course of American inv olvement in Vietnam. As March wore on, it became ev ident to Clifford that the
war could not be won, even with a significant militarv escalation. The new Secretary of Defense, in
the past an ardent supporter of Lyndon Johnson's war policies, began to openly v oice his skepticism in
policy deliberations. Johnson watched Clifford's transformation from stalwart ally to reluctant
dissenter with consternation. Shocked by the rev ersal, Johnson called a meeting of his informal group
of elder statesmen and advisors, dubbed "the Wise Men" by White House staffers, to assess the state of
the conflict. In the past, the President had shrewdly utilized the Wise Men to preserve political support
for his war policies. On this occasion, however, Johnson would not find the statesmen amenable.
The Wise Men gathered at State Department in Washington on 25 March to review background
papers on the war prepared by the State Department and the Defense Department.'2' The DIA did not
submit an independent assessment of conflict, but contributed to the defense papers. The group was
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briefed by General William DePuy, a former field commander in Vietnam now Special Assistant to the
.ICS for Counlerinsurgcncy and Special Activities (SACSA). It is notable that DcPuy briefed the
assemblage rather than a D1A officer. Apparently, the agency had become too "dovish" for the .ICS to
trust. Not surprisingly, DcPuy offered a sanguine appraisal of the war. Clifford, present in dual
capacity as Secretary of Defense and elder statesman, recalled:
General DcPuy . . . portrayed the Tct offensive as an allied victory -- but his
presentation was diminished in a telling exchange w1th Arthur Goldberg after the
General had said that the communists had lost 80,000 men killed in action. What,
Goldberg asked, was the normal ration of wounded to killed? A three-to-one ratio
among the Vietnamese would be a conservative estimate, DcPuy answered. How
many "effectives" — regular soldiers -- do you think they now hav e. Goldberg asked.
Perhaps 230,000, maybe 240,000, said DcPuy. Well, said Goldberg, with 80.000
killed and a wounded ratio of three to one, that makes about 320,000 men killed or
wounded. "Who the hell is there left for us to be fighting," he asked.1
General DePuy's presentation was followed by that of George Carver, the CIA's chief analy st for
Vietnam. He offered a bleak assessment of the conflict as a crude stalemate with no end in sight.
Carv er also asserted that the CIA believ ed the MACV order of battle — presented as 230.000 by DcPuy
-- was too low , and that a more accurate assessment was approximately 600,000. The Wise Men
received additional briefings that evening and the following day. Optimistic presentations by General
Crcighton Abrants and General Earle Wheeler were not persuasive: the elder statesmen, like
McNamara, had lost confidence in the the officials assessment'; of military progress. In a striking
rev ersal of their previous position, on 26 March the Wise Men recommended that there should be no
substantial escalation, nor an extension of the conflict.1,1 They suggested that the administration seek
disengagement. The turnabout left the President deeply shaken.
In a major address on the war on 31 March, the President announced a unilateral move by the
United States to dccscalatc the conflict, a temporary bombing halt, and -- surprising friends and foes
alike — stated that thereafter he was devoting himself entirely to the war effort and therefore would not
seek re-election. The war had consumed Ly ndon Johnson, just as it had dev oured Robert McNamara.
In preparation for the OB conference called by Helms in April, representatives of the CIA and D!A
met in private to try to find common ground. DIA officers repeatedly asserted that they were under
considerable pressure to support the MACV OB, which they considered to be spurious. At a meeting
on 18 March, the head of the DIA's order of battle effort Lt. Colonel Charles Thomann told George
Allen that "we [the DIA] think MACV figures are phony," but "it looks like we'll have to go whole
hog with it." After extensive debate, CIA officials persuaded their DIA peers to oppose the MACV
130 Recounted in Clifford, Counsel to the President, p. 513.
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OB, c\cn if the dispute went all the way to While House for resolutions By early April, both
agencies agreed to subscribe to the position that the order of battle estimates should be revised upward
substantially.1 "
The 1968 order of battle conference was held at the headquarters of the CIA in Langley, Virginia,
from 10-16 April. Like the 1967 "Tower of Babel" conference, the symposium preceded the drafting of
an influential SNIE and therefore was attended by representatives of MACV, CINCPAC, NSA. D1A,
CIA, and the State Department. Soon after the conference opened it became apparent that MACV was
opposed to the proposals of the CIA and DIA to quantify and carry the communist irregular units in the
official OB estimate. The participants swiftly adopted their well-established positions. In light of the
scope and intensity of the communist offensive the CIA, supported by INR. advocated a substantial
increase in the official OB to 440,000-590,000; MACV, supported by CINCPAC, wished to keep the
OB consistent with its pre-Tct assessments of communist military strength and offered an estimate of
278,000-328,000; DIA adopted the midpoint posture of 368,000-468,000.'34 During the heated
debates over the si/e and composition of enemy forces, the CIA and MACV remained intransigent.
The CIA was convinced that the present OB was spurious and was determined not to placate MACV as
it had in the fall of 1967. MACV refused to dev iate from the command position that the present
estimate w as accurate, irrespectiv e of evidence and logic. In one telling exchange, George Allen of the
CIA challenged the assertion of Daniel Graham of MACV that the communist hamlet militia should
not be carried on the OB because it displayed "no significant military potential." George Allen
remembered:
Citing statements from MACV's own reports that a large portion of friendly
casualties resulted from the numerous incidents (patrol clashes and harassing attacks)
attributable to local militia elements. I questioned whether the colonel [Graham]
really believed that the militia posed no significant military threat. "Of course 1
don't believe it." he replied, "but it's the command position and I'm sticking with
it.'" "
Amid this obstinacy the DIA sought to broker a compromise, to no avail. The chief of the DIA
delegation Colonel John Lanterman, after observing discussions between CIA and MACV over
contentious issues, repeatedly devised compromise positions which he thought might be acceptable to
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both sides. Since Lanterman could not formally propose the compromises w ithout the approval of his
superior, General G rover Brown (the chief of production at DIA). Lantcrmun was forced to drive over I"
the Pentagon to seek official sanction. On several occasions Lanterman received Brown's approval for
a compromise position and returned to Lang Icy to present it to the conference only to discover, much
to his chagrin, that in his absence Daniel Graham of MACV had learned of the proposal and personally
telephoned Genera! Brow n at the Pentagon and conv inced him to abandon the compromise. It was a
frustrating ordeal for Lanterman and the DIA analysts. Major John Williams, howev er, found some
humor in the situation. He later recalled:
That is where we came with the story of used to giggle about it. Of the lady who
died and w ent to heav en and saw St. Peter and she said, "I'd like to meet my husband
because he predeceased me." She said, "Well, his name is John Smith." He said,
"Well. Ma'am, wc have got book after book after book of John Smiths here in
heaven." He said, "Tell me something distinctive that 1 can remember about John
Smith, your husband." She said. "Well, I remember on his deathbed that he said if 1
ever made love to another man, he would roll over in his grave." St. Peter said, "you
mean old twirling John Smith."
And wc referred to the DIA during these negotiations as old twirling DIA because
Lanterman w ould go ov er and get one position and come back and Graham had already
called and changed the damn thing.""
The DIA failed to achieve a compromise on the divisive irregular component of the OB, the CIA and
MACV estimates were not reconciled. The CIA refused to submit to the military position as it had in
the past, and deadlock resulted. In the end, the conference agreed to continue to disagree.
Aware thai an influential SNIE on Vietnam was soon to be drafted incorporating a communist OB.
immediately after the conference Graham, in a shrewd bureaucratic maneuver, sent an official MACV
dissent on the CIA OB estimate to Helms. Dissents were normally submitted at the end of the
estimate process: MACV issued the dissent prior to the preparation of the estimate because they saw
the way the wind was blowing, that the CIA would not accept the MACV OB, not now and not in the
future, and wished to get the first position paper on the desk of the DCI and so gain a slight
bureaucratic advantage from framing the terms of the debate.13~ As was expected, BNE adopted the CIA
order of battle estimate of half a million communist forces, and strove to incorporate it into the SNIE
A fierce bureaucratic battle erupted, again pitting the military command against the CIA over enemy
military strength. The outcome of the struggle is unclear. It appears that the spring SNIE on Vietnam
employed the higher CIA OB, but there is some disagreement as to whether Helms "signed off" (that
136 Westmoreland, Deposition, Major John B. Williams, 29 September 1983, fiche no. 438, pp.
37-38.
137 Westmoreland, Deposition, Colonel George M. Hamshcer, 7 November 1983, fichc no. 263,
pp. 178-79.
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is, officially sanctioned) the estimate.; '* hi any e\ ent. the dispute is moot, as after the conference the
White House rejected military estimates and relied primarily on CIA order of battle assessments for
policy formulation.1
The reason lor the White House switch is simple: all the information, from public and private
sources, that the President and his staff received concerning the military situation in Southeast Asia
was at odds with the modest enemy strength estimates supplied by MACV. It was evident that
American forces were being tested by a powerful, tenacious enemy. Sam Adams observed:
Westmoreland said there were eight-four thousand at max committed at Tet. Again,
he is talking about the first two or three w eeks of this offensive. Okay, you can do
this mathematically — this is a joke for me — if it took eighty-four thousand men to
kill fifteen hundred Americans in the first three weeks, how many did it take to kill
the other six or seven thousand through June? In other words, this notion that Tct
stopped on the third week in February is baloney. Tct continued for another four
months, which you can see by American and South Vietnamese casualty statistics.
So this business of eighty-four thousand committed -- okay, thev committed eighty-
four thousand to kill the fifteen hundred GIs, poor bastards, in the first three weeks of
Tet. Who killed all the rest of them?'"40
Indeed, the two months following President Johnson's historic speech of 31 March contained the
fiercest fighting of the Vietnam War, wherein 3.700 American soldiers were killed and 18,000 more
were wounded seriously enough to require hospitalization?41 Moreover, from January to July 1968 the
overall Vietnam casualty rate reached unprecedented historical proportions, surpassing the overall
casualty rate for the Korean War and the Mediterranean and Pacific theaters during World War II.14- The
rising number of body bags arriving from Vietnam to America poignantly contradicted MACV's claims
that the enemy was weak and frail.
The North Vietnamese had responded to Johnson's offer to negotiate by announcing on 3 April that
they would send representatives to Paris for "official conversations." Diplomatic negotiations began in
earnest on 7 May. The United Stales delegations was led by the venerable Averell Harriman and the
diligent Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance. The JCS were against the negotiations, for they
maintained that the communists had been badly bled by Tct and agreed to negotiations onlv to gain
1,8 CIA sources have maintained that Helms signed the SNIE, a claim that Daniel Graham
disputes. Personal interv iew, Daniel O. Graham, 12 October 1992.
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141 White House, Situation Room, Memorandum from Duty Officer to the President, "Casualties:
9 June 1968." DSDUF Files, LBJ Library.
143 Cited in Ronald Spcctor, After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam. New York: Free Pres.v
1993, pp. 317-18. From Office of the Secretary of Defense, Directorate for Statistical Services, DOD
forms 1300, MACV Strength Reports, Army Build-up Progress Reports. Army Center of Military
History. Spector, a former director of Naval History for United States Navy, adds: "Indeed, during the
first half of 1968, the overall Vietnam casualty rate exceeded the overall rate for all theaters in World
War II, w hile the casualty rates for Army and Marine maneuv er battalions was more than four times as
high." p. 55.
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time to regroup and recover. Intelligence support for the American negotiators was prov ided b\ an ad
hoc inter-agency group, which assessed daily battlefield and diplomatic developments. In light of the
recent tendency of the D1A to endorse the bleak CIA appraisals of the war effort, the .ICS were
concerned that the military intelligence agency might deviate from the command position and go
"dov ish." Consequently, when the inter-agency intelligence group was established, the Chiefs took
precautions to prevent the D1A from supporting the civ ilian desire for a diplomatic settlement. A
former DIA analyst recalled:
Expectations were running high at that time, so the JCS picked men with the hardest
noses possible for assignment to the committee. They faked D1A out be ensuring
that their representatives outranked the DIA and service intelligence staffs by at least
one grade. The natural result within the Pentagon was the predominance of the JCS
view — which at the lime was, "We don't want to give those bastards an inch." 4"
General Carroll, aw are that he had already angered the JCS by his refusal to endorse the MACV order of
battle, was not prepared to challenge the Chiefs on this matter. In an effort to mollify tensions
between his agency and the JCS, he chose intelligence analysts that were amenable to the Chiefs' view
on negotiations (that is, hawkish) to represent the DIA in the group.144 It was a revealing act: Carroll
only challenged MACV on the OB w hen presented vv ith overwhelming cv idcncc that the estimate was
erroneous. It had still been a difficult decision for the director of the DIA; he was uncomfortable to
challenge his superiors and reluctant to question the judgment of the command. Yet he had parted with
the military establishment on the order of battle, a courageous, albeit belated, decision. But in May
1968 he was unw illing to challenge the fundamental tenet of American involvement in Southeast Asia.
In May, MACV again lowered the OB, in spite of a large spring offensiv e launched by the
communist forces. Analysts at the CIA and DIA were bewildered; the estimate clearly contradicted
events in the field. Throughout the month, MACV insisted that the offensive was a last gasp effort,
launched in desperation. The DIA was cynical: American casualties from 5 to 18 May were twice that
of the first week of Tel. when, according to the MACV OB, the communist forces were twice as
strong.145 Once more the discrepancy between the enemy OB and American casualties suggested that
the MACV estimate was erroneous.
Analysts at the CIA and DIA were angered by MACV's disregard of COMINT which indicated that
communist infiltration had significantly increased after Tet. The command ignored this intelligence,
refusing to increase the OB accordingly . On 12 June, the CIA and DIA informed the White House that
they were skeptical of the infiltration figures employed by MACV (at the time 6,6(X) per month), and
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suggested that the actual numbers might be twice as high/'" Subsequently, the DIA sent a team of
intelligence analysts to Saigon to investigate why MACV disregarded the new infiltration figures. The
DIA team arrived in Saigon to a cool reception. MACV intelligence officers were far from
cooperative. In a revealing letter to his w ife, dated 24 June 1468, the MACV chief of OB. James
Meaeham wrote:
The types from DIA were here and badgered me endlessly trying to pry the truth from
my sealed lips. They smell a rat but don't really know where to look for it. Tbe\
know we arc falsifying the figures, but can't figure out which ones and how.14
The DIA was unable to sway MACV to accept higher infiltration and a corresponding increase 111
the OB. Agency analysts returned to Washington in frustration; the OB dispute remained unresolved.
After further consultations w ith the CIA, the DIA was convinced the OB should rise, but uncertain by
how much. The matter remained open throughout the summer.
It was an arduous summer for the DIA. The simmering OB dispute made the formulation of
national estimates on Vietnam impractical and complicated relations with MACV. Moreover, the
agency was harshly criticized by Congress and the press. As a result of the perceived failures of the
DIA during the Pueblo capture and the Tct Offensive, the powerful Chairman of the House-
Appropriations Committee, Representative Jamie Whitten of Mississippi, commissioned an
independent investigation of agency operations. Completed in March, the study censured the agency
for belated and timid analysis and inept management.148 Subsequently, the House Appropriations
Committee became a vocal critic of military intelligence operations, demanding that the agency be
reformed and its budget reduced. u" Such criticism w as contagious: during the 1968 campaign for the
Presidency, candidate Richard Nixon repeatedly censured the agency for its failure to predict the threat to
the Pueblo and r owed to abolish it if elected.1"
In early September the CIA and DIA agreed to advocate a thirty percent increase in the estimated
figures for communist infiltration in South Vietnam. The CIA hoped that this agreement would lead
to a parallel agreement on the communist OB. yet the DIA was doubtful of the prospect. This doubt
w as the result of enduring differences between the intelligence agencies and MACV over the current
si/.c and composition of North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam. In brief, MACV wished to
146 White House, Memorandum from Robert Ginsburgh to Wall Rostow, "Infiltration," 12 June
1968. DDRS: 1986-1784. Also see Joint Chiefs of Staff, CM-3399-68. Memorandum from Earle
Wheeler to Walt Rostow, "Evaluation of the Infiltration Memorandum," 13 June 1968. DDRS: 1986-
673.
147 Westmoreland, Joint Exhibit No. 241K, "Correspondence of James Meacham," 24 June 1968,
p. 31047.
148 The two hundred page report, "The Management and Conduct ofMilitary Intelligence
Activities in the Department of Defense." w as prepared by the Survey and Investigation Staff of the
House Appropriations Committee and released to the committee on 14 March 1968.
149 New York Tunes, "House Unit Votes Big Defense Bill," 19 July 1968, (1:7).
450 See Armbristcr, A Matter of Accountability, p. 395.
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classify the majority of these formidable units as as "irregular" forces and thereby exclude them from a
formal listing in the OB through the continued use of the now-notorious "spring methodology." The
DIA scorned this methodology and alternately proposed a significant increase in the guerrilla statistics;
a substantial increase, but not as great as that desired by the CIA (totaling 120,000 and 140.000 to
155,(XX) respectively).151 Neither agency could persuade MACV to accept the proposed revisions.
Furthermore, a w orking group of CIA and DIA analysts w as unable to resolve the differences betw een
the two intelligence organizations.15:
At the end of September, officers from the DIA and MACV met at CINCPAC in Hawaii in an
attempt to establish a common military estimate of the problematic enemy "irregulars." The DIA
successfully lobbied MACV to accept a figure halfway between the September CIA and DIA proposals.
MACV agreed to adopt this figure in return for the acquiescence of the agency to MACV's "spring
methodology." The DIA consented. DIA officials viewed the compromise as a stunning success: the
command had finally agreed to a substantial increase in the irregular forces: a revision from 99,000-
102,000 to 130,000: an objective the agency had long pursued. The CIA, however, was not
impressed. In an irate memorandum of 16 October, Paul Walsh, the director of the CIA's Office of
Economic Research, informed DC! Richard Helms that the agency w ould thereafter end negotiations
with the military organizations over the OB, noting that:
The differences between the two ranges [of the military and the C1A[ for the end of
August 1968 arc quite small (about seven percent). If this were the only factor, 1
would not be concerned. The differences in methodology, validity and consistency
arc, however, highly significant and are likely to result in more divergent numerical
estimates in the future . . . DIA uses a starting base that is demonstrably in error,
and gives, we believe, and inaccurate picture of NVA forces in Administrative Service
units.'5'
151 Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Economic Research, Memorandum for the Record,
"CIA/DIA Session on the Estimate of North Vietnamese Forces in South Vietnam, 12 September
1968. Kcsaris. Vietnam and Southeast Asia. Supplement, reel 6, no. 533.
',6J Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Economic Research, Memorandum for the directors of
the CIA and DIA, "Results of CIA/DIA Working Group on Estimates of NVA Presence in. South
Vietnam." 20 September 1968. Kesaris, Vietnam and Southeast Asia, Supplement, reel 6, no. 555.
153 Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Economic Research, Memorandum for the Record, "CI A-
D!A Meetings on Estimates of NVA Forces in South Vietnam," 16 October 1968. Kcsaris, Vietnam
and Southeast Asia, Supplement, reel 6. no. 617.
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According to Walsh, the irregular agreement was a hollow achievement for the D1A: in order to get
MACV to accept higher figures in the short run the agency had agreed to a spurious methodology
which would yield lower figures in the long run. It was, in many respects, a Pyrrhic victory. 54
For the remainder of the Vietnam conflict, the CIA formulated its own enemy OB, independent of
the Defense Department, although it continued to exchange information w ith the military agencies.
The civilian intelligence analysts had finally concluded that the military command was incapable of
separating its political and operational interests from dispassionate analysis. Ironically, three months
later the DIA would conclude the same and adv ance an OB significant!) lower than that of MACV for
strategic estimates.'" In fact, by February 1969, the Nixon administration, the JCS. and the
Washington intelligence community were so cynical of the MACV OB that they essentially removed
the command from the OB estimative process. At the request of the NSC Ad Hoc Group on Vietnam,
an Inter-Agency Intelligence Committee was established, composed of the DIA, INR. NSA, and the
CIA (the latter chaired the committee), to produce a detailed OB on communist forces (both Viet Cong
and North Vietnamese) in Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam for future NIEs. From the start, the
committee was in agreement that the MACV OB was spurious and proposed a substantial increase in
the estimate, approaching 500.0(Xl Subsequently, the committee produced a putative OB. which
formed the basis for SNIE 14-3-69 in March 1969.I5,; Thus MACV lost its hegemony ov er the
communist OB in Southcas! Asia and the DIA fell into further disrepute.
Final Thoughts
Absent from this tale arc the actions of the USIB, ostensibly the management forum of the
American intelligence community. Its absence should not be surprising. As recounted in prev ious
chapters, the military departments persistently obstructed the bids of McNamara its reorganize the Board
in line the the recommendations of the Joint Study Group to enable it to lake a dynamic role in
directing national espionage operations. Deprived of the structure and authority needed to arbitrate
disputes within the intelligence community, the influence of the USIB was marginal at best. Though
the contentious NIEs and SNIEs on Southeast Asia -- wherein the OB was the "gut" of the estimate --
were prepared under its auspices, in reality the Board was largely idle. It allowed the individual
154 Walsh noted that in the recent past the DIA had spurned the "spring methodology" -- a
gains/loss technique applied to base figure -- as of questionable accuracy and reliability for it relied
disproportionately on "soft" intelligence, but now cast aside its reservations without explanation.
Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Economic Research, Working Papers, "The NVA Presence in
South Vietnam." 21 October 1968. Kcsaris. Vietnam and Southeast Asia. Supplement, reel 6. no.
">04.030
"5 Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum from Richard Helms to Walt Rostow,
"Reassessment of the Number of North Vietnamese Troops in South Vietnam," 10 November 1968.
Kesaris, Vietnam and Southeast Asia, Supplement, reel 6, no. 653.
156 Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Economic Research,"Chronology of the VO'NVA OB
Problem," 22 October 1969. Kcsaris, Vietnam and Southeast Asia. Supplement, reel 6. no. 720.
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intelligence agencies to contest the specifics of estimates and benignly bestowed its imprimatur on the
finished product. Its actions (or, more precisely, inaction) w ere a far cry from that proposed bv the
Joint Study Group and desired by the Secretary of Defense. In 1968, the L'SIB did not direct the
community; rather it supervised through proxy and diffidence.
In late 1966, Sam Adams stirred the embers of the smoldering OB controversy, re-kindling the
doubts of many Washington intelligence analysts. By early 1967, there was a preponderance of
evidence to justify these doubts. Even officers within the military were openly skeptical of the
accuracy of the OB promoted by MACV. The time was ripe for the D!A to dissent. The agency had
long harbored private cynicism regarding the estimates, but lacked the capabilities and will to challenge
them. In 1967 it was opportune for the agency to act: its analytical capabilities were now fully
developed, its analysts were proficient and sure, and -- most importantly -- it had powerful institutional
allies in the CIA, 1NR, and OSA to contest MACV. Then, if ever, the D1A was poised to successfully
assert its contrasting evaluations. Yet once more the agency failed to act. Although many DIA
officials — including Director Carroll himself -- doubled the accuracy of the MACV OB, nonetheless
the agency staunchly defended it in SNIE meetings in the spring of 1967. When enjoined to support
the command, the agency faithfully complied. Colonel Daniel Graham persuaded DIA officer* to
accept an arbitrary ceiling of 300,000 insurgents not through reasoned analysis, but the assertion of
prerogative. Thereafter, the agency, wracked by doubt and indecision, idly watched the 1968 Te!
Offensive unfold. Yet — and this is especially revealing -- ev en after the offensive, w hen confronted
with irrefutable evidence that the MACV OB was in error, the agency delayed nearly eight months in
revising the estimate. Though the agency possessed the insight to rccogni/c that the OB was false, it
lacked the resolution to act.
The irony is that by all accounts the agency's superiors would have been receptive to dissent.
McNamara, tormented by doubt, would likely have been amenable to an increase in the communist
OB, for it would hav e provided him w ith further justification to pursue the negotiations for w hich he
longed. In fact, in 1968 he turned to OSA for dissenting estimates on the state of the conflict.
Similarly, the JCS, intent on forcing Lyndon Johnson to fully mobilize the American armed forces,
would have v iewed an increase in the OB favorably as a means to attain this end. Recall that in the
aftermath of the Tct Offensive they persuaded Westmoreland to request over 200,000 additional troops
to force the President's hand. Of course the request came too late: the United States had already been
dealt a devastating setback. Ycl had the DIA pressed for an increase in the OB earlier, perhaps the
additional troops might have been in South Vietnam by January 1968 or perhaps the American defense
establishment would have been advised of the true magnitude of the communist military threat, and
taken precautions accordingly. Such thoughts arc speculative: the reality is that the DIA failed to
serve the interests of the JCS, the Secretary of Defense, and the nation as a whole. This failing was
the result of an organizational inclination toward pusillanimity and timid leadership. Rawed from
birth, the agency showed itself incapable of surmounting its heritage.
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Epilogue
On 20 January 1969 Richard M. Nixon was inaugurated as the thirty-seventh president of the
United States. Nixon chose Melvin Laird, the former congressman from Wisconsin, to be his
Secretary of Defense. As the ranking Republican on the House Defense Appropriations
Subcommittee, Laird was extremely know ledgeable about the American military intelligence effort,
particularly the problems associated with the DIA. After assuming office, Laird promptly ordered his
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration Robert F. Frochlkc to study present military
intelligence operations and olfer recommendations. On 29 July 1969 Frochlke submitted a report to
the Secretary that was extremely critical of military intelligence, concluding that the management of
Defense Department intelligence activities was fragmented and chaotic. As a result. Laird
commissioned a more expansive study, the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (chaired by Gilbert H.
Fitzhugh), to examine and make recommendations on the organization, management, and operations of
the Department of Defense. While awaiting the completion of this inquiry, Laird transferred the
authority and responsibility for several intelligence functions, notably budgetary oversight and
collection requirements determination, to the office the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Administration in August.1 Due to the failures of the DIA in both areas. Laird made it known that he
expected the resignation of General Joseph Carroll. Carroll reluctantly complied, and resigned in
September 1969.' Carroll's departure marked the end of an era for the DIA: its founder, first director
and two Democratic administrations lay in its w ake. An era of uncertainty and retrenchment beckoned.
After assuming office, the new director of the DIA Lt. General Donald V. Bennett immediately
announced yet another internal reorganization of the agency, intended to improve its strategic
intelligence capabilities in support of national policy planning.1 The reorganization was a belated
response to persistent complaints from policymakers that the agency failed to prov ide intelligence
relev ant to their concerns. Laird w as unimpressed. Frustrated by the deliberate pace of reform, in the
fall of 1970 the Secretary of Defense attempted to modify the DIA charter so that the director of the
DIA would report directly to him, rather than the JCSC Mirroring the bureaucratic struggle of 1961.
the military leadership fiercely resisted this revision and insisted that the agency respond first and
1
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foremost to the JCS. in the end, they prevailed, in matters other than domestic intelligence and
counterintelligence activities, the chain of command continued to run from the Secretary of Defense
through the JCS to the DIA. After examining the dispute and its resolution, the historian of the D1A
Dcanc Allen concluded: "The situation remained business as usual."5
Accordingly, the national intelligence requirements of OSD continued to be neglected by the
agency. In desperation, on 5 November 1971 Laird established an Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense for the management of intelligence
resources, programs, and activities.'' The creation of the post was an explicit rebuke of the DIA. The
Secretary, for all intents and purposes, resurrected the position of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations: an office (that is, OSO) that the DIA had replaced on 31 October 1961. It was the
final irony of this tale: the impotence of the agency was so great that the very organization the DIA
was created to supplant was restored. The fears of the critics of the agency had become reality: the
agency had evolved not into an effective manager, but simply another layer of duplication. Indeed, the
agency perpetuated the very faults it had been created to rectify -- redundancy and inefficiency." Far
from being the adjudicator of the military intelligence community, the DIA was in fact its clerk.
In creating the DIA eight years earlier, Robert MeNamara had two objectives: to improve the
quality of strategic intelligence estimates and provide central management for military intelligence
operations. As the foregoing chapters have demonstrated, the Secretary of Defense was thwarted in
both objectives. The military departments repeatedly resisted substantive reform of the L'SIB: the
centerpiece of the Joint Study Group recommendations.8 Consequently, the NIE process remained
contentious: marked by redundancy and vulnerability to political and bureaucratic influences, as
demonstrated during the Vietnam conflict." In its 1970 report, the Blue Ribbon Defense Pane!
concluded:
It is paradoxical that DIA cannot develop a capability to perform its assigned
functions while the Military Departments, which provide a large proportion of DIA
personnel, maintain the required capabilities to produce intelligence estimates — or
more properly, threat assessments -- which are crucial to decisions on w eapons
5 Dcanc Allen, DIA, p. 201.
6 Deane Allen, DM, pp. 203-205.
7 Church Committee (I), p. 349.
8 Regarding the continued presence of the military departments on the USIB, in 1968 General
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systems research and development. DIA is charged with the responsibility, but has
never been organized to discharge it. The Military Departments produce such
estimates and the Air Force, at least, intends to enlarge its capability.10
Similarly, the DIA proved to be incapable of effectively managing military intelligence operations.
It simply lacked the authority, resources, and will to challenge the entrenched military institutions. In
1968 the House Appropriations Committee concluded:
The committee is convinced that certain intelligence operations are overstaffed,
duplicative activities arc being carried out, and there is general inadequacy of
management. There appeared to be far too many separate operation units or
intelligence organizations, too many layers of authority, and too much time,
personnel, and money is being spent on accumulating a wide variety of information
of no immediate concern and of doubtful value.''
The compromise that created the DIA — that it report to the Secretary of Defense through the JCS --
weakened the authority of the agency to such an extent that it was unable to contest the established
military organizations. The demands of the military leadership were more immediate and therefore
more compelling: consequently, the agency tended to be more amenable to the requirements of the JCS
than the Secretary of Defense. Assigned miscellaneous and sundry tasks, the agency lacked a defined
mission and a clear sense of purpose. Staffed largely w ith military officers who w ere acutely aw are of
their reliance upon the armed services for future assignment and promotion, DIA intelligence analysts
displayed a propensity to acquiesce to the operational preferences of the military departments and the
U&S Commands. Diffident leadership, unwilling to assert agency prerogatives and contest
organizational jurisdictions, contributed to the enduring impotence of the DIA.
For the failures of the DIA. many share the blame: the chieftains of the military departments,
contemptuous and intransigent; the JCS, myopic and politic; and the leadership of the DIA. diffident
and equivocal. Yet Robert NlcNamara is particularly culpable. As the Secretary of Defense it was his
responsibility to ensure that the national interest prevailed over organizational self-interest; that
defense intelligence prevailed over military intelligence. As the Secretary himself once observed:
Every hour of every day the Secretary is confronted by a conflict between
the national interest and the parochial interests of particular industries,
individual services, or local areas. He cannot avoid controversy in the
whole range of issues which dominate the headlines if he is to place the
interest of the many above the interest of the few. And vet it is the
national interest, above all, which he has sworn to serve.'"
'c Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (Fitzhugh Panel), Report to the President and the Secretary of
Defense on the Department ofDefense. 1 July 1970. GPO. 1970, p. 23.
11 USC (90/2) House Appropriations Committee. Hearings, p. 143.
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By his own standards, McNamara failed to fulfill his responsibility.
The consequences were grave. Erroneous intelligence during the Cuban missile crisis took the
nation to the brink of war. Armed conflict — perhaps a nuclear exchange - w as a\ crted largely by
intuition and chance. In Vietnam, this luck was absent. Inaccurate military intelligence, prejudiced by
political and operational influences, contributed to American intervention and escalation in Southeast
Asia. The DIA could not "ride herd" (in the memorable words of Admiral Samuel Frankel) over the
military agencies; could not consolidate, integrate, and coordinate the military intelligence community.
Consequently, strategic intelligence operations were fragmented, duplicative, and frequently
contradictory. They played no small role in pushing the United States into the quagmire of Vietnam,
destroying the lives and careers of countless people and poisoning the American polity. In the end.
McNamara was consumed by the war, his dream of controlling the Pentagon shattered.
It was, McNamara said much later, the system which had created the war. Left unspoken, how ever,
was the knowledge that he had helped create the system and ultimately failed to control it.
2 6£
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